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Cologne, Germany Masduki
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Abbreviations

ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Indonesian Armed Forces)
AIBD	Asia Pacific Institute for Broadcasting Development
AJI	*Aliansi Jurnalis Independen* (Alliance of Independent Journalists)
ANTARA	Name of Indonesian News Agency
APBN	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara* (Indonesian National Budget)
ARD	*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Joint Organization of Germany's Regional Public Broadcasters)
ARSSI	*Asosiasi Radio Siaran Swasta Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Private Radio Station)
ATVSI	*Asosiasi Televisi Swasta Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of Private Television)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BIKN	*Badan Informasi dan Komunikasi Nasional* (National Information and Communication Board)
BLU	*Badan Layanan Umum* (State Social Service Agency)
BOD	Board of Directors
BOS	Board of Supervisors
BP3N	*Badan Pertimbangan dan Pengendalian Penyiaran Nasional* (National Broadcasting Advisory Board and Controlling Agency)
BPK	*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan* (Public Financial Auditor)
BRV	*Bataviasche Radio Vereeniging* (Jakarta based Radio Club/Association)

BUMN	*Badan Usaha Milik Negara* (State-owned Corporation)
CAMECO	Catholic Media Council
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CIPG	Center for Innovation, Policy and Governance
CPB	Corporation for Public Broadcasting
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEWAS	*Dewan Pengawas* (Supervisory Board of RRI/TVRI)
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (House of Representatives or National Parliament)
DW	Deutsche Welle
EU	European Union
FCC	Federal Communication Commission
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FoME	*Forum Medien und Entwicklung* (Forum Media and Development)
GOLKAR	*Golongan Karya* (The ruling political party during Suharto era)
HKK	Hoso Kanri Kyoku (Japan Military Radio in Indonesia)
IAMCR	International Association for Media and Communication Research
IDR	Indonesian Rupiah
IFES	International Foundation of Electoral Systems
IJTI	*Ikatan Jurnalis Televisi Indonesia* (Indonesian Association of TV Journalists)
IMLPC	Indonesian Media Law and Policy Center
KIDP	*Koalisi Independen untuk Demokratisasi Penyiaran* (Indonesian Coalition for Broadcasting Freedom)
KNRP	*Koalisi Nasional Reformasi Penyiaran* (National Coalition for Broadcasting Reform)
KPI	*Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian Broadcasting Commission)
KTVPI	*Komunitas Televisi Publik Indonesia* (Indonesian Public Television Community)
LPPL	*Lembaga Penyiaran Publik Lokal* (Local Public Service Broadcasting)
MCIT	Ministry of Communication and Informatics of Indonesia
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MNC	*Media Nusantara Citra* (Indonesian Media Company since 1997)
MPPI	*Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society)
NGO	Not-for-Profit Organization
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NIROM	*Netherlands Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij* (Netherlands Indies Radio Broadcasting Company)

NKRI	*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* (The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)
NORDIC	Group of Countries in Northern Europe
NPR	National Public Radio
Pancasila	*Lima Asas* (Five Indonesia's Ideological Platforms)
PBS	Public Broadcasting Service
PDIP	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle
Perjan	*Perusahaan Jawatan or Perusahaan Djawatan* (Government-Owned Corporation of Indonesia)
Persero	*Perseroan Terbatas* (Private or State-Owned Corporation)
PKMBP	*Pusat Kajian Media dan Budaya Populer* (Center for the Study of Media and Popular Culture)
PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (Prosperous Justice Party)
PPP	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party)
PPRK	*Perikatan Perhimpunan Radio Ketimuran* (Federation of Eastern Radio Societies)
PRSSNI	*Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Private Broadcast Radio Association)
PSB	Public Service Broadcasting
PSM	Public Service Media
RAI	*Radio Televisione Italiana* (Italian National Broadcasting Company)
RIPE	Revisionary Interpretations of the Public Enterprise in Media
RPJP	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang* (Long-Term Development Plan)
RPLPP	*Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik* (Indonesian Public Broadcasting Clearing House)
RRI	*Radio Republik Indonesia* (Radio of the Republic Indonesia)
RSPD	*Radio Siaran Pemerintah Daerah* (Local Government-owned Radio)
RTRI	*Radio dan Televisi Republik Indonesia* (Radio and Television of the Republic of Indonesia)
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
Sendenbu	Propaganda Agency of Japanese Military Power in Indonesia
SET	Sains Estetika dan Teknologi
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SPS	*Serikat Perusahaan Pers* (Newspaper Publishers Union)
SR-MDO	Swedish Radio Media Development Office
SRV	*Solosche Radio Vereeniging* (Solo/Surakarta based Community Radio)
Tri Prasetya	*Tiga Komitmen Angkasawan RRI* (Three Precepts of RRI Broadcasters)
TVRI	*Televisi Republik Indonesia* (Television of the Republic Indonesia)

UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UPT	*Unit Pelaksana Teknis* (Technical Working Unit of Government)
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WJS	World of Journalism Study
WRTC	World Radio and Television Council
ZDF	*Zweite Deutsche Fernsehen* (Germany's Public Television)

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Studying Post-Authoritarian Public Broadcasters

The fall of communist political regimes in Eastern Europe in the 1980s and authoritarian political systems in Asia in the 1990s brought about changes in media systems, including a shift from the state-owned broadcasting model to the public service broadcasting (PSB) model (In this book, the term PSB is used to refer to either "public service broadcasting" or "public service broadcaster".). Since the late 1980s, many post-communist and post-authoritarian countries—the so-called transitional regimes—introduced PSB systems to replace existing government broadcast systems (e.g., Estonia, Macedonia, and Mongolia as well as countries in the Middle East and North Africa) through policy reform (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Raboy 1995; Smith 2012). This change was also driven by pro-democratic actors in the global arena, who sought to ensure that new governments adopted a liberal democratic media system (Banarjee and Seneviratne 2006; Harding 2015).

Taking part of the growing debate on media transformation and PSB adoption in post-authoritarian societies, this study explores the way in which PSB was legally introduced and implemented as the Indonesian political system transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy. The struggle to adopt PSB during the early period of political reformation that followed the resignation of Suharto (1998–2002) is discussed

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herein, followed by an exploration of the obstacles faced by former state-owned broadcasters, namely Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI), as Indonesian PSB providers between 2002 and 2017. This study also explores broadcasting system models under both the Dutch and Japanese colonial regimes (1930s–1940s) through the end of the New Order regime, covering both the Sukarno and Suharto eras (1945–1998), as the historical backdrop of the arrival of the PSB model in Indonesia.

In this book, the term post-authoritarian society refers to a society that is experiencing a political transition that is defined by the absence of an autocratic regime and the presence of a new, but unstable, government. As argued by O'Donnell and Philippe (1986), this begins with the fall of dictatorial power and ends with the acceptance of democracy. In this climate, media policies are uncertain, either because they are difficult to apply or because every stakeholder wants his or her own rules. As described by O'Donnell and Philippe (1986), in such a society, the policy-making model shifts from linear (with the government being dominant) to circular (with local and global actors involved in the policy-making).[1] Policy creation is also driven by the length of time the former political regime held power and by the state ideology. It is also shaped by the history and political culture of the transitional nation (Carnegie 2010).

Looking at post-authoritarian politics, this book frames Indonesia's PSB adoption initiative as an instant policy driven by the euphoria of welcoming a democratic media system, one without roots in a pro-public broadcast system in the country's colonial and authoritarian periods. Such a picture is typically found in post-authoritarian states in Asia and Africa, including Zimbabwe (Mano 2016), India (Mohapatra and Das 2014), and Bangladesh (Rahman 2014). However, given the long history of Western colonialism (up to the 1940s) and authoritarianism (1966–1998) in Indonesia, investigating the importation of what is globally perceived as a Western European PSB model in the country is challenging.

This study is inspired by the broad hypotheses of Hallin and Mancini (2004) and Voltmer (2013) regarding the influences of political changes and media transformation when a PSB is the primary form of political intervention from government and parliament. In accordance with the four indicators of media systems developed by Hallin and Mancini (media market structure, political parallelism, professionalism in journalism, and the state role in media), this study explores two main

areas of inquiry and conceptualization. First, it addresses PSBs and political systems (e.g., political parallelism and the degree of state control over media). This includes a debate on the strong links between the political system and PSBs (policy and governance). Past studies on media reform in Asia have confirmed that the influence of political forces is much more significant than that of economic or technological forces (Im 2006, 2011; Kwak 1999; Lin 2012).

Second, the study is concerned with concepts of PSB policy and institutional component. Particular focus is given to four aspects: remit, ownership, structure, and funding. The findings and assumptions of past studies of PSBs in transitional democracies are examined from a scholarly perspective. Several studies of media and PSB systems (e.g., Hallin and Mancini 2004; Hanretty 2007; McCargo 2012; Raboy 1997; Voltmer 2013) are used as points of departure. In this book, the author considers the four components not only as categorical concepts but also as research objects. This study tracks the changes and continuity of Indonesia's former state-controlled broadcasters as they transitioned into public-oriented service channels.

Following the fall of communist regimes worldwide in the late 1980s, scholars began paying attention to the strong ties between political changes and broadcasting systems, focusing on the trend of PSB creation and crises in eastern and central Europe (Jakubowicz 2006; Moe 2008; Mendel 2000; Smith 2012). To a lesser degree, studies have examined the adoption of BBC-like models of PSB policy and governance in Asia and Africa and their failures following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the late 1990s (DW Akademie 2014; Raboy 1995; Thomson 2013; Voltmer 2008, 2012).

Nevertheless, systematic assessment of PSB reform in Southeast Asia is still limited. Previous investigations have rarely applied a broad perspective to the interplay of politics and PSB invention in post-authoritarian settings (Rahman 2014; Tangkitvanich 2008). Voltmer (2013), for example, examined the PSB systems in countries that transitioned to multi-party systems from one-party dictatorships during the third wave of democracy. This does not include PSB implementation in Indonesia, despite its post-authoritarian political regime.

The PSB concept was initially used to describe broadcast systems established in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s (Syvertsen and Moe 2009). The first PSB model emerged in Western Europe after World War I; this was the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), established in 1922 in

the United Kingdom. The BBC model was influential when it began regular television service in 1936 (Blumler 1992). After several decades, the BBC model was developed into a variety of models in the Global North and Global South. The BBC is considered a classic model, and it has been adopted by established and new democracies outside Europe, such as Japan, Canada, and Thailand. During the 1930s and 1940s, most European states adopted similar public channels, with radio as their stable platform. The widespread dissemination of television after World War II expanded broadcasts to this platform (van Dijk et al. 2005).

However, as will be discussed in this book, the author agrees with Voltmer (2013) and Thomson (2013): The Western European concept of media or the PSB system might be difficult to export to other political and cultural contexts. Legacies of tyrannical politics, including paternalistic culture (Romano 2003), clientelism (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002), and the rise of oligarchy in media industry ownership (Winters 2014), have delayed the application of PSB systems. Moreover, the cultural shift toward neoliberal thinking and the reliance on free market competition for broadcasting called the PSB concept and state policies into question.

Evaluations of new PSBs in 'the fragile states' of postwar Africa have found limited support from existing political regimes (Putzel and Zwan 2005). Two reports, entitled 'Looking for Shortcuts, Assistance to and Development of PSB in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania' (Thomson 2013) and 'Public Service Media in the Divided Society, Relic or Renaissance?' (Harding 2015), confirm the failure of PSBs in the African region, despite media development projects. PSBs in Indonesia may follow the experiences of these 'fragile states.'

As with many developing and Global South countries, Indonesia is categorized as a post-authoritarian regime (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005; Zakaria 1997). It is an Asian country that experienced repressive political rule under both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes (1945–1998), and the fall of Suharto's regime marked the beginning of the ongoing reform era. Before the country declared its independence on August 17, 1945, two colonial powers (Dutch and Japanese) deployed an autocratic model of broadcast systems; this was adopted by subsequent political regimes. For example, both Sukarno and Suharto (1945–1998) managed RRI and TVRI as state agencies, and both RRI and TVRI were used as mouthpieces of the two regimes. The transition to a PSB model in 2002 ended

this period of autocracy and made Indonesia the first country in Southeast Asia to adopt a PSB system (Green 2013).

On December 28, 2002, Indonesia formally introduced a public broadcast system through the Broadcast Law of 2002; thus, the ownership of RRI and TVRI shifted from the government to the public. For example, Article 14 of the Law stipulates that Indonesian PSBs are legal entities established by the state; they are independent, politically neutral, and non-commercial, and they aim to benefit society. Article 14 also states that PSBs are to be governed by two public bodies, i.e., the supervisory board and executive board, partially adapting the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) model used in the United Kingdom. Two other articles regulate mix-funding, which may come from licensing fees, state subsidies, donations, advertising, and commercial activities.

Nevertheless, since transitioning to the PSB model between 2002 and 2017, there has been no significant change in RRI and TVRI management in Indonesia. As with the formerly state-administered channels of former communist states in Eastern Europe or in the former postwar countries in Africa, the change is merely superficial; these broadcasters remain autocratic agencies (Ndolu 2009; Pippidi 2003; Smith 2012). Unlike privately owned channels, RRI and TVRI are still significantly influenced by the state.

These problems have emerged from a series of political interventions in public sectors and commercialization of those sectors (Intani 2012; Nugroho et al. 2012). For example, between 2000 and 2011, political intervention occurred in the selection of TVRI's supervisory board and in the formulation of its operational policies. The most heated conflict between TVRI's supervisory board and politicians occurred in early 2014, when members of parliament delayed the 2015 national budget for TVRI and dismissed all the elected board members. In addition, despite the existence of new supervisory and executive boards in Jakarta, the management of regional stations remains unchanged.

The relationship between the state and media (Steemers 2016), particularly the changing policy of acting governments, determines the development of PSBs. During the 1990s and 2000s, Indonesia's new political authorities produced policies that favored a liberal media system (Heryanto 2003; Nugroho et al. 2012; Kristiawan 2012). Two pillars of post-authoritarian media laws were enacted: in 1999, Law No. 40 on the Press, and in 2002, Law No. 32 on Broadcasting. With these two laws, media liberalization is indicated by the limit of state control over

the media industry, leading to the emergence of free market competition and the rapid growth of private broadcasters. Lim (2012, p. 1) described this situation as 'the league of thirteen,' wherein small media oligarchs owning thirteen media groups dominated the national media landscape and marginalized public service broadcasters.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, with the absence of press bans and publication licenses, the Indonesian media structure shifted from a system of total state control to one of limited free market competition. Meanwhile, a monopoly in television ownership developed rapidly, driven by the Broadcast Law of 2002 (which heavily favored capitalist players) (Masduki 2007). By 2016, private television broadcasters dominated the Indonesian media landscape, providing entertainment broadcasts and receiving huge amounts of advertising revenue as funding. Consequently, RRI and TVRI have become drastically less popular as sources of cultural education and information (Sudibyo 2004).

Reacting to the above crisis, between 2014 and 2017, the Indonesian parliament attempted to draft a special law (Radio–Televisi Republik Indonesia) to regulate these media. Two drafts were produced, one from parliament and one from civil society organizations (CSOs). However, given the lack of awareness from politicians and government officials, this initiative has remained solely 'on paper.' Despite broad public support and encouragement, there has been no major progress as of 2019. There is uncertainty in the formation and development of PSBs in Indonesia. To understand this situation, it is necessary to map out the struggle to adopt the PSB institution and its policy and to provide an in-depth look at the Indonesian political systems that lie at the core of the problem.

By looking at four broadcast components: remit, ownership, structure, and funding (Hanretty 2007) in the history of autocratic and post-autocratic Indonesia, this book seeks to revisit the argument that political change brings change to a real PSB system. In particular, this study seeks to revisit the PSB models promoted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), and DW Akademie (2014) with Indonesia as its case study.

Taking Indonesian public broadcasting policy as its core example, this book also seeks to revisit the findings of Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) that the media transformation model in post-communist or post-autocratic societies is mimetic and atavistic. At the end, this study will re-discuss what Voltmer (2012, 2013) termed the 'hybrid model' of state and public driven media systems in post-authoritarian societies.

The questions that will be answered by this book are: What is the public service broadcasting model in Indonesia's post-authoritarian politics? Why has the PSB system in the country is not worked? What systematic features hinder PSB policy and its execution?

In response to these general questions, Indonesia will be the case study and this book will focus on three key questions.

First, from its long history of authoritarian political systems in the colonial and independence eras (1930s–1990s), what were the models of Indonesian broadcasters and to what extent has Indonesia experienced a pro-public broadcast system? Second, during the struggle of PSB adoption in the post-repressive period (1998–2002), how was PSB policy constructed in the Broadcast Law? The answer to this question relies on analysis of the contributions of stakeholders behind the legislation of Broadcast Law, which recognized PSB, as well as identification of the interest groups involved in the policy production and analysis of the formal output of the law. Third, how have a mix of political structure and culture (Almond and Verba 1989) contributed to the failed adoption of true PSB in Indonesia between 2002 and 2017? To address these questions, this book uses historical data, policy documents, semi-structured interviews, and field visits to RRI/TVRI offices.

1.2 Argument of the Book

The significance of this book lies in its contribution to global studies of the PSB concept in the transitional states of Asia, which are still rare. In particular, this study benefits academics by identifying four patterns of PSBs (remit, ownership, structure, and funding) in previously authoritarian states, clarifying the conceptual framework developed by Raboy (1997), Hallin and Mancini (2004), Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), and Voltmer (2013) with its focus on PSB adoption in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

This book serves as an academic effort to identify the model of Indonesia's PSB system based on its policies and practices in two periods of media and political reform (1998–2002 and 2002–2017). It also clarifies the transition from state-owned broadcasting to a PSB model, influencing both political and cultural structures (Almond and Verba 1989). I selected Indonesia because it is my homeland and has experienced an authoritarian political system (1966–1998) that transitioned to a liberal system (1998–present). The 1998–2017 period is considered the golden era of change in

contemporary Indonesian politics (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005) and media systems (Sudibyo and Patria 2013).

In this book, I argue that despite the enthusiasm to transform former state broadcasters in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the idea of adopting a PSB system in Indonesia has been mission impossible. From its governance, Indonesia's PSB is legally a hybridization (Chadwick 2013; Raboy 1997; Voltmer 2013) of state-oriented and public-oriented systems. Referring to the PSB typologies of Hallin and Mancini (2004) and DW Akademie (2014), Indonesia's PSB is still transitioning to public-oriented media. I found that it remained state-oriented broadcasting during 2002–2018.

By tracking four aspects of public broadcasting institution (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), this study recognizes the global trend of PSB adoption in transitional democracies. Yet, it also provides contrasting evidence of the legacy of autocratic politics and its interference in PSB operations.

Historically, the struggle to adopt a public-driven broadcast system and its practice in Indonesia was influenced by various factors. The desire for a democratic and pluralistic media system after the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 was accompanied by an absence of experience with operating PSB channels. This resulted in the 2002 law only weakly providing for PSBs.

The interaction of pro-public versus pro-state interests in drafting of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 resulted in a compromise to formally elect RRI/TVRI as PSB providers, without any detailed direction for institutional reform. Between 2002 and 2017, the implementation of a PSB system faced severe obstacles, including clientelism and paternalism and strong pressure from the media oligarchs that dominated policy so as to maintain their control of frequency allocation and advertising income.

Unlike the western European experience of PSB policy and its development, which was driven by democratic corporatism (Hallin and Mancini 2004), the introduction and implementation of PSB in Indonesia have dealt with the liberal media landscape and legacy of past autocratic politics. A mixture of media oligarchs with a culture of clientelism among the politicians and elites of RRI/TVRI delayed the creation of true PSBs. The orientation of serving government interests between 2005 and 2017 and the dominant use of state-controlled budget and state-run personnel represent choices favorable to media elites that were close to the government as their 'traditional father,' not to the public. The

lack of experience with pro-public interest media institutions in the colonial and post-colonial eras (1930s–1990s) led to a choice to continue a state-owned broadcast management.

This book provides another example of the argument that, although PSB adoption is linked to the global tendency to choose a liberal media system in former autocratic regimes, a PSB in a given country may experience unique conditions. Indonesia's PSBs may contribute to the growing investigation of former government-run broadcasters' reform in the Global South, drawing a more complex picture of Indonesia as a post-colonial, post-authoritarian regime in Southeast Asia. For policymakers, this study has significant implications for the drafting of a public service broadcast law and seeking a new way to create a PSB policy and governance that is appropriate for post-authoritarian societies. To illustrate, the Indonesian parliament has been working on a PSB law since 2014, and this study provides evidence and serves as a potential guide to creating a detailed law. For media advocates, this study updates a macro-analysis of PSBs that can help them advocate to lawmakers.

For global media development agencies, such as UNESCO, this book provides insight and serves as a tool for formulating PSB assistance in transitional societies, in both policy design and advancing media management. Finally, this study and its follow-up publication will enrich the systematic views of both PSB policy and governance in Indonesia, generating awareness that will benefit future investigations.

1.3 Methodology and Data

This study applies the qualitative method for several reasons. First, this method is the most appropriate tool for studies that aim to explore people's subjective views and experiences in natural settings (Creswell 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Glesne 1999), including their interpretations of those experiences. In seeking a deep understanding of the social and political situations behind the construction of PSBs in post-autocratic politics, an examination of policy stakeholders' point of view (van den Bulck 2012) is employed. Second, the qualitative method also allows the study of PSB systems in depth and in detail. This contrasts with the quantitative method, which attempts to isolate a detail and specific issue and uses numbers and/or statistical correlation. Third, this method has conventionally been applied in the social sciences (Brennen 2013).

Concerning the study choice to explore Indonesian PSB, a case study approach was selected. Case study is a research strategy that focuses on a single organization, event, system, or group. Creswell (2003) classified case study as one of five approaches used in the qualitative method, the others being phenomenology, narrative, ethnography, and grounded theory. Hence, in this study, the author utilizes numerous sources of Indonesian broadcast studies to understand the larger issue of post-authoritarian PSBs.

Taking Indonesia as a special case, this study also uses the media policy approach previously adopted by several studies of media policy (e.g., Fan 2011; Syvertsen and Moe 2009).[2] The policy analysis examines how a specific policy is developed and its impact on the media landscape, with a focus on PSB. With regard to this approach, the author divides the relationship into two levels. First is the relationship between the government, parliament, and PSB elites. Second is the level of all agencies (such as political parties, media professionals, and media advocates) in one analytical framework. Aside from analyzing existing regulatory documents, this study delves deeply into the history and models of national broadcasters in Indonesia across all political periods.

To gather empirical materials, this study conducted the following activities. First, semi-structured interviews were conducted with people involved in the drafting of Indonesia's two broadcast laws (Law No. 24/1997 and Law No. 32/2002). Second, documents such as government decrees, minutes of policy meetings, and RRI/TVRI's annual reports were collected. Third, for validation purposes, I conducted field visits to several RRI/TVRI offices as well as historical sites in and outside of Jakarta, Indonesia.

To provide historical background on early Indonesian broadcasting, a combination of field visits to historical sites, interviews, and document analysis was essential for exploring the legacies of the colonial-, Sukarno-, and Suharto-era media systems. It is important to note that both the semi-structured interviews and document collection served as this study's primary tools for material collection, while direct visits to broadcasting and historical sites were used for complementary purposes.

In line with Lindlof (1995), semi-structured interviews were used to learn things about PSB systems that could not be directly provided by observation or documents.[3] Between May and December 2017, thirty-five informants were interviewed from two groups. First, informants

providing information about the drafting of the PSB provision in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, which according to Majone (1992) consisted of government and politicians as policymakers; media associations, including RRI/TVRI executives; commercial media owners; international media development agencies; and academics, and/or media activists. Second were informants providing information about the implementation of the PSB policy.

In line with the research questions described above, the interview questions follow three different issues.[4] The first issue is the models of broadcast governance in colonial and post-colonial history of Indonesia. Second is the drafting process of the 2002 Broadcast Law as a social situation reflecting the competition of interests between state officials, RRI/TVRI elite, political parties, media activists, and the general public within the legislative house (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). In this step, informants involved in the debates to draft the PSB articles of the Broadcast Law between 1998 and 2002 were interviewed. They include politicians in *Komisi I* (Commission I) of Indonesian parliament active at that time, officials of the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MCIT), Indonesia and international media advocates, commercial radio and television associations, former RRI/TVRI supervisory or executive boards and some of their senior staffs.[5]

Third is the implementation of the Law between 2002 and 2017, with strong emphasis on four PSB elements: remit, ownership, structure, and funding. In this step, I interviewed informants who were engaged in the actual process through which RRI/TVRI transitioned from state to public-oriented services. These included members of parliament who had the power to define and execute PSB policies, particularly to decide the amount and allocation of the state budget, to appoint supervisory bodies, and to monitor performance; the RRI/TVRI executives who legally received the mandate to implement the PSB provision; and high officials of MCIT, who represented the ruling government in accelerating transformation of the ownership and structure of RRI/TVRI from state to public.

Moreover, to reveal the historical and other factors influential on the formation and implementation of PSB systems in Indonesia, informants such as media policy observers and the broadcast historian were also interviewed. Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with representatives of several international aid agencies in Indonesia (e.g.,

UNESCO media consultants; USAID/Internews; Open Society Foundation/Tifa Foundation) to exercise global influence on Indonesian broadcasting policy reform.[6]

In addition, concerned that some potential respondents were perhaps not familiar with public broadcast systems, the author briefly explained how PSB systems operate in developed countries such as in United Kingdom, United States of America, or Japan before collecting their viewpoints about their perceptions of Indonesian PSB. This was intended to provide respondents with a general idea about the public broadcast issue.

Document collection is used by this project because documents largely provide both primary and additional information that can support or be further explored in both observation and semi-structured interviews.[7] For this study, these documents are essential for tracking the historical backdrop of Indonesian broadcast models since the colonialism era to 1998, and the current profile of RRI/TVRI. It also provides specific details to confirm data from other sources and helps identify patterns in PSB policy-making.

In between 2016 and 2017, this study collected about 238 primary and secondary documents that can be categorized in eight sectors: First is 30 parliamentary papers: the full reports of the legislation of Broadcast Bill No. 24/1997 and Broadcast Bill No. 32/2002 as well as some proposed broadcasting acts drafted between 1998 and 2002, including new ideas for RRI/TVRI. Second is 74 documents from RRI/TVRI offices: annual reports and books on RRI/TVRI performances, statements of the supervisory boards for the period of 2016–2017: for instance, book *55 Tahun RRI*; and *TVRI: Towards Digital*, etc.

Third is 76 documents of academic examinations of Broadcast Act No. 24/1997 and No. 32/2002 (PhD and master's theses from several Indonesian universities examining RRI/TVRI issue; published papers of academia and media activists concerning government decrees, such as Decrees No. 11, 12 and 13/2005; and printed books/reports on RRI/TVRI in the Sukarno and Suharto powers). Fourth is 33 public statements from media activists about RRI/TVRI performance during broadcast legislation (1998–2004); reports of civil society organizations to guide politicians when drafting media laws; public statements from private media owners on their concern to RRI/TVRI or broadcasting at large.

Fifth is 22 official reports of media development agencies in promoting democratic media system, in particular the PSB system in Indonesia

between 1998 and 2005. For instance, this included comprehensive description of the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) projects to shift RRI toward PSB; a partial report by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) on its project promoting media pluralism; and Internews reports on assistance drafting media laws. Sixth is 34 documents from government offices, mainly from MCIT: annual reports of the ministry as well as government decrees on RRI/TVRI management (both draft and final texts produced between 2010 and 2015). The author also found a compilation of MCIT's policy on the entire post-Suharto Indonesian broadcasting system.

The seventh type of document collected for this study is journalistic publications, including the public statements of politicians—such as Hayono Isman (former Deputy Chair, Commission I), Meutia Hafid, Arief Suditomo, Evita Nursanty, and Ramadhan Pohan—on RRI/TVRI-related issues. This study also collected online statements from media advocates, several news websites' coverage of politicians' debates regarding RRI/TVRI. Eighth is photographic documents on historical RRI sites; old photographs of Soloschee Radio Vereniging (SRV), the first radio station in Surakarta, Central Java; and statues of such RRI initiators as Abdurrahman Saleh, etc.

To ensure the reliability and validity of documentary materials after collection, all documents were reviewed from the perspective that they are socially produced and created under specific contexts and by particular bodies. I checked the accuracy and authenticity of the materials by reading and interpreting documents with critical eyes. In order to avoid inaccurate reports, I cross-checked documents with each other. My engagement in initiating broadcast reform since the 2000s, for instance, at the Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik [Indonesian Public Broadcasting Clearing House or RPLPP] and as an independent advisor for RRI helped me access and clarify the documents on RRI/TVRI's history and development in the 2000s and 2010s.

To confirm the findings regarding Indonesian PSB (remit, ownership, structure, and funding) from semi-structured interviews and document collection, this study conducted field observations in two areas. First, the management offices of RRI/TVRI, both in Jakarta and in other important cities, were visited. The objective of this visit was to confirm the broadcasters' actual condition. In addition, I visited parliament and MCIT's offices to see policy-making activities. I also visited and actively participated in several public forums on RRI/TVRI and media law that

were organized by the Department of Communications at Universitas Indonesia between October and December 2017.

In detail, during field research in 2017, I observed the following sites: the RRI/TVRI central offices in Jakarta and the RRI/TVRI branches in Surakarta, Yogyakarta, and Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan. The selection of these offices followed the 'snowball technique' for data collection, beginning with my visit to the two media headquarters in Jakarta and followed by me being recommended to visit the above regional stations. In addition, I also visited several historical RRI sites, a statue of Abdurrahman Saleh on the Universitas Indonesia campus, and the former SRV buildings in downtown Surakarta, Central Java. At all those sites, I took several photographs.[8]

Following the end of field observations, during which materials were mostly collected, I conducted four processes: document compilation; reduction; display; and conclusion. All materials were reduced by using the PSB conceptual framework and with reference to the key research questions of this study.[9] To follow Creswell (2003), I managed all empirical materials for review: transcribed interviews, optically scanned these transcripts, typed up field notes, and sorted and arranged various types of information on PSBs (history, process of adoption, and policy execution). In this sense, I divided materials into three categories: historical roots; process of PSB adoption after 1998; and materials describing issues between 2002 and 2017. I read all of the relevant materials carefully to obtain a sense of knowledge and reflect on their connection with these key issues: What ideas were involved in governing RRI/TVRI? What was the tone of these ideas? What was the impression of the credibility of the materials? Finally, to draw a conclusion, I reflected on the materials and linked them with the lessons learned from past PSB studies.

To verify a validity of the empirical documents, this study further did triangulation (Denzin 2017) by following several steps. First is triangulation of material gatherings through multiple methods of inquiries: semi-structured interviews, document collection, and field visits. Second is ongoing dialogue with informants regarding their views, experiences, and meanings through personal meetings during my fieldwork as well as through social media contacts. Third is repeating visits to RRI/TVRI in Jakarta and Yogyakarta.[10]

1.4 Structure of the Book

This book consists of seven chapters. This chapter is the introduction, intended to provide the background, research questions, and arguments of this book. This chapter also explains the methodology and data collection strategies used for gathering and analyzing empirical materials. At the end of the chapter, the structure of this book is explored.

Chapter 2 serves as a conceptual orientation of the public-driven broadcast system and its link with political systems, which has resulted in the formation of PSB models in developed and developing societies. It first explores conceptual debates in which politics determines the invention of public service broadcasting in both developed and developing democracies, including an assessment of past studies on public interest media. Then, this chapter discusses both the characteristic and policy framework of PSB. In this chapter, the author also explores parts of PSB (remit, ownership, structure, funding), which offer tools for identifying PSBs in new democracies and displays conceptual identifications of public-driven broadcast models in post-authoritarian regimes, which differ significantly from the mature models of Western European developed states. Last, this chapter shows the lack of studies of PSB in Indonesia and in post-authoritarian politics more generally.

To write the Chapter 2, this book traced relevant pieces of literature on PSB concepts and its characteristics in Western Europe and in Asia/African regimes. To identify the PSB system and its policy model, the author assesses concepts of PSB from Humphreys (1996), Kops (2000), Hanretty (2007), Jakubowicz (2006), and Raboy (2002). Hanretty's *Five Ways to Govern a Public Broadcaster* (2007) is used to examine structure. PSB/PSM systems studies in transitional regimes of Eastern Europe and Africa conducted by Deutsche Welle and UNESCO further enrich this book.

Chapter 3 surveys Indonesia as a post-colonial and autocratic political regime, accompanied by its political characteristic as illiberal democratic nation in the Global South. This chapter also examines the Indonesian media system.

Chapters 4–6 present the overall empirical findings. Here, the book lays out the three issues. Chapter 4 of the book explores historical roots of Indonesia's broadcasting model under Dutch and Japanese colonialism (1930s–1945) and under the authoritarian Sukarno and Suharto

regimes (1945–1998). It coincided with many aspects: actors, institutional involvement, and media policies as a backdrop for PSB invention in post-autocratic politics of Indonesia. Chapter 5 demonstrates the struggle of stakeholders to introduce PSB through a new broadcast law between 1998 and 2002. More, this chapter shows ideas on the format of Indonesian PSB remit, structure, ownership, and funding and its formal provision through Broadcast Act No. 32/2002. By comparing these with similar ideas in other transitional states, this chapter describes the first formal model of Indonesian PSB and how it was legislated in parliament between 1998 and 2002.

Chapter 6 illustrates the systematic obstacles faced when implementing PSB between 2002 and 2017. It is an examination of delay in implementing a true PSB system in Indonesia, with more than singular features. This chapter portrays how political paternalism and clientelism among broadcasters and politicians, on the one hand, and pressures from media oligarchs, on the other hand, delayed Indonesia's PSB.

Chapter 7 shows the model of Indonesian PSB and its position within the global arena of PSBs. This chapter also discusses the future of PSB in Indonesia's digital and social media landscape, and recommends topics for further study.

Notes

1. Generally, transformation from a repressive to a democratic political climate has three phases: end of the old autocratic power, introduction of democratic principles, consolidation of democracy through a new system. In a such linear way, change of media systems has also three steps: breakthrough in the media sector, fixation of the changes, development of a new and stable media system. In every transition to democracy, pro- and anti-democratic powers are equally keen to design a new policy. To follow O'Donnell and Philippe (1986), in the policy-making negotiation, the pro-autocratic system separates in the two groups: hard and soft lines. Meanwhile, pro-democracy separates into radical and moderate groups. This book would examine this frame by using PSB policy-making in post-authoritarian Indonesia as case study.
2. Moreover, media policy analysis seeks to examine the ways in which policies in the field of media are implemented, and critically tracing how a certain policy came about, why it became dominant, what parties were involved in the decision-making process, and how power was distributed (van den Bulck 2012).

3. Compared with informal conversation, which has no predetermined questions, a semi-structured interview is guided by a specific topic being studied and is determined in advance, with the interviewer deciding the logical sequence of questions during the meeting (Patton 1990). Nevertheless, there is much flexibility with this type of conversation. The interviewer may ask to follow-up questions to delve more deeply into topics addressed or to clarify answers given by the respondent. Most meetings are face-to-face; however, they can also be conducted online (Brennen 2013).
4. To keep my semi-structured interviews in line with the goal of this project, I created interview guidelines following the concepts described in Chapter 2 of this book. These guidelines covered three topics. First is the personal details of respondents. Second is some general questions seeking to explore the positions, opinions, and proposals of related to the history and reform of RRI/TVRI during the past decade. In particular, with informants from CSOs, politicians, government officials, and RRI/TVRI elites, the author traced their views on regulatory rationales as well as PSB components (remit, structure, ownership, and funding). Third is a list of questions exploring ways in which the current policies and overall systemic features, both in the internal and external managements of RRI/TVRI, have hindered the adoption of true PSB. Aside, I conducted my semi-structured interviews using an informal-conversational approach intended to create a natural condition that allows interviewees to freely express their opinions or experiences on structural and cultural problems of PSB. By this tactic, all specified PSB topics may be easily covered. For informants whom I met for the first time, this study sought informed consent to ensure that they precisely understood what the research study was about, how the material would be used, its publication plan, and their privacy rights.
5. From government, I interviewed Henry Subiakto, Deputy of Law to Minister of MCIT; Niken Widiastuti (former President of RRI and General Director for Information & Public Communication of MCIT, since 2016); and Chaerul Zen (secretary for the General Directorate of Radio, Television, and Film at Information Ministry in the late Suharto era). From politicians, the author interviewed Paulus Widiyanto (former Head of the Special Committee of *Komisi I* [Broadcast Legislation], 2000–2004); Mahfudz Siddik (politician and former Head of *Komisi I* [Communication Policy], 2009–2014); El Nino Husen Mohi (member of *Komisi I* from Gerindra party); and S. Yani (former member of *Komisi I*, 2009–2014). Other than active politicians, this study interviewed Ahmad Budiman, coordinator of policy-making consultants to

Komisi I, who actively analyzed PSB issues to help policymakers. Interviewees with RRI/TVRI included members of supervisory and executive boards, as well as senior broadcasters in these media. Board members included Ahmad Sofyan, Kabul Budiono, and Retno Intani (TVRI), as well as Dwi Hernuningsih and Suryanta Saleh (RRI). Senior broadcasters, meanwhile, included Sutrimo, Sukirman, and Meidiana Frinces (TVRI), as well as Said Abdillah, and Dani Al-Ramdhani (RRI). Outside RRI/TVRI, I also interviewed Purwoto, the station head of a local PSB in Pacitan Regency, East Java, Indonesia. Also, this study traced the origin and past policy of RRI/TVRI by interviewing Hari Wiryawan, a broadcast historian, researcher, and author of the book *Mangkunegoro VII dan Awal Penyiaran Indonesia* (2006). To obtain views from commercial media owners, I interviewed the chair of the Association of Indonesian Private Television Owners (ATVSI), Ishadi SK; a member of the central board of the Association of United Indonesian Private Radio Station (PRSSNI), Errol Jonathans; and a member of the central board of Association of Indonesian Commercial Radio (ARSSI), Daniel Damaledo. The interview with the chair of the Indonesian Press Council, Stanley Adi Prasetyo, and the vice chair of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, Rahmad Arifin, during their visit to Central Java by November 2017 were also conducted to clarify control of regulators for RRI/TVRI. Moreover, a number of media academics and CSO activists were interviewed to get their views and experiences in advocating RRI/TVRI. For the story behind the 1998–2002 era, I talked to Kukuh Sanyoto (former member of the Press and Broadcasting Society, and a leading advocate of the Broadcast Laws); Garin Nugroho (a well-known promoter of public television); and Eko Maryadi (national coordinating head of *Koalisi Independen Demokratisasi Penyiaran*) in Jakarta. To gain views of the performance of RRI/TVRI in the general public during 2002–2017, I talked to Nina and Ade Armando, both lecturers at Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta; Antonius Darmanto and Puji Rianto, who are senior researchers and advocates at *Pemantau Regulasi dan Regulator Media* and *Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik,* two non-profit organizations based in Yogyakarta, Central Java. From international media development agencies, the author interviewed partners at UNESCO, Open Society Foundation (OSF), and USAID or Internews in Indonesia. They are Kristiawan (manager of media project at Tifa Foundation, partner of OSF), Christiana Chelsie Chan (executive director of the Indonesian Media Law and Policy Center), and Toby Mendel (executive director of the Article 19, and UNESCO legal consultant for broadcasting legislation in Indonesia).

6. It's important to note, the availability of personal contacts with informants, including members of the Indonesian parliament; high officials of MCIT, and RRI/TVRI elites, were helpful. The contemporary political climate of 2017 was also influential, with legislative, MCIT, and civil society organization activists debating the urgency of a special law for RRI/TVRI, namely UU RTRI. To easily access official documents from parliament, MCIT, and RRI/TVRI headquarters, the author stayed for ten days in Jakarta area around October–November 2017. To verify and validate findings, all conversations were taped and, and where possible, I also took photographs. Not all of the respondents were interviewed in 'face-to-face' sessions. Four of them—Toby Mendel, Purwoto Sumodiharjo, Sutrimo Sumarlan, and one of the former media legislators—were interviewed online. In my experience during organizing semi-structured interviews, making appointments to meet Indonesian legislators and government officials was the hardest, as they are the most mobile figures in Indonesia. However, I was lucky to get two kinds of informant: the former and present members of Indonesian legislators; and the high officials of MCIT. It is important to note that, except for one source (a senior politician), all informants allowed me to publish their personal identities in this book publication.
7. Primary documents included official government and parliamentary policy on RRI/TVRI (broadcast laws and government/presidential decrees); the operational policy frameworks of RRI/TVRI; and minutes of the supervisory board meetings. The primary document also includes reports from the media industry and media activists, as well as releases from international aid agencies engaged in public broadcasting legislation between 1998 and 2002. The secondary type includes media exposes and past-research publications on the issues of Indonesian broadcasting, or RRI/TVRI in particular.
8. I also observed several historical locations of RRI/TVRI in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta. These included the former SRV office in Surakarta, which is now the office of RRI Surakarta, the location of the Abdurrahman Saleh statue on the old campus of Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta. In addition, during May–June and October–November 2017, I was formally invited by the RRI supervisory board to attend some of their policy meetings in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta. I was also asked by media academics and activists to meet them in Jakarta and to present my views on the progress of RRI/TVRI reform. This occasion was used to observe their concern over PSB issues, to conduct semi-structured interviews, as well as to collect documents. Moreover, this study observed social media sites such as Facebook and Instagram used by RRI/TVRI. During field visits, I create notifications on the situation

of RRI/TVRI offices, activities of their supervisory and executive boards, and broadcasting in general.

9. Overall, from May to December 2017, this study run several methodological steps: first, to begin fieldwork by identifying all of the needed documents and analyzing stakeholders to determine respondents, types of documents, location of materials, and appropriate times for interviews. In this process, the stakeholder analysis model developed by Majone (1992) and van den Bulck (2012) was helpful. Secondly, I coordinated with and contacted the secretariats of parliament, RRI/TVRI offices, and other individual respondents using various media, including e-mail, telephone, and social media. My current position as a communication lecturer and media activist facilitated my work. Third, at the beginning of May 2017, during my first fieldwork, this study prioritized the collection of documents from various regulatory agencies, such parliament and MCIT. Then, I traced papers from RRI/TVRI headquarters as well as from media policy offices and visiting RRI/TVRI headquarters in Jakarta, the parliamentary secretariat, several public universities, and non-governmental organization offices in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Upon my return to Germany, this study compiled and reduced the documents obtained as background material for the next field interviews. Field interviews served to clarify documents and deeply explore current issues. Fourth, between October and December 2017, this study conducted face-to-face/personal interviews with about 35 respondents from various parties. Meetings were unstructured, casually in the office or at events attended by most respondents in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and other cities. In particular, during my interview with the chief of RRI/TVRI branches, I conducted studio observations as well.
10. The aim of triangulation is to increase the credibility and validity of the research findings. I refer to four basic types of triangulation (Denzin 2017): data (time, space, and persons); investigator (multiple researchers in an investigation); theory (using more than one theoretical scheme in the interpretation of the facts); and method (using more than one method to gather data, such as interviews, field observations, and documents).

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CHAPTER 2

Public Service Broadcasting: Politics, Policy, Models

2.1 Introduction

I was fortunate to join the one-day conference on 'Public Service Media in a Time of Global Reordering,' held on June 25, 2018, at the University of Oregon, United States. The Public Service Media Policies Working Group—the organizer—invited several prominent speakers to discuss conceptual and practical issues of public broadcasting worldwide, as well as to map out the current progress of PSBs in both mature and developing regimes. Looking at the conference sub-topics, as well as the speakers and their countries of origin (i.e., the United Kingdom, Australia, Bangladesh), the forum demonstrated the different picture of PSBs and challenges they face operating in the 'Western' and 'Eastern' world.

In this forum, the intersection of politics and PSBs (both policy and institution) was conceptually and empirically tested. Examining past studies of PSB systems, observations of this field in mature and developing democracies have become more common since the 1970s (Katz and Wedell 1977; Raboy 1995; Sterling 1980). For instance, Hallin and Mancini (2004) look at PSBs in the Western Europe, the heartland of the media. Arguing a causal and linear link between political developments and media systems, the authors see the stability (or lack thereof) of the political system as determining the formation of public broadcasting.

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This forum illustrates this book's key concern: the arrival of PSBs in developing democracies whose political systems are shifting from autocracy to democracy. It also demonstrates the relevance and actuality of this issue. This forum and several other conferences on PSBs that I attended between 2014 and 2017 challenged me to revisit the academic debate on the link between changing political regimes in post-authoritarian countries and transforming media systems, with strong emphasis on PSB formation. I have thus prepared this chapter to present the conceptual orientation of this book.

More precisely, this study investigates the historical roots of the PSB model, efforts to adopt it, and its development in post-colonial and post-authoritarian Indonesia. Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), Voltmer (2008, 2012), and McCargo (2012) have previously investigated PSB models in post-communist and post-repressive regimes in Eastern Europe and Asia. Their argument contrasts with a study by Hallin and Mancini (2004), which found that, in the unstable political climates of post-autocratic regimes, there is no linear link between the introduction of democracy and the arrival of public interest broadcasting. New PSB systems may exist somewhere between the authoritarian and liberal systems.

While still employing Hallin and Mancini's media system framework, this book will add to and revisit the arguments of Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), Voltmer (2008, 2013), Raboy (1997), and Pippidi (2003) with a focus on Indonesia. Many scholars have given their attention to Eastern European countries and their transition from communist oligarchies, as well as Asian countries and their transition from military/single-party autocratic regimes. I would agree with Voltmer's thesis that, while adopting liberal media policies, ruling post-repressive regimes continue to intervene in their national broadcasters to spread political propaganda, promote development goals, and convey a sense of national purpose. As such, the PSBs in these regimes may be continuations of a former autocratic media model or mixtures of said model with a (limited) public-oriented one.

This chapter is ordered as follows: First, I explore the conceptual debates in which politics determines the invention of PSBs in both developed and developing democracies, providing (among other things) an assessment of past studies of public interest media. Second, I discuss the character and policy framework of PSB. Third, I explore the core dimensions of PSB (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), which offer tools for identifying PSB models in post-authoritarian societies. Fourth,

I present conceptual identifications of public-driven broadcast models in post-authoritarian regimes, which differ significantly from the mature models of Western developed states.

In writing this chapter, I have traced relevant pieces of literature on PSB concepts as well as the characteristics of PSBs in Western Europe and in post-autocratic regimes. To identify PSB systems and policy models, I apply concepts of PSB from Humphreys (1996), Kops (2000), Hanretty (2007), Jakubowicz (2006), and Raboy (2002). Hanretty's *Five Ways to Govern a Public Broadcaster* (2007) is used to examine PSB structures. Studies of PSB systems in transitional regimes of Eastern Europe and Africa conducted by the DW Akademie and UNESCO further enrich this chapter.

2.2 Public Broadcasting and Political Systems

Does the demise of an authoritarian regime in Asia or Africa and the arrival of democratic politics lead to the creation of true public broadcasting? Does the adoption of pro-democratic media systems in former autocratic media regimes necessitate the closure of long-standing pro-government broadcast channels? To answer these questions, I was driven to revisit academic debate on the linear and non-linear links between political systems and media systems.[1]

As a starting point, I would agree with scholars (i.e., Spark 1998; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Hardy 2008; Voltmer 2008, 2012) who argue that a country's choice of a particular political system determines its acceptance or rejection of a PSB model. In this sense, McChesney argues that the acceptance or rejection of PSB is determined by a nation's political structure and culture, how its political systems work, and how particular social power is exercised (McChesney 2001).

The strong link between politics and media has produced various types of media institutions. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995, p. 23) note that the strong link between political structure, culture, and media produces three competing formats: (1) a party-tied media system; (2) a more subordinate media system; (3) a media system with greater autonomy.[2] These systems may appear in two main variants: commercially supported autonomous media and non-commercial/semi-commercial media that are disposed to PSB. By focusing on broadcasting, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 32) identify the relationship between broadcasting and politics as having three

distinctive levels: (1) politics-over-broadcasting systems; (2) professional or formally autonomous systems; and (3) politics-in-broadcasting systems.

Arenas where political authorities and media systems interact vary, and in most cases, political authorities exert strong control over public media. There are six sectors of public broadcasting where the authorities are influential: policy, remit, ownership, structure, funding, and news sources (Pippidi 2003; Smith 2012). In line with Pippidi and Smith, Nord and Glowacki (2010) recognize government control in legal and institutional frameworks, ownership, funding, technology, and activities in new media environments. Spark (1998) and Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that government intervention is more common in the legal design of PSB, while Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) see intervention as mostly occurring in the process of state budget delivery and the appointment of PSBs' top boards. With regard to different political, cultural, and structural conditions, the motives and results of interactions may vary from accepting a pluralistic media and creating a truly pro-public broadcasting system in democratic politics to maintaining state broadcasters as mouthpieces for those in power in authoritarian politics.[3]

The question of whether new democratic systems can mechanically produce and maintain a PSB system has animated media policy debates. Traditionally, a democratic politics has been linearly correlated with healthy PSB development in Western European countries. Democratic media and political systems assert individuals' right to influence power, and here, PSBs are smoothly developed as macro-public institutions (Keane 1995), act to promote media freedom (DW Akademie 2014), and distribute power between the ruling regime and the public. In Western Europe, public broadcasting is deeply rooted in the history and political discourses of the region's political power holders and public broadcasters' presence is central in the acceptance of democratic political culture (Chan 2001).

However, if I read Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), Voltmer (2008, 2012), and McCargo (2012), the situation in other Western European countries shows an opposite trend. As democracy has become widespread; formerly autocratic powers have developed the political structure to create free (or relatively free) media systems. However, when political reform processes are weaker, new PSBs face much higher barriers to their development. Following the fall of repressive regimes, their legacies of repression—as well as the attitudes and constraints of the political elites—shape new PSBs

out of formerly state-owned channels. For instance, regarding the invention of the Japanese and South Korean PSBs, Harding (2015) and Kwak (1999) find that their policy framework exhibits democratic and autocratic political influences (e.g., state control is exerted through state ownership and licensing mechanism). Similarly, McCargo (1999) point out that old autocratic politics are blended with formal democracy to produce a mix of public- and state-controlled broadcasting institutions.

To follow Voltmer (2013), in former autocratic regimes, the rules of political structure and culture, as well as its link with the adoption of PSB systems, are ambiguous, a balance of intrigue and hostility, collaboration and confrontation. A weak or stable state, market power, political will, and knowledge of PSB systems are the most crucial factors in PSB creation, as seen in the Arab countries (Harding 2015). Meanwhile, perceptions of the marginalization of PSB in the United States—where most donor agencies advocating PSB policy and development come from—have reduced initiatives to govern public broadcasting in the Arab states (Sakr 2012).

The seminal book 'Three Models of Media Systems,' as well as the subsequent book (edited by Hallin and Mancini 2004), raised academic attention regarding the PSB models that emerge in developing societies. Their idea of four PSB models (government; professional; parliamentary; civic corporatist) presents initial guidance for identifying PSB models. The authors use the term 'political parallelism' to describe the linear link between media and political systems and the phrase 'the role of the state' to assess interventions done by the European political authorities in their public media.

Given that Hallin and Mancini's PSB concepts are valid only for certain periods and regions (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Voltmer 2008; El-Richani 2012), this book discusses them together with concepts presented by McCargo (1999) and Voltmer (2008, 2013) to assess post-autocratic media systems. Their concepts of political parallelism and the role of the state in media should be revisited and accompanied by other concepts rooted in post-communist and post-authoritarian powers: clientelism, paternalism, and the desire to adopt a liberal pro-market media policy. The following sections will discuss three conceptual dimensions proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004), McCargo (1999) and Voltmer (2008, 2013) in detail: political parallelism and the role of the state; political clientelism and paternalism; and market-driven media policy.

2.2.1 *Political Parallelism and the Roles of the State*

Assessing three media system models in Western Europe and North America, Hallin and Mancini (2004) use two frameworks: 'political parallelism' and 'the role of the state' to describe the strong link between PSB development and regional political authorities. Political parallelism, they argue, can be seen in PSBs' ownership models and organizational structures (Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp. 28–29), while the roles of the state can be exercised in PSB policy design, budgeting mechanisms (Brüggemann et al. 2014), remit, content, and technology (Nord and Glowacki 2010).

Reading the book *Three Model of Media Systems* (Hallin and Mancini 2004), the experience of Europe—as the heartland of PSB—shows the presence of political parallelism in formal legal mechanisms, particularly government and parliamentary systems. The authors found that, in the European tradition, parliamentary structure determines the way PSB is understood and media operations are controlled. For instance, two parliamentary structures found in Western Europe and North America, namely the majoritarian and consensus models, have shaped PSB policies and institutions in these regions. Majoritarian (Lijphart 1999, pp. 31–34) refers to a political custom where the majority of the population (mostly represented by a political party) is entitled to primacy in society and has the right to make decisions that affect the whole nation. For instance, the United States features a majority cabinet, a two-party system, and a unitary and centralized state. In contrast, consensus refers to policy-making structures that involve a range of opinions. Such structures generally involve a large coalition cabinet and multi-party system, and tend toward power sharing—such as in Germany. In these two parliamentary structures, four PSB models developed: the government; parliament; professional; and civic corporatist models.

Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp. 30–31) explain that, in the government model, a PSB is controlled directly by the government or political majority (e.g., Greece, Portugal, and Spain). This model of broadcast policy typically exists in majoritarian systems, such as that of France before the 1980s and of Spain. In these states, PSB is vulnerable to capture by leading political tendencies. By contrast, the professional model has its roots within the tradition of free political influence, and the PSB is run by media professionals (e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Scandinavian countries). In the parliament or proportional representation model,

the PSB board is divided among political parties through proportional representation. Political parties share power when controlling the PSB through a consensus system, such as in Italy. In the civic corporatist model, PSB control is distributed among various social, economic, and political groups (e.g., Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands).

Concerning the role of the state in PSBs, experiences in developed European countries show a strong role, while the United States has applied the opposite (Moe and Syvertsen 2009). In Germany, the national and regional PSBs are highly protected by each of the country's member states (Brüggemann et al. 2014). Similarly, the United Kingdom has used its authority to protect BBC as the sole PSB. In the United States, PSBs are mainly seen as supplements to commercial services, rather than as core national channels.

Based on Europe's experience with parliamentary models, as well as its effect on the creation of four different PSB models, confirms the strong parallels between political structure (particularly parliamentary condition) and PSB format. The question now is what political parallelism is typical in post-authoritarian societies. I agree with McCargo (2012, p. 208) that the concept of political parallelism in Asia does not refer to the formal organizational ties of a political structure, but has everything to do with the personal links of broadcasters and politicians, wherein senior political figures (for instance) exercise their paternalistic power over public broadcasters.[4]

McCargo (2012) further explained that—in contrast with the model of political parties as having explicit membership, platforms, and ideology—in Asian countries, parties are likely to be 'personalized voter-gathering machines.' In this sense, there is no strict majoritarian or consensus pattern of political decisions in designing a PSB policy.

Similarly, a 'state' in the Western democratic tradition is a unitary actor, an actor with a consistent core of interests. In contrast, former authoritarian states are combinations of opposite bureaucrats, political actors, and private groups with a patrimonial character used as vehicle for rent-seeking (Voltmer 2012) or oligarchic democracy (Matuszak 2012). As the economy has progressed rapidly in post-authoritarian Indonesia since 1998, for instance, the interests of private elites have captured the government as well as politicians' policies in the design of the country's media system. A group of media oligarchs rule the country with their political allies in parliament (Winters 2014, pp. 26–28).

In short, the practice of political parallelism and the roles of the state in PSB design vary depending on the actual condition of state and parliamentary systems, whether they are autonomous or more easily captured by private interests. The Western developed picture of governments having an active role in supporting media pluralism and facilitating citizen engagement is contrasted with non-Western post-autocratic climates, where the media, government, and parliament are but some of many competing actors. As such, their power must be negotiated in PSB development and policy-making.

2.2.2 Political Clientelism and Paternalism

Exploring PSB development in post-authoritarian societies also leads me to look at the political cultures of these societies, particularly the practices of clientelism and paternalism. As PSBs are politically driven media institutions, their operations offer room for the development and implications of their political cultures. For instance, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002, p. 13) identify clientelism as developing in the PSB systems of several transitional states in Latin America and Southern Europe. The personal-primordial ties between top PSB board members and policy-makers may limit PSBs' ability to independently and equally serve the general public.

Clientelism refers to a social connection in which patrons control and deliver social resources to clients in exchange for deference and various forms of support. Scott (1972) recognizes political clientelism as having two scales: vertical and horizontal. On the vertical scale, clientelism is the instrumental alliance in which an individual of higher political and economic status uses his influence and resources to provide benefits to a person of a lower status or a person seeking a particular strategic position. In line with Scott, Jacquemin (2015) emphasizes that clientelism occurs when a person of a high political position or socioeconomic status uses resources to provide benefits to a person of the same or lower status by offering generous support to his/her structural career.

Referring again to Hallin and Mancini (2004), clientelist culture contrasts with rational-legal authority, a form of open citizenship in which access to resources is based on universal criteria and formal equality before the law. Political clientelism is generally a commitment to particular individual interests (Hilgers 2012), while rational-legal authority is associated with a political culture that enshrines the notion of common interest.

In countries where rational-legal authority has developed (such as Northern Europe), public broadcasters as public entities are relatively free of direct control from state officers and politicians. In such countries, they are governed by precise rules and procedures for appointing their boards and for their whole operation. By contrast, in countries where rational-legal authority is less developed (as in Asian post-authoritarian states), state control and the practice of clientelism in PSB institutions is stronger and deeper.[5]

As with clientelism, paternalism is a legacy of autocracy in transitional societies. Paternalism refers to the practice of authority to restrict the freedom or responsibility of subordinates. The word paternalism uses the traditional family concept of the father as superior and children as subordinate (Aycan 2006, p. 447) to metaphorically describe the connection between government officials and ordinary citizens in the state system. The word 'paternalism' gained currency in the late nineteenth century and was mostly used to refer to benevolence in hierarchical power, such as between a king and his subjects (Grill 2007). Interpersonal relationships in such cases are emotional, not professional. In this system of unequal power, protection and affection may create an organizational culture in which low performance is protected and tolerated (Aycan 2006; Gherghina and Volintiru 2017), resulting in nepotism and favoritism in the management of public institutions.

As a consequence of paternalism, which has roots in most traditional societies of Pacific Asia, scholars often use 'hegemony'—a term popularized by Antonio Gramsci—to describe the public tolerance of politicians' or government officials' dominance over society (Bates 1975). Hegemony is a kind of political control exerted by ruling powers; people under hegemony accept it as 'common sense' or the 'natural' condition. For instance, paternalism is linked to the cultural values of Confucianism in Japan and Javanese values in Indonesia (Irawanto 2009); these cultures may define the orientation and working habits of former state-run media in these two countries. Romano (2003) identifies the dominant understanding of political paternalism, including the acceptance of state control over society in Indonesia. This understanding further leads to acceptance of government ownership of the country's public service broadcasters as will be discussed later.[6]

2.2.3 Market-Driven Politics

From a political economy perspective, two other important analytical notions—political structure (the structure of parliament and government) and culture (paternalism and clientelism)—need to be defined. Following the massive globalization and commercialization of media, 'market-driven policy' has been widely adopted in many newly democratic regimes. Here, market-driven politics refers to a set of government policies that favor the private ownership of mass media as part of a neoliberal economic doctrine.

Potschka (2012, p. 247) notes that the ideological foundation of economic liberalism traces its roots to the United Kingdom in the 1950s. Vital to the neoliberal doctrine is the deregulation and privatization of former state monopolies over public goods by providing adequate policies that foster competition for economic growth. The end of BBC's public broadcasting service monopoly in the 1960s, as well as ARD's monopoly in 1970s Germany, can be seen as examples of this deregulation policy.

The term 'market-driven politics' is also used by Hallin and Mancini (2004) to describe the presence of liberal free market media policies in the United Kingdom and North America (United States and Canada) that have gradually marginalized public broadcasters. When state intervention is relatively limited, commercial broadcasting grows rapidly. In former authoritarian regimes, massive market-driven politics have resulted from media oligarchs' intervention in policy-making processes (Kononczuk et al. 2017; Matuszak 2012; Winters 2014). Robinson and Hadiz (2014, p. 37) defines media oligarchs as private media owners who work systematically to influence policy arrangements in government and parliament.

However, despite similarities in the market-driven media policies of old democracies, PSBs' structures may differ. For instance, in the United Kingdom and Canada, PSBs have strong positions, being centralized channels with high levels of state support in their regulation and funding, while in the United States the ruling government has left power over PSB policy to broader society, resulting in these non-state broadcasters having marginal public positions.

Market-driven political policy's favoring of commercial broadcasting over public broadcasting has frequently been emphasized by scholars (i.e., Winter 2014; Liddle 2014), as it invites commercial media oligarchs and limits the quality of democracy in post-authoritarian political settings. Oligarchy is defined by concentrated material power based on enforced

claims or rights to property or wealth in the capitalist marketplace. They limit the capacity for high-quality democracy and media by maintaining inequalities in the supply of political resources (Liddle 2014), including money and knowledge, as well as in public organizations and media.

Following Winter (2014) and Kononczuk et al. (2017), there is interplay between oligarchs, political parties, and governments with the extreme concentration of commercial media and the delay of public-driven media development.[7] Having close relations with governments and politicians, oligarchs can capture legislative processes to promote policy relaxation. Problems in the legislative process may arise when policy-makers act in the industry to oppose the advocacies of public controlled media (Mitnick 2011) due to their lack of knowledge regarding the significance of PSBs to the public.

In the sense that PSB is perceived by private media oligarchs as their competitor, Jakubowicz (2006, p. 8) identifies several tactics used by PSB's enemies. First is the arrested PSB evolution strategy, an argument that public media should not be allowed to move into online service platforms. Second is the harmless strategy, a demand to reduce PSB's roles to readdress market failure by producing unattractive content and prevent the media from running advertising. There is also the claim that public-administered broadcasters should only be financed by specific funds outside license fees and state budgets. The last strategy is the 'no-longer-needed tactic,' massive propaganda in public that private media can replace public broadcasting in delivering quality service to the younger public.

2.3 PSB Characteristics and Its Policy

This section explains the origin and regulatory design of public-administered broadcasting. It is intended to provide a broader understanding of PSBs (their characteristics; initial models; policy formats; and rationales) before examining the PSB models typically developed in post-authoritarian settings.

2.3.1 Characteristics of Public Broadcasting

In identifying PSB, most scholars deal with several dimensions: ownership; mandate for public; form of service; and governing structure. Smith (2012, pp. 7–8) developed her definition of PSB based on the media's

ownership and orientation. For her, a PSB is an independent, non-profit, and public-oriented service media. In addition, PSB is media that is, by law, financed with public funds and has the largest degree of newsroom independence. Mendel (2000) adds that the character distinguishing PSB from both private and state-owned media models is its mission to cater to the diverse tastes, interests, and beliefs of societies, fostering national culture and upholding high standards of quality.

In his historic speech regarding BBC, John Reith emphasized four criteria: BBC (as PSB) must be protected from state and commercial pressures; it must aim to serve the whole nation; it must have a monopoly position; and it must aim to provide high-quality content (Jeune 2009). Arriving from this idea, UNESCO (2010, pp. 54–57) lists four factors to be 'taken into account' in judging whether a PSB system plays the role it is expected to perform. These are universality (meaning that the entire population has full access to the service); diversity (in the content offered, the audiences targeted, and the subjects discussed); independence (guaranteed through protection from political and commercial pressures); and distinctiveness (through a remit to innovate and set high standards).

Detailing the concept of PSB as a media organization and comparing PSB with state broadcast channels, Harding (2015) and Tambini (2015) identify three issues: accountability, control, and content. If state broadcasters are accountable to the government and directly under control of relevant ministries or political parties, PSBs are obligated to the general public and controlled by independent boards of trustees. SB employees are mostly civil servants, while PSBs have autonomous staff. Content on SBs mostly features the viewpoints of the ruling power, while PSBs provide a wide range of public opinions.

In Europe, the term 'public service broadcasting' is more applicable than 'public broadcasting.' It reflects the ideological justification of PSBs as public service entities. In contrast, the term 'public broadcasting' is popular in the United States. It refers to non-profit educational channels (Sterling 1980) that offer a counterpart to private channels. Since the late 1990s, the new term 'public service media or PSM' has been used to mark changes to PSB institutions beyond their analog platforms. The classic analog and terrestrial modes of service are currently no longer compatible with the advanced services of such multiplatform corporations as the UK's BBC or Japan's Nippon Hoso Kyoku.

From a historical point of view, Europe has been the historic 'heartland' of the public service broadcasting model, with radio as the first

technological platform. This refers to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which was established in 1922 in the United Kingdom. The PSB model was very influential when the BBC began regular television service in 1936 (Blumler 1992). The widespread adoption of television after World War II smoothly expanded PSB monopoly (van Dijk et al. 2005). PSB later came to southern Europe (the 1970s) under the military dictatorships of Greece and Spain, as well as to central-eastern Europe (1990s) after the demise of the communist political regimes.

In the United States, the PSB model was launched in the latter half of the 1960s, while in Germany and Japan PSB was instituted after World War II. Previously, following the invention of the radio by David Sarnoff in the early twentieth century, broadcasting in the United States has been a matter of private ownership, focused on profit accumulation. For instance, the country's three big broadcast networks—the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)—view the public as a commercial consumer. Today, National Public Radio (NPR) and Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which position the public as a citizen, are marginal.

The classic BBC model is described as an alignment between the objectives of the state, those of the corporation's key personnel, and the public's appetite for new technology, with John Reith providing the persona to develop BBC as a national institution (Reid 2014). Over several decades, the BBC model of governance was developed into a variety of models in many countries outside Europe, mainly in the former colonial territories that gained political independence after World War II. Also, since the 1990s, there has been greater effort to develop public-driven broadcasting systems in Asia (Lowe 2016).

2.3.2 Regulatory Rationales for PSB

At least five factors justify the urgency of strong regulations for public broadcasting. First is the politics of technology scarcity. Second is the public interest orientation of service. Third is the failure of market-driven media in providing broadcasts as public good. Fourth is the need of the public sphere (Habermas 1991) as a forum for public debate. Fifth is the term 'public service' as a vital facility provided to the public by the government.

The first justification for strong PSB policy is the 'politics of technology scarcity' (Thierer 2005). The scarcity of available airwaves made access a crucial issue, and regulation was necessary for equality in frequency allocation (Voltmer 2013). Governments and private sectors should not utilize all parts of the broadcast band, which should be used to benefit citizens. Although the expansion of satellite, cable, and Internet technology has dismantled the scarcity doctrine, its regulatory legacy remains evident in the 'protection of the public interest, public convenience, and necessity' requirements for broadcasting content (Thierer 2005) and to justify the licensing scheme (Moe 2008).[8]

The term 'public interest' is the second factor that legitimates legal provisions for broadcasting, particularly in terms of the state's obligation to provide freedom of expression and ensure minority groups' access to PSBs (Schejter and Han 2011). As such, an extensive broadcasting policy is rooted in the belief that broadcasting has extraordinary power over public opinion. In Western Europe, PSB regulation is best oriented toward serving the objectives of national welfare and cultural integration, ideas that emphasize the public interest over government interest (Voltmer 2013).

The third justification of strong PSB policy refers to arguments by van Dijk et al. (2005) and Keat (2011) that private media have failed to provide broadcasts as a universal public good. In Northern Europe, where media policy is based on a long tradition of democracy and well-developed civil society, PSB services are often defined as the public good. Public media organizations such as Swedish Radio make different kinds of programs available for everyone, with the market's failure to provide adequate news justifying its operations. To agree with Anderson (2000), radio and television services are examples of pure public good. As public good, their content is consumed by two types of agents: viewers/listeners who receive direct benefit from content, and advertisers who receive indirect benefits by contacting consumers. Unlike private channels, more detailed policy is needed for PSB due to the use of public funds in operations.

The fourth reason for PSB regulation is firmly connected to its role to provide a public sphere as a free forum for debate (Ramsey 2010). The inventor of the concept, Jurgen Habermas (1991), describes the original public sphere as face-to-face deliberation on public issues, such as those that occurred in the coffee houses that emerged in mid-seventeenth-century Germany. From this point, public interest broadcasting became a

mediated public space in which individuals can discuss their political and economic rights (Scannel 1989).[9]

Finally, the term 'public service' that is embedded in PSB is a key factor driving the need for strong PSB policy and obligatory audit of its content by national and supranational bodies. Public service is a kind of provision that is vital for all members of society, from telephone lines, healthcare, public education, to broadcasting (Moe 2008). Syvertsen (1999) notes that the first Director General of BBC, John Reith, in his paternalistic approach to BBC set the quality, efficiency, and universal distribution as the main criteria. PSB, in its services, satisfies the interests and preferences of individual—rather than collective—consumers.

Most PSBs in developed democracies have adopted the phrase 'in the service of the public' in their national policies. For example, BBC Royal Charter 2016 specifies that the BBC is tasked with providing public service through sound and television. In the political tradition of the UK, PSB protection is seen as the state's obligation to deploy a mediated public sphere and PSB is a medium for cultural and political participation (Brevini 2013). By maintaining PSB, governments of the UK have ensured responsibility for media pluralism and the content quality necessary for the country's public service.

The Norwegian PSB Act of 1988 similarly identifies NRK as a public service radio and television company involved in radio and television broadcast activities (Larsen 2014). In this way, PSBs enjoy the advantage of political and social privilege, including access to state money for operational costs and protection through national policy.

However, in Asian transitional countries, the terms 'public interest' and 'public good' have been expressed differently than in Western democracies. In post-autocratic societies, these two terms are culturally understood as the political desires of state authorities, rather than the public. In a state where the link between government and media sector is unclear, rarely formal, and paternalistic in culture, Kitley (2000) found that the government—as a patron—restricts the public's interest in the name of national interest.

Conversely, to agree with Syvertsen (1999), there has been an expansion in the use of public service rationales in respect to public service broadcasting. As media systems have shifted toward liberalism around the world, PBS's privileges as sole public service providers have been criticized as condescendingly paternalist, whereas commercial broadcasters seem to be responding to the general public in a more transparent fashion.

2.3.3 Policy Design: Format and Actors

Concerning how PSB channels are viewed as powerful media for public interests, as in the tradition of Western European media policy, PSB policy is designed in more detail than other media sectors. Given PSBs' high level of rivalry with commercial broadcasters, defenders propose robust national regulation. In their view, ideally, PSBs must be governed by specific laws alongside general broadcasting laws.

For example, the BBC of the United Kingdom has two key regulations: the Royal Charter and the BBC Charter 2016. Meanwhile, SBS and ABC (Australian PSBs) have two special acts. Similarly, Thailand Public Broadcasting has had the Thai PBS Act since 2008, and this law is as a good example of a strong PSB policy from Southeast Asia (Green 2013). Germany's PSB is protected by stronger policy at three levels: basic constitution, federal constitutional court, and interstate/interfederal member state treaties. Outside Europe, developed countries such as Japan and Canada have made PSB provisions as the central parts of their broadcasting acts.

Observing variances in PSB policy format in developed and developing societies, Nowak (2014) found the influence of three factors: political, economic, and public objectives. In addition, Jones et al. (2009) identify structural and knowledge factors. Structural factors are those historical and autocratic legacies that have left their mark on PSB policy-making, are often deeply embedded, and slow to change. The knowledge factor, meanwhile, includes policymakers' competencies regarding public media issues, different viewpoints and sources, and the types of PSB information available.

Moreover, differences in policy design are also determined by the actors involved in PSB policy-making. To agree with van den Bulck (2012), various actors may be involved in PSB policy production, including national and transnational bodies, politicians, media interest groups, and citizen or civil society activists. In designing PSB policy in Europe, for instance, the European Commission is a key actor, whose main stake is to ensure that all member states comply with the 'single market policy' and 'state aid rules' of the European Union.

Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) note that, in the post-communist states of Eastern Europe, most PSB creation has been driven by the European Union as a supranational actor, resulting in the formal transformation of former state broadcasters into PSBs. However, in post-autocratic regimes

outside Europe, the transplantation of the Western European PSB model into the policies of pre-existing state channels has been demanded by cross-organizational actors. Active stakeholders have included UNESCO, as a supranational agency, in cooperation with Indonesian civil society organizations (CSOs).

For instance, examining PSB design in Arab countries, Sakr (2012, p. 31) identifies four actors: (1) foreign governments and their aid agencies in partnership with CSOs working for media development; (2) state actors, such as ministries of information and the elites of Arab state broadcasters; (3) individual practitioners working for private media or national trade unions; and (4) regional advocacy bodies such as Arab media alliances.

Howlett and Ramesh (2003) identify a 'cycle model' of media policy-making that consists of several stages: agenda setting (issue recognition); policy formulation (ideas of solution); decision making (choice of solution); policy implementation; and policy evaluation (checking the results). To agree with Meyerhöfer (2009), decision making is the cognitive process leading to the selection of a particular policy from several alternatives

In contrast with the policy-making tradition of developed democracies (public debates, public notices, or written opinions), the dominant model of policy formulation in developing states is one of bureaucratic politics, wherein the process and actors may vary (in number and type, structure, and rules of conduct, power relations, etc.). To follow Voltmer (2013), in post-autocratic powers, broadcasting regulation is a long fight between the ruling government, political parties, private broadcasters, and CSOs. As a result, broadcast legislation is often delayed, and after new laws are passed, they quickly become subject to amendment.

Moreover, the creation of PSB policies in Asian transitional societies is also colored by particular cultural contexts. For example, in Hong Kong and South Korea, Confucian culture has influenced differences in each state's perceptions and priorities in their PSBs (Kwak 1999, p. 256). This has, for instance, resulted in PSB being remitted as tools of cultural preservation instead of facilitating the freedom of public expression. Kwak also notes that, in Singapore, the press and broadcasting has been highly regulated by the state, a practice derived from the Confucian belief that state officials should function as parents, with their citizens—their 'children'—being controlled in many aspects; this includes the media.

2.4 Four Components of PSB Systems

Following discussion of the characteristics and policy rationales of PSBs, this part explores the key components that will be used to examine the media model in post-authoritarian Indonesia.[10] Many scholars have identified the components of media institutions. For instance, McQuail (2005) identifies media institutions as having six elements: scale and centralization, degree of politicization, profile diversity, source of financing, degree of public policy/control, and normative goals. McKenzie (2006) adds several further components: cultural character, public access to media, news reporting, media content at large, import/export, and media audiences.

Other scholars have narrowed these broad media components. Hanretty (2007, pp. 3–4) identifies several key issues related to components: board structure, board appointment process, funding method, and way of regulating political content. d'Haenens and Bardoel (2007), Steenfadt and Screenworld (2010), Schweizer and Puppis (2017), and Smith (2012) identify several other components: national policy; 'broadcasting for all' remit; funding/market shares; link between government and PSBs; and independence of structure, ownership, and staff, which involve creative and professional human resources.[11]

Reviewing these media components, this book summarizes four PSB components, which interestingly reflect the approach used by UNESCO (2010, pp. 54–56) in studying PSBs: (1) mandate or remit; (2) ownership; (3) governing boards that can manage PSBs structure without government or commercial interests; and (4) funding, ideally on a three-year basis, with precise tools for accountability and transparency.[12] In creating national media institutions, these components follow a logical sequence: formulating media remits, mandating institutions or individuals as owners, selecting governing boards to operate the media, and providing funding to cover operational costs. The following part will explore these four components in detail.

2.4.1 Remit: Public Sphere vs. National Integration

Remit is the first component, through which media scholars often determine two crucial issues in public service broadcasting. First, remit indicates whether a national broadcast channel is public-oriented, commercial, or state-oriented. Second, remit also indicates whether the broadcaster is

oriented toward serving the goals of the nation, the ruling class, or the public in general. Also, the official remit may also strengthen or weaken the role of state in PSB operations.[12]

Moreover, the choice of remit defines broadcast ownership and funding. For instance, scholars such as Roncagliolo (1996, p. 299) identify three broadcasting orientations: economic motives (broadcasting is financed by advertising); political motives (government or party apparatuses use broadcasting as an instrument of power); and sociocultural motives (the Western European ideal of public service, which has been developed not by the political administration but by non-state or civil society organizations). In this sense, PSBs are perceived as social and cultural media organizations, rather than political media entities.

Drawing from Katz and Wedell (1977), Curran (2002), Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), and Nissen (2015), it can be argued that 'public sphere' is the typical and most common term used to describe PSB remits in developed democracies. Conversely, national integration commonly lies at the root of post-autocratic and post-colonial broadcasters.

In its 2014 survey of PSBs in post-autocratic powers, DW Akademie (2014, p. 25) identified these broadcasters as having two competing roles: creating a public sphere (criticism, moderation of political expression) and supporting, integrating, and protecting cultural cohesion. At the same time, PSBs in different political settings must ensure balance with commercial broadcasters (Glowacki 2012).

According to Humphreys (1996) and Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), public-driven broadcast ers in Western European countries textually incorporated democratic values in their remits: to represent society over political authority; to provide a forum for public expression and debate; to cater to minorities; and to serve as a government watchdog. These remits are derived from normative meanings of 'public interest' and 'public sphere' in the media. For example, the Royal Charter 2017 mandates the BBC to 'act in the public interest, serving all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and distinctive output and services which inform, educate and entertain.' Also, those remits are in accordance with the European Union policy for PSBs in its member states (Glowacki 2012). This supranational body emphasizes that PSB must fulfill social and cultural needs and guarantee media pluralism as part of human rights (Berka and Tretter 2013).

However, in new democracies, PSB remits may differ from those in mature democracies, as informed by their political history and how new

political powers define their national broadcasters. Although the broadcasting systems in post-colonial Asia and Africa derive primarily on the broadcast models developed in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other imperialist European nations, their remits still reflect the objectives of the societies within which they were set at their time of creation (Katz and Wedell 1977).

In this sense, Katz and Wedell (1977, p. 171) find several typical broadcasting remits in Asian developing states that were first expressed in the colonial period and later became paramount after independence: integration, development, and culture. In this sense, broadcasters are obliged to contribute to social integration and accelerate development processes. In the sense that broadcast media are seen as instruments for development goals, some regular programs, such as sports events, are usually used as tools to create strong feelings of national solidarity.[13] However, as Katz and Wedell (1977, p. 171) also note, these remits face crucial problems: multiple ethnic groups; regionalism; governments' instability and need for legitimacy; and gaps in the distribution of resources.

To follow Voltmer (2008), in transitional regimes, there is often a claim that public service channels should put themselves in the service of national unity, political stability, and economic development. Also, there is always a link between the development plans of developing nations and their choice of particular remits for their PSBs (Rahman 2016; Katz and Wedell 1977). For instance, Thailand and Indonesia have stressed the goals of political and cultural unity behind the adoption of PSB. According to the Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act of 2008, the objectives of Thai PSB are to promote national policy and shared interest in politics, military, economics, and social welfare. The law also encourages Thai citizens to be loyal to the nation's three political icons (the country, the religion, and the King) and to campaign for collaboration between the army and citizens.

2.4.2 Ownership: Between Government and Public

The second key component of PSB is ownership, observation of which is central because it determines media freedom and often symbolizes its relationship with the ruling political authorities. Referring to the definition of PSBs as media that are publicly owned, operated, and financed

(Smith 2012), ownership is a 'key word' that deals with who owns, operates, accesses, and finances the media. Moreover, the choice of ownership will define the media's employment type and working carriers.

According to scholars such as Davidson et al. (1976, p. 46) and Raboy (1997, pp. 10–11), broadcast institutions may be identified as following six models: (1) publicly managed national public broadcasting; (2) alternative public broadcasting; (3) privately owned or commercial broadcasting; (4) multiple ownership broadcasting (public–public or public–private partnership and joint ventures); (5) community-owned broadcasting; and (6) state-owned broadcasting under strict government control. While these first two categories use the term 'public' as indicators of PSB ownership, the authors fail to clearly describe the meaning of 'national' or 'alternative' public broadcasting.

Rather than proposing a strict ownership model, several PSB promoters such as UNESCO (2010) define PSBs normatively as self-governing media entities that are separate from government officials and market players; and PSB owner should be an entity that free from the motive of profit-seeking and policy-seeking. Profit-seeking owners are mainly concerned with the economic success of their enterprises and keep their media out of struggles for public interests. They interfere by lobbying or through editorial policy if specific policy issues go against their business interests. Similarly, policy-seeking owners use their media to promote a particular political mission or political party, occasionally even when this is against their profitable interest (Voltmer 2013, p. 168).

In practice, meanwhile, experiences with PSBs in Western Europe and the United States show that there is no common ownership model. The only similar characteristic is that PSBs are owned by autonomous public corporations with their own employment systems, rather than being government-controlled agencies using government employment systems. In those countries, PSBs are generally set up as nationally entities, with solid help from governments in funding and policy. They are commonly autonomous public corporations that apply professional standards of employment.

In Western European countries, PSBs were under an autonomous state model of ownership, reflecting strong state support for its operations, while in the United States, the PSB is owned by local and independent communities rather than the ruling authority.

In transitional political regimes, PSBs—as former state-owned media—vary depending on the new government's level of interest in owning

media. Public and government ownership are often blurred, in the sense that most PSBs are continuations of former state-owned broadcasters. However, even when normative criteria of public ownership are stated in countries' relevant PSB laws, lower policies and practices often manipulate them. Reflecting their remit of supporting national integration, PSBs in new democracies are managed as closely associated with the ruling authorities (DW Akademie 2014).[14]

My observation to several PSBs in post-authoritarian countries in Asia such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, with a long experience of owning state-controlled media platforms, the PSBs are state agencies that are directly controlled by the Ministry of Information. In this ownership model, most employees are permanent civil servants/government employees with a habit of accepting government, rather than public, control. Their working culture refers to civil servant policy rather than broadcast policy. In addition, when state officials control news production, journalists have no room to work independently.

For instance, India's public television Doordarshan is a corporate entity attached to the Ministry of Information and broadcasting. Sinha (1996, p. 220) views this as halfway between a public corporation and a government department. It is not directly part of the ministry's administrative structure, nor does it enjoy financial and administrative freedom. In practice, however, Doordarshan operates much like a national government department. It is formally accountable to parliament; however, parliament can do nothing more than rubber stamp the decisions made by the executives of Doordarshan.

2.4.3 Structure: Political Control Over PSB Boards

Together with ownership, structure/organizational design is a central component of PSB independence and professionalism. Scholarly debate of PSB structure mainly deals with the top level, namely the supervisory and executive boards, as well as their mandates, the choice between the single or dual board models, and their appointment mechanisms (Boev 2010; Hanretty 2007, p. 3). Discussion often focuses on the relationship between PSBs' top boards and ruling political authorities, as well as the state's role in overseeing the boards.

In this sense, Nissen (2006) identifies three types of board: (1) the government and majority party model, (2) the proportional representation model, and (3) the independent model. In the first model,

government takes an active and rather direct steering role over PSB board, while the second model places the government in no legal formal position, with its influence distributed between several political parties in parliament. The third model insulates PSBs from politics, seeking to ensure that the board is free of state interference. The ideal model, according to Nissen (2006), is for the government and parliament to have limited influence on the boards. Government interference should extend only to setting-up the annual contract of operation, as in the BBC, while parliament holds the mandate for appointing supervisory boards.

Meanwhile, translating the ideas of political interference in PSB boards and with concern for particular political settings, the Council of Europe identifies PSBs in the region as having three types of structure: (1) national integrated structure, as in the United Kingdom and Italy; (2) federated structure by region, as in Germany, which reflects the country's political powers; (3) fragmented structure, as in France, where each branch of the PSB is controlled by one or more separate operators (Mooney 2004, in Hanretty 2007).

Similar to PSB ownership, the way in which a PSB's top board is constructed is a power struggle between politicians, government officials, and the public. It involves arenas of political interferences such as who appoints the PSB board; membership criteria; procedures for electing board members; selection mechanisms; veto rights in decision making; terms of office; renewability of office; dismissal; eligibility; and incompatibilities (Mutu and Corral 2013). In his study of the transformation of state television into public television in Hungary, Poland, and Rumania, Pippidi (2003, p. 43) found that the appointment and dismissal of PSB boards and the limits of their authority are key issues regarding the independence of public television. Before new broadcast laws were passed, such appointments and dismissals were made by the government or president. Following the passage of new broadcast laws, such appointments became the responsibility of parliament.

Observing various kinds of PSB top structure, Hanretty (2007, p. 6) points out two approaches of designing the structure. First, countries that adopted models rooted in their public/state-owned corporations. For instance, countries in which public companies have single boards—Italy, Spain, Portugal, Australia, and South Africa—have mostly chosen a similar single top board for their PSBs. In this approach, government and parliament play a key role in board appointment as well as in examining the board's annual report (Boev 2010). Second, in the

UK, and Japan, authorities have instead chosen structures dissimilar to their respective public corporate practices, establishing two governing bodies, namely the board of trustees or advisory board and the executive committee (including the General Director). This dual board system is also a common approach of PSB structures in Western Europe as well as in newly developing democracies in Asia (Hanretty 2007, p. 8).

In the single board model, the executive board manages and supervises all PSB jobs and ensures compliance with legal or financial matters. The president of the board acts as chief executive officer and, whether in law or practice, enjoys effective control over the organization (Hanretty 2007, pp. 7–8). However, in the dual board model, responsibility for management and compliance is divided between both the supervisory and the executive boards. In this sense, the supervisory board is best described as an administrative council or board of governors and is headed by a chairperson. The executive board includes the director general as leader and acts with consent from the supervisory board.

At this point, the choice of single or dual board and its appointment, which involves government and politicians, are vulnerable to political interferences. In this sense, the dual board model (Boev 2010) is perceived as better than the single board, as the supervisory board acts as a non-pernicious accountability mechanism. Politicians can only pressure PSBs through their interactions with the supervisory board, freeing the executive officers elected by the supervisory board from the need to listen to politicians' complaints.

In term of who appoints the board, Hallin and Mancini (2004) identified four models of PSB structure: the government, professional, parliament, and civic corporatist models. In the first model, the government has the right to select and control PSB boards, as in state-owned broadcasting. In the professional model, the government chooses the executive committee, but the elected board members represent public interest groups. In the parliament model, the executive board is selected by parliament, and its members reflect a balance of political parties' power in parliament. Finally, in the civic corporatist model, parliament elects the top leader, but board members represent social and political stakeholders.

As for appointment power, Hanretty (2007, p. 11) identifies four patterns. First is appointment by an independent media regulator, such as the National Broadcasting Council. Second is appointment by civil society. Associated with public service broadcasters in German-speaking countries, typical boards have some 30–40 members, consisting of

government representatives, political parties in the legislature, and church, trade council, and employer associations. Third is appointment by parliamentary politicians, the most common method in Europe. Fourth is appointment by government, as applied by English-language broadcasters (e.g., BBC in the United Kingdom, SABC in South Africa, CBC in Canada, and ABC in Australia) and in some Scandinavian countries.

2.4.4 Funding: Politicization of State Budget

In addition to ownership and structure, choice of financial resources, access to appropriate funds, and distribution of funds are crucial issues in PSB management and often become arenas for the media's politicization (Kops 2000). When investigating PSBs' funding in liberal media systems, focus is given to government intervention and market competition with private media. According to Kops, countries that have begun developing PSBs must adapt their financial systems through strong policies that enable them to compete with private media and maintain independence.

According to Rovekampt (2014, p. 52), the financing systems of public interest channels vary worldwide from license fees, state budgets, advertising, commercial taxation, and donations. The first three types are the most popular: public funds originating from general taxation, license fees paid by citizens and directly wielded by PSB (Kops 2000), and commercial revenues from advertising. By collecting license fees, for instance, PSBs may flexibly create long-term plans for public service. In Western democracies, the tax revenues raised by the state are considered inappropriate for PSB income.

In the opinion of Smith (2012), license fees—a tax linked to receiver ownership—have historically been the primary means of financing PSBs. They create a direct link between PSBs and the public. As the main source of income for PSBs in Europe, this type of fund is perceived not only as a financing method but also contributes to the definition of 'what public service is supposed to be.' Concerning the needed independence from state and commercial logics, license fees are also viewed as the ideal source of money for PSBs, even better than annual state budgets or commercial advertising. Up to 2017, several PSB channels have been financed predominantly by license fees, such as BBC in the UK and NRK *(Norsk Rikskringkasting)* in Norway. Other PSB channels have been financed by a mixture of public and state subsidies, as well as commercial advertising revenues.

However, to ensure financial stability, a mix of license fees, advertising, and annual state budget is mostly used. As Nordicity (2016, p. 3) notes, recent progress in media technology means that radio equipment license fees are a poor proxy for the consumption of PSB services. The public and/or consumers can now use a variety of different devices and online services to find and enjoy broadcast programming. As such, to mitigate the effects of technology, several countries (e.g., Denmark, Austria, and UK) have migrated from equipment license fees to receiving license fees, meaning that households pay license fees regardless of the type of equipment they use: television, computer, or mobile/smartphone.

Financial decisions for PSBs, as public institutions, depend highly on PSB elites' political struggles with policymakers: politicians and government officials. In Europe, both national economics and politics determine the varied financial resources of PSBs (William 2005). Political influence raises in these two ways: the agreement of amount and source of funding (Kops 2000). In Southeast European PSBs, for instance, Micova (2012, pp. 4–5) notes that theoretically 'stable' license fees can become practically unstable. When times are uncomfortable and politics are tight, license fees are a convenient target for competing politicians. Also, there are limits to how much can be raised by license fees or state budgets, especially from small populations or in times of economic hardship. Based on a study of PSB financing, Joesaar (2011) argues that, due to the economy of scale, PSBs in smaller countries need to have higher levels of funding per capita than in large countries.

In line with Micova (2012), Schroder (2017) finds that federal funding has been a frequent political issue for the CPB (Corporation for Public Broadcasting) in the United States. The CPB is a taxpayer-supported source of funding for public media houses in the United States and defends its existence by taking advantage of private channels' failure to produce content for minorities and children. Around January 2017, Schroder (2017) writes, staff members for President Donald Trump were looking to include a line in the proposed budget that would privatize the Corporation. Such a problem also occurred in India (Sinha 1996).

In short, the choice of PSB funding model is central in maintaining the freedom of the media from political authorities and avoiding a market orientation of its services. No matter the source of funding, the decision and allocation of state moneys are arenas for political intervention in PSBs. Political persuasion and clientelist practices among politicians and PSB executives may occur, as will be shown in this book.

2.5 Public Service Broadcasting Models Around the World

After discussing political influence on the four aspects of PSB (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), this section compares PSB models in both Western developed countries and non-Western developing societies. This section begins with an examination of PSBs in developed democracies. Afterward, it discusses PSB models in new democracies, which differ significantly from those in mature democracies.

2.5.1 PSBs in Developed Democracies

Broadly speaking, broadcasting systems in developed democracies—particularly in Western Europe, such as the United Kingdom and Germany—were initially considered single public service monopolies. Radio (1920) and television (1950) channels were considered part of the public interest (Felius and Waal 2005). Consequently, their content was produced and distributed by publicly owned institutions, while their mechanisms were guaranteed by respected political authorities. However, around the 1990s, the last public service broadcast monopolies on the European continent came to an end as dual broadcast systems involving public and commercial actors were put in place (d'Haenens and Bardoel 2007).

In detail, Siune and Hulten (1998, p. 27) identified four broadcast systems as existing in Europe: (1) public monopoly/license fees broadcast channels only (in the 1980s); (2) public monopoly/mixed revenue; (3) private monopoly/advertising only; and (4) dual system (emerging in the 1990s). After the advent of radio in the 1920s, most European countries rejected the unregulated, free market broadcast model developing in the United States and the directly state-controlled system emerging in the Soviet Union (William 2005).

Raboy (1997) emphasizes that, as the leading model in Western Europe until the 1970s, public service monopolies were characterized by their strong public service remits and their lack of direct competition, as well as their relative degree of autonomy from the state, varying from country to country. Nearly all of these have become mixed systems since the 1970s, and traditional public broadcasting has become increasingly marginal. Raboy (1997, p. 11) further notes that, in Europe, mixed systems—increasingly the leading model since the 1970s—are depicted

either by the economic insulation of one sector from the other (as in Australia or Sweden, where PSBs are out of the advertising market) or by competition (Spain, where advertising exclusively finances public channels).[15]

The PSB system in Western Europe has several characteristics (McQuail 2010): a programming policy catering for all tastes (giving minority groups access, with fair and impartial political coverage), public accountability (through regulatory bodies), monopoly with a national scope of service, independence from vested political interests, and non-commercial ism. License fees are the most common source of money, as set by ruling governments or parliament and collected by public bodies. Similarly, Felius and Waal (2005) identify PSBs in the region as having a distinctive institutional form that combines three elements: publicly-owned (often not-for-profit) bodies, service monopoly, and clear programming policy emphasizing national and cultural themes.

The BBC in the UK has been the classic national model of European PSBs since 1922. Its activities are governed by the Royal Charter and its accompanying framework agreement, which guarantees the broadcaster's editorial independence. In its structure, the BBC answers to the BBC Trust, appointed by the Queen on advice from the ruling government. Funding comes mainly from license fees. Between the 1920s and 1970s, BBC initially took a key position (Raboy 1997). However, William (2005, p. 10) notes that, based on the view that the market will increase consumer choice and provide greater fiscal benefits, the pro-market broadcasting arrived in the UK around 1980s and grew.

Learning from BBC experience, politics was central to the development of PSBs in Europe. In this sense, William (2005, p. 46) finds three forms of PSBs. First is a formally autonomous system, with decision making separated from the government, as in Britain, Ireland, and Sweden. Second is an organizational governing body that has representatives from all majoritarian political parties as well as all social groups, as in Germany, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Third is a 'politics over broadcasting system' (Hallin and Mancini 2004) form that enables government and other political bodies to intervene in PSBs' day-to-day operations, as in Greece, Italy, and France.

Potschka (2012) recognizes Britain and Germany as having a shared ideal of a public service-driven broadcast system independent from state interference. However, they represent different ownership paradigms and also show different trajectories in their historical invention and

movement. In Germany, for example, there is a blend of political and administrative borders and regional television through the Consortium of Public Broadcasting Institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany (namely ARD). This contrasts sharply with the national-centralized BBC system, where the structures of regional governments in England have historically been less powerful. In line with Potschka, DW Akademie (2014, p. 12) notes that the first case of successful post-conflict media transformation is Germany's PSBs. After World War II and the Nazi landscape of propaganda media, a free media sector had to be created—at least in Western Germany. Although the BBC served as a reference for the PSB system, its model was adapted to the needs of German federal politics.

In comparison with the European model, PSBs in the United States can be broken down into two types: public and community broadcasters. According to Caves (2005), PSB grew out of a movement in the 1950s centered around educational and non-profit community bodies. The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 legalized this movement and set up a self-governing entity, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), to distribute federal funds. This broadcasting system centered on locally licensed stations.

From World War II until the late 1970s, PSBs in Europe were more dominant than private broadcasters, while in the United States PSB was viewed as 'an additional' and non-state model that supplements existing private commercials. PSBs in the United States are represented by a network of television and radio stations known as the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public Radio (NPR), both non-state autonomous bodies. Where most PSBs in Europe are mandated to serve their nation, NPR and PBS are obligated to help audiences stay away from commercial networks. To follow Freedman (2008), the BBC plays a hugely influential role in British public life and is the dominant broadcaster; in comparison, PBS and NPR play a rather marginal role in the United States.

Drawing on Humphreys' frameworks of PSB (1996, pp. 155–158), and by comparing both the European and the US PSBs, Hallin and Mancini (2004, pp. 30–31) identifies four models of PSBs in developed democracies as follow:

1. The government model, which approaches state broadcasting. It is controlled directly by the government or by the power of the majority. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), many European

states approached this model in an early phase of their broadcasting history, but eventually developed alternative institutional forms that would insulate PSB from political power. In this case, PSB board s are appointed directly by politicians in the parliament, not by the government.

2. The professional model. It is a strong broadcast fashion that mostly has freedom from political control and is run by professionals. This model is represented, above all, by the BBC in the United Kingdom, by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), and by PSBs in some Scandinavian countries.
3. The parliamentary/proportional representation model. Control over PSBs is divided among all political parties through proportional representation. However, in the majoritarian political system, although a PSB may be formally under the authority of parliament, the appointment of the governing board through proportional representation results in direct control by the political majority (as in Spain).
4. The civic corporatist model. This is similar to the parliamentary model, in the sense that control of the PSB is distributed among various social and political groups, but differs in that representation is extended beyond political parties to other kinds of social groups, such as trade unions, business sectors, and religious. The Dutch and the German public broadcasters, run directly by associations rooted in diverse religious and ideological subgroups, are the best examples of this model.

2.5.2 PSBs in Post-authoritarian Countries

As I discussed in the introduction to this book, due to different political histories and landscapes, the PSB models of Western developed democracies cannot easily be employed in new democracies. In the sense that media systems reflect the society in which they operate (Raboy 1997), PSB models can partially borrow from Western European experiences, but they might be designed contextually. This section is an attempt to examine the typical model of PSBs in transitional and post-autocratic politics.

By comparing both Western and non-Western radio broadcasting systems, Lewis and Booth (1989) conclude that the public and community radio types developed in Western democracies have generally been

modified and sometimes rejected by post-autocratic regimes in the cause of economic expansion and revolutionary struggle. The two key models—the American commercial and the European public broadcast monopoly models—have in practice influence post-colonial broadcasting systems differently.

Lewis and Booth (1989, p. 165) find that, in Latin America, the models of radio broadcasting introduced in the 1920s were commercial. State ownership has remained insignificant in the region, even though each country has a national government broadcaster. A similar private dominance is found in areas of American influence in the Pacific and Asia. In contrast, former British colonies in Africa and Asia (such as India and Sri Lanka) soon abandoned their BBC-like autonomy. Nonetheless, the new powers valued national broadcasting as an instrument for forging national identity, and most broadcasters employed state-run personnel (Lewis and Booth 1989). This confirms that PSBs in post-autocratic societies typically reflect the actual political systems in which they operate. Terms such as 'hybrid regime' and 'hybrid media system' have been proposed by Voltmer (2012, p. 240) to refer to such patterns.

Hybrid here is a blend of past regime and past broadcast organization with new dimensions of democracy and PSBs. New political powers exist in a gray zone, between autocratic and democratic political norms, being no longer repressive but not yet fully democratic. In line with Voltmer (2012), Zakaria (1997) proposed the term 'illiberal democracy,' describing a situation in which a post-autocratic regime has some democratic tendencies, such as public media institutions, but they do not necessarily function well.

A view of a hybrid media system is promoted by Chadwick (2013), who bases his studies on technological, structural, and behavioral views of the media systems in the United States and Britain. By applying four concepts (genre, norm, behavior, and organizational form), Chadwick (2013, pp. 9–11) presents hybridity as a codependent, complex, and transitional media system. He reveals how older and newer media logics and the power relations within the media in a dynamic regime overlap, and how continuities of the past have shaped periods of change. In the UK and the United States, Chadwick (2013) finds a hybrid mixture of three actors: older, newer, and renewed media. Older television, radio, and newspapers are still referred to as mainstream, but the very nature of the mainstream itself is changing. Old media entities are adapting and renewing their channels of delivery.[16]

The Chadwick's concept of hybridity is generally linked to a blend of non-profit, alternative and commercial media, or of advertising-funded and state-regulated or PSB systems. In a wider context, it may blend liberal ideals of a free and publicly run media with trajectories of past autocratic values and experience of unstable political transition (Voltmer 2008). The hybrid system adopts democratic elements in PSBs, but some elements of the autocratic system still exist. A hybrid system can also be understood as a blend of the already existing practices of former state-run media governances and new practices from imported Western PSB systems. With regard to Voltmer (2013) and McCargo (2012), hybridity in the governance of former state broadcasters in post-autocratic regimes can be seen as the outcome of unbalanced power between political actors and the public in seeking an appropriate way to continue former state-owned channels. Therefore, the degree to which hybrid PSBs adopt pro-democratic values may vary from state to state.

PSBs' hybridity can be found in the 'gray area' between the definitions and practices of state and public media. Why? Two answers can be provided here. First, when new governments are too weak to create suitable media policy, former state-owned broadcasters must be reformed to re-orient their four elements (remit, ownership, structure, and funding) from state to public interests. As such, even when policymakers in post-autocratic powers formally make policies to transform state broadcasters into PSBs, the implementation of said policies will be slow and existing patterns of ownership and funding may remain unchanged. The state broadcast system in Poland, for instance, detached itself from its communist ties in the 1990s and moved toward the Western PSB model, but it still has its Polish autocratic media legacies, such as the use of the channel as a political instrument of the ruling power.

Second, as argued by Voltmer (2013, p. 153), many Western European PSB models were imported by supranational organizations such as the European Union without considering the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. For instance, when post-autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe emerged from the ruins of state socialism, they inherited a vast bureaucracy of broadcasting entities. State-run channels were overstaffed, inefficient, and governed by a general attitude of loyalty to the ruling political elite. In this climate, PSBs were formally welcomed but practically rejected.[17]

Moreover, with no suitable political will or media assistance, media activists' and international consultants' proposal to transform state-run

channels into PSBs was accepted by new political authorities as a means of symbolizing democracy rather than transforming their national media. As a result, Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) identify media reform in Eastern Europe as having three different conditions: (1) systemic (total end of autocratic media), (2) formal (post-communist regimes formally integrate media policy into the European Union framework), (3) and institutional (new media institutions are created and stand to replace old state media).[18] Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008, pp. 17–19) further divide the media policy approaches taken by post-communist and post-autocratic regimes into three categories: idealistic, mimetic, and atavistic.

> First, idealistic (a switch-off the past media system totally). Fascinated with Western concepts of 'access,' 'participation,' and 'social management' of the media, this pattern was promoted by intellectuals and opposition leaders. The idea was to implement the democratic participant press theory (McQuail 2005) and create a media system based on a vision of non-authoritarian, self-managed CSOs with a critical role for broadcasters. While the concept of PSB may have appeared in this thinking, the real plan was to turn 'state' into 'social' broadcasting (i.e., directly managed and controlled by society).
>
> Second, mimetic orientation. The instant policy of post-communist regimes to adopt a generic template of PSB originally from Western Europe to respond to the European Union's request for its new member states. After the democratic breakthrough in 1989, the 'mimetic' policy was also conceived as a way of achieving realistic and practical approximation to the Western, including creation of a dual broadcast system. The 'mimetic' was initially dedicated to the pursuit of the goals of the public service phase of media policy in Western Europe. However, neoliberal economists' arguments for a free market prepared liberalization of the media market and the introduction of commercial broadcasting. Under the key terms of Westernization and 'Europeanization,' public service enthusiasts and neoliberal free market advocates forged an alliance in the 'mimetic' orientation.
>
> Third, atavistic. The ruling powers initially received mimetic media policy by formally importing PSB, but they remain sought to cling elements of the old authoritarian policy. In this model, public broadcasters are expected to be 'cooperative,' i.e., guided by a sense

> of responsibility for the process of transformation and assist the government as the leader of the process, rather than exercise an independent, and critical watchdog role. The PSB adoption was proposed at all instead of the continued old state-run stations.

Adding Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) and with respect to media digitalization, Harowitz (2015, p. 88) highlights several types of policies through which PSBs are transformed in former autocratic media regimes: the paternalistic type based on the public enlightenment goals, as in the classic BBC experience; the democratic and emancipatory type that emerged when state broadcast organizations transformed into PSBs in the 1970s and 1980s in some European and non-European states; and the systemic type wherein PSB is considered part and parcel of political change, such as in the transition to democracy in many former communist countries in Eastern Europe. In selecting between these policy types, two challenges face new PSBs in post-authoritarian countries: imitative policy that follows the models of mature PSBs, despite it potentially being ill-suited to the context of the transition from state to public broadcast channel taking place; and overly deregulated/commercialized media landscapes that leave little room for PSB development (Harowitz 2015).

In an attempt to advance the Jakubowicz and Sukosd's classification (2008), the DW Akademie assessed former state-run media models from twelve countries using several indicators: legal framework; governance and ethics; capacity building and human resources; financing management and newsroom; perception and public engagement (2014, p. 8). With particular focus on remit and ownership models, the organization identified three different journeys of former state-run media, as detailed below:

> First, media that remains state media. Their contribution to the general function of creating a public sphere is poor, but they nevertheless may support the integration of society by supporting cultural cohesion and expression. For example, RTA Afghanistan, NBC in Namibia, and MRTV in Myanmar are still officially state broadcasters. They offer one-sided information and generally do not let the opposition speak, or, at best, offer only limited occasions. However, according to DW Akademie (2014) these state broadcasters respect the general remit of supporting integration.

Second, PSB in initial transformation. These media are more independent to serve the public sphere, let the opposition speak, and offer societal criticism and orientation; they also support social integration through various functions, from education to cultural cohesion, with a legal basis and independent governing body in which civil society is represented in the top body.
Third is PSB in advanced transformation. These media offer objective and independent news journalism of acceptable professional quality, as well as forums for public debate and criticism. However, criticism of the government and its policy, as well as agenda setting and in-depth journalism, may be rare. In term of remit, this media model fulfills functions relevant to the integration of society, strengthening of identity, and cultural cohesion. On ownership, PSBs—as self-directed entity—have a legal basis and a governing body in which civil society is represented.

For instance, MNB in Mongolia and OTRK in Kyrgyzstan are quite advanced in their journey into real public service broadcasters. They are officially called PSBs and perform much better in creating a public sphere for the country. All political parties have the opportunity to speak and be heard. Moreover, MNB offers a wide range of programs to enhance public debate (DW Akademie 2014, p. 7).

Lacking experience with PSBs in the authoritarian era, and with limited public attention to the change of state channels into PSB, PSB design and practice may blend democratic and non-democratic governances, what Voltmer (2013) and Chadwick (2013) call 'the hybrid model,' existing, as Raboy (1997) wrote 'between the state and the public.' In remit, there may be a mixture of managing public expression with mouthpiecing the ruling political power; between freedom of expression and national integration. Also, there may be a conflict of ownership between PSBs as state agencies (as under autocracies) and the introduction of independent corporations outside the ruling government.

In structure, the appointment and performance of supervisory and executive boards are vulnerable to direct political intervention, both from governments and from politicians. In funding, the provision of mixed funding sources amidst the rapid growth of media oligarchies may, in practice, be reduced by the dominance of the state budget, which drives political control and clientelistic processes in its allocation and supervision.

Finally, if I back to the Hallin and Mancini' four models of Western European PSBs (2004)—governmental, professional, parliamentary, and civic corporatist—I would argue that the PSB models in new democracies can be either governmental, civic, corporatist, professional, or something beyond these models. Referring to DW Akademie (2014) and Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008), post-authoritarian PSBs may also either remain state-run media or use a Western European PSB-like model in initial or advanced transformation through ideal, mimetic, or atavistic ways of adoption.

2.5.3 Post-authoritarian PSBs in Practice

Pressured by multiple enemies (past legacies of autocratic culture as former state-owned broadcast channels, politicization of new governments and politicians, arrival of media oligarchs, new media, and digital technologies), the institutions and practices of PSB in post-autocratic regimes exist in 'limbo': between state- and public-oriented governances. This section explores some examples of post-authoritarian PSBs.

To obtain a real picture of post-authoritarian PSBs, we can start by looking at PSBs in Central and Eastern Europe states, which have received more advocacy than other transitional regimes. Chira (2009, p. 37) notes that the transformation of the media in Central and Eastern European countries has primarily been influenced by the liberal conditions imposed by the two organizations these countries sought to join after the fall of their authoritarian regimes: the Council of Europe and the European Union. Broadcasting systems in this region have been characterized by the control of commercially driven companies, a trend similar to that experienced in Western Europe. In this unhealthy climate, countries have to create PSB systems that reinforce their newly fashioned democracies.

Some observers (e.g., Pippidi 2003; Brikse 2010; Thomson 2013; Vitu 2009) find that Central and Eastern European countries have failed to adopt PSB. For instance, Moldova failed to transform the national channel Teleradio-Moldova (TRM) from a propaganda tool into a genuinely independent broadcaster. Vitu (2009) notes that the Moldovan government did not allow state television and radio to be transformed into public institutions and suggested that those who wanted a PSB should launch a new one (p. 193). Although combined international and domestic pressure forced the Moldovan parliament to adopt a law reforming TRM in the summer 2004, concrete improvements at the broadcaster have been

minimal. Latvia has four public radio channels and two public television broadcasters (Brikse 2010, p. 67). However, there is uncertainty in policy; it proclaims media freedom, but at the same time seeks to retain instrumental control.

In the Middle East and North African region, Zaid (2016, pp. 41–50) notes that, despite the presence of a supportive legal basis, PSBs in this region remain 'pseudo-public systems' in a 'game' played by competitive autocratic regimes. Although legal and institutional structures are in place, the political culture makes it impossible to implement real PSB channels. In Morocco, the mission to establish a public-oriented channel remains in an embryonic stage; the same goes for more liberal nation-states in the Middle East and North Africa such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. According to Abdulla (2016), the former state-run broadcaster Egypt Radio and Television Union (ERTU) is blurring state and public-oriented media. Abdulla (2016) further explains that the ERTU has positioned itself as PSB, despite its allegiance remaining to the state rather than the people. Moreover, most media staff continue to think of themselves as working for state media, and they prioritize the state officials that pay their salaries. Also, there is nepotism in the recruitment process.

In his study of PSB initiatives in the Global South, Rahman (2016, p. 7) concludes that state-administered broadcasters in the region are not dying. He also paints a complex picture of former state-run broadcasters in their journey to become PSBs. His country case studies—Bangladesh, Morocco, Mexico, Indonesia, and South Africa—demonstrate how political interference is the biggest hurdle to a fully functional public media. They have similarities in their political structures and cultures, historical settings, and ties to post-colonial structure and contemporary forces linked with global media capitalism.

Smith (2012) identifies different tracks in the former state-run channels in post-autocratic Asia and Africa. Not all media changes are linked to the democratic system. In Thailand, PSB was introduced under a military government, and it came into being because of strong pressure from CSOs and media professionals. The 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act set Thailand's PSB as a commercial-free broadcaster with editorial independence. The PSB is financed by taxes on tobacco and alcohol, the so-called Sin Tax. As Smith (2012) further noted, Thailand's PSB has an elected board of governors, with four-year terms, and this board works closely with a fifty-member audience council.

In India, the PSB emerged from the integration of the former state-run channels, namely Doordarshan and All India Radio. It involved transforming these broadcasters into PSBs through the Prasar Bharati Act of 1997 (Mohapatra and Das 2014). In the view of Smith (2012), the main difficulty experienced by the Indian broadcaster has been to change the mindsets of journalists and program makers who are used to serving those in power, or those who have money, rather than the 'public interest.'

In contrast with India, in its ten years of reform from a state media to a PSB, the Mongolian National Broadcaster (MNB) has seen significant achievements. According to DW Akademie (2014), despite increased competition from commercial rivals, the public broadcaster still has the best ratings and the highest credibility among the population.

Elsewhere, the Taiwanese PSB was born as a government-initiated media project to secure and reinforce national identity in the conflicted relations with the People's Republic of China. The channel operated and managed by the Taiwan Public Television Service Foundation is credited as the sole PSB provider (Cheng and Lee 2016, p. 103). Despite huge resources, the development of Taiwanese PSB needs support at the grassroots to accelerate its transformation into public service media. Lin (2012) finds that the process of reconstructing Taiwan's broadcasting is dominated by political and academic elites, with the public excluded from active participation and relegated to the role of spectator.

Concerning post-authoritarian, post-colonial, post-communist, and post-apartheid political systems, Table 2.1 features trends in former state-owned broadcasting models in new democracies. Table 2.1 describes policy models as well as four elements of PSBs: remit, ownership, structure, and funding.

Table 2.1 illustrates the characteristics of PSBs in four new democracies. It confirms that there is no single picture of PSB. In remit, for instance, there is a mix of promoting 'democratic socialism, human freedom' and 'national integration.' In ownership, the adoption of SABC as a non-state corporation reflects the commercialization of the sole South Africa n PSB. In contrast, the Georgian PSB system has adopted a state autonomous agency model and kept distance with direct control from parliament. In terms of funding, the Egyptian model uses the state budget as its primary source of money, while license fees and advertising are the main financial sources of South Africa's SABC. Moreover, Tomaselli (2008) affirms the high politicization of the country's post-apartheid

Table 2.1 Portrait of PSBs in post-autocratic countries

Character	*South Africa*	*Egypt*	*India*	*Georgia*
Political History	Post-apartheid	Post-authoritarian	Post-colonial	Post-communist
Past-Power Holder	FW De Klerk (up to 1994)	Husni Mubarak (1981–2011)	Great Britain up to 1947	Russian Empire up to 1991
PSB Policy	Broadcasting Act no. 4/1999, amended 2002	ERTU Act no. 223/1989, revised by 2014–2017 to convert ERTU to PSB	Prasar Bharati Act no. 25/1990	Broadcasting Act 2004, amended by new Law no. 1592/2013
Key Remit	To reflect unity and diverse cultural and multilingual nature and to maintain a shared South African identity (Act. no. 4/1999 on Broadcasting)	To promote the values associated with democratic socialism, national unity and to maintain the human dignity and freedoms (Act. no. 223/1989 on ERTU)	To uphold the unity and integrity of the country and the values enshrined in the Indian Constitution (Act. no. 25/1990 on Prasar Bharati)	To facilitate the development of the uniqueness of the country; to cover the pluralism of ideas existing in the public (Act. no. 1592/2013 on Broadcasting)
Ownership Model	Public corporation, serving public and commercial interests in separate divisions	Public authority under the Ministry of Information	Autonomous broadcasting corporation	Legal entity under public law, outside government (boards and employment)
Type of Structure	Non-Executive Board: 12 persons elected by president under advice of the parliament and group of CEOs	A general assembly chaired by the Minister of Information, elected by the president & managing directors elected by the Minister of Information	Prasar Bharati Board (15 persons), full time and part time, elected by both public and the Minister of Information	Board of Trustees (9 members, elected by parliament for six-year terms) & Director General

(continued)

public broadcaster. The first two boards of SABC (1993–1996 and 1997–2000) positively balanced race, gender, and political affiliations. However, subsequent boards have been dominated by the allies of the ruling South African political party, the African National Congress (ANC). Also, the

Table 2.1 (continued)

Character	*South Africa*	*Egypt*	*India*	*Georgia*
Employment Status	Autonomous corporate staff	Of 46,000 employees, 92% are government-run staff	Of 81,800, most are government-run staff	Autonomous staff
Funding Source	Mix of license fees, advertising, other related businesses	Mix of fees, state budget, advertising, loans, etc. In practice: state budget	Mix of fees, state budget, commercial advertising. In reality: mostly state budget	Mix of license fees and other related revenues
Media Brand	South African Broadcasting Company Ltd.	Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU)	Prasar Bharati (All India Radio & Doordarshan)	Georgian Public Broadcaster & AJARA TV and Radio

Source Compiled from Abdulla (2016), Beckerman (2014), Fourie (2003), and Mohapatra and Das (2014)

SABC's high dependence on commercial funding and the increasing political insecurity of the executive boards have led to difficulty maintaining editorial freedom (Rahman 2016).

2.6 The Limits of Studies on Post-Authoritarian PSBs

It is important to note that studies of PSB systems have evolved since the birth of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the UK in 1922, and BBC researchers have played a dominant role in this arena (Moe 2008). The recent liberalization of media in the United Kingdom, for instance, has driven academics to further examine non-classic PSBs that have shifted from being synonymous with BBC—a paternalistic model—to become a catch-all that may broadly include global new media institutions. Hence, studies into PSBs have become more comprehensive, covering all broadcasting types that may be claimed and replace classic modes of PSB services (Moe and Syvertsen 2009).

Since public-driven broadcast channels in post-communist and post-authoritarians are dependent on political changes, much research has

focused on policy analysis, particularly on the interplay between political reform and PSB development. For instance, scholars have examined the fall of communist political systems in Eastern Europe/resignation of autocratic powers in Asia and Africa and its impact on the reform of state broadcasting and the arrival of public-oriented broadcasting (e.g., Hallin and Mancini 2004; Pippidi 2003; Smith 2012; Voltmer 2013). They have also paid attention to the high pressure exerted by private media owners over government protection of PSBs in Western Europe. On the other hand, studies of new media's effects on PSB services have increased.[19]

In their article 'Researching Public Service Broadcasting,' Moe and Syvertsen (2009, pp. 400–402) identify four types of research into PSBs: policy issues, institutional issues, role of PSBs in democracy, and post-modern studies. Moreover, they distinguish between two distinct waves of PSB studies. The first occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s, when media monopolies were broken and classic PSBs faced competition from commercial channels; the second followed a wave of digital and convergence in the late 1990s and 2000s, when competition increased on all platforms and prompted PSBs to enter new markets. To observe PSBs, scholars often deployed political, economic, and sociological approaches, and may work as an individual observer or as part of academic research institution.

As I have observed, systematic studies of public-driven broadcast ers fall into four types: (1) policy design, (2) PSB institutional change, (3) macro-analysis of PSB and democracy, and (4) PSB performance reviews.

The first type focuses on the interplay of politics, economy, and social context with PSB policy-making and its implementation in single/multiple countries. It may examine, for example, the influence of the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and subsequent European Union policy on PSB adoption in post-communist countries on critical debates on the application of EU State Aid Policy that restrict PSBs' financial income in the digital era (e.g., Bardoel and d'Haenens 2008; Brevini 2013; Jeune 2009; Joesaar 2011; Murphy 2008). Joesaar investigated the impact of European policy on PSBs in Estonia, while Brevini examined European Policy on PSB 2.0 (Internet-based PSB services) in the convergence era. Beckerman (2014) evaluated the Georgian media policy's failure to adopt the PSB, while Pippidi (2003) focused his attention on state television reform in Eastern and Central Europe. Outside Europe, Rahman (2014) explored PSB policy in Bangladesh.

The second type focuses on PSB institutional reform within political settings and its challenges for digital technology adoption, audience interaction, and consumption that leads to the introduction of PSM instead of analog PSB. This type also covers the investigation of PSB ownership and remit, as well as public access to PSB structures. For example, Mendel (2000) conducted a comparative legal survey of PSBs, Nissen (2015) investigated PSB audiences in the digital era; and Cowling and Tambini (2002) examined the shift from the classic PSB model to public service media (PSM). Similar studies were conducted outside Europe (e.g., Im, 2011 in Cambodia; and Reid, 2015 in New Zealand). There are also compilations of papers, such as PSM in Europe (Ibarra et al. 2015), PSM remit in Europe (Glowacki 2012), and a guide to PSM policies in Europe (Steenfadt and Screenworld 2010).

The third type of study on the link between PSBs and democracy has examined mandates, political economies, and social and cultural values drawing on theorists such as Habermas, Marx, and Gramsci. Also, they have examined legislative changes and the impact of liberal policy on the shift of PSBs from public- to market-oriented services. One seminal study was conducted by McChesney (1997) into the myth of commercial broadcasting and the PSB crisis. This was followed by Lin (2012) and Larsen (2014) for Scandinavian cases; and Tracey (1998) for BBC and NHK (Japan's PSB). Other studies have emphasized PSBs within the context of Habermasian public sphere (Ramsey 2010), public values notions (Knoll 2012); Internet democracy (Moe 2008); and free market media (Park 2005).

Finally, the fourth type is profile assessments of PSB institutions, supported by regional or international aid agencies such as UNESCO, DW Akademie (Germany), or BBC Media Action in the United Kingdom (e.g., Carlsson 2013, for NORDIC Countries; Dabbous 2014 for the southern Mediterranean). Outside Europe, Sakr (2012) assessed PSB in the Arab–Middle Eastern states while Green (2013) assessed PSB in the Mekong Southeast Asia n region. Deutsch Welle conducted a comparative study on PSB adoption in developing nations of Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Middle Asia (2014); Thomson (2013) in Eastern Europe; and Harding in divided regimes (2015). With the full support of UNESCO, Banarjee and Seneviratne (2005) outlined best practices for PSBs, while Raboy (1995) and Smith (2012) compared state broadcaster transformation worldwide.[20]

A smaller survey of PSBs in the Middle East and North Africa was conducted by Panos, the Paris Institute, and Mediterranean Observatory Communication (2012). Also, Marko (2017) conducted an investigation of PSBs in the Western Balkans.

In all of the previous studies mentioned above, I found two limitations. First, most of the studies were conducted in Europe, the heartland of PSB (e.g., Smith 2012; Mendel 2000; Jakobuwicz and Sukosd 2008; Bardoel and d'Haenens 2008). The second most common region for PSB studies was North America, followed by parts of Africa and the Middle East. As such, in term of numbers, surveys of PSB policy and its components in other regions, in particular Southeast Asia, remain limited. Second, there is a lack of more in-depth study into the interplay between PSB and the complexity of political reform in post-colonial and transitional democracies outside Eastern Europe. Research that combines historical review, examination of the policy-making process behind PSB design, and its practice is also rare. Most PSB assessments from aid agencies are concentrated on the output of their assistance projects, and as such lack analysis for implementation in the field.

It can be said, there is a need to bridge the high numbers of PSB studies in the Western world (Europe and North America) with investigations in the non-Western world, mainly Southeast Asia. Also, there is a need for deeper analysis of the interplay between the change of former state channels into PSB channels alongside the dynamics of political change from autocracy to democracy, both at the macro-level (e.g., media-state relations in policy-making) and at the micro-level (e.g., four PSB components).

In Indonesia, there have been studies of broadcasting, mainly the policies implemented since Indonesia's political reform. Both Indonesian and non-Indonesian scholars have conducted these studies (e.g., Arifuddin 2014; Gazali 2003; Jurriens 2009; Kitley 2000; Kristiawan 2012; Lin 2012; Masduki 2007; Sen 2003; Subiakto 2010; Triputera 2005).[21] Some studies have focused on the arrival of liberal media policy, wherein most private broadcasters provide programs to the general public in the interest of accumulating money (Lin 2012; Nugroho et al. 2012; Rianto 2014), and put Indonesian PSB as an actor balancing the dominance of the private sector in the marketplace.[22]

On the transformation of state broadcasters into PSB in Indonesia, only a few systematic studies have been conducted. Compared to studies

of other media platforms, such as commercial and community broadcasting, studies of PSB in the country are still rare. Before and after the enactment of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, both foreign and Indonesian scholars concentrated their focus on the general broadcasting policy reform, with a focus on the emergence of the television industry and community radio. Little consideration has been given to the transformation of Indonesian PSB ambassadors, namely RRI/TVRI as a study object. For instance, a series of media policy reviews from two research bodies—*Pemantau Regulasi dan Regulator Media* (Media Regulation and Regulatory Watch) and the Center for Innovation, Policy, and Governance (CIPG)—investigated Indonesian broadcasting policy between 2010 and 2014; however, they considered RRI/TVRI's transformation from state to public channels as only a marginal part of their analysis.

During the 2010s, five PhD theses addressed community radio, including Birowo (2010), Maryani (2007) and Rachmiatie (2007). In contrast, only two doctoral theses inspected the RRI/TVRI as well as local PSBs (Intani 2012; Widodo 2017). Widodo investigated the reduction of the public sphere in local PSBs in East Java, while Intani (2012) concentrated on the normative debates of PSB concepts among TVRI stakeholders. This is believed to be a result of two factors: (1) decreasing popularity and significance of RRI/TVRI as public channels and (2) the concept of PSB itself still being alien.

During 2003–2018, there are numerous master theses on RRI/TVRI. Effendi (2008) for instance, focused on civic engagement principles in RRI Malang (a local station in East Java) following the enactment of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, while Sasongko (2003) and Heryanto (2003) focused on the changing policy of TVRI from 1998 to 2002. Irma (2003) examined the political interests of the enactment of five articles regulating Indonesian PSB in Broadcasting Law of 2002. From a media advocacy interest, there have been few studies seeking to ensure public access in RRI/TVRI. For example, between 2013 and 2014, the Public Broadcasting Clearing House (PBCH)—a national non-governmental organization run by media activists and journalists—performed field assessment and mapped the institutional problems of PSB. This produced the book *Save RRI and TVRI* (Masduki and Darmanto 2014). Previously, academics at Universitas Indonesia, working with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES), held a series of media workshops on RRI/TVRI.

Nevertheless, I observe at least three limitations to the above studies. First, most of the studies depart from the enactment of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, analyzing the text of the law. Not enough attention has been paid to the policy-making process between 1999 and 2002, the flow of ideas behind the process, and the negotiations applied by stakeholders to influence the law's output within a particular political setting. Also, there has been no continual observation of the law's implementation since 2002, particularly its practice in RRI/TVRI. Second, most researchers have limited their study to one particular PSB provider, either RRI or TVRI, and thus not compared them to generate a wider analysis of Indonesia's PSB models. For instance, Heryanto (2003) limited his study to analyzing government decrees on TVRI from 2000 to 2002, while Intani (2012) focused on the formulation of PSB concepts within the Broadcast Law, using TVRI as her case study.

Overall, this study seeks to fill the described gap in studies of post-authoritarian PSBs, to encourage the growth of academic debate on PSBs in new democracies—with Indonesia as its case study—and to understand the complex picture of PSB within the different political and social landscape as shown by this chapter.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has explained the relationship between PSBs and political systems, as well as thoughts on the dimensions of political systems that influence PSB policy design and its execution in developing democracies. I have discussed three dimensions of political structure and culture: (1) political parallelism and the role of state; (2) political paternalism and clientelism; and (3) market-driven politics. Afterward, this chapter has explored characteristics, policy rationales, and PSB components and their link with political structure and culture in developed and developing societies.

Embarking from the spirit behind the publication of the book *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World* (2012), this chapter has outlined the contesting ideas and schemes of post-autocratic PSBs. Based on the underlying concept that any media system that shifts away from autocracy is transitioning to uncertain conditions, the description of alternative PSB journeys—such as from Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008)—is useful for dealing with non-Western Europe developments and different political trajectories.

This chapter has identified two prominent reviews of PSB systems. The first is a survey of PSBs in Western developed societies (Humphreys 1996; Hallin and Mancini 2004). Examining parallelism and the role of the state in designing media policy, they find four PSBs used by European and North American regimes: (1) the government or state-oriented model, as in classic era of French media; (2) the professional model, inherited from the BBC in the UK; (3) the parliamentary or proportional representation model, as in Italy in the 1980s; (4) the civic corporatist model, in which PSB control is distributed among various social and economic groups, as in the Dutch and German tradition.

Second is a survey of public media institutions in transitional societies organized by the DW Akademie (2014, pp. 7–8). This organization focuses its study on the social functions and modes of transformation of former state-owned channels in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Central Asia. Using extensive literature review and interviews with key stakeholders, the organization identifies four conditions of new PSBs: (1) broadcasters that remain state media, as in Afghanistan and Namibia; (2) PSBs in initial transformation, as in Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia; (3) PSBs in advanced transformation, as in Moldova and Serbia; (4) alternative-community models of PSB, as in Nepal and Serbia.

My review finds that the Humphreys, Hallin and Mancini, Jakubowicz and DW Akademie's classifications have several problems. First, they concentrate on the policy, ownership, and structure of PSB, and do not integrate and compare the four PSB components of remit, ownership, structure, and funding. Second, most studies are based on European states (Humphreys) and North and South Asian states (DW Akademie), ignoring the Southeast Asia n region (including Indonesia). Additionally, the models prepared by Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) were designed during the early consolidation of democracy in the 1990s–2000s. However, the situation has become more complicated with the rapid growth of commercial channels, new media, and the return of political intervention in PSBs.

Overall, looking at the four aspects of PSB components (remit, ownership, structure, and funding) in the post-authoritarian political setting of Indonesia, this book will revisit the scholarly argument that political change brings change to the real PSB. In particular, this book seeks to revisit the PSB models promoted by Hallin and Mancini, Humphreys, and the DW Akademie, using Indonesia as its case study. The present book also revisits the findings of Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) that media reform in post-communist/autocratic societies is mimetic and atavistic. At


Clientelism & Paternalism Politics
REMIT: (Roles of PSB in a particular political system; who intends to serve for; scope of service mandates, etc.)
OWNERSHIP: (State or non-state own; its rationales; political bodies responsible for PSB support; staffing)
Political Paralel lism
PSB SYSTEM IN POST-AUTOCRATIC POWERS
Roles & Nature of State Interventi on
STRUCTURE: (PSB governing board model; who appoints the board; procedures of appointment; its membership, etc.)
FUNDING: (Type of budget; state bodies provides moneys; procedures to access; forms of accountability)
Market Driven Politics

Fig. 2.1 Influential factors to PSB systems in post-authoritarian regimes

the end, it re-discusses what Voltmer (2012) and Chadwick (2013) have termed the 'hybrid model' of public-driven media in developing societies.

In the interest of providing guidelines for investigating the PSB model in Indonesia, I have created a general conceptual framework in Fig. 2.1.

Notes

1. System is a collection of interrelated quantities that makes a whole and each element interacts to produce a whole system (McKenzie 2006). Media commonly refers to these three objects: a medium, analog, and digital; the organization that produces media contents; and the product/content itself (Hardy 2008). To mix the two terms, a media system may be defined as a set of arrangements for public communication with a particular distinct pattern of features (McQuail 2005). Media system may also be understood as a network of platforms (television; radio; newspaper; and the Internet) in a specific region/district. Media system can also be seen as complicated relationship among different media, which includes management and content, state ownership, and the society in which the media operates.

2. The first academic investigation of the interplay between political development and media systems, Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's *The Four Theories of the Press*, was published in 1956. The authors identify four media systems, namely the Soviet communist system, the authoritarian system, the liberal system, and the social responsibility system. Both the communist and authoritarian models are characterized by states exerting active control over mass media. In contrast, although both the liberal and social responsibility models emphasize market competition, in the latter the state may regulate media and establish pro-public broadcasting channels. However, these models received criticism for their 'ethnocentricity,' West-centrism, and 'the US and the rest paradigm' (Esser and Hanitzsch 2012) simplifying multifaceted media systems. Hallin and Mancini (2004, p. 10) argue that Siebert's theory was influenced by the Cold War, in which the United States and Soviet Union were competing for their ideologies. To advance Siebert's concepts, the two authors developed a three models of media system: liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist. The liberal system exists in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and North American states, within the free market and without state intervention. The democratic corporatist model is applied in Northern Europe, including in Germany, and is embedded within private and media-related social and political bodies or commonly termed as PSB. The third model, the polarized pluralist system, is described by close media affiliation to the current power or political party and by steady state intervention in media, as in Italy (Hallin and Mancini 2004, pp. 89–248).
3. Politics was central to the development of PSB systems in Western Europe. Blumler (1992) pointed out that PSB bodies are highly politicized entities. The government plays a vital role in the formation of PSB governance, although this does not mean that governments always tightly control PSB. For instance, political control dominated the development of French television under the De Gaulle regime, while political re-education policies have enhanced government support for broadcasting and encouraging social diversity in Germany. The rationale of the state taking a role in public channels is that broadcasting is too important to be defined as a market commodity (William 2005).
4. According to McCargo (2012), in Southeast Asia there is a partisan tradition in the formal and informal links between the media and political parties, which must be understood as a range of connections in the world of media politics. Under the hegemony of post-autocratic politics and market players, the media are untrustworthy actors, potentially supporting political liberalization or undermining an elected government.
5. In studying post-Soviet media systems, Roudakova (2008) notes that clientelism is marked by close and compromistic relationships between

journalists and politicians. She argues that clientelistic political culture lies at the center of power struggles, sometimes as politicians' weapon of choice and sometimes as independent retailers of publicity. In such clientelism, public opinion is a resource that 'patrons'—politicians or financial tycoons—can use to retain influence on PSB creation.

6. In the making of media laws in Indonesia, less public engagement links to paternalism where, in the past, media houses were controlled entirely by the elite, not public. Ispandriarno (2008) identifies the impact of paternalism in making Press Law during 1998–1999, in which elite groups of society dominated policy debate. Agenda setting and construction of the Law belongs to elite officials, and is adjusted by small number of politicians, while ordinary people are alienated from the processes.
7. In Indonesia, over the past fifteen years, a small number of oligarchs have owned the vast majority of the country's print, television, radio, and online media (Nugroho et al. 2012). In pursuing their political ambitions, most economic oligarchs have established new political parties or engaged with the past-existing parties, actively seeking to develop positive perceptions through commercial television and delegitimize PSB as well as block media reform initiatives by ensuring that the public pays little attention to RRI/TVRI (Masduki 2014).
8. In addition to technological scarcity, uncontrolled social impact of broadcast contents is another reason why broadcasting is strictly regulated (Dominick 2004). Free access to commercial television has entered the private sphere of citizen and alienated them from normal societal interaction. Moreover, strict public policy is applied equally to public and private media to guarantee fair competition and speech.
9. On the importance of the public sphere in the twenty-first century, Larsen (2014) identifies three models: the fellow citizen (associated with Habermas's deliberative democracy), the pluralist democracy (Mouffe 2000), and the consumer or neoliberal democratic model. In this sense, PSB is vital for securing the public sphere in the deliberative format of Western democracy. To agree with Ramsey (2010), PSB may act as: (1) the inclusion, with PSB in principle being open to all; (2) deliberation; and (3) opinion formation through rational arguments and critical debates.
10. PSB component here can be associated with PSB governance. According to Girard et al. (2002, p. 15), the Commission on Global Governance has defined 'governance' as the sum of the many ways in which individuals and public/private institutions manage their common affairs. In media policy and regulatory sectors, governance here means the framework of practices, rules, and institutions—both national and supranational—that set limits and give incentives for media performance (Puppis 2010). Freedman (2008, p. 14) defines media governance as the sum total of the mechanisms—formal and informal, national and supranational, centralized and

dispersed—that aim to organize media systems. In this context, I follow Hanretty (2007), holding that the governance of public-run broadcasting is the system by which it is directed and controlled. It encompasses public media policy, institutions, and roles within society's diverse interests and actors.

11. To McQuail (2010), PSB component centers in the structure (ownership model, licensing, financing, size of service, public or private control, and overall organizational management). In his study on PSB laws in developed states, Mendel (2011) stated that the key component of PSB policy consists of service provided, public service mandate, structure, and funding system.
12. The first General Director of BBC, John Reith, pointed out that the remit of PSB is to provide service for information, education, and entertainment with high-quality content (Jeune 2009). From this perspective, PSB audiences are viewed as citizens, not consumers. The Reith's trinity of remit: information, education, and entertainment, as well as his statement that broadcasting serves as the interrogator of democracy lies at the heart of PSB worldwide (Holland 2003). Regarding the Rheitian paradigm, the Office of Communication (Ofcom) as the UK's broadcast regulator, translated the BBC's remit as a medium for informing 'our understanding' of the world; stimulating knowledge and learning; reflecting the British cultural identity; representing diversity and alternative viewpoints; and formulating some characters: high-quality, original, challenging, engaging, and wide availability (Jeune 2009).
13. In India, for example, the government-oriented motives of PSBs are used as room for extensive political control. Since its creation in 1936, All India Radio (AIR) has been expected to play an important role in achieving political integration, economic progress, and social modernization (Sinha 1996, p. 2013). As Sinha (1996) notes, AIR was tasked with helping overcome the immediate crisis of political instability that followed India's independence and fostering the long-term process of political modernization and nation-building that was the dominant ideology of the newly formed state. To ensure the application of these remits, AIR was tightly controlled by the ruling political administration.
14. During the 1960s and 1970s, Katz and Wedell (1977) noted, almost all broadcast services in Asian authoritarian regimes were owned directly by the ruling government, and the state officials controlled their operations. The location of radio and television broadcasting is heavily concentrated in the larger, richer, centers of population as shown by RRI/TVRI in Indonesia. The pattern wherein broadcasting studio, together with presidential palaces, are the first sites to be attacked and occupied when a political crisis occurs indicates the importance of the use of a broadcast channel. However, since the 1970s, broadcast policy and its structure have

tended toward the American multi-operator and commercial broadcast model, yet privately owned services have added to state-owned channels.

15. In line with Raboy (1997), William (2005, p. 10) notes that, in the 1970s, European PSBs were destabilized by a number of changes. The entrance of new media, as well as satellite and cable technology, brought an end to the scarcity problem that had justified the monopoly system. Commercial pressure came from media moguls, who sought the relaxation of national rules and deregulation to facilitate their entry into the expanding broadcast market. However, to follow Curran (1996), the decline of PSB across Western Europe has not been uniform. In some countries, PSBs have been able to resist the pressure of privately owned broadcasters and improved their performance as they have fought off the competition.
16. According to Chadwick (2013, p. 9), the concept of hybridity is commonly used in the social sciences as a messy mixture of democracy and autocracy, between elite control and individual autonomy, bureaucratic, and market-based inter-organizational flows. In the study of a political system, Huang (2009) noted, Asia-Pacific states are good example of the political hybridity: being a republic does not necessarily mean being a Western model of liberal democracy. In contrast, being a republic does not necessarily determine the extent of state dominance.
17. Katzand Wedell (1977)—in their seminal book *Broadcasting in the Third World*—reveal that developing nations have adopted the pattern of television used by the industrialized countries that have close historical ties with them. For example, former British colonies in South Asia such as India and Sri Lanka have followed the pattern set by BBC in England. In contrast, Latin American nations have followed the commercial television pattern of the United States. Also, Katz and Wedell (1977, p. 89) identify Dutch broadcasting patterns as having a significant influence on the early broadcasting models of colonies such as Indonesia.
18. In studying the broadcasting revolution within post-authoritarian states experiencing 'state run broadcasting' as their core system, Raboy (1997, p. 9) divides the journey of broadcasters into three steps. First is the residual state core system, referring to countries that have not yet broken with the tradition of single and monolithic national state-owned broadcasters playing a dominant role. Second is the emergent state core system, in which private and community radios play a key role within existing state-owned and controlled broadcasters, as seen in Asia and Africa. The regimes in these regions seek a new model linking mixtures of public, private, and community features. Broadcasting is viewed as a tool for development, and some grapple with the objectives of Western-style PSB. Third is the transitional state core system, as seen in the former Soviet-bloc states, in which pluralistic media are established on the old foundation of autocratic monopolies.

19. In terms of authors and publishers, systematic studies of PSB may be conducted by individuals as part of graduate/doctoral projects (e.g., Fan 2011; Lin 2012) or international institutional projects (e.g., Banarjee and Seneviratne 2005). Moreover, research into PSB systems is developed by policy and advocacy centers or media institutions as part of their global or regional media assistance projects; law drafting and its evaluation; and/or strategic advocacy. However, the types of studies depend on the particular region as well as the author's interests. In established democracies, many studies concentrate on PSBs' struggles with private media, ownership monopolies of commercial broadcasters, and technological revolution. In contrast, in transitioning states that have newly adopted PSB, most studies have focused on political pressures and efforts to formulate strong laws that maintain PSB in public.
20. Additionally, during the 2000s, two non-profit bodies, RIPE and IAMCR, have held international conferences to debate current issues of public broadcasting. In cooperation with NORDICOM publishing, RIPEat published a journal on PSB, while the Working Group on Public Service Media Policies of the IAMCR published a proceeding. In the same way and spirit, academics and PSB elites engage in annual meetings run by the Public Broadcasting International (PBI) in different cities. In such forums, they examine PSB issues and share knowledge and practical experiences. Nevertheless, most attendees and speakers come from Europe and North America, and most case studies are centered there. Many international aid institutions such as UNESCO and the Asia-Pacific Institute of Broadcasting Development (AIBD) have conducted document-based overviews of PSB systems. They have mapped out trends in media policy changes and their impact on PSB. In 2017, Freiburg University produced a map of PSBs in the Western Balkans together with the Swiss National Science Foundation. The results of these studies were mostly published in books that were shared in a wide range of global communities as part of PSB advocacy, such as *A Road Map to Public Service Broadcasting* (Smith 2012). As a tool for activism, all of the above efforts have helped locate the empirical situation that lead researchers to compare PSB issues in particular regions before entering the field. It has produced much descriptive and document-based data but mostly lacked macro-analysis. There is a need to renew data from all previous public-driven media studies, both through macro-analysis and through more profound field observations.
21. Arifuddin (2014), for instance, described three competing actors being involved during the drafting of the Broadcasting Law, inspired by the successful enactment of Press Law No. 40/1999: (1) parliament and officials under two presidents: Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, (2) industry players, and (3) civil society, seeking a new law that promoted freedom

of expression. According to Arifuddin, at least four drafts were proposed by some parties such as non-governmental organizations, parliament, the Ministry of Communication, and the Association of Private Broadcasters. Similarly, in a master's thesis at Universitas Indonesia, Sekundatmo (2006) examined the struggle between civil society, industry, and government in the process of making regulations under Broadcasting Law No. 32/2002. However, none of these studies have paid attention to the debate on the PSB policies within the act or observed the stakeholders involved in the PSB policy-making process. In the radio sector, Sen's investigation (2003) helps understand the dynamic change of RRI and its connection to the political climate before and during the 1998 political reform. In her article 'Radio Days, Media Politics in Indonesia,' Sen described the state control over the national radio as a legacy of colonialism; depoliticization of private channels; and the rise of illegal radio that opposed RRI as the state broadcaster. Mainly, Sen paid attention to the rise of journalism on private radio channels that drove media policy reform. Nevertheless, this study did not examine the situation after the year 1998.

22. Most previous studies have solely departed from the Press Law No. 40/1999 and Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 as the two pillars of Indonesian media policy. Some researchers (Arifuddin 2014; Sekundatmo 2006; Subiakto 2010; Wahyuni 2000) focused on the difficulty of constructing media pluralism and the contested ideas behind Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, providing a map of stakeholders and interests in the drafting of the act in parliament during 1999–2002. In addition to examining the media law, using the political economy perspective, researchers have investigated the emergence of media ownership monopolies in Indonesia, including private television (Armando 2014; Lin 2012; Rianto 2014; Wahyuni 2008). On the other hand, during the 2014 general election, there were efforts to investigate political intervention in the newsrooms of private TVs. However, given the limited influence of RRI/TVRI content in the 2014 election, study of this issue was only a small part of the bigger issue of political intervention in media operations.

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CHAPTER 3

Indonesia as a Case Study

3.1 Introduction

During the annual Forum Medien und Entwicklung (FoME) Symposium, held November 3–4, 2016 in Berlin, Germany, I met numerous media activists and Europe-based media assistance managers for new democratic regimes in Asia and Africa. These included Sofie Jannusch from the Catholic Media Council (Germany); Esben Q. Harboe from International Media Support (Denmark); and James Deane from BBC Media Action (UK). In an informal talk during the meeting, I sought their perceptions of Indonesia and discussed the rationale for choosing this country as an aid recipient. Jannusch, Harboe, and Deane expressed similar thoughts, emphasizing the positive progress in media system reform, including the introduction of PSB in post-autocratic Indonesian politics and the way in which their projects seek to sustain this positive condition.[1]

In line with this positive view, the goal of this chapter is to state the importance of studying Indonesia's PSB system by reviewing the country's mixed characteristics, as described by global media scholars.[1] This chapter serves as a backdrop for further study of the Indonesian PSB system in comparison with PSBs in other post-authoritarian polities.

Overall, the importance of studying the Indonesian PSB system lies in its position as an arena for the contestation of the post-autocratic media system, liberal media policy, and continued legacies of the colonial era and post-independence Sukarno and Suharto regimes. Academic studies

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over the past fifteen years, including those by Romano (2003), d'Haenens and Gazali (1999), Jurriens (2009), Hanitzsch (2001, 2005), and Steele (2011), have painted a complex picture of post-authoritarian Indonesia.[2] By situating Indonesia's PSB development within the context of post-repressive societies and illiberal democracies, this book will demonstrate how western European (or 'BBC-like') PSB models have traveled to new democracies, mainly Indonesia, and how the autocratic legacies embedded in former state-owned radio and television broadcasters have resisted external pressures.

The exploration of the Indonesian PSB in this book will contribute to the global academic debate on PSB models outside the European and American contexts that began with studies such as Marc Raboy's *Public Broadcasting for the 21st Century* (1995), Jakubowicz's *Post-Communist Media Development in Perspective* (2005), Hallin and Mancini's *Comparing Media Systems: Beyond the Western World* (2012), and Voltmer's *The Media in Transitional Democracies* (2013). This study will also add a 'new paradigm for the West and the Global' of comparative media systems (Esser and Hanitzsch 2012, p. 9), with a focus on post-authoritarian PSBs.

3.2 The Characteristics of Indonesia

When selecting Indonesia as a study focus, scholars often refer to the rich history and development of the Indonesian' politics, economics, demographics, and culture. The four common features emphasized are Indonesia as a post-colonial state in the Global South (Heeren 2012), post-authoritarian (Kitley 2000), and majority Muslim country (Steele 2018).[3] A combination of these characteristics distinguishes Indonesia from neighboring countries, such as Thailand and the Philippines, as well as with other post-autocratic regimes in Asia and worldwide. A detailed discussion of these characteristics and the relevant academic works will be provided here.

3.2.1 Indonesia as a Post-colonial State

In the field of socio-political sciences, post-colonialism usually refers to the study of Europe's former colonies since their political independence or colonization, or the study of cultures in terms of power relations with other cultures. To follow Boogert (2011, p. 11), post-colonialism covers

all aspects of the political culture that have been affected by imperial processes, from the moment of colonization until today.

Using Indonesia's long-standing history of Dutch and Japanese colonialism since the eighteenth century as its case study, scholars have developed a wide range of academic approaches. As with India, Egypt, Brazil, and South Africa, Indonesia experienced a lengthy and repressive history of Dutch colonialism. Indonesia (formerly known as the Netherlands East Indies) was initially occupied by the Portuguese, and then more systematically by the Dutch, for almost 300 years. Between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese military expanded its influence, driving out the Dutch and occupying the Indonesian archipelago until Indonesia's independence was proclaimed on August 17, 1945.

In a study of the ideological origins of post-colonial democracies in South and Southeast Asia, Tudor (2015, p. 2) identified India and Indonesia as the two largest and unlikeliest democracies in the post-colonial world. Two of Asia's most populous countries have long faced severe poverty and inequality, extreme ethnic plurality, as well as violent separatist actions. India has remained a democracy, nearly without break, since independence, while Indonesian democracy emerged after the end of Dutch and Japanese imperialism and again after the fall of a repressive power. In short, the author characterized India as a stable democracy and Indonesia as the opposite.

To compare, Dutch colonial power strongly influenced the formation of the state institutions and lawmaking systems under Sukarno and Suharto, while the Japanese colonial period characterized the centralistic pattern of Indonesian government and the first Indonesian media system as a centralistic state-oriented format. This included radio broadcasting and its management style in the 1940s.

The government bodies of present-day Indonesia were influenced by the Dutch colonial model of government. Pursuant to the 1945 constitution, Indonesia has six state organs: the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), the presidency, the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), the Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung), and the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan) (van Anrooij 2014).

The Japanese applied a highly interventionist, controlling state model, which contrasted with the Dutch model of ordered development and

stability. Kurasawa (1987), in her study of social change in rural Java, characterized Japanese rule as a mix of 'mobilization and control.' The key department in policy management was Sendenbu, the official propaganda agency. Within this organization, Jones (2005) noted, specialized culture centers were established for print media, reporting, radio broadcasting, film production, and film distribution.

Kingsbury (2006, p. 34) noted that, despite some changes in form, Dutch power in Indonesia retained a paternalistic ethos and continued to be both unitary and centralized in its political structure until World War II. The Japanese occupation of 1942–1945 did little to alter this structure (and even reinforced it). These political styles of paternalism, unitarianism, and centralism deeply influenced the post-independence government of Indonesia, mainly the Sukarno and Suharto regimes.

It is important to note that the Proclamation of Independence was first broadcast through nationalist-captured Japanese radio on August 17, 1945. The establishment of RRI began as a consortium of eight local radio stations from the Japanese network (Sen 2003). To some extent, the centralized propaganda model of Sendenbu influenced the early institutional format of the Indonesian Ministry of Information and RRI's management in the Sukarno and Suharto eras.

Several previous studies have used a post-colonial perspective to examine Indonesian media and politics. For instance, Philpott (2000) investigated the country's political life, which has been shaped by ethnicity, modernity, and the Cold War. Kusno (2000) shows how colonial representation has been reshaped in Indonesia, partly in the urban space that characterizes both evolving and declining social order.

Regarding media and journalism, investigation of the changing communication culture in post-colonial regimes by linking them to their former Western occupiers is growing. Lindsay (1996) investigated old broadcasters of Indonesia during the Dutch colonial era, their institutional governance, and services, as well as their influence on the formation of radio services in post-independence Indonesia.

Similarly, Kaan (2017) explored the relationship between radio and identity politics in the Dutch East Indies (1927–1942). He compared the motives of the Philips Broadcasting Organization of the Netherlands Indies (PHOHI), developed to support Dutch identity and authority, with those of NIROM (the Dutch colonial radio company), which was segmented between eastern and western audiences, with eastern stations

having been established in reaction to the severe underrepresentation of eastern cultures.

Heeren (2012), meanwhile, conducted a study of contemporary Indonesian cinema and its link to the post-colonial era. She identified discourses and discourse practices in film within the New Order era as neo-colonialist power. She also investigated the way in which, after the resignation of Suharto, new colonial discourses and imaginations of society were reflected in film, particularly in Islamic films.

3.2.2 Indonesia and Its Autocratic Legacies

Since the end of colonialism, Indonesia has experienced three types of democracy, all of which failed. Bhakti (2004, p. 197) noted that the first was the failed attempt at parliamentary democracy (1949–1957), which was followed by a 'guided democracy' (1957–1959) during which President Sukarno established a business cabinet that consisted of political parties, economists, and the military. There was another attempt at 'guided democracy' under President Sukarno (1959–1965). The third and longest period was that of 'Pancasila Democracy' under President Suharto, which lasted from March 1966 to May 1998.

Similarly, Lang (2015) noted that, since its independence was formally proclaimed on August 17, 1945, Indonesia has adopted many political orientations. In its first years of independence, based on the constitutions of 1945 and 1949, Indonesia was a democracy on paper. However, democratic rights were hard to apply due to the lack of education and limited knowledge of good institutional practices.

The next period, from 1949 to 1955, is known as the Constitutional Democracy era, wherein Sukarno formally adopted a Western-style liberal form of government. At this time, the press enjoyed considerable freedom. Particularly in cultural policy, Jones (2005, p. 108) noted, there was an effort to introduce the 'national universal culture' of Indonesia and an international orientation in cultural policy, with culture used to foster relations with other countries. As part of Indonesia's cultural institution, the national radio broadcaster—RRI—was used in this process.

Between July 1959 and October 1965, the struggle for democracy slowed when Sukarno introduced 'Guided Democracy' (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) as a tool to secure his grip on state power (Bhakti 2004, p. 198). Guided democracy concentrated power within the president.

Where liberal democracy had put emphasis on the process, guided democracy emphasized the attainment of one major objective; 'a just and prosperous society,' only to be achieved by a 'systematic and planned democracy.' President Sukarno loved to call it 'democracy with leadership.'

In the Sukarno era, Jones (2005) noted, print media enjoyed a Western-oriented press system (1950–1957), when most of their journalistic products were partisan (spokespersons for political parties) and owned by private enterprises. In this period, Sukarno's political administration was happy to provide a vast amount of press freedom, in return for controlling government administration. However, after a series of political conflicts, Sukarno declared a state of emergency on March 14, 1957, which continued until April 30, 1963. At this time, Sukarno gave military leaders the power to monitor media publications in the name of national security.

Suharto's authoritarian rule lasted for more than three decades (1966–1998). In this extended period, Suharto applied the 'Pancasila democracy' (Bhakti 2004) and systematic suppressions rooted in his militaristic leadership and his manipulation of Javanese culture (Sarsito 2010). It ranged from patrimonialism (Mas'oed 1989), cultural centralization, to media politicization (Sen and Hill 2000).

Pancasila, Indonesia's ideological platform, was first formulated by President Sukarno on June 1, 1945. It consists of five basic norms: (1) belief in one supreme God; (2) just and civilized humanitarianism; (3) Indonesian unity; (4) popular sovereignty governed by wise policy arrived at through deliberation and representation; (5) and social justice for all of the Indonesian people.

The Javanese-style 'father–son relationship' or '*kekeluargaan*' was an important element of the Suharto's Pancasila Democracy. *Kekeluargaan* was feudalistic and patriarchal in nature, a classic model of traditional society drawn from Dutch cultural scholarship. Suharto positioned himself as the nation's father, the 'Father of Development,' a manipulation of Javanese cultural values (Sarsito 2010).[4]

Suharto's articulation of *kekeluargaan* was strongly used to justify his political repression. For instance, he translated it into a military doctrine of leadership to manage the loyalty of the armed forces. Kitley (2000) argued that the *kekeluargaan* model also extended into the state-owned TVRI soap opera, *Keluarga Rahmat* (Blessed Family).

Aside from his *kekeluargaan* politics, Suharto adopted a 'monoloyalty' model, preventing bureaucrats from joining political parties except for his political vehicle, Golkar. A political hegemony was applied, positioning Golkar as a hub for all government employees, including RRI/TVRI staff.

The Suharto regime also adopted the 'integralistic' norm of collectivism promoted by the constitutional lawyer R. Supomo to differentiate itself from the Western norm of individualism. In this sense, state officials committed not to individual rights but to Indonesian society as a whole. Romano (2003, p. 1) noted that an integralistic nation is an organic whole with rulers and ruled linked in harmony, and this norm influenced state–media relationships in the autocratic period. This norm was incorporated into Pancasila courses and was a common part of the speeches of New Order figures and of RRI/TVRI managers between 1970 and 1990.

Webber (2005) classified the Suharto regime as a patrimonial state. Patrimonial rulers exploit power as their 'personal property,' unconstrained by regulations. To illustrate, Webber (2005) and Mas'oed (1989) noted that the practice of patrimonialism was evident in the fact that Suharto only gave licenses to operate non-government televisions to his inner political circle and his children.

The pervasive corruption in the last decade of Suharto's power (1990s) was a manifestation of the regime's patrimonial political norms and practices. International surveys rated Indonesia as among the most corrupt nations in the world, and the unbridled manipulation of contracts and monopolies by Suharto family members led to public protests and mass student rallies that ultimately brought about the president's fall in May 1998. This was exacerbated by the financial crisis that overwhelmed Indonesia in 1997–1998, creating further dissatisfaction with the political status quo (Webber 2005).

3.2.3 Indonesia as an 'Illiberal Democratic Nation'

Together with neighboring Asian countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, Indonesia has been viewed as experiencing rapid political reform during the 2000s and as facing a transition that could lead to a variety of outcomes, from the consolidation of democracy to regression to authoritarianism.

After the breakdown of autocratic power in 1998, Indonesia entered a period of transition defined by the absence of a dictatorial regime without a stable democratic administration. In this period, to agree with

O'Donnel and Philippe (1986), most public policies—as well as forms of state intervention in media—were uncertain, either because they were difficult to apply or because each party wanted to make its own rules.

Following the fall of the Suharto's regime in 1998, legacies of his power—such as *kekeluargaan* and patrimonialism—remained extant despite the adoption of formal practices of democracy. In this sense, Indonesia was considered an 'illiberal democracy' (Zakaria 1997) and a transitional-hybrid political regime, a term that refers to a state that contains both democratic and authoritarian forms of rule.

Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) similarly identified Iran, Thailand, and Brazil as illiberal democracies, referring to a regime that combines multi-party elections with a failure to protect civil liberties. In these countries, some democratic political features have appeared even as authoritarian forms of government have persisted, posing a challenge for the hybrid political and media systems.

According to Zakaria (1997) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011), the Suharto regime is the best example of the concept of illiberal democracy. The country had some democratic tendencies, such as election. However, this did not mean that they functioned well. The president decreed (without consulting parliament), civil liberties and human rights were lacking, and central rule was strict.

Due to domestic and global pressures for democratization, President Habibie, as Suharto's successor, was able to initiate many new laws to open up the political system. These included Press No. 40/1999. The Law was a good achievement of pro-democracy clusters, experts, and mass media professionals (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005). Habibie also established some democratic attributes, such as free and fair elections and a legislature that was central to lawmaking. However, the formal freedoms of media and journalists were still restricted in practice, not because of old autocratic power, but because of private media owners and local state apparatuses (Manan 2015).

Soon after taking power in October 1999, President Abdurrahman Wahid closed down the Ministry of Information, the central propaganda and censorship instrument of the Suharto regime (Sen and Hill 2000). This was a great moment to eliminate the legacy of Suharto in the media system. Further, Wahid introduced non-state press and broadcasting regulators who were responsible for safeguarding media freedoms from external intervention and supervising the professional code of ethics.

Nevertheless, Jones (2005) identified the transitional governments of Indonesia (1998–2002) as having been penetrated by interests that were opposed to reform. As Robison and Hadiz (2014) noted, the political-business groups (oligarchies) of the New Order regime, which had profited from the corruption and the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, survived the collapse of the Suharto regime. During the years after 1998, these oligarchies adjusted to take advantage of the new political climate, limiting the possibility of political reform. In addition, the legacy of non-transparent processes for dealing with the government and judiciary remained extant. This was accompanied by a rise of money politics (Aspinall et al. 2018).

The political parties of Indonesia, as key players in producing media policy, are perhaps the best illustrations of the practice of illiberal democracy. As important building blocks in the country's politics, especially compared to other Southeast Asia n countries such as the Philippines, Indonesian political parties are better institutionalized and more effective in fulfilling key functions such as political recruitment or political mobilization (Mietzner 2013; Tomsa and Ufen 2013). Most parties have developed comprehensive institutional infrastructures that comprise branch offices across the entire archipelago. Yet, parties also suffer from many weaknesses such as programmatic shallowness, pervasive corruption, elitism, and a lack of engagement with ordinary citizens. Tomsa (2013) further noted that many of them are highly leader-centric at the top level but largely clientelistic at the grassroots.

Moreover, the internal dynamics in Indonesian parties tend to be driven primarily by rent-seeking and the quest for patronage rather than ideological or programmatic debates. Political scientists such as Slater (2004) and Aspinall et al. (2018) have argued that Indonesia's political parties are dominated by a 'cartel' (a common desire to share the spoils of office, rather than ideological or policy differentiation). Parties are often portrayed as being more or less the same in terms of ideology and policy platform. There is no strict ideological stand, or they tend to adopt hybrid right-wing and left-wing ideologies. The only distinction is between secularist and Islamic parties. For example, PDI-P is a left-wing party that is supposed to be fighting for equality, giving better facilities to the poor, and promoting economic nationalism. However, in practice, their sponsored President, Joko Widodo, has increased the tariffs of lower-class public transport and opened the doors wide to foreign investors—both typical right-wing platforms.

In terms of finance resources, political parties—both in Indonesia and in other parts of Southeast Asia—have become vitally dependent on the financial support of individuals or conglomerates with large private fortunes (Reuter 2015), and some of the billionaires who have long sponsored political parties have decided to out themselves as political leaders and thus adopt the style of oligarchs. Conflicts of interest between the demands of public-interest policy, including media pluralism, and their private interests are thus difficult to avoid for politicians who also run large business empires.

As a result, in designing public policy, most political parties act more like tools for exercising ideas instead of tools to fight for particular idealistic positions (Datta et al. 2011). Every decision is done on a popularity contest. Political parties keep changing stances based on what voters want, as voters do not really care about party ideology as long as candidates seem promising; look capable; appear kind and honest; and are quite attractive. Although some parties have very different historical origins, there is no guarantee that their politicians will have different outlooks on the need of democratic media system s. For example, the Golkar party was the electoral vehicle of the former Suharto's autocratic power, while PAN (the National Mandate Party) was formed by Amien Rais, the leader of the *Reformasi* movement that led to the demise of that power (Aspinall et al. 2018).

3.2.4 Indonesia in the Global South

Aside from recognizing Indonesia as a post-colonial regime connected to developed Western countries as its former occupiers, studies of the country's complex economic and social climate have commonly examined Indonesia as part of the Global South. According to Rigg (2007), the Global South concept was associated with countries of low economic competence or nations with limited financial stability. Located mostly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, these regions have also been described with other sociological terms by other academics: the majority world, the non-Western world, the poor world, the third world, the undeveloped world.

In particular, Rigg (2007) assessed the word 'global' in Global South as not a strict geographical categorization of the world, but rather as centering on economic and social inequalities. The term emphasizes that both the North and South are, together, drawn into global courses rather

than existing as separate pieces. Conditions in the Global South are only understandable when set against the Global North.

Some academic examinations that have positioned Indonesia as part of the Global South have not only examined it from an economic perspective, but adopted a wide range of issues, such as legacies of Western colonialism, unequal North–South political interface, and the politics of populism, clientelism, etc. For instance, Amar (2012) underlined the role of Global South states as victims of Eurocentric agendas. The idea to privatize state-run assets is part of a neoliberal market ideology that is imported from developed Western regimes (Elliott 2017).[5]

In the communication sector, Willems (2014) examined five leading concepts of the Global South in the fields of comparative media studies; global media studies; and development communication. He argued that the Global South continues to be theorized from the Global North's point of view. Instead of being sympathetic to the Global South on its terms, scholarship frequently appreciates the role of communication only insofar as it emerges from and represents the active intervention of the Global North.

Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) developed a theoretical understanding of political clientelism in the Global South and found similar features in the media systems of Latin America, in the sense that they share historical connections and political developments, partly in the conflict between liberal democratic and authoritarian traditions that continued through most of the twentieth century.

Frenzel et al. (2011) investigated differences in alternative media in the Global North with such media in the Global South, with a case study of the cooperation of the Northern and Southern partners 'IFIwatchnet' and 'Indymedia Centre in Africa' (IMCA). They highlighted how both partners differed in their identity, organizational forms, and accountability. The Northern partners were oriented toward marginal identity, informal accountability, and fluid organizational structures. In contrast, Southern activists articulated 'mainstream' identities, relied on more structured forms, and formalized media and public accountabilities.

In a study of the role perceptions, epistemological direction, and ethical views among journalists from eighteen countries of the North and Global South—including Indonesia—Hanitzsch et al. (2011, p. 273) found a different situation, wherein Western-North journalists are generally less supportive of active promotion of particular values, ideas, and social change. They adhere more to universal principles in their ethical

choices. In contrast, journalists from non-Western contexts tend to be more interfering in their role perceptions and flexible in their moral views.

In studying PSB development, Rahman (2016) used Bangladesh as a case from the Global South. Rahman adopted a mixed-method approach to locate four problematic areas, including political instrumentalities, commercialization, and contradictory policy responses. He concluded that the inability of the country's former state-controlled radio and television to transform into PSBs has to be understood not as a failure of the state, but as a result of colonial legacy, and a derivative of the neoliberal market orientation of communications in the Global South. In a monograph published by Nordicom, Rahman (2016) also included Indonesia and Malaysia to represent the Southeast Asia n context of public service media development in the Global South.

3.2.5 Indonesia as a Muslim Majority Country

Together with Arab states such as Egypt and Palestine, Indonesia is considered as majority Islamic country. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the rapid rise of negative perceptions about Islam, Indonesia's Islam and its media system has attracted the attention of Western scholars. They see Indonesia as an alternative face of Islam in the midst of rising religious extremism (Anwar 2010). Studies have mostly centered on the dominance of Islam as the religion of people and its relation to ideological battles and changes in the communication system.

Islam in Indonesia is perceived as a hybrid of the religion itself and local ethnic practices. With 257.9 million inhabitants, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country, after China, India, and the United States (MCIT 2017). Its population has increased in the past four decades, from 119,208,000 people in 1971 to 147,500,000 in 1980, to 179,300,000 in 1990, and to 203,456,000 in 2000 (Kettani 2010). These inhabitants are living on nearly one thousand permanently settled islands. Demographically, Indonesia consists of various ethnic groups and religions, including Javanese (45%), Sundanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), and coastal Malays (7.5%).

In terms of religion, Indonesia is the most populous Muslim-majority nation in the World. Muslims in this country account for 88% of its population, followed by Protestants (5%), Roman Catholics (3%), Hindus (2%), and Buddhists (1%). Among the three Muslim-majority countries in the

Malay world (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam), Indonesia has the largest population (Kettani 2010).

Since its independence in 1945, Indonesia has officially been a non-theocratic state (Hasyim 2013, p. 13). Instead of adopting Islamic values as the country's ideological foundation, the founding fathers chose 'Pancasila.' More importantly, Muslims in Indonesia have been able to peacefully accept a Western-based democracy with respect for religious minorities, who enjoy equal rights under the 1945 Constitution (Hasyim 2013). In comparison with other Muslim majority states, such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, the country has ranked highly on the global democratic index, with a score of 49 in 2015 (Intelligence Unit 2016).

Unlike Islam in the Middle East, Indonesian Islam has a unique characteristic as a result of its interaction with local values. Prawiro (2013) emphasizes Islamic syncretism, namely the acculturation of traditional Javanese culture with Islamic tradition. He wrote that Islam came to Java when the population had a form of cultural traditions and belief in the power of certain objects (dynamism) and belief in the power of animals (totemism). Webber (2005) emphasized that Islam in Indonesia in the early fourteenth century was 'gentler' than the Islam in its Middle Eastern heartland, and that it interlinked with pre-existing Hindu, Buddhist, and animist beliefs.

Indeed, Islam arrived in Indonesia through a peaceful transmitting process. As noted by Törnquist (2007), the Indian and Middle East ern traders who brought it with them did not use the method of state-backed repression, plundering, and occupation that later European colonizers applied in their pursuit for land and wealth.

Driven by globalization and rapid technological progress, Indonesia's 200 million Muslims have been expressing their faith in more complex ways. Fealy and White (2008) wrote that 'Smiling Islam' is mediated by various media platforms and performances. Internet *fatwa* services, glossy jihadist magazines, Islamic medical treatments, almsgiving via mobile phone, and electronic Sharia banking services are some of the signs of a more consumer-oriented approach to Islam, which is interacting with and replacing more classical expressions of the Islamic faith.

The dynamics of Indonesian Islam have led media scholars to investigate popular culture, perception, and development on media system and journalism in the country (Heryanto 2008; Steele 2012, 2018). Muchtar,

et al. (2017), for example, looked at the perceived roles of journalists in nine Muslim-majority countries in Africa (Egypt, Sierra Leone, and Sudan) and Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, and Turkey). Part of the World Journalism Study (WJS) project, their study showed that socio-political and economic factors of the Muslim-majority states determined different perceptions of journalists' roles in those countries.

In line with Muchtar, Steele (2012) examined models for teaching journalism in eighteen Islamic universities and institutes in Indonesia. Focusing on three aspects—vision and mission, curriculum/course content, and what happens to students upon their graduation—she found that, unlike in developed Western states, in Indonesia courses in journalism are located not in social science faculties or independent colleges, but in *dakwah* (Islamic propagation) faculties.

3.3 The Indonesian Media System

The instability of media systems in post-autocratic Indonesia has invited the attention of media scholars (e.g. Hanitzsch 2001; Jurriens 2009; Romano 2003; Sen and Hill 2000). Indonesia has experience two contradictory politics that determine its media and communication policy. The first, which occurred during Sukarno and Suharto presidencies (1955–1998), during what may be collectively called the authoritarian period. Second, the political reform era (1998–present), which may be considered a transition from an autocracy to a liberal democratic political system (Heryanto 2008). This section discusses these periods in detail.

Gazali, Hidayat, and Menayang (2009, pp. 128–129) noted that the communication system in Indonesia has experienced three distinct periods: (1) the Suharto autocratic regime as the center of interaction between media and the government; (2) the May 1998 revolution as the result of internal contradictions within Suharto's politics and communication policies, exacerbated by international pressures; (3) the *Reformasi* period, with more open, democratic communication environment, but also politically weaker government. In this era, Indonesian CSOs and mass media flourished.

The Suharto regime was perceived as seeking to create both national integration and economic growth through strict control over the media and journalists. For instance, pursuant to a 1969 Ministry of Information decree, journalists were required to become members of a

state-authorized organization. Such a policy was also applied when the Ministry declared the Indonesian Private Radio Association (PRSSNI) to be the only recognized radio association in the country (Sen and Hill 2000). Under the Suharto regime, control over media institutions was also applied by limiting media ownership. In this era, only two kinds of broadcast media were allowed to operate: government-run channels, namely RRI/TVRI, and small private corporations.

Overall, the key source of both Sukarno and Suharto's communications policy was the state ideology of Pancasila. According to Romano (2003), Pancasila promoted two opposing media positions: limited freedom from state control, and a requirement to support state programs to improve economic and social conditions.

Suharto's resignation in 1998, after 32 years in power, ended the autocratic media system. Unlike Suharto, President BJ Habibie—Suharto's successor—introduced new and pro-democratic political and media policy. He scheduled free and fair elections, released political prisoners, and instituted a decentralization process that turned the heavily centralized state into one of the most decentralized states of the transitional world. Habibie handed over power to his successor Abdurrahman Wahid in 1999. Wahid, as well as subsequent presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, continued such political policy.

After May 1998, the Indonesian media moved away from being highly state-controlled to being without state intervention (Nugroho et al. 2012; Kristiawan 2012). By introducing media laws, the regimes after Suharto accepted global and local pressure for a democratic media system, transforming the government-centric communication system into a public-oriented and pluralistic one. In particular, the new regimes lifted strict limitations on daily journalistic work.

After the fall of the Suharto power, Hamad (2004) noted, the government's role as the central source of information was diminished by individual freedom to share their views within the marketplace of ideas. The change resulted in the rise of pro-public journalism, as well as the rapid growth of the broadcasting industry and the increase of private broadcast channels to compete with state-controlled channels: RRI and TVRI. In 2017, there were at least 297 private terrestrial TVs and 1184 private radio channels. Also, there were 8 local public television channels and 113 community television channels, together with 33 local public broadcasters and 71 community radio. By 2017, the number of private

radio broadcasters had increased to 3317 and private television channels had increased to 1154 (Manan 2018).[6]

Aside from the positive development in addressing alternative broadcast channels, this data also shows that national state broadcasters were fewer in number than private broadcasters; this represents the arrival of liberal media logic s in Indonesia. Indeed, since the late 1980s, the Suharto regime adopted a mix of liberal and authoritarian media policy, distributing licenses to operate commercial television broadcasters only to the president's family members and cronies (Wahyuni 2000; Heryanto 2003). The first four private television channels, namely RCTI, SCTV, TPI, and ANTEVE, were shared ownership ventures involving Suharto's sons and daughters and their cronies. Although the fall of Suharto in 1998 broke this ownership pattern, these privately-owned media remained extant and were taken over by new players that had close connections to the new political players.

This market expansion has encouraged a new model of broadcasting ownership, with owners having close relationships with those in power (Armando 2014). Similarly, Sudibyo and Patria (2013) noted, between 2005 and 2012, Indonesian broadcasting entered a period of partisanship due to the arrival of former non-media owners creating vertical integration in ownership pattern s to realize not only financial profit but also political power. During the 2014 presidential election, for instance, televised reports on the election were based on media owners' affiliation with the candidates.[7]

Illustrating such a situation, Tapsell (2015, p. 32) described Indonesia as having an 'oligarchical media system.' Television broadcasters have been key political players during the presidencies of both Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo, with the owners of the largest media being directly affiliated with political parties. For instance, the broadcaster MetroTV is owned by Surya Paloh, founder and chief of the National Democrat Party, while TVOne is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, chairman of the Golkar Party. Although the audience shares of TVOne and Metro TV are rarely above 7 percent, their prominence as news providers is clear because they both have free-to-air (broadcast) analog channels that transmit around the entire archipelago.

In his book *Televisi Indonesia dibawah Kapitalisme Global (*Indonesian Television under Global Capitalism), Armando (2016) described the systematic policy of the Suharto regime and subsequent governments that encouraged liberalization, in particular, the massive entry of global media

to the ownership structure of Indonesian television. He also identified the rapid growth of global advertising as the driver of broadcast marketization, and thus the marginalization of public-oriented broadcasters.

From 2006 to 2015, however, the media policy did not fully follow the logic of liberalization described. Leading up to 2016, pro-market policy was accompanied by pro-government policy in order to regain political control over the broadcast landscape. For instance, in mid-2016 the Indonesian government proposed a version of a new broadcasting law that limited KPI's power to merely supervising broadcast content, rather than regulating all issues pertaining to broadcasting. In addition to limiting KPI's mandate, this proposal also signaled the strong desire for government intervention in broadcasting, something identical with the old authoritarian policy.

Finally, Rahayu et al. (2016) broadly identified an overlap in communications policy that reflects the directional crisis of media system in Indonesia today. Press Law No 40/1999 encourages freedom of publication; however, it contradicts the Film Law that still maintains a censorship policy. Rahayu et al. also mentioned that Indonesian broadcasting digitalization policy have, since 2010, produced stronger state authority with a tendency to prioritize industry over the public.

Based on the above discussion, it seems that the Indonesian governments from the Habibie era through the Joko Widodo era have had no clear or consistent policy on media system. Indonesian communication policy legally moved toward some forms of democracy between 1998 and 2002; however, the arrival of private broadcasters and their politicization in post-2002 has violated norms of media pluralism. Kristiawan (2012) described this phenomenon as 'the dark passenger of democracy.'

It can also be observed that the media system in Indonesia is unstable and does not simply refer to a single model, be it social responsibility, authoritarian, or liberal (Siebert et al. 1956). Using the three models of media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004), the ongoing Indonesian media system may be seen as approaching these two models: (1) polarized pluralist and (2) liberal. As has occurred widely in Asia and Africa, the broadcasting system in Indonesia can be considered hybrid, as defined by Chadwick (2013).

Because such a tendency has also been found in other post-authoritarian regimes in Asia and Africa, media scholars—for instance, McCargo (2012) and Thomson (2013)—have conducted comparative studies on Southeast Asian media systems. The present study would be

located within the growing constellation of studies of transitional media systems in Asia.

3.4 Conclusion

Given the political, social, and media characteristics described in this chapter—post-colonialism, post-autocracy, illiberal democracy, Muslim-majority country, part of the Global South, and having an unstable communications policy—Indonesia is a challenging site for surveying PSB systems. These created a unique condition for the arrival of Western PSB systems and thus provide a rich perspective for the study of post-autocratic PSBs.

For Indonesian academia, the importance of studying PSB lies in the lack of systematic surveys of three issues: (1) broadcast institutional models during repressive political periods; (2) changes of RRI/TVRI's ownership from state to public between 1998 and 2002; and (3) the media's journey between 2002 and 2017 (see Chapter 2).

Finally, this book's exploration of the development and transformation of Indonesia's PSB system has bridged a gap in studies of PSB development in post-colonial and post-authoritarian societies. In the growing debate on the failure of PSB application in transitional Asian and African regimes (Harding 2015; Thomson, 2013), this book has offered an additional map of how Western European PSB model s have traveled to new democracies and how the autocratic legacies embedded in Indonesia's former state-run national broadcasters (RRI/TVRI) have resisted external pressures.

Notes

1. Located in Southeast Asia, between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indonesia shares land borders with Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, and West Malaysia as well as maritime borders with Malaysia, the Philippines to the northeast, and Australia to the south. Regional Language Network (2007) noted, the name Indonesia, meaning 'Indian Islands,' was coined by the Englishman J. R. Logan in Malaya in 1850. It is derived from the Greek words *Indos* (India) and *nesos* (island). A German geographer, Adolf Bastian, used this word in the title of his book, *Indonesia*, in 1884, and in 1928 Indonesian nationalists adopted it as the name of their hoped-for nation, defined as the successor to the Netherlands East Indies.

2. As one of the biggest countries in the world in its geography and population (BTI, 2018), past academic works on Indonesia lie with multiple perceptions of this country as a transitional democracy that has achieved solid economic growth since the 1970s, but which faces challenges of media liberalization and freedom of expression. Heryanto (2011) and *Tempo magazine* (2011) note that single-country focus research into Indonesia is generally decreasing in number; however, there is a trend of examining it within larger contexts as a transitional and post-colonial democracy.
3. In his seminal book *The Politics of Indonesia* (2005), Damien Kingsbury used *wayang kulit* (shadow puppets) as a metaphor for Indonesian politics. He emphasizes that the puppets reflect the mysterious, transitional, and abstract attitude of Indonesian society. Each character represents human strength and weaknesses through formal and informal practices. Using this traditional tale, Kingsbury also concluded that Javanese culture has influenced the style of Indonesia's presidents and their daily governance to some extent. For Kingsbury, *wayang kulit* represents Indonesian politics: post-colonial and autocratic power with strong influence of Javanese's paternalism.
4. Anderson (1983) identified the Javanese kingdoms that existed before Dutch colonialism inspired Suharto's patrimonial power. The past Javanese rulers secured the loyalty of their officials by granting them land that they could exploit commercially.
5. In the comparative study on *The International Monetary Fund and The Global South*, Elliott (2017) examined structural adjustment programs undertaken by Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Elliott found that the hard adoption of Global North liberal economic policies was intended to solve the financial crisis in Indonesia during the 1990s. The privatization of state-run/public enterprises as a tool of 'economic efficiency' sought to do away with the 'inefficient' market practices.
6. In terms of press freedom, between 2006 and 2016 Indonesia was identified as partly free, ranked 99 worldwide (Freedom House 2016). Reporters Without Borders (2016) marked Indonesia between 110 and 139 of the 178 assessed countries as a partly freed state. However, there has been a trend of decreasing level of freedom, particularly compared to Indonesia's peak rank of 57 in 2002 and 124 in 2017 (Manan 2018).
7. For printing media sector, reports from the Indonesian Press Council (2013) and the Association of Newspaper Companies (2013) indicated that the dominance of commercial ownership is evident in both national and local companies. In 2013, for instance, Indonesia had 322 daily newspapers, 402 weekly newspapers/magazines, 455 monthly magazines, and 239 weekly tabloids.

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CHAPTER 4

Broadcasting Systems in Authoritarian Indonesia (1933–1998)

4.1 Introduction

At an intersection of Jl. Gadjah Mada, Kestalan, Solo, Central Java, Indonesia stands an old building that is now called the Press Monument and serves as Indonesia's national press museum; it now houses about one million archived Indonesian print media. The building was built in 1918 by Mangkunegara VII (the leader of the Mangkunegaran Kingdom), Surakarta, Central Java and was initially used as a society building (called the Societeit Sasana Soeka). On February 9, 1946, the first Congress of Indonesian Journalists was held in this building, and the delegates established the first Indonesian journalists' association, Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia (PWI). The date of this event has been designated as the National Press Day of Indonesia.

Sasana Soeka is also a biggest physical monument of the first radio station fully managed by Indonesians, SRV (Solosche Radio Vereeniging); the date of SRV's establishment, April 1, 1933, has been designated National Broadcasting Day. Today, the museum hosts two historical artifacts of Indonesian broadcasting. The first is an old SRV radio transmitter used to broadcast *gamelan* music from Mangkunegaran Kingdom to Noordeinde, the Netherlands, in 1936. The second is a T-shirt worn by TVRI journalist Hendro Subroto while covering East Timor's integration into Indonesia in 1975. It was at this building that Indonesia's

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national broadcast day was commemorated by the Indonesia Broadcast Commission (KPI), on April 1, 2010.[1]

As such, this well-preserved building is an important site in the histories of two fields: press and broadcasting. The building has been open to the public since March 16, 2011, and managed by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics of Indonesia. Recognizing the rich contributions of this museum, my fieldwork began therein in October–December 2017. The current chapter's discussion of models of Indonesian broadcast governance in authoritarian politics begins with the establishment of the first local radio station in Indonesian colonial history there.

To identify the various approaches to broadcast governance under autocratic politics in Indonesia, this chapter explores the long history of development in Indonesia broadcasting, with a strong emphasis to two periods: the colonial period and the post-colonial period. It focuses on change and continuity models of institutional governance, from the advent of community-based channels in the Dutch colonial period (1920s–1940s) up through the arrival of monopolistic and state-oriented broadcasting under the Suharto regime. Using the aspects of remit, ownership, structure, and funding as its objects of description, this chapter looks at the policies and the actors involved in every moment and how earlier models influenced subsequent ones. Recognizing the lack of academic publication of the history of radio in colonial Indonesia, particularly its institutional models, this chapter seeks to fill this gap. Sen and Hill (2000) argued that surveys of radio as a pillar of Indonesian broadcasting have been less common than surveys of television. I found, however, that the summaries of the history of radio provided by Lindsay (1996), Witte (1998), McDaniel (1994), Jurriens (2009), and Yampolsky (2013) were impressive. These summaries showed partial historical moments. This chapter, meanwhile, will look at the broadcast institutional models in detail (remit, ownership, organizational structure, and funding system).

Regarding the long journey of RRI as government-administered channel, from its establishment through 2017, two books are publicly available: *Sedjarah Radio* (published by the Department of Information 1953) and *RRI 55 Tahun* (published by Djawatan RRI, 2000). The launch of the book *Sedjarah Radio* coincided with the release of a second book, on the history of radio in Sumatra, on the RRI's anniversary (September 11, 1953). Both books mostly refer to the personal notes of two influential RRI figures, Maladi and Jusuf Ronodipuro.[2]

Several non-Indonesian researchers have also published short writings/papers or book chapters on radio broadcasting in Indonesia, such as Wild (1987), McDaniel (1994), Lindsay (1996), and Mrázek (2002). McDaniel, for instance, wrote a book titled *Broadcasting in the Malay World*, while Lindsay wrote an article titled "Making Waves: Private Radio and Local Identities in Indonesia."

Seeing that most past publications have provided summaries of the history of Indonesian radio in a specific period, rather than since its establishment, I was inspired to write a more comprehensive exploration of the Indonesian broadcasts in autocratic eras, both under Dutch and Japanese rule and after independence (i.e., spanning from the 1920s to the 1990s). I saw, for example, that the book *Sedjarah Radio* discusses only radio history from Dutch colonialism until the 1950s, while the book *Mangkunegara VII and Awal Penyiaran Indonesia* focused on the birth of SRV in Surakarta.[3] Similarly, the book *Television, Nation, and Culture in Indonesia* (Kitley 2000) focused on the development of TVRI between the 1960s and 2000s.

This chapter covers three aspects: (1) the late colonial period, involving the three models of broadcasting governance that existed under Dutch and Japanese rule; (2) the arrival of RRI/TVRI, including the history of these state-owned channels, the actors involved, and the related political policies; (3) the eras during which RRI/TVRI were state-owned, with a specific focus on Suharto's political policies during his regime (1960s–1998) and their impact on remit, ownership, structure, and finance.

4.2 Between the 'Western' and 'Eastern' Models (1933–1942)

Tracing the origins of Indonesia's broadcasting system from previous studies (such as Lindsay 1996; Sen and Hill 2000; Wiryawan 2006; Jurriens 2009) leads to the conclusion that the Dutch and Japanese colonial powers influenced the formation and development of Indonesia's broadcasting system.

Broadcasting in colonial Indonesia can be divided into two historical periods: the Dutch colonial period (1925–1942), during which Bataviase Radio Vereeniging (BRV) of Jakarta, Solosche Radio Vereeniging (SRV) of Surakarta, and NIROM operated; and the Japanese occupation period (1942–1945), under which the Hoso Kanri Kyoku (in short, Hoso Kyoku) operated. Previously, in the early 1920s, a radio station had been

opened on Sabang Island, north of Sumatra; however, its influence was not strong. Sen and Hill (2000) noted that, during World War I, listening to radio broadcasts in the Dutch colonial period was considered illegal. Only in the late 1920s, after the war ended, did Indonesian citizens dare access radio services for social, non-political interests.

The period of 1925–1934 was the first decade of Indonesian radio, and a time in which some community-based channels emerged. In Jakarta, for instance, the Bataviase Radio Vereeniging (BRV) first aired on June 16, 1925 (Sen and Hill 2000), operating from the Des Indies Hotel in Batavia (now Jakarta). Despite being a community institution, BRV was managed by citizens of the Dutch descent who lived in Jakarta. They were fans of radio communication and bought broadcast materials using a joint funding model (Birowo 2010). Nine years later, the non-profit BRV model transformed into the NIROM radio network, which embraced a commercial mission. Following BRV, radio stations appeared in several other cities; some of these were directly managed by indigenous Indonesians. These included, for instance, Solose Radio Vereeniging (SRV) in Surakarta (April 1, 1933); Vereeniging voor Oosterse Radio Omroep (VORO) in Jakarta (1934); Meyers Omroep Voor Allen (MOVA) in Medan (1930), and Mataram Voor Radio Vereeniging (MAVRO) in Yogyakarta (1934).

Through the late 1930s, radio was viewed as a medium for entertainment and culture, with music dominating the program. Government regulations kept it that way, with restrictions against political or religious content, a model that continued in the private radio era of contemporary Indonesia. Lindsay (1996) notes, for example, that the BRV—run by a group of radio enthusiasts in Batavia—broadcast programs of Western music from a room in the Hotel des Indes, Jakarta. Its funding sources were a listeners' society, which paid for program costs, as well as advertising revenues. After BRV became NIROM, the listeners' fees were replaced by radio taxes collected from all wireless receiver holders. In contrast, the SRV (and the later Japanese radio network) chose to broadcast Javanese gamelan music. This second radio model emphasized the cultural role of radio rather than its political role and received voluntary contributions to finance its operations.

Of these channels, SRV is considered the first broadcasting model owned and operated by indigenous Indonesians (Darmanto 2014; Wiryawan 2006). SRV—a locally and culturally oriented radio station with a strong spirit of Indonesian nationalism—was born in the city of

Surakarta, a center of Javanese culture. Its establishment was backed by Mangkunegara VII, the King of Mangkunegaran.[4] Surakarta has several historic sites related to SRV and its establishment, including the Press Monument and the RRI Surakarta office (formerly the SRV office), both located in downtown Surakarta (Wiryawan 2015). According to my observations, the former SRV building now houses both on-air and off-air RRI services as well as a small public museum.

Wiryawan (2006) noted, a historic meeting was held on April 1, 1933, beginning at 19:00 p.m., at the Soos Mangkunegaran (now the Press Monument). At the beginning of this meeting, RM Sarsito, a radio engineer and close ally of Mangkunegara VII, expressed his plan to set up a radio station for maintaining Javanese art and culture. The meeting, attended by nine people, agreed to the establishment of the Solosche Radio Vereeniging (SRV). Aside from determining the socio-cultural mission of SRV, the founders decided on a financing model, choosing to charge a monthly membership fee of IDR 1 (one rupiah).[5]

Based on the book by the Department of Information (1953, p. 13) and personal interview with Wiryawan (November 26, 2017), I can say the first SRV management did not represent a broadcast organizational model, but rather a social/voluntary committee working for a radio station. Its structure consisted of a Chairman (Sarsito), administrative staff (Sutarto), and Treasurer (Liem Tik Liang). They were assisted by engineering, program, and propaganda staffs, as well as by volunteers. The SRV radio network later adopted this structure in other cities, including Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya. This organizational structure looks simple, not as complex as the structure of modern broadcast institutions that usually incorporate an advisory body.

The single model of highest organizational structure (incorporation of supervisors with executives) in SRV was also adopted by subsequent stations, as seen in the use of the term 'Pengurus' for VORL in Bandung, which consisted of chairman (M. Enoch), vice-chairman (Atmadinata), author (Apandi Widaprawira), administrator (Edjeh Ardimihardja), and a number of broadcast volunteers (Neneng Sastramidjaja, Toeng Tek Liang, and Sutopo Wonobojo). The organization was also supported by some treasurers. Using this structure, the station could collect about 3000 gulden in membership contributions, which were used to acquire new transmitter equipment.

In addition, as noted by the Department of Information (1953), a private radio station in East Java called CIRVO (Chinese Inheese Radioluisteraars Vereeniging Oost) was established in 1935. It had a general non-broadcast organizational structure, as evidenced (for instance) in its use of the terms: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, and Commissioners. Interestingly, this station was operated by both Javanese and Chinese personnel: Tan Tjeng An, Go Hie Lie, Sungkono, Thio Sing Liong, Ismail Sumodiwirjo, Sukandar Hardjopratisto, etc. The station's mission was to foster public awareness of education and promote local arts.

As Wiryawan (2006) and Yampolsky (2013) noted, SRV officially began operations in January 1934 and became the first native Indonesian radio to serve a 'Ketimoeran' ('Easternness') mission: to maintain Javanese culture, as opposed to the Jakarta-based BRV mission, which prioritized Western music entertainment. The use of Dutch vocabulary among the 'SRV' was influenced by the founders, who graduated from the Netherlands higher education and were considered social elite. For example, Ir. Sarsito is noted as an engineering expert, member of the Mangkunegaran royal family, and head of the Java Bank (Birowo 2010).[6]

Concerning the growth of SRV, Darmanto (2014) notes that the station began building a permanent office on September 15, 1935, with Ir. FCL Van Olden as the architect. On September 23, 1936, the SRV building was inaugurated by BRAj. Siti Koesoemowardhani (popularly known as Gusti Noeroel) and is now used as the Surakarta office of RRI. Following the establishment of SRV, other stations began operation in nearby cities throughout the 1930s, including in Jakarta (Vereeniging voor Oosterche Radio Omroep or VORO), Surabaya (Vereeniging Oostesche Radio Surabaya or VORS) and Madiun (Eerste Madiunsche Radio Omroep or EMRO).

In addition to SRV, in October 1934 a channel known as SRI (Siaran Radio Indonesia) was established in Surakarta and managed directly by the Kingdom of Surakarta. This radio channel is considered the first to have used the term "Indonesia" in its name (Wiryawan 2006) and served as a social program directly under the control of the King at Kasunanan Palace (Yampolsky 2013). From its inception, SRI was funded through a regular subsidy from NIROM (the Dutch colony radio network). SRI also opened a branch in Kudus, Central Java, with the help of Nitisemito, a local cigarette entrepreneur (Department of Information 1953).

SRV served as a means of cultural diplomacy, through which Mangkunegaran VII opposed Western colonialism, balancing the 'West' with an understanding of the 'East.' Previously, under Mangkunegara III and Mangkunegara IV, the kingdom had tended to compromise with the Dutch and even British colonial forces, even providing royal troops to serve them. Moreover, the use of the term 'Ketimoeran' was strategic in hiding interest for Indonesian nationalism, which in this era was actively propagated by such figures as Sukarno (Wiryawan, personal interview, November 26, 2017).

Both SRV and SRI shared an awareness of Javanese culture and entertainment as their remit. The ownership of SRV by Mangkunegaran and SRI by Kasunanan influenced the stations' operations, which provided an 'elite taste' of Javanese culture to maintain the power legacy of these two kingdoms. As Wiryawan (2015) noted, there was regular cooperation among the two stations to air religious events; however, SRV's audiences and network outside Surakarta were bigger than those of SRI.

Once a week, religious rituals were broadcasted live from Surakarta Great Mosque and from the Chuan Min Kung Hui Chinese Temple. This collaboration marked the strong relationship between SRV/SRI and religious societies in Surakarta. When SRV networks developed in Jakarta, Semarang, and Yogyakarta, such cooperation in broadcasting was also regularly conducted, including with NIROM for art events.

In their funding, aside from the contributions of working broadcasters, SRV received small gifts from its loyal audiences, not only from Java but also Kalimantan and Sumatra (Wiryawan 2015). Audience donations were collected through a postal-transfer system organized by SRV listeners, particularly those who were not living in Surakarta or Jakarta.

During the SRV period, a second broadcasting model was sponsored by the Dutch colonial regime as a continuation of the BRV. After three years of preparations, in January 1933 the colonial administration issued a license to establish a radio company named NIROM (Nederlands Indische Radio Omroep Maatschappij, the Dutch East Indies Radio Broadcasting Corporation), based centrally in Amsterdam since 1928 (Yampolsky 2013). In 1934, NIROM officially came on air and began competing with the SRV network. Supported by the Netherlands in its equipment and transmission lines, NIROM established relay stations in cities such as Semarang, Bandung, and Surabaya. The *Globe Circle*, a magazine of international DX'Ers in its November 1936 edition, confirms NIROM's existence in Indonesia as a private radio company with

two kinds of broadcast services: an eastern and western entertainments, targeting different communities in Java island.

The Department of Information (1953) and Yampolsky (2013) both noted that the NIROM model differed considerably from that of the SRV network. NIROM was a commercial corporation entity and entirely controlled by as well as accountable to the Dutch colonial regime. Concerning ownership, NIROM was affiliated with similar broadcasting companies in the Netherlands. NIROM's funding came from a public tax levied on radio receiver owners, both those of European and of indigenous heritage. In addition, NIROM received direct subsidies from the Dutch colonial government. By contrast, stations on the SRV network were not for profit channels and were not affiliated with institutions outside their communities. With its social mission, the SRV network relied on financial resources from membership contributions and was accountable to local community members as the owners of the station (Yampolsky 2013). Moreover, while the services of NIROM tended to be centrally managed, the SRV network relied on local and/or regional-based broadcasting service models.

As for financial policy, Yampolsky (2013, p. 195) noted that the colonial regime applied single model for NIROM financing: a *luisterbijdrage* (listening contribution, set at three gulden per month in 1934 and reduced to 1.5 gulden in 1938). By January 1939, it went down a talen to fl.25. This pattern was akin to the contemporary financial models of radio broadcasting in Europe, especially in the Netherlands. The Dutch Post and Telegraph managed the collection of payment (Sen and Hill 2000). However, these fees applied only to NIROM audiences. According to Gouvernements Besluit (governmental decree) No. 38 of 1932, listeners who accessed service from the SRV network were subject to varying fees, in accordance with their capacity in their respective cities. For example, in 1938 these fees were set at 1 gulden per month for MAVRO and 0.50 gulden per month for SRV.

The colonial government gave NIROM its full support, aiming for the network to serve audiences throughout Java within a year and the entire colony within three years. NIROM programs, meanwhile, were not allowed to oppose colonial politics or violate public morality (Yampolsky 2013). At its official opening, on April 1, 1934, NIROM had a registered list of 6200 listeners, the majority of whom were Europeans.

In terms of content, the Dutch station spent about 80% of its broadcast time on music, 81% of which was in the "light classical" or "light

music and cabaret" category. In some ways, early non-Eastern stations in the Indies functioned like gramophone clubs, with listeners sharing musical tastes and information on recordings (Lindsay 1996). To gain an indigenous Indonesian audience, in 1936 NIROM opened a special channel to produce or to relay Javanese art programs from SRV (Lindsay 1996; Wiryawan 2006; Yampolsky 2013). For this, NIROM subsidized or purchased broadcasting rights from SRV. The more hours the relay, the higher the fee paid to the SRV network. To gain more local audiences, in January 1937, NIROM began seeking to exclusively create its 'Ketimoeran' content, rather than using the services of SRV.

NIROM's plan to manage its 'Ketimoeran' content resulted in protests and solidarity among SRV and its allies. On March 29, 1937, in Bandung, radio managers from VORO (Jakarta), VORL (Bandung), MAVRO (Yogyakarta), SRV, and CIVRO (Surabaya) held a meeting to oppose NIROM's idea. They officially established the first Indonesian radio association, called Perikatan Perkoempoelan Ketimoeran Radio (Federation of Eastern Radio Associations) or PPRK, with Sutarjo Kartohadikusumo as its first chairman. PPRK was intended to become a forum to aid the struggle of Eastern-oriented radio channels in competing with NIROM. On November 1, 1940, this association proposed a full mandate in producing Ketimoeran art programs, and through Decree of the Government Secretary No. 1458/A, dated June 30, 1940, the Dutch colonial regime approved the proposal. As such, the PPRK radio network enjoyed about 1.5 years of exclusive production until the Japanese military entered Indonesia (Birowo 2010).

This opposition was not surprising. Effendi (1990) argued that NIROM's rapid progress in developing its transmitters, relay broadcast studios, telephone lines, etc. was a result of the availability of money through taxes collected from receiver owners, unlike the Eastern Radio Network (PPRK), which was only supported by the personal contributions of managers and listeners. Moreover, NIROM was a commercial and profit-oriented enterprise, while the PPRK network was a community and social institution based on volunteerism.

Witte (1998) noted, the policy toward radio-broadcasting in the Dutch East Indies was determined by the interest of colonialism and legal measures that were created by the Dutch military for the maintenance of social order called 'rules of fear' and to oppose demands of Indonesian society for political freedom. The colonial power granted a monopoly for NIROM as the sole government-sponsored commercial channel. The

networked station was allowed to access advertising in addition to taxes. Witte (1998) concluded that the Dutch Indies broadcasting policy was an example of a colonial rule that guided and kept every Indonesian's initiative of politically rebellious activities.

The fall of the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia in 1942 ended not only the competition between PPRK and NIROM, but also the existence of the two broadcaster model in Indonesia. The rapid change in colonial politics after the Japanese invasion in early 1942 led the operations of NIROM and PPRK to collapse. According to the Department of Information (1953), on March 2, 1942, Dutch troops had ordered that all of the radio infrastructure owned by PPRK and NIROM be destroyed. This order, however, was not fully accepted by the broadcasters. For example, technical staff at SRV Utoyo and Sugito burned only secondary equipment (Darmanto 2014).

In summary, the Table 4.1 highlights these two first broadcasters:

As the Table 4.1 illustrates, by the end of the Dutch colonial period, broadcasting in Indonesia had settled into a dualistic system, involving both private and state ownership as well as eastern and western service orientations (term used by Lindsay 1996). Up to 1942, when the Japanese occupied the Indonesian archipelago, two models existed: the NIROM corporation in cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Semarang, and Medan; and the SRV network (later named the 'Ketimoeran' private stations), located in Jakarta, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta,

Table 4.1 Broadcasting in Dutch colonial era

Broadcasters	*Period*	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
SRV groups or "Eastern" model	(1933–1942)	Awareness of Javanese culture and social services	Community non-profit, managed by group of local people	One pillar, combination of broadcast and general social teams	Membership fees and fees from program cooperation
NIROM network or "Western" model	(1934–1942)	Awareness of Western music and culture as part of colonial propaganda	Commercial entity, owned by Dutch colonial company	Two pillars: Supervisory and Executive boards	Tax on radio receiver owners and Dutch subsidies

(Compiled from Department of Information 1953; Lindsay 1996; Yampolsky 2013)

Madiun, Semarang, and Surakarta. However, since the arrival of the Japanese military in 1942, the two models were transformed into a single and centralized broadcasting model, as will be described below.

4.3 The Hoso Kyoku Monopolistic Model (1942–1945)

Exploring Hoso Kyoku as the Japanese colonial broadcast model in this section, I found that the extension of the Dutch political intervention in broadcasting governance was used not only to voice colonialism in a specific country but also to propagate war in the Asia Pacific region (Kurasawa 1987). The Japanese occupation forces introduced a new broadcast policy in Indonesia that was described as rigidly censored, state-controlled, and entirely devoted to the purpose of conditioning the public to accept and applaud its slogan of 'Asian nationalism.'

According to the Department of Information (1953) and Darmanto (2014), the presence of the Japan military in Indonesia (1942–1945) eliminated the first two broadcasting models. After the Japanese military arrived on Java, the new colonial power disbanded all NIROM and PPRK channels and transferred their assets to new radio stations. PPRK and NIROM's management was converted into a single monopolistic radio called *Hoso Kanri Kyoku*, abbreviated *Hoso Kyoku*, which handled Japan's colonial mission. On March 5, 1942, soon after the Japanese army arrived in Surakarta, the military commander Funabiki ordered that SRV be returned to the air under the name *Hoso Kyoku* Solo.

Lindsay (1996) noted that, in installing a new centralized ownership model with the colonial government controlling the airwaves, the Japanese military set up a central station in Jakarta with fifteen branch stations outside the capital. These included Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Surabaya, Purwokerto, and Malang, indicating the reactivation of former PPRK and NIROM radio channels.

Although broadcasts consisted mainly of war propaganda, it did include local music as a vital component of shaping Indonesian minds in the next years (Darmanto 2012). Some Indonesians, including Herawati Diah and Bachtiar Lubis, were employed by this radio and tasked with creating Indonesian language programming. In addition, *Hoso Kyoku* spent much time airing the speeches of Indonesian leaders such as Sukarno, thereby evoking patriotism and a strong sense of pride in being Asian (Ningsih 2016).

To avoid Western broadcasts, the military banned audiences access to other radio stations, outside *Hoso Kyoku* and the Tokyo-based *Nippon Hoso Kyokai*. In this, the colonial regime established a regulatory body called Shodanso to coordinate radio repair efforts and block non-*Hoso Kyoku* programs (Sen and Hill 2000). Throughout Java, radio receivers owned by indigenous Indonesians were asked to be submitted to a workshop and then blocked from receiving foreign broadcasts. Also, the Japanese banned its network from airing Dutch or foreign-language songs, as well as Western music in general.

According to Kurasawa (1987), to smoothly occupy Java as a dependable partner in the 'Greater East Asia' campaign, the Japanese military paid great attention to how to capture people's minds and how to tame them. To manage this, the Japanese military government in Indonesia (Gunseikanbu) set up a special body, the Sendenbu, as part of its military structure. Established in August 1942, Sendenbu was headed by an army officer handling two jobs: administrative work and operational execution. In addition to setting-up a radio station, the army established a newspaper corporation, named *Java Shinbunkai*, a news agency, named *Domei*, and censored all radio programs. Similar to NIROM, the main source of funding for *Hoso Kyoku* continued to be taxes paid by the owners of radio receivers.

One key Sendenbu strategy was employing local citizens in its local propaganda units as part-time operators, including political leaders and musicians. For instance, from March 11, 1942, to January 23, 1943, the Solo Hoso Kyoku used former SRV manager Maladi to head Hoso Kyoku, who later became one of the founders of RRI/TVRI (Darmanto 2014).[7] Meanwhile, the propaganda authority in Yogyakarta, Kochi Jimukyoku, hired many actresses of the traditional *ketoprak* drama and gave them monthly allowances.

It can be seen that *Hoso Kyoku* radio represented a third broadcasting model in colonial Indonesia. Where the PPRK network was an autonomous body, owned by citizens with a strong socio-cultural mission, *Hoso Kyoku* was a fully state/military-owned entity that took its war with the Western world as its political mission. In ownership, the PPRK was community-based, serving local interests. Meanwhile, state-owned entities (NIROM & *Hoso Kyoku*) served colonial interests both in Java and in the Asia Pacific region.

Moreover, PPRK radio activists were local residents, some of whom (such as Maladi) later became freedom fighters and co-founded RRI (the

Table 4.2 Broadcasting in Japanese colonial era

Broadcaster	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
Hoso Kyoku (March 1942–August 1945)	Propaganda of Japanese colonial politics	Military government owned	One pillar, controlled by the Japanese troops in Jakarta	Taxes on radio receiver owners and subsidies from the Japanese

(Compiled from Department of Information 1953; Lindsay 1996; Ningsih 2016)

first national radio channel). The PPRK network structure followed a broadcasting operational-oriented organizational model, rather than the bureaucratic institutional model of the *Hoso Kyoku*. The PPRK network was financed primarily by voluntary fees paid by members, while both NIROM and *Hoso Kyoku* received taxes and subsidies from colonial authorities.

The Table 4.2 illustrates the *Hoso Kyoku* model during the Japanese period:

This Table 4.2 shows the single model of broadcasting in Japanese colonial era. It tells the transformation of the dualistic broadcasting model of the Dutch colonial era (Table 4.1) into a single centralized institutional model during the Japanese occupation. There was, for instance, a change in ownership patterns: from community non-profit or state corporations to military ownership, followed by changes in remit and structure.

The Hoso Kyoku model inspired RRI's early management model after the station was established in September 1945, partly the inclusion of political interests in broadcast content and its ownership. The choice of becoming a *Djawatan* (a government-owned entity, not an autonomous body) under the Ministry of Information in 1946 and controlling production of RRI's content in Jakarta was identical to the model used during Japanese rule (Kitley 2000). This occurred in part because RRI's early initiators were former Hoso Kyoku personnels, such as Maladi and Abdurrahman Saleh.

Importantly, as argued by Ningsih (2016), Hoso Kyoku did not cultivate political sympathy for Japanese colonialism, but rather emphasized the need for Indonesian independence. During the Japanese occupation, the country of Indonesia did not yet exist. However, as a nation, it was envisioned through radio broadcasts that rejected Japanese power,

including patriotic songs such as 'Indonesia Tanah Pusaka' as well as the speeches of Soekarno.

Overall, the above description shows that Japanese colonial politics influenced the early development of RRI as Indonesia's first national radio channel. The most important legacy of Hoso Kyoku as a Japanese colonial channel in RRI is in the choice of government—not public—ownership. As a consequence, RRI's broadcast orientation was merely political propaganda, not part of the Dutch colonial culture.

4.4 Invention of State Radio: RRI (1945)

Formed by the veteran broadcasters of military-sponsored radio amidst the public euphoria that followed political independence, it can be said that the establishment of RRI—the first national broadcast channel in Indonesia—continued the use of radio as tool of political propaganda, albeit with a new agenda (spreading news of freedom from colonial powers). The pragmatic choice to integrate RRI's management into Sukarno's political administration, as will be explored in this section, was also a continuation of the Hoso Kyoku model and led to intensive political interference in radio operations.

On the afternoon of August 17, 1945, at central Hoso Kyoku station, Jakarta, two broadcasters: Jusuf Ronodipuro and Suprapto successfully aired a full transcript of what is now called the proclamation of Indonesia's independence, which had been read by Sukarno earlier that day. Similar broadcasts were made by a former announcer from Hoso Kyoku Bandung, Sakti Alamsyah (Effendi 1990), as well as other broadcasters using a transmitter on the Stovia (School tot Opleiding vor Indische Artsen) now UI campus in Jakarta (Kitley 2000). In 1975, the newspaper *Suara Merdeka* reported that a broadcast of the statement also occurred on the morning of August 17, 1945, handled by Markonis Wua, a journalist working for Domei news agency.[8]

These events were dramatic because, for instance, both Jusuf Ronodipuro and Bachtiar Lubis were threatened with death after reading the text. Following these broadcasts, Hoso Kyoku transmitters in several cities were destroyed by the Japanese military. However, facing this crisis, the former Hoso Kyoku broadcasters sought to take over the assets of Hoso Kyoku to create an Indonesian broadcaster. On August 14, 1945, they received word that the Japanese had surrendered to the Allies, as relayed by such foreign radio services as BBC. This story was then shared

by broadcasters using old transmitters that had successfully been hidden from the Japanese authorities.

Prepared since late August 1945, the idea to have a national radio broadcaster officially began with a meeting of eight former Hoso Kyoku broadcasters in Jakarta on September 11, 1945 (Department of Information 1953, pp. 124–127). These broadcasters were: Adang Kadarusman, Suryodipuro, and Yusuf Ronodipuro (Jakarta); Sakti Alamsyah, Darya, and Agus Marah Sutan (Bandung); Suharjo (Purwokerto); Sumarmadi and Sudomomarto (Yogyakarta); Suhardi and Harto (Semarang); Maladi and Sutardi Hardjolukito (Surakarta); and unspecified representatives of Malang and Surabaya. To call this meeting, in early September 1945, Maladi sent an invitation to his fellow broadcasters (Abidin 2000; Darmanto 2014). Before the meeting, the broadcasters tried to meet Sukarno directly and tell him of their idea to create a national radio, but this did not succeed.

Abidin (2000, pp. 33–35) noted that, on the afternoon of September 11, 1945, at 5:00 p.m., the former Hoso Kyoku broadcasters—led by Abdurrahman Saleh (known as Pak Karbol), a medical doctor and telecom expert—met several of Sukarno's top allies, including Secretary of State AG Pringgodigdo; Minister of Foreign Affairs Achmad Soebardjo; Minister of Domestic Affairs Iwa Kusumasumantri. In this forum, the broadcasters submitted the idea to establish a national radio network to replace the Hoso Kyoku. They emphasized the importance of radio for the nascent Indonesia and emphasized that this station would be dedicated to Sukarno for the purpose of communicating with the general public.

Given that the legal status of the radio was not formulated, broadcasters planned to operate as an autonomous entity outside political administration. At their September 11, 1945, meeting, activists proposed two additional issues related to RRI governance. First, they sought to seek Sukarno's support to provide government funds to cover production costs. Second, they proposed that state-run radio employees be given the status of government personnel (Department of Information 1953).

However, the activists were unhappy with the results of their meeting with Pringgodigdo and other Sukarno allies. Sukarno's allies still thought that it would be more useful to use direct diplomacy between the Indonesian and Dutch militaries rather than using the radio, while the activists viewed radio broadcasting as more influential in diplomacy. The activists were also disappointed that Sukarno had not met them directly. By

the evening, they headed to Adang Kadarusman's house in Menteng Dalam, Central Jakarta, to hold a meeting. The historic meeting started at midnight of September 11, 1945, led by Abdurrahman Saleh, and resulted in the decision to establish a national radio broadcaster under the name Radio Republik Indonesia.[9]

The Department of Information (1953) described the first goal of RRI as being the promotion of a spirit of independence, the national unity, and the enforcement of public loyalty. To push this goal among broadcasters, the legendary slogan 'Sekali di udara tetap di udara' (Once on the air, always on the air) was created.[10]

As Sukarno had given the radio limited attention, RRI initially followed an autonomous non-state ownership model, continuing the model used by PPRK. The station was to be managed from Jakarta as its national headquarters, with other members serving as branches responsible for their respective regions: Bandung, Purwokerto, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Malang, and Surabaya. As for employment issue, all former Hoso Kyoku staff in each district were asked to choose between two alternatives: to remain as RRI staff, with the status of civil servant, or be transferred to another state agency outside RRI.

The founders agreed to adopt an organizational structure that had a single top executive, with no supervisory body. However, they were initially unable to determine a funding model, and thus gave each RRI branch the flexibility to make decisions (Department of Information 1953, p. 126). The meeting also agreed to set September 11 as the birthday of RRI and to appoint Abdurrahman Saleh as the first general chairman (Abidin 2000).

To mark RRI's core remit as spreading news about the Indonesian nation, which had already emerged under the Japanese occupation, the founders determined three precepts (Tri Prasetya RRI) to explain the broadcaster's loyalty to the nation and its neutral position. The Tri Prasetya consists of a promise to protect radio equipment from 'anyone who wishes to use it to destroy our State'; to employ radio as a tool for securing national independence, and to avoid factional politics by supporting national unity. The charter was formulated by the second RRI chairman, Maladi, and publicly agreed upon at the 4th RRI Labor Union Congress, held in Surakarta, Central Java, in 1953 (Abidin 2000).

Experiencing unstable management during its first six months of operation, initiatives to change the ownership of RRI emerged during the RRI Conference held in Surakarta from January 12–13, 1946. In this forum,

broadcasters changed RRI from an autonomous entity to one accountable to the Minister of Information, signaling RRI's transformation into a government institution. At a second conference, held from January 23–24, 1946, in Purwokerto, Central Java, all delegates decided to integrate RRI in the Sukarno administration. This decision, Darmanto (2014) argues, was forced mainly by the general view that the radio influenced the national agenda, but lacked internal financial resources.

As noted by the Department of Information (1953, p. 131), at the Purwokerto forum, delegates entered a long and hard debate to formulate a final decision on RRI's legal status. They identified two possible choices for RRI: whether to be a Djawatan, an institution under Sukarno's government, or to remain an autonomous entity outside the government. This situation reflected a struggle between the idealist and pragmatic interests of radio activists.

Of the two vote sessions, the first offered a balance between those who sought to maintain an autonomous body (the delegates from Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya) and those who proposed integrating RRI into Sukarno's administration. The second round of voting, meanwhile, resulted in a majority—except the delegates from Surakarta and Semarang—supporting the inclusion of RRI in the Sukarno regime. As a consequence, the General Chairman of RRI would be appointed by the Minister of Information and the Minister of Transportation Affairs, with all employees having full staff status under the Department of Information. As such, the conference selected three candidates, one of whom would be appointed RRI chairman by Sukarno.

On February 26, 1946, the Minister of Information—on behalf of Sukarno—appointed Maladi as the first head of Djawatan RRI, replacing Saleh (who had served less than eight months). Kitley (2000) describes Maladi as a broadcaster with experience using radio as a political tool rather than to promote social interests. He influenced the performance of RRI, and later, while serving as Sport Minister in 1962, he initiated the adoption of the Televisi Republik Indonesia or TVRI.

In accordance with its status as a state-owned corporation, Djawatan RRI applied a mix of broadcast and bureaucratic management. In its structure, instead of using specific terms such as production, technique, domestic, or overseas affairs, the organization used the generic terms of Sukarno's bureaucratic institutions, such as 'Kepala Seksi' (Section Chief) or 'Pengurus Tata Usaha' (Administrator). A similar policy was further

applied to RRI and TVRI by the Suharto administration between 1966 and 1998.

Regarding political intervention in RRI, Darmanto (personal interview, May 1, 2017) noted that President Sukarno attempted to use both the Minister of Information and RRI newsroom through his RRI friends. For instance, an airplane crash in 1946 was heavily covered by the radio. Trying to block coverage of this event, Sukarno called upon Minister of Information Mohammad Natsir to stop coverage. However, Natsir rejected this request, instead telling the editor-in-chief to provide further coverage. According to Darmanto, when RRI was established in September 1945, Soekarno did not take into account its power, but in subsequent years he used his close ally Jusuf Ronodipuro (founder of RRI) and a reporter named Subardjo to transform RRI into his political mouthpiece.

In the early stages (1945–1946), the finances of RRI came from various sources. Jakarta received Sukarno's support. Meanwhile, the costs of RRI Surakarta and Semarang were covered by the government of Central Java. RRI Surabaya, Malang, and Purwokerto, meanwhile, were funded by the State Telecom Company or PTT (Department of Information 1953, p. 130).

Between 1946 and 1949, RRI faced a severe crisis of management after the return of the Dutch military and its allies to Indonesia. A series of military invasions in Jakarta and some other major cities in Java resulted in a crisis in the Sukarno's political leadership. This climate influenced the operation of RRI as the voice of Sukarno. In securing its operations, RRI moved its headquarters out from Jakarta to cities such as Surakarta and Yogyakarta, Central Java. As noted by the Department of Information (1953), in this period a number of emergency radio broadcasters had emerged to help RRI. For example, on October 13, 1945, Soetomo (better known as Bung Tomo) established 'Radio Pemberontakan' in Surabaya, which he used to voice his protests of the British military invasion.

Puguh (2017) notes that in November 1946, around the time the Indonesian government established RRI (1945–1947), the Dutch and British military established ROIO (Radio Omroep in Overgangstijd) to counteract it. Based in Jakarta, this station aired English-language radio programming. In Dutch and British-controlled areas, the term 'RRI' was temporarily banned. This dualistic broadcast model finally ended in December 1949, when RRI took over the management of ROIO and

Maladi renamed it Radio Republik Indonesia Serikat (RRIS). This new name was short-lived; after Sukarno declared the unitary nation (*negara kesatuan*) of Indonesia on August 15, 1950, RRIS was again renamed RRI.

Sukarno's political policy between 1951 and 1966 was typified by a parliamentary system and guided democracy. At this time, the governance of RRI remained static, and its content tended to fully serve Sukarno's agenda (Darmanto 2014). There was an idea among broadcasters to change RRI from a Djawatan to an autonomous body; however, this was rejected by the Minister of Information, Arnold Mononuto, and all cabinet members.

Reading the official report of the Djawatan Radio executive conference in Jakarta, held September 30–October 2, 1952, RRI's mission in this time of consolidated power was clear: it was a tool for continuing the 'Revolusi Nasional.' As such, it was used to stem the rise of regional separatism. RRI was also used as war propaganda in the political confrontation with Malaysia, a counterbalance to the broadcasts of Voice of America and its representatives, such as Radio Malaysia, that urged Indonesians to go against Sukarno's administration (McDaniel 1994). Beginning in 1964, RRI changed its music services to reflect Sukarno's anti-Western pop culture policy in particular rock and roll (Haryadi and Shodiq 2014).

Overall, following McDaniel (1994), I found a link between RRI invention and the changing of political systems in Indonesia. For instance, the inclusion of RRI's management under Sukarno's administration beginning April 1, 1946, occurred when Sukarno consolidated his power and positioned the national channel as a revolutionary voice, rather than a social service. During Sukarno's guided democracy era (starting 1957), the broadcaster was used to orient the general public to a new way of thinking demanded by post-colonial nation: a "mental reforming of the population," the typical political thinking of Sukarno.

In short, the first model of RRI governance can be described as follow:

The Table 4.3 illustrates that, following September 11, 1945, former Hoso Kyoku channel was reactivated as a national centralized channel called the Radio Republic Indonesia or RRI. The Table 4.3 shows that, in its first decades, RRI had two different ownership statuses: as an extension of the former PPRK model of community/non-state ownership with centralized management (1945–1946) and as a full state-owned agency (1946–1975). In April 1946, the ownership of RRI was transferred to

Table 4.3 First governances of RRI (1945–1974)

Period	*Status*	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Finance*
11 September 1945–30 March 1946	Autonomous/ Non-State Organization	Supporting post-colonial nationalism and the struggle to form a national unity	Community non-state operated by autonomous broadcasters	Single model: continuation of PPRK model	Subsidy of local publics and voluntary donation
1 April 1946–1975	Djawatan, an autonomous institution under the Ministry of Information	Strengthen national integration and cultural awareness	State agency, through the Ministry of Information	Single model: General chairman, appointed by Ministry of Information	Mixed sources: state subsidy and voluntary donation

(Compiled from Department of Information 1953; Lindsay 1996; Puguh 2017)

the Sukarno government, which was marked by two policies: the establishment of Djawatan Radio as a unit under the Ministry of Information on April 1, 1946, and the inclusion of all RRI employees as state control led personnel. Overall, the invention and development of RRI during the early independence period (1945–1950) was politically guided by the idea of supporting political freedom and consolidating Sukarno's political interests.

4.5 Establishment of State TV: TVRI (1962)

After almost 27 years of radio being the only broadcast media in Indonesia, on August 24, 1962, television broadcasting began through a government-owned entity (Sen and Hill 2000). The idea of a national television broadcaster was pioneered, among others, by several of the same figures as RRI. At the time of its establishment, Maladi, a major figure behind the establishment of RRI, was acting as Minister of Information under Sukarno, and he created a policy to use a national television system as a top-down political tool for maintaining Sukarno's power.

In the 1950s, there were initiatives to establish a state-owned television network. For instance, in 1952, Maladi began such an initiative to support the political interests of Sukarno, but due to the high investment required,

this proposal was rejected by the majority of parliamentary members (SK 2011).

In the 1960s, a second proposal to establish a state television network was made, taking advantage of Indonesia's hosing the Fourth Asian Games that between August 24 and September 4, 1962. SK (2011) described Maladi's proposal as being accepted by Sukarno for political reasons, i.e., to gather the spirits of Indonesians in a time of crisis. Coverage of the sport events was seen as a tool for reducing concern over the rise of separatism since the 1950s, which had threatened Sukarno's integration policy. Inspired by RRI's experience airing the National Sports Week (Pekan Olah Raga Nasional) in Surakarta in 1948, television was believed to benefit national unity amidst political movements against Sukarno as well as military conflicts in several regions (Junaedi 2013).

The establishment of TVRI as a special mass media project formally began on July 25, 1961. A small team, with a mandate under Ministerial Decree No. 20/1961 on the Preparatory Committee for Television (P2T), was chaired by Sutarto, the director of the State Film Company. Previously, a parliamentary decree was issued (No. 11/MPRS/1960 Chapter I Annex A) recognizing the importance of adopting television for educational interests (SK 2011). For the earliest equipment, Sukarno decided to use Japanese-made products. On October 23, he sent a telegram from Austria instructing Maladi to buy NEC devices from Japan. The TVRI building was constructed by PT Adhi Karya, completed on August 23, 1962, and inaugurated the day before the opening of the Fourth Asian Games (Kitley 2000).

TVRI was formally launched at the opening ceremony of the Asian Games on August 24, 1962, at Bung Karno Stadium, which broadcasted the event from Jakarta for three hours a day, from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Kitley (2000) argued that, by broadcasting the Games, TVRI complemented Sukarno's spirit of 'symbol wielding,' televising high profile speeches, ceremonies, and 'insignia of national prestige and power.' Subsequently, TVRI was set as 'the national culture project,' wherein nationalism was the dominant philosophy, with President Sukarno as chief promoter (Kitley 2000; Rakhmani 2013).

In terms of its ownership model, TVRI was initially positioned under the Radio and Television Bureau of the Committee of Fourth Asian Games, and the organizing committee managed content for the interest of the Asian games rather than political purposes. By the end of events, the government proposed integrating both TVRI/RRI into direct control

under the Ministry of Information, but most members of parliament rejected it. As such, TVRI retained its non-ministerial status for one year (from August 1962 to September 1963).

After October 20, 1963, Sukarno issued Decree No. 215 to position TVRI as able to manage its own finances, with Sukarno as general chairman. The decree also gave TVRI the mandate as the single organizer of Indonesian television. As such, it was obligated to serve as an official medium for carrying out the political concept of 'Pembangunan Mental Manusia Sosialis Indonesia' (Development of an Indonesian Socialist Human Mind') promoted by Sukarno.

According to Directorate of Television (1972), between 1962 and 1972, TVRI was fully managed as a government entity for two reasons: the high influence of television shows on the public and the high demand for government financial support for the media's infrastructure and operation. Another argument behind the acceptance of this policy was to avoid commercial interests in TVRI that may negatively affect the government political agenda. Commercial objectives were thought to hinder the principle of broadcasting as provoking development.

As TVRI was a state-owned institution, in its first weeks it broadcasted government activities such as Sukarno's welcoming remarks to foreign guests in Jakarta. Broadcasts were generally conducted live, and included coverage of various sport events. Regular programming began on September 5, 1962, taking the form of movies and adlibs, broadcast from Monday to Friday. According to Directorate of Television (1972), by 1972 commercial advertising had reached 10% of TVRI's daily broadcast hours. The remainder was used for education (60%) and entertainment such as films and music programs (30%). Advertising on TVRI began on March 1, 1963, and was intended as a mean of collecting financial resources and promoting industry.

In mid-1963, a news department was formed, with five staff members working 14 hours a day to produce two news programs every 24 hours. Most of these news items were sourced from the Indonesian News Agency (ANTARA), newspapers, radio, and other sources. News and news features comprised about 28% of TVRI's total programming. These included such successful programs as *Daerah Membangun* (Development in the Provinces), which focused on important aspects of development in villages and districts; *Desa Kita* (Our Village), showing the effects of television in the villages and the progress being made in the lives of villagers;

and *Gema Pancasila* (Echo of Pancasila), which encouraged awareness of political and social ideas of the Suharto regime.

Indeed, the use of TVRI as Sukarno's mouthpiece began with the first broadcast on August 17, 1962, which conveyed a speech by Sukarno from Merdeka Palace, Jakarta. In this speech, Sukarno emphasized his ambition to make TVRI a modern Indonesian icon. The official opening of TVRI was held the first day of the Asian Games, which Indonesia hosted from August 24 through September 4, 1962. As such, the date August 24, 1962, was designated the broadcaster's birthday. According to Kitley (2000), Sukarno gave full support to the establishment of TVRI, including by installing television receivers along Jakarta's public roads to give general residents easy access. In addition, the government distributed 10,000 television sets to residents of Jakarta to popularize the medium.

Maladi admitted to worrying that the private television would be used by anti-Sukarno groups to oppose his political policies. He also considered the Indonesian people to not yet be intellectually ready to access commercial channels. Also, there was a need for political stability and the perception that Sukarno's power could act as a motor for development. The choice of the state-run system was similar to the broadcasting political policy later used in former Communist states around Eastern Europe (Armando 2016).

Between 1962 and the end of Sukarno's power in 1965, debate on the status of TVRI had developed around three competing ideas. The first sought to position the station as a government entity, addressing weakening government funding for TVRI. Such a status would give TVRI the flexibility to access non-governmental funds, such as by collecting license fees and public donations. It also meant that the content policy would be controlled by Sukarno, but the operating costs could come from the general public. The second sought to establish TVRI as a state-owned commercial entity, a *Djawatan* similar to RRI. The third, meanwhile, sought to transform TVRI into a fully private company. However, until the end of the Sukarno regime, TVRI remained a state organization.

The organizational model used by TVRI in its early years was quite simple, mixing a general organization and broadcast operation model. For example, in its Jakarta headquarters, TVRI was led by a Director and some assistants, including the Head of Service and the Secretary of the Director. However, its terminology—*Kepala Seksi* (Section Chief) and *Kepala Sub-Seksi* (Sub-Section Chief)—referred to the typical nomenclature of the Ministry of Information, and was therefore bureaucratic

in nature. Similarly, the organization of TVRI Medan, North Sumatra, consisted of three levels: top, middle, and bottom. At the top level was a chairman and deputy chairman, as well as planners, supervisors, and a secretary. At the middle level were several departments, including production, research affairs, editorial affairs, and archival matters. The bottom level involved four sections: general affairs, production, technical issues, and news.

As for employment, SK (2011) noted, in its preparatory stages, TVRI was managed by team of bureaucrats, and most of the first broadcasters were recruited from government institutions considered to have relevant expertise. For example, Ir. Sutarto, who was appointed the Development Project Head of TVRI, was also the Director of PPFN (National Film Company). Staff at the regional level, meanwhile, were recruited from senior bureaucrats rather than broadcasters. For instance, the heads of TVRI Medan (1975) and Palembang (1980) were army officers from the Land-Based Transport Office. SK (2011) further noted that the Minister of Information acted as chief commissionaire of TVRI, holding the authority to elect a managing director or to appoint individuals considered capable to run the given state mission.

According to Directorate of Television (1972), by 1963 TVRI had about 100 staff and a production capacity of about 15 hours per week. This number had risen to 898 staff by 1972, consisting of full state employees (760), semi-full employees (97), temporary staff (20), military staff (12), and emergency staff (9). This shows a dominance of full employees over employees with temporary status. Following the efforts of Sukarno and Suharto to control TVRI's management, the number of full state employees increased during the final years of Sukarno's rule as well as under Suharto's authoritarian regime.

To finance its daily operation, TVRI received funding from three sources: license fees, state subsidies, and commercial advertising. The license fee system involved payments from radio registrations, charges for changing the ownership of television sets, and voluntary donation. As such, all owners of television receivers were required to register their television with the TVRI headquarters in Gelora Bung Karno, Jakarta, and pay about Rp. 300 per month. Under Decree No. 121/Kep/Menpen /1969, violations of this requirement could result in fines of 25% of the total cost (Pandjaitan 1999).

Between 1962 and 1971, TVRI's income from license fee payment was higher than the income received from advertising and state subsidies. Fixed state subsidies began to be paid in 1966. Previously, state support had been a temporary policy. According to Directorate of Television (1984), the income was used to finance three sectors: (1) the cost of regular production, including a fee for producers and the acquisition of rights to foreign broadcasts (2) the maintenance and development of technical facilities, (3) general interest (i.e., salaries).

The first TVRI governance model can be seen in the following Table 4.4

From Table 4.4, it can be concluded that, in the Sukarno period, TVRI initially held the status of state-owned foundation. Unlike RRI, which was a *Djawatan* under the Ministry of Information, TVRI was positioned closer to Sukarno, in the sense that the president chaired the broadcaster. In this sense, Sukarno's chairmanship offered space for government intervention in all aspects of TVRI operations. For instance, Subrata (2004)

Table 4.4 First governance of TVRI (1962–1974)

Component	*Description of Component*
Ownership	– As a part of Bung Karno Sport Stadium Foundation – Foundation chaired by Sukarno under Presidential Decree No. 215/1963. Kitley (2000) considered this model as a mix of non-profit foundation and government-controlled entity
Remit	Ministerial Decree No. 34/1966 identified TVRI' s remit as broadcasting information channel about Pancasila as the state ideology and the Basic Constitution 1945, and to inform the public about government programs.
Structure & Employment model	Single: Chairman with no supervisory body A mix of bureaucrats and RRI broadcasters, state-owned film company personnels and supporting staff from Ministry of Information. Employment status: state apparatus working for TVRI
Funding	Mixed of state budget, monthly television ownership fee, sponsorships and commercial advertising (1963–1980)

(Compiled from Kitley 2000; Subrata 2004; SK 2011)

noted, in the broadcaster's first year of operations, the Director of TVRI was appointed directly by Sukarno; however, after November 1967, the Minister of Information (then BM. Diah) was given the power to choose TVRI executives.

The first funding model used by TVRI mixed television receiver fees, state subsidies, and advertising. However, the state budget gradually increased. With this money, TVRI developed its physical infrastructure, including its first branch in Yogyakarta, on August 17, 1965. A number of regional offices were also established under the Suharto regime, including in Medan in 1970 and in Makassar in 1972.

Overall, the consolidation of Sukarno's power at the time of TVRI's establishment in 1962 influenced its orientation as the voice of Sukarno rather than the general public. To follow Armando (2016), given the absence of a fixed long-term strategy for broadcasting development in the country, the invention and development of TVRI at the hands of Sukarno can be seen as a pragmatic means of promoting his political interests.

4.6 RRI/TVRI in the Suharto Era (1965–1998)

The period when Suharto (the second president of Indonesia) came into power, from 1966 through 1998, was Indonesia's longest foray into authoritarian politics. At this time, RRI/TVRI as state-owned media continued. In particular, between 1970 and 1998, when Suharto enjoyed consolidated power, can be seen as a period of extreme cooptation. This section discusses these broadcasters' cooptation by Suharto according to four aspects: remit, ownership, structure, and funding.

To ensure RRI/TVRI maintained its remit as a media partner and mouthpiece of the government agenda, special ministerial regulations were produced and translated into official guidelines for broadcasters. For instance, Decree of the Minister of Information No. 54/1971 required TVRI to support national development, including Suharto's ambition to modernize Indonesia. Suharto and his Ministry of Information regularly spoke on the importance of RRI/TVRI supporting and following the philosophy of information 'encouraging the people's potential to engage in government projects and to expose the implementation of government policies.' Kitley (2000) found that, during his reign (1966–1998), Suharto constantly promoted the maintenance of national unity and development based on 'the norms of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.'

In daily operations, Suharto's media policy was translated into a written guide for producing TVRI broadcasts. An official guide distributed in the 1980s said: as a state-owned media accountable to the Ministry of Information, TVRI's general duty was to inform the public of government policies and to provide two-way communications to maintain 'a positive image of government.' In addition, TVRI was required to follow the national ideology of Pancasila and the 1945 constitution. The term 'public service' was used, but in the sense of serving government interests, rather than public interests.

In his remarks on the opening of RRI's new transmitter and its public studio on May 21, 1984, in Bogor West Java, Suharto stressed that the core mission of RRI/TVRI was to maintain and strengthen the nation's motivation in development and to reduce public criticism. To facilitate this remit, the government was committed to seeking ways to expand RRI/TVRI technology and budget.

The use of RRI to secure national unity was also supported by the installation of new studios and use of the slogan 'Persatuan Indonesia' (Indonesian political unity) to defend against separatist movements in South Sumatra, Sulawesi, and West Java. In critical regions such as Papua, the regime set up regional stations in almost all small towns, including Jayapura, Nabire, Merauke, Fak Fak, and Manokwari, through the 1970s. Similarly, to maintain government control over East Timor (now the independent country of Timor Leste), the Ministry of Information opened an RRI station in Dili on August 2, 1976 (Sudibyo 2004).

In addition, the Ministry of Information organized regular meetings of RRI/TVRI leaders. At one meeting, held December 12, 1983, in Bali, Minister of Information Harmoko emphasized the obligation of TVRI/RRI to support the improvement, stabilization, and expansion of information services on national development at all social levels. As a strategy for fulfilling this mandate, TVRI's management formed an audience association using a national project: *Koran Masuk Desa* (Newspapers for the Villages) as a tool for spreading government information on national development.

In RRI, the remit was translated into several broadcasts that began in 1954, such as *Varia Nusantara* (Miscellany on the Archipelago), which was produced centrally from Jakarta. Another daily program: *Siaran Pedesaan* (Village Broadcasts), began broadcasting in 1969 in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture. Another program was used to

present political doctrine, namely *Forum Negara Pancasila* (Forum for the Pancasila State), began broadcasting on February 7, 1981.

RRI/TVRI's ownership in the Suharto period was shaped by the paternalist and feudalist culture of his power. Suharto viewed the government as a leader (father) and society as a follower (child), and thus used RRI/TVRI as a tool to maintain this relationship with society. In conjunction with this, in his welcome speech for the anniversary of TVRI in 1972, Minister of Information Boediardjo emphasized TVRI's status as a government entity that no longer had the full autonomy it had had in the past. He stated that TVRI was a mass media broadcaster under the Ministry of Information, and thus a tool used by the government to speak to society.

As argued by Romano (2003), the political paternalism of the Suharto regime were pushed by a 'Pancasila Press' that was presumed to be organized around a family-oriented structure, which was essentially feudalistic. State officials and community leaders held a high position, not because of their occupations, but because they were perceived as 'the fathers' of the people. In this sense, Suharto was perceived not only as the head of the nation, but also the 'father of all citizens.'[11]

Moreover, to ensure the government had full authority to run RRI/TVRI, in 1975 its ownership was reinforced by the total integration of RRI/TVRI's management and staff into the Department of Information, meaning that the government (Department of Information) became both the sole regulator and operator of Indonesian broadcasting. Previously, through Ministerial Decree No. 07/I/Kep/Menpen/1972, Suharto had established *Dewan Siaran Nasional* (national broadcasting council) to advise the Ministry of Information.

Under Decree of Minister of Information No. 55B of 1975, the legal status of TVRI/RRI as a government unit was given legal reinforcement. Kitley (2000) noted that the emergence of political conflict in Jakarta in 1974 was one reason for this decree's passage. Prior to the enactment of this policy, TVRI had had dual status, being an organization with full autonomy in financing policy as well as a unit of the Department of Information without direct access to government funds. Kitley (2000) considered this model a mix of a non-profit foundation with state-ownership. For RRI, the ministerial decree changed its previous status as a *Djawatan*, a state-owned body outside the bureaucratic management, into a bureaucratic unit. After this decree was passed, RRI/TVRI became managed entirely by ministerial officials. For example, to develop

the Jakarta branch office of TVRI, the Minister of Information issued Decree No. 17 on February 25, 1970, which specified that only the TVRI chairman could receive and use the facility.

In practice, two contradictory norms had been applied by RRI/TVRI staff, which violated their independence: as members of the state body, they had to maintain loyalty to government officials, and as media professionals, they had to follow broadcasting ethics. Moreover, with their status as state civil servants, all employees of both media were required to attend all state ceremonies and show their loyalty to their highest superior rather than to their audience. Given this permanent status as state personnel (rather than autonomous staff), most RRI/TVRI broadcasters adopted a habit of '*bapak*-ism' ('father-ism'), or making the leadership happy with pro-Suharto programs, even when this action violated the public right to quality broadcasts.

The political cooptation of RRI/TVRI was also done by extensively recruiting government staff for both media, rather than autonomous broadcasters. According to a report from the Director General of Radio, Television, and Film at the Ministry of Information, in 1983 TVRI had 4539 employees, 1012 of whom were on duty at both regional and border stations. By July 1984, the number of state staff had increased to 4564. To improve the competence of these staff members, they received intense training in broadcasting skills. In 1985, for example, a session was held at the Multi-Media Training Center campus in Yogyakarta, which could accommodate 500 students.

However, this increased number of staff was not meant to improve the quality of the stations. Positioned by the government as a bureaucratic entity, rather than broadcasting station, RRI/TVRI received more administrative staff than production staff. According to a report by Subrata (2004), the number of TVRI personnel had increased by an average of 250–300 people per year between 1962 and 1984, or an average of 1000 people every five years. By 1977, the number of staff had reached 2000 persons; it had increased to almost 3000 staff members in 1981. Of these, approximately 1417 were administrative staff working at the Ministry office; only 1007 employees were part of the operational team.

Suharto's most controversial policy was the politicization of RRI/TVRI's top structure, not only to promote his development projects, but also to ensure his political vehicle (the Golongan Karya Party) won every general election. To achieve this goal, former TVRI Director Ishadi explained that RRI/TVRI's top leaders were positioned

below Minister of Information Harmoko, who was also the leader of the Golkar Party. As Minister of Information, Harmoko systematically used RRI/TVRI to campaign for Golkar's victory, such as by forcing directors and staff to be party members. As party cadres, all directors and personnel were required to campaign for Golkar. Ishadi stated:

> RRI/TVRI employees had to be members of the Golkar Party. Including the acting Director of TVRI. They had to campaign for a Golkar victory in the general election. Well, the exploitation of TVRI at that time was done perfectly. Simply because Pak Harto (Suharto) did not want to take the risk of losing his power in the general election. (Ishadi, personal interview, November 16, 2017)

In Central Java, with Golkar's target of winning voters in the province, regular TVRI newscasts were expected by Governor Suwardi to cover the "Yellow"—the typical color of Golkar—public buildings in the province.

In funding, RRI/TVRI under Suharto's administration applied a contradictory policy, imposing license fees and state subsidies while simultaneously banning advertising. The strategy of forcing income to be collected through license fees was intended to solve the limitations of state subsidies. This may be seen as reflecting the government's full support to finance TVRI, but also as providing room for Suharto's sons to profit from the network.

According to Directorate of Television (1972), between 1965 and 1971, its funding came from a mix of license fees, advertising, and government subsidies. For example, TVRI's total income for 1971 was IDR 654,282,000 (46,500 USD), with IDR 235,251,000 collected from license fees, IDR 367,477,000 from advertising, and IDR 51,554,000 from state subsidies. From this data, it can be seen that the amount of money received through the national budget was less than both that received through license fees and through advertising.

However, the amount of state funds provided to TVRI significantly increased between 1966 and 1971, in line with Suharto's efforts to intervene in its operations. For instance, in 1967, TVRI received subsidies of IDR 12,557,000; this increased to IDR 30,857,000 in 1969 and IDR 51,554,000 in 1971. As the media landscape was liberalized in the late 1980s, TVRI's income was supplemented by the annual contribution of commercial television broadcasters and their advertising revenue.

However, this additional income was only received between 1986 and 1997.

To reinforce income from license fees, on September 13, 1990, the Indonesian government issued Policy No. 40/1990 on the collection methods on which TVRI could cooperate with private parties as the second policy on TVRI financing. The first policy on such fees for financing TVRI was enacted in 1963.[12] One year later, PT Mekatama Raya, a private company owned by Suharto's sons, took advantage of this policy to cooperate with TVRI. This partnership, however, received criticism. As a single collector, the company was marked by cases of corruption (Sudibyo 2004). According to SK (2011), into the late 1980s, the involvement of Mekatama Raya raised public criticism due to malpractices in the collecting process. Of its IDR 120 billion targeted income for the period 1991–1992, TVRI received only about IDR 90 billion from this partnership. The cooperation, thus, was considered to benefit Mekatama Raya more than TVRI.[13]

Around this time, there was a significant increase in the number of television owners, which may support the expansion of broadcast services as well as the financial resources of TVRI. When TVRI was first established, the government distributed 10,000 televisions; the number of televisions in the country increased to 180,000 sets within several years. The number of television sets increased further to 1.2 million in 1978 and 2.8 million sets in 1982. To promote audience loyalty, both RRI/TVRI formed *Kelompok Pendengar, Pembaca dan Pemirsa* or *Kelompencapir* (audience groups) in 1984.[14]

Based on his investigation, Armando (2016) noted that the 1970s marked a golden period in TVRI history, during which license fees and commercial advertising revenue covered about 80% of TVRI's operational cost. In 1975/1976, for example, TVRI had IDR 20 billion in advertising revenue as well as IDR 2.8 billion in license fees, covering 75% of its operational needs. In contrast, it received less than IDR 95 million in state subsidies. In this time, the salary of TVRI staff was on above of a normal amount for general public servant. However, the situation changed when, in 1981, the Suharto regime stopped allowing commercial advertising on TVRI.

Decree of the Minister of Information No. 30, dated April 1, 1981, banned TVRI from using advertising as a source of financial income. Increased foreign investment and booming oil prices in the 1970s gave the Suharto regime the confidence to fund TVRI without advertising.

As noted by Armando (2016), the banning of commercial advertising reduced the network's regular and direct income from public and commercial industry by about IDR 17–20 billion per year. To replace lost advertising income, in April 1980 the regime increased license fees by about 300%, from IDR 500% for each receiver to IDR 1500–3000 per month.

Media observers (Armando 2016; Kristiawan 2012; Sudibyo 2004) argued that, instead of reflecting the state's capacity to fund TVRI, the termination of advertising was political, intended to accommodate the protests of Islamic and anti-consumerism groups, who took umbrage to 75% of advertised products being imported. As such, in the 1980s TVRI's income came solely from the national budget, and thus the network faced a high risk of political intervention. In addition to licensing fees, it received annual and fixed subsidies, of an amount determined by TVRI elites' ability to bargain with/lobby the government.

According to Kitley (2000), the banning of advertising for TVRI affected many things, including an increase in pro-government (rather than pro-public) programming. Give the significant dependence on the state budget, TVRI acted as a public voice of the Suharto administration. Moreover, the use of state funding reduced the creative work of TVRI employees, as their jobs were supervised by government officials rather than the public.

As noted by SK (2011), budget setting, allocation, and reporting were complicated due to the need to engage government officials and politicians on a yearly basis. This process took a longer time than obtaining money through advertising and licensing fees. As a result, it was difficult for TVRI to provide any unplanned services.

Finally, inspired by the growing neoliberal media system, in the late 1980s Suharto introduced two policies that ended TVRI's monopoly: the Open Sky policy and the issuance of commercial television licenses. On August 20, 1986, the Open Sky policy started enabling satellite technology to be used for personal purposes; as such, people could easily and freely watch television broadcasts from abroad (such as Malaysia or the UK) and thus not watch TVRI. Although the government issued Ministerial Decree No. 111/1990 to ban the screening of international shows in TVRI via satellite, in practice, without enough enforcement ability this policy was ineffective (Armando 2016).

The more controversial policy was Decree of the Minister of Information No. 190A, which welcomed Indonesia's first private television

broadcaster, Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI). First airing on October 28, 1987, RCTI served residents of Jakarta. It was followed by the second privately owned television broadcaster, which began serving Surabaya on September 27, 1989. In the 1990s, five private television broadcasters were operating nationally (Wahyuni 2000). Ironically, instead of producing guidelines to reform TVRI's management and enable it to compete with these commercial broadcasters, the government maintained the national broadcaster as a bureaucratic entity.

Previously, considering the rapid development of privately owned radio, on December 17, 1970, Suharto had issued Government Decree No. 55/1970 to allow the operation of non-state radio broadcasters, with the condition that these private channels did not produce political news. This policy officially ended RRI's public monopoly. Maintaining Suharto's political power, the ministerial decree also dealt with two other issues: the prohibition of using private broadcasters for practical politics and the obligation for stations to obtain a permit from the Ministry of Information before beginning operations. Instead of involving the public, the policy involved the military—(*Panglima Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban* or *Pangkopkamtib*)—and gave all regional officials of the Ministry of Information the power to authorize or revoke permits.[15]

In the first five years after the end of the RRI's monopoly over broadcasting (1970–1975), privately owned radio stations continued to flourish and began to rival RRI. McDaniel (1994) noted that the overall number of radio stations increased every year, for instance, increasing from 250 channels in 1970 to 543 channels in 1975. Most private radio channels were reactivations of former 'illegal' student and activist radio broadcasters. In addition, the number of local government channels was also increased.[16]

Overall, Suharto's autocratic power between 1966 and 1998 showed the ultimate cooptation of RRI/TVRI as campaigners of national integration. The two state channels were a 'loyal partner of the ruling authority in the process of nation building' and 'to protect the spirit of unity' (Romano 2003). At every telecast, the station aired Suharto's speeches on his top-down economic development policies and urgency of adopting the national ideology of 'Pancasila' (Kitley 2000).

When broadcasters were the only players supplying broadcast programs (from the 1950s–1970 for RRI and from the 1970s–1980s for TVRI), they enjoyed government support in the form of equipment, studios, and

access to government events. In the mid-1970s, some private radio channels emerged, providing more sophisticated broadcasting services to rival RRI. Commercial television channels arrived in the late 1980s. The rise of these private channels not only ended the monopoly of RRI/TVRI, but also the popularity and audience loyalty of these state broadcasters.

4.7 Autocratic Broadcast Law

This section explores the first Broadcast Law of post-independence Indonesia (Law No. 24/1997), which was created under the authoritarian regime of Suharto. The legislative process, the flow of government/politicians' ideas regarding state-owned broadcasting, as well as the legislative output can be seen as consolidating the broadcasting policies developed between 1966 and 1986 to reinforce Suharto's cooptation of the two media. This section will discuss to what extent Suharto's administration controlled the policy-making process behind the Broadcast Law and managed its own political interest in owning RRI/TVRI.

According to a public note from the Parliament Secretariat (1996), the initiative to create a broadcast law originally came from Suharto's administration via the Ministry of Information. Formally, the first bill was submitted on March 4, 1996. Four days later, this draft was officially revealed to all legislatures through a plenary session.

This law's drafting can be seen as seeking to reinforce government control over broadcasting. In an official explanation of the submitted draft, Minister of Information Harmoko emphasized the high influence of radio and television in shaping public issues and confirmed the government's desire to control the media. Another reason cited was the limited availability of radio frequencies as a natural resource, thus requiring strong policy to protect national interests. Furthermore, the Minister encouraged broadcasting to strongly support Suharto's political vision of *Pembangunan Manusia Indonesia Seutuhnya* (developing the Indonesian people as a whole).

In the Suharto's view, ministerial-level broadcasting policies were insufficient to address the complexities of broadcasting and the need for effective political control. For example, before the first broadcast law was enacted, the regulations dealing with licensed private channels were only formal agreements between TVRI and private broadcasters such as RCTI (Letter of Agreement of TVRI Director with RCTI No 12/SP/DIR/IV/1988, dated February 22, 1988). Also, the provision of

license fees for funding TVRI was only protected by government decree level.

Following Kitley (2000), the legislative process of the Broadcast Law shows Suharto's dominance over politicians and the public. Politicians instantly agreed with Harmoko's proposal to use the bill submitted by the government as legislative material, meaning that parliament and the public positioned themselves as simply following the government draft. Neither the public nor the politicians proposed an alternative bill to balance Suharto's proposal. This repressive political situation made politicians and civil society organizations almost incapable of conveying different ideas. As Kitley (2000) noted, the public hearing of the bill in parliament was not open. Outside of parliament, there was no serious attempt to include the general public in discussions.

Kitley (2000) detailed this legislative process as taking two periods: draft formulation (around May 1996) and discussion of crucial issues (May–December 1996). The first forum for politicians to comment on the proposed bill was carried out on June 10, 1996. Four political factions, namely Karya Pembangunan (Development Work), ABRI (military), Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development), and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, the opposition) furthered their political opinions. A special legislative committee was formed on July 1, 1996, and led by Abu Hasan Sadzily, with Marcel Beding and Aisyah Amini as vice chairmen. This committee consisted predominantly of politicians supporting Suharto: Fraksi Karya Pembangunan and ABRI (30 persons). Representatives of the two oppositional parties, FPP and PDI was minimal (11 persons).

It can be said, if I refer to the official document of politicians' views (1997), debates on RRI/TVRI as state-owned media in the legislative process mostly followed what had been written in the draft, with small and minor revisions. Debates corresponded with three issues: remit, ownership, and funding. On remit, politicians' proposals were varied. However, they shared similar interest in using both media to promote national integration, to educate people on the Pancasila and religious norms, and to confront the dominance of commercial media. They also agreed to place RRI/TVRI as a state agency under the Ministry of Information and to end TVRI's status as a state-foundation.

In terms of structure, the Broadcast Law was intended to reinforce past policies that placed RRI/TVRI as a bureaucratic unit of the government, rather than as an independent unit; however, politicians urged both

media to be more creative in their provision of services. In this sense, the selection of RRI and TVRI directors remained in the hands of the government. It was planned to establish a supervisory board to follow the model used by international broadcasters. However, the body remained led by the Ministry of Information, rather than professional figures outside the ministry.

In terms of funding, most politicians suggested maintaining a mix of state subsidies, license fees, advertising, and a 12.5% royalty from the advertising revenues of private television broadcasters. State subsidies were considered necessary in the sense that the two media were government-owned entities. There was another idea, proposed by the oppositional party PDI, to end the use of state subsidies as a core funding mechanism and then transfer media ownership to state-owned corporations (state-business unit). However, this idea was rejected by all other political parties (Secretariat of Parliament 1997).

With extensive supervision from the presidential palace, the legislative process of the Broadcasting Law was quite fast (eight months); on December 9, 1996, parliament officially held a plenary meeting and approve the law. According to Afif Ma'roef (1997), the first draft initially had 12 chapters and 26 articles. After legislative review, the draft was expanded, consisting of 12 chapters and 31 articles. Secretariat of Parliament (1997) noted that the plenary was started by a report from the special team legislating the law, then was followed by comments from all political factions. An address by the Minister of Information ended the forum, and finally Wahono (the speaker) signed the Law.

The final draft of the Broadcasting Law, adopted on December 9, 1996, affirmed a dual broadcasting policy in Indonesia: government and private (Article 9); foreign broadcasting was prohibited (Article 27). The Law generally legalized Suharto's political stance regarding the broadcasting system, with RRI/TVRI being used as an authoritarian mouthpiece while commercial television broadcasters received more open access as a sort of limited media liberalization. To maintain this power, the Law positioned the government as the sole regulator, by introducing a National Advisory Board and Controlling Agency (BP3N) under the Ministry of Information. The agency's task was to provide input on practical policies, supervise content of both state and non-state channels, and issue licenses and operational permits to commercial broadcast channels.

RRI/TVRI was dealt with in an expansive article (Article 10) in the Broadcast Law, which consisted of eight paragraphs. Paragraph 1 regulated the legal status of these media as an organic unit under Ministry of Information, and removed TVRI's status as a government foundation; however, it did not clearly regulate the institutional structure of RRI/TVRI. The article also regulated the general orientation of both media, mandating them with serving all Indonesians by providing three media types: TVRI, RRI, and international radio/television channels. In addition, both media were allowed to conduct subscription broadcasts or teletext broadcasts. Article 8 ruled that RRI/TVRI, as the national broadcasters, had to serve all citizens. In addition, the two channels were tasked with coordinating all types of broadcasters and with representing the government at global forums.

With regard to the remit, Article 4 required all broadcasters to foster a national agenda to develop 'a Pancasila-oriented society,' strengthen national unity, and promote prosperity among society. Article 6 further stipulated that broadcasting should be directed by a number of purposes: channeling constructive public opinions and the community inclusion in national development; enhancing cultural resilience; improving the national economy; and managing the national political stability.

The Table 4.5 indicates the RRI/TVRI in the first broadcast law:

It is important to note that, although policymakers prioritized the regulation of RRI/TVRI, fewer articles in the Broadcast Law deal with them than commercial broadcasters. For example, the law clearly regulated the procedure for private broadcasters to obtain frequency licenses, despite the state channels not being mentioned. Instead of regulating the governance of RRI/TVRI in detail, the Broadcast Law gave a 'blank

Table 4.5 RRI/TVRI in Broadcast Law 24/1997


REMIT:
To Mouthpiece Soeharto Politics: Developmentalism, Social Order
Status: Government-run channel under Ministry of Information
OWNERSHIP:
Government (a unit under the Ministry of Information)
STRUCTURE:
Single Board (headed by a Director from Senior Official of Information Ministry)
FUNDING:
Mix of State Budget, Advertising, License Fee, Royalty of Private TVs

cheque' to Suharto's administration to further govern the media by producing lower policies, outside the Broadcast Law, without public involvement.

According to Septy (2000), overall the Broadcast Law indicated Suharto's interest in controlling all broadcasters, not only RRI/TVRI. In her investigation, Septy argued that Law No. 24/1997 benefited the ruling power rather than the public by framing broadcasting as an extension of power rather than public interest. Similarly, a consultant to parliament named Budiman (personal interview, May 2017) viewed Law No. 24/1997 as a 'ceremonial law.' Including private channels in the Broadcast Law, Budiman said, meant formally accepting a pluralistic media policy; however, in practice, the Ministry of Information only granted licenses to operate private broadcasters to Suharto's children and his allies.

In a media policy meeting in Jakarta, on December 15, 1998, the media activist Leo Batubara argued that Law No. 24/1997 was overly protective of Suharto's power. About 27 of the law's articles limited freedom of information, and none of the items gave private broadcasters the freedom to produce their own news (Batubara 2000).

Overall, Suharto's dominance over politicians in parliament was intense, not only during the legislative process but also when Suharto decided to delay its implementation and asked politicians to again review the Law. From January to July 1997, Suharto refused to sign the bill that had been approved by parliament, and he returned it for parliament to re-examine some chapters that he saw as practically difficult to apply.

The private television owners, who were the children and allies of Suharto, were viewed as the actors behind this refusal. Through a letter dated July 11, 1997, Suharto asked parliament to review certain articles in the Broadcasting Law, including the five-year duration of private television authorization and the provision of advertising as funding income of TVRI, which could limit the growth of his children's television businesses (Mutmainnah 2014). Politicians criticized this, holding that the pressure to re-discuss the Law was higher from private television managers than from the general public. They argued that five-year terms for television licenses were prevalent in other countries, such as the United States and avoided ownership monopolies and enabled media performance evaluation.

Reacting to Suharto's request, political parties separated into three positions: two pro-government political factions, consisting of Golkar

(Karya Pembangunan) and ABRI, agreed. Persatuan Pembangunan rejected the request, while PDI remained neutral. After considerable political lobbying, the latter two factions finally accepted the request, showing Suharto's power over parliament. On 29 September 1997, the plenary session approved a small revision to the Broadcast Law, extending the term of private television permits from five years to ten years. Although the provisions pertaining to RRI/TVRI were not modified, the decision to extend the duration of private television permits gave more privilege to commercial media.

In short, Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 produced a broadcasting system in which state corporatism occurred (Soeyanto 2011). In state corporatism, all public institutions and activities are under state control or co-opted through intimidation or legal persuasion. All provisions of the Broadcast Law facilitated Suharto's efforts to control broadcasting by exclusively managing all frequency licensing processes and regulatory units. Kitley (2000) argued that Suharto's political control was embodied in his giving the power to grant broadcast permits to two ministries: the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Transportation.[17]

However, after this extended legislation, the huge economic crisis in Asia and Indonesia between 1997 and 1998 delayed the implementation of the Broadcast Law. Approximately seven months after the Law was enacted, Suharto's regime—the sole regulator—collapsed. As such, the law remained only on paper.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter tells that, even before the invention of the Indonesian national radio, named *Radio Republik Indonesia* on September 11, 1945, the history of Indonesian broadcasting could trace its roots to the eras of Dutch and Japanese colonialism. I have concluded, the broadcast policy and governance in both colonial and post-colonial Indonesia varied in accordance with the interests of the regimes in power.

It was in 1925 when Batavia Radio Vereeniging (BRV) began operations, the first radio in Batavia (Jakarta) to air popular music from Europe for a limited Western public. Between 1925 and 1945, three subsequent forms of radio service emerged: First, the non-state indigenous Indonesian community (represented by Perikatan Perkumpulan Radio Ketimoeran/PPRK network); second, the Dutch corporation model (represented

by NIROM); third, the military-owned channel with centralistic management for political propaganda (represented by the Hoso Kyoku radio network in Java island during the Japanese occupation).

During the Dutch colonial era, radio was privately run, without content being strictly controlled by Dutch authorities. In this period, broadcasters represented two parallel and complementary systems, one operated by and associated with the West, and one operated by and associated with the East (Lindsay 1996). In the interest of political propaganda, the Dutch established and used NIROM as a commercial corporation that opposed the PPRK Network, which used local Javanese culture as its primary content. The arrival of the Japanese military in 1942 dismantled these two channels, replacing them with a single state-owned channel, Hoso Kanri Kyoku, which operated between 1942 and 1945. They used radio as war propaganda and exerted strong control over its content, personnel, and technology.

What later became known as RRI can be seen as a continuation of the Hoso Kyoku model (a centralized production system, state-managed personnel, use of state budget, and use to promote political propaganda). From its establishment on September 11, 1945, RRI operated as a non-state entity consisting of eight branches outside Jakarta. Six month later, at a conference in Purwokerto, Central Java, broadcasters decided to integrate RRI into Sukarno's administration to ensure its sustainability. As a 'Djawatan Radio' under the Ministry of Information, RRI received budget and staffing support from the Sukarno regime, and as a consequence it was used to voice Sukarno's political policies and gave Sukarno full authority to select its chairman. Similar to Sukarno, Suharto required RRI to support his political policy for economic growth, military power over civilians, and unification of social forces. Under this regime, RRI was 'a technical unit of the Ministry of Information,' with full budget and staff support.

Meanwhile, the first national television broadcaster, TVRI was established in 1962 to cover the Fourth Asian Games (which Indonesia hosted) and further used as a tool to confront political separatism. From this goal was crafted TVRI's slogan: 'TVRI menjalin persatuan dan kesatuan' (TVRI weaves unity and union). Under Sukarno and later Suharto (1962–1998), this channel exercised two state ownership patterns, first being a state-controlled foundation and then being a full governmental unit under the Ministry of Information.

Although RRI and TVRI had similar positions as 'ideological state apparatus'—to borrow a term from Antonio Gramsci—(Ransome 1992) in the 1960s–1990s, each had different backgrounds and different political settings. RRI was born amidst Indonesia's struggle to seize its national independence, while TVRI was inspired by Sukarno's personal agenda. The idea to set up TVRI was initiated by a top-down policy from Sukarno, while RRI was established from the bottom by broadcasters-cum-activists promoting Indonesian independence. However, in the Sukarno-Suharto political periods, RRI/TVRI were similarly managed by state-employed officials and produced regular programs promoting government interests. This can be traced to their programs, which frequently covered the ceremonial activities of both Sukarno and Suharto. In their financing, these state-run media shared similar sources (i.e., state subsidies and license fees). However, TVRI gained additional income from advertising between 1963 and 1980.

Two prominent figures were key actor in three different ages of broadcasting: Maladi and Abdurrahman Saleh. Both were veteran broadcasters with the PPRK network and Hoso Kyoku and later were major figures behind the establishment of RRI on September 11, 1945. These men's experiences managing PPRK and Hoso Kyoku influenced the setting of RRI as national media. As an information minister, Maladi was also a key figure in the establishment of TVRI in 1962.

The Table 4.6 summarizes broadcasting institutions in the colonial and authoritarian political eras of Indonesia (1930s–1990s):

Using four dimensions of governance (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), it can be seen that the Indonesian autocratic broadcasting system began under three channels: PPRK (community-based ownership), NIROM (commercial), and *Hoso Kanri Kyoku* (military-owned media). Of these, it was the centralized operations and political propaganda uses of *Hoso Kyoku* that inspired the model that prevailed after Indonesia's independence. When Sukarno consolidated his power, the ownership model transformed from a regional non-state into a government-centric model.

In terms of remit, there was a shift in policy, from an orientation toward maintaining Javanese culture (SRV/PPRK network); war propaganda (*Hoso Kyoku*); up to provoking Indonesian nationalism and political integration when RRI/TVRI was first established (1940s–1960s). In terms of ownership, the Hoso Kyoku model, in which the broadcaster was state-controlled and centralized but had several regional branches,

Table 4.6 Broadcasting in authoritarian Indonesia

Type	*Broadcasters*	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
Radio	SRV groups (1933–1942) & NIROM network (1934–1942)	Social and cultural awareness, entertainment	Community non-profit (SRV) State company (NIROM)	Single model, the top chair is elected by members of the station	Fee from member; advertising; taxation
Radio	Hoso Kyoku (1942–1945)	Japan political propaganda of Asian freedom	Japanese military	Single model, the top chair is elected by Japanese military power	Radio owner taxation
Radio	RRI (Djawatan under Ministry of Information in 1946–1965)	Struggle of political freedom & national unity	Government of Sukarno	Single model, the top chair is elected by Information Ministry	Mix of state subsidy; donation; license fee
Radio	RRI (Djawatan in 1965–1975 & Technical Unit or UPT under Ministry of Information in 1975–1998)	Agent of the national unity interest as well as development issues	Government of Suharto	Single model, the top chair is elected by Information Ministry	Fully state budget & limited amount of advertising
Television	TVRI (State own foundation directly under President in 1962–1975)	National integration & development of Indonesia	Government of Sukarno & Suharto	Single model, the top chair is elected by President	Mix of state budget; license fee; and adverti sing

(continued)

was adopted fully as the ownership model for post-colonial Indonesian broadcasting, particularly for RRI.

Regarding funding, a mixed funding model was applied, including donations, license fees, commercial sponsorships, advertising revenue, and state subsidies (incidental subsidies and regular budgets). In other

Table 4.6 (continued)

Type	*Broadcasters*	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
Television	TVRI (Technical Unit under Department of Information in 1975–1998)	Agent of the national unity interest as well as development progress	Government of Suharto	Single model, the top chair is elected by Information Ministry	State budget; license fee; advertising (up 1980), private TV revenue of 12,5%

(Compiled from Department of Information 1953; Lindsay 1996; Kitley 2000; SK 2011)

word, the mix funding model had a historical root in similar models used during the colonial period, especially those used by the PPRK and NIROM. Nevertheless, the dominance of government funding in the post-independence era was the main legacy of *Hoso Kyoku*.

This chapter discussed that Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 reinforced the position of RRI/TVRI as a state-owned entity. Article 10 of the Law regulated RRI/TVRI as state-owned broadcasters under the Ministry of Information. In accordance with this legislation, the Suharto administration controlled their contents, staff, and finance resources. As a consequence, the Minister of Information held the power to select the executive leadership of RRI/TVRI, without any public involvement.

Following Hallin and Mancini (2004), this chapter confirmed that the invention and development of broadcasting in authoritarian Indonesia (1930s–1990s) were linked to the political policies of power holders. Broadcast governance in authoritarian politics of Indonesia had different roots than such governance in Western democracies. Compared with the UK, where PSB was the first broadcasting model used in the 1920s, Indonesia experienced several forms of authoritarian broadcasting before accepting PSB. Although the presence of culturally oriented broadcasts and the use of license fees for funding was found in pre- and post-independence Indonesia, it may not be seen as being for public engagement. Translation of the remit and method of payment collection was handled by the political authority, not the public.

Overall, during the colonial and autocratic periods (the 1930s–1990s), five different models of broadcasting practice were developed: the community non-profit (SRV groups), commercial corporation (NIROM

network), Japanese military agency (Hoso Kyoku), non-state foundation and Djawatan (RRI/TVRI in the Sukarno era), and state autocratic agency (Suharto era, 1973–1998). The passage of Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 completed Suharto's autocratic policies in broadcasting by placing both RRI/TVRI management as his power ally alongside private broadcasters.[18] This leads to the next question: to what extent did the breakdown of Suharto's repressive politics open the idea of adopting an autonomous public oriented broadcasting system? Chapter 5 will discuss this issue.

Notes

1. Controversy over the issue of the establishment of Indonesian broadcasting stems from the different views regarding three elements (ownership; historical context of the media establishment; media's contribution to the struggle for Indonesia's political independence) as the references of choice for the country's first radio station. Regarding history of establishment, Batavia Radio Vereeniging (BRV) in Jakarta was the first to operate, because it was established in 1927. Similarly, a cable radio system named Malabar had been established in Bandung, but was not associated with radio broadcasting because it was only for communications between the Dutch troops and the Netherlands. As such, criticism over SRV arose because this radio was not chronologically the oldest and was initiated by the Kingdom of Mangkunegaran, Surakarta, which was known—in the Dutch colonial era—a supporter of Dutch colonialism. In terms of supporting the national struggle, another local radio existed in West Sumatra, namely Radio Rimba Raya, between 1945 and 1948. However, the SRV was ultimately agreed upon as Indonesia's first radio, in the sense that SRV was owned by residents of Indonesia (specifically Java) and oriented toward serving the Javanese, an indigenous Indonesian group. SRV was also managed and financed by indigenous Indonesians and later became pioneered the 'Eastern radio institutions,' and eventually almost all of its staff were pioneers of RRI in 1945.
2. To compare, a key document describing the history of TVRI is *Televisi di Indonesia: TVRI 1962–1972*, published by the Directorate of Television, Ministry of Information. Aside from providing notes on the history of TVRI and its progress during the Suharto era, this book includes a number of advertisements from such major companies such as BNI 46, RCA Indonesia, Pertamina, and Unilever Indonesia. In contrast, there are no such advertisements in the published books on the history and

development of RRI. This shows the greater support given to TVRI by commercial sponsors.

3. In an address for a book titled *Mangkunegara VII dan Awal Penyiaran Indonesia*, authored by Wiryawan (2006), the chairman of the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, Sasa Djuarsa Sendjaya emphasized that the book was the most comprehensive to examine the early history of broadcasting in colonial Indonesia. Other previous studies, such as those by Lindsay (1996), Sen (2003), and Yampolsky (2013) focused solely on the development of radio and its particular link to certain politics or the development of local music.
4. Mangkunegara VII, chief founder and donor of SRV, had predicates: artist, broadcaster, and intellectual. In 1925, he managed the Javanische Kuntskring Mardiraras cultural club, with Karawitan art (playing a musical instrument [gamelan] accompanied by Javanese *gendhing* [songs]) as its core activity. At this time, there existed a radio station using the call signature 'PK2MN' that belonged to the Javanische Kuntskring Mardiraras association. However, the station focused solely on airing the Javanese *gendhing* of the club and Wayang Wong ('puppet people') from Balekambang in Surakarta, Central Java. In 1913, Mangkunegara VII registered as a student at the University of Leiden, Netherlands. He later returned to Indonesia to chair the nationalist organization Boedi Utomo. In 1916, he was appointed King of Mangkunegaran Palace with the name Prince Aryo Adipati Prangwedono; after his fortieth birthday (1924), he took the name Mangkunegara VII.
5. Mangkunegara VII donated 600 guilders for the purchase of the radio transmitter and handed over 600 square meters of land (worth 15 thousand guilders) for the construction of the SRV office in Kestalan (now the site of RRI Surakarta office). Construction of the SRV building was completed by Tee Bing Koen's technical bureau (based out of Yogyakarta). This financial support marked SRV as the first broadcast institution to be directly managed and financed by indigenous Indonesian and it was also the first networked radio model with no outside political interference (mainly from the Dutch military). With this action, Wiryawan (2015) argued, Mangkunegara VII showed his political opposition over the Dutch colonialism.
6. According to Wiryawan (personal interview, November 26, 2017), the use of the name SRV (a Dutch term) had two meanings. First, it was a direct influence of its founders, who were elites who had graduated from Dutch universities. For instance, Sarsito was an alumnus of the engineering department of Delft University, the Netherlands. Second, it was a form of resistance against BRV Jakarta, using a similar station name so that audiences may perceive it as equal. In some photographs, I saw displayed at the residence of Wiryawan in Ngarsopuro, Surakarta, on my

visit in November 2017, I could see that all of SRV's founders wore suits during the meeting that formally established the broadcaster, showing their confidence.

7. Maladi was born in Matesih, a small district of Surakarta, Central Java, on August 31, 1912. Having graduated from AMS in 1932, Maladi was one of the leading broadcasters at SRV and later, during the Japanese occupation, Hoso Kyoku. One month after Indonesian independence, he initiated a meeting with eight former Hoyo Kyoku staff (from Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Jakarta, Solo, Semarang, Malang, and Purwokerto) in Menteng, Jakarta which led to the establishment of the Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI). After chairing the local RRI branch in Surakarta for about two years (1945–1946), Maladi was selected to be the first (and ultimately longest serving) RRI chairman while concurrently holding other strategic positions in the Sukarno regime. For instance, Maladi was also chosen by Sukarno as Minister of Information (1959–1962). After studying media systems in Europe and the United States, from 1962 to 1966 Maladi served as Minister of Sports, in which capacity he pioneered the establishment of a national television broadcaster.
8. In the early days of Indonesian independence, an overseas channel of Indonesia also aired the text of the proclamation after it was translated into English, using a transmitter owned by PTT, a former Dutch telecom company in Bandung. Foreign broadcast service itself started during the Japanese occupation. Department of Information (1953) noted, due to technical limitations, in the NIROM era there were no overseas broadcasting services. During the Japanese period, foreign broadcasts were conducted by Indonesian fighters in Jakarta, under direct supervision of Japanese troop, in several languages (such as English and French). It is here that fighters such as Surjodipuro and Budiman learned how to manage overseas broadcasts.
9. Abdurrahman Saleh was born in Kwitang, a small district of Jakarta, on July 1, 1909. Known as Maman in childhood, he gained access to the westernized education system through his father, a doctor named Mohammed Saleh. As such, he studied at HIS (Hollandsch Inlandsche School, or elementary school) then MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager School, or junior high school), and AMS (Algemeene Middlebare School, or senior high school) in Malang, and then STOVIA, a medical school in Jakarta. There, he obtained a physician's degree. He later became a professor of medicine at both the Universitas Gadjah Mada in Yogyakarta and Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta. In 1934, Saleh established VORO (Vereeniging voor Oosterse Radio Omroep), a local channel for Jakarta, with several colleagues. Using 40-watt transmitters, the station was self-financed. Here Saleh learned broadcasting, which further helped him

engage with Hoso Kyoku after the Japanese occupied Indonesia on March 8, 1942. In the first week of Indonesian independence, while busy teaching the Salemba campus of Universitas Indonesia, Saleh established an emergency radio station in Salemba 6, Jakarta (now the Medical Faculty building), the Voice of Free Indonesia. This initiative was carried out because the Japanese military had stopped the Jakarta branch of Hoso Kyoku after it aired Sukarno's proclamation of Indonesian independence. With other activists, Saleh was a founder of RRI on September 11, 1945. He served as the first chairman, as well as the key contact between RRI and the new political regime. Among the founders of RRI, Saleh was the oldest; this was one of the reasons why he was chosen as its first leader. On January 12, 1946, he led the first national radio conference in Surakarta; this was followed by a second conference in Purwokerto, Central Java, on January 23, 1946, where Maladi was elected as his replacement. Hence, Saleh led RRI for only eight months.

10. The slogan "Sekali di Udara Tetap di Udara" (Once on the Air, always on the Air) symbolized a strong sense of resistance to the return of Dutch colonialism. This slogan formally emerged during an emergency meeting held in Surakarta from December 19–20, 1948. RRI, led by Maladi, was preparing to leave Surakarta and avoid an invasion by Dutch military forces. In this meeting, it was agreed that all broadcast equipment should be transferred to Tawangmangu, a small town outside Surakarta, and all RRI activists scattered to different areas. To closing the meeting, Maladi voiced the historic slogan: 'Believe. God will protect our adventures. We can meet again at a happy time. Sekali Merdeka, Tetap Merdeka, Sekali di Udara Tetap di Udara.'
11. Historically, according to Romano (2003), the label "Pancasila Press" encapsulated the fundamental tenets of Supomo's integralist and totalitarian philosophy, rooted in early twentieth-century views of Indonesia. Citizens were expected to show filial piety and loyalty to the emperor, relinquishing their rights and authority to the emperor.
12. Pursuant to Decree No. 40/1990, the collection of public fees was intended to assist TVRI in carrying out its public service mandate in addition to dealing with a state budget crisis. The decree defined public contribution as the amount of money specified by the government that must be paid by the owners of television receivers. Exceptions applied to state-provided TV receivers and sellers of TV sets. This fee was collected by TVRI and would be directly used for broadcast operations. However, TVRI was allowed to cooperate with private parties to obtain payment, with the approval of the Minister of Information. In detail, the collection procedure began with the registration of the television set/receiver by its owner at the local TVRI branch or another specified location no later than

30 days after the receiver was acquired. The policy also mandated both the Minister of Information and the Minister of Finance to fix the total fee, without requiring them to consult with parliament.

13. Regarding the cooperation between Mekatama Raya and TVRI, Ishadi (interview, November 16, 2017) argued that it was linked to Suharto's interest in sharing TVRI's profit among his children and maintaining loyalty of the cadres of Golkar as his political vehicle. As several private television broadcasters, including Rajawali Citra Televisi (RCTI), Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia (TPI), and Surya Citra Televisi (SCTV) were managed by his children (Bambang Trihatmojo and Siti Hardianti Rukmana) and their business partners, the Mekatama Raya company was intended to favor his other sons (Sigit and Tommy Suharto). Under this company, the method for collecting license fees changed, with direct home visits to collect money from television receiver owners replacing the old method in which TVRI passively waited for receiver owners to send their money. Under the terms of this cooperation, TVRI had to share 30% of its income with Mekatama Raya. In addition, the station had to accept the Suharto's policy of using unemployed Golkar cadres as fee collectors.
14. Between 1970 and 1980, several international cooperation programs were initiated. These included, for instance, a joint Indonesia–Malaysia broadcast titled "Salam Muhibah." TVRI also joined the regional public broadcaster association ABU (Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union) and was an active member in the Asian Committee on Culture & Information (COCI) and the Broadcasting Organizations of the Non-aligned Countries (BONAC). Photographs explaining international partnerships, including with Japan, West Germany, the UK, and Australia, are included in the book *Televisi di Indonesia* (p. 163). The book also confirms the support of international bodies in the development of state television. In 1970, West Germany assisted the establishment of TVRI's first training center, which was equipped with facilities for television engineering, film, etc.
15. Previously, on December 30, 1967, Suharto issued a policy on amateur radio. The policy positioned amateur radio as a non-commercial and non-political activity, and required practitioners to obtain permission from the Telecommunication Council on behalf of the Suharto government. The policy also required radio managers to fulfill a minimum technical standard.
16. In his remarks at the opening session of the 7th National Private Radio Association (PRSSNI) conference in Jakarta, held December 11, 1995, Minister of Information Harmoko said that to maintain a single state television channel and limit private television broadcasters to just five channels. Without such restrictions, Harmoko argued, the commercial advertising scheme would not be equally shared. However, in practice,

Table 4.7 Organization of RRI/TVRI in Suharto era


Minister of Information
General Director of Radio, Television & Film
Director of RRI
Director of TVRI
Administration Unit
Administration Unit
Operational Units: Indonesian Service, Foreign Service, Newsroom Unit, Technology Management
Operational Units: Newsroom Unit, Production Management, Technology Management

the distribution of advertising revenues was concentrated solely in Jakarta and co-opted by private television channels.

17. Under Suharto's authoritarian power, the organizational structure of RRI/TVRI can be understood in the following Table 4.7.

    This Table 4.7 shows that RRI and TVRI are controlled by the Ministry of Information as a bureaucratic entity, alongside such units as the State Film Service.

18. Widarto (1998, pp. 3–4) noted, by the end of Suharto's power in 1998, RRI has 52 stations (one national channel, five regionals, 46 local broadcasting channels). Meanwhile there are 780 commercial radio channels. Alongside five private television services, TVRI stations have expanded all over the country consisting of one national broadcast center, 13 regional stations, 7 mobile production centers and more than 350 transmitters spread out throughout the country. Widarto (1998) further noted, the domestic satellite Palapa which was launched in 1976 has made TVRI broadcast accessible to remote places in Indonesian archipelago.

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Check for updates

CHAPTER 5

Reforming Indonesian Broadcasting System (1998–2002)

5.1 Introduction

During my fieldwork in Jakarta, from October to December 2017, I was fortunate to visit two locations. The first was the postgraduate campus of Universitas Indonesia (UI) in Salemba, Jakarta. A small 10 × 10-meter seminar room on the 6th floor of the IASTH building therein is used as a gathering place by activists, academics, and broadcasters as they assess the progress of media policy in Indonesia. On December 6 and 18, 2017, lunches with traditional Indonesian dishes such as *gado-gado* and *lemper* opened the discussion, an evaluation of fifteen years of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 and the future of PSB in Indonesia. While having lunch, activists shared sociopolitical information, designed follow-up actions (such as publishing statements in the media and lobbying policymakers). In this room, years earlier—between 2000 and 2004—a group of communication lecturers who called themselves the 'Salemba School' designed policy advocacy to promote PSB.

The second was the 6th floor of the Press Council building at Jl. Kebon Sirih, now the secretariat of the Newspaper Publishers Union (SPS), which served as an office of the Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society (MPPI) between 1999 and 2002 and where the organization advocated for press and broadcasting policies. During a lunch break at this office, I met several members of the Indonesian Press Council, former activists, and senior journalists who actively advocated media policy. I also obtained

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public statements and policy drafts from the SPS library, where media activists had contributed to the legislation of Indonesia's two media laws: Press Law in 1999 and Broadcast Law in 2002. The continued concerns of the activists gathered at UI Salemba, Jakarta, as well as the various documents I found at the MPPI office, became important sources in the writing of this chapter.

This chapter explores the struggles of stakeholders (politicians, government officials, civil society activists, broadcasters, etc.) to transform a previously authoritarian media system into a more democratic one by introducing public broadcasting. It also elucidates the changes and continuities of Indonesia's pre- and post-authoritarian broadcasting system, particularly in its state-owned broadcasting policy.

This chapter examines three aspects: (1) the struggle behind the legislation of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, which formally recognized PSB (the idea of introducing media pluralism that was triggered by the dissolution of the Ministry of Information); (2) the stakeholders and interests involved in the drafting process (the internal dynamics of RRI/TVRI between 1998 and 2002, as it transitioned from a state agency to semi-commercial and ultimately PSB; the various initiatives of stakeholders in promoting RRI/TVRI as a public-oriented channels, which emerged at the end of 1999); (3) the legal-textual provision for Indonesian PSB (the proposals from the government office, parliament, broadcasters, private broadcast operators, and CSOs in the drafting of the Broadcast Law between 2000 and 2002, with a particular focus on PSB).

In sequence, I will begin by describing the policy of dissolution of the Ministry of Information, the single regulator of broadcasting in Indonesia, that had a systematic effect. I will then explore the initiatives undertaken by strategic actors to influence the policymakers to adopt a pluralistic media system and incorporate a PSB in new policy. These actors included civil society activists, RRI/TVRI elites, and international media agencies, who worked together and successfully passed a new Broadcast Law in late 2002. In the final section, I will analyze two core issues: the formal model of Indonesian PSB governance and the extent to which the PSB provisions of Law No. 32/2002 comply with the universally accepted PSB model.

Stories in this chapter are derived from two main types of sources. The first are print documents obtained from official seminar reports, workshops, public testimonies, and policy proposals related to RRI/TVRI

reform produced between 1998 and 2002. The second are semi-structured interviews with multi-stakeholders involved in PSB policy-making, including of RRI/TVRI elites and staff, civil society activists, politicians, and government officials (at the Ministry of Communications and Informatics) as well as staff at media assistance organizations. Past studies of Indonesia's broadcast policies, especially Law 32/2002 and other RRI/TVRI policies (1998–2002) also helped, such as Heryanto (2003), Sasongko (2003), and Irma (2003).

5.2 Dissolution of the Autocratic Broadcast Regulator

As politically driven media institutions, most state-owned broadcasters in post-authoritarian societies experience enormous pressure to change following the fall of autocratic power and its regulatory offices. Experiences in post-communist Eastern Europe such as Georgia (Beckerman 2014), or African post-autocratic powers such as South Africa (Fourie 2003), confirm that regime changes result in changes in media regulators and the national broadcast channels that they previously controlled. In the case of Indonesia, as will be explored in this section, the fall of Suharto's 32-year regime on May 20, 1998, led to changes in various government offices, including in the single broadcast regulatory unit. All of the Suharto regime's media policies and institutions were questioned, including the government's control of RRI/TVRI.

Between 1998 and 1999, there was a gradual change in RRI/TVRI management to fit with democratic media aspirations. In the first year after Suharto's resignation, the new government initiated small changes in the content of RRI/TVRI. In this period, the two media conveyed more journalistic contents and voiced public agendas rather than state-driven issues; however, they remained government-owned and government-staffed, and continued to receive state funds. Moreover, in September 1998 Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah reduced the number of times private radio broadcasters were obliged to relay pro-government news aired by RRI from eighteen times per day to three times per day, thereby giving private radio broadcasters more space to produce their own news (Jurriens 2009).

This situation shifted dramatically when Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur) replaced B. J. Habibie as president. Through Decree No. 136/1999, dated October 26, 1999, Wahid dissolved the

Ministry of Information and blocked the implementation of Law No. 24/1997. In his reasoning for this policy, Gus Dur argued that information was a public affair and that the government had to serve as a regulator, rather than an operator (*Gatra* 1999). This policy received the full support of civil society, as it was seen as a means of dismantling the authoritarian media system. Some experts, such as Sen (2000), Kitley (2000), and Jurriens (2009), have described the Ministry of Information as the pillar of Suharto's autocratic press, where this institution entirely controlled the operations of RRI/TVRI and privately owned media.

Amidst the strong desire to adopt a democratic political system, the dissolution of the Ministry of Information had a systemic impact on Indonesia's entire media system and led to the idea to replacing Law No. 24/1997 and reforming RRI/TVRI. However, the new political powers tried to continue the previous mandate of the Ministry of Information by introducing a smaller government unit that was tasked with managing public information.

It can be said that the dissolution of the Ministry of Information sent 'good signals' to media and democracy activists, as it ended the government's position as a single regulator. As Wahyuni (2006) and Kristiawan (2012) noted, Gus Dur's policy was a direct response to the new aspirations of political and economic forces that sought to defend all of Suharto's policy products. The policy welcomed the emergence of a democratic spirit in broadcasting (to invite publicly-oriented channels and protect viewers from sensational and pornographic broadcasts) and welcomed foreign investors' into Indonesia as a free market. The number of private television stations increased rapidly, from five channels in mid-1998 to twelve in 1999.

The dissolution of the Information Ministry meant there was no government leader who could implement Broadcast Law No. 24/1997. Provoked by social activists and media professionals, in 1999 the idea of producing a new broadcasting law emerged. Two civil organizations were actively involved in policy advocacy, namely *Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia* or MPPI (Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society) and *Koalisi Penyiaran Indonesia* or KPI (Indonesian Broadcasting Coalition). While the MPPI consisted of cross-interest individuals, the KPI was a coalition of represented media associations.

On September 1, 2000, KPI issued a statement asking for the revision of the previous Broadcast Law to fit the aspirations of democracy, including to transfer RRI/TVRI from government ownership to public

ownership. Hoping that RRI/TVRI would be able to compete with private channels, KPI proposed a change in their governance to meet the demands of democracy. In this sense, the idea to protect RRI/TVRI with a specific law, similar to the BBC in the United Kingdom, began to emerge. This aspiration received a positive response from RRI/TVRI elites, which will be discussed separately in this chapter.

Among private media operators, the dualism of licensing regulators also led to a drive for a new law. Private practitioners saw a conflict between the existing Broadcast Law and the Indonesian Telecommunication Law. According to the Telecommunication Law, the Minister of Transportation was responsible for regulating telecommunication, with every user of the frequency spectrum being required to obtain his permission. According to the Broadcast Law, however, licenses were to be issued by the Minister of Information. Following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information, the position of the Minister of Transportation as a frequency licensor alarmed private broadcasters, who were concerned with the potential for corruption in the ministry.[1]

In the case of RRI/TVRI, Gus Dur policy's shocked the media's management and the thousands of employees who enjoyed comfortable positions under Suharto. As part of the Ministry of Information, RRI/TVRI enjoyed extensive financial facilities, infrastructure, and employment security as a government unit for almost 30 years. More importantly, as a government agency, RRI/TVRI obtained full operational funding from the state budget and license fees, without needing to competitively earn income. In Law No. 24/1997, which came into force in September 1999, the RRI/TVRI ownership and staff were conveniently placed under the Minister of Information.

Since 1975, all RRI/TVRI staff had been government employees who could not be terminated until they retired, generally when they reached 55–60 years of age. The dissolution of the Ministry of Information thus meant the loss of the broadcaster's 'father,' which practically disrupted its work. RRI/TVRI, then a government institution, lost its parent organization and experienced unclear ownership. This was exacerbated by two serious issues: poor performance in serving news to audiences and limited ability to compete with private broadcasters.

As noted by Jurriens (2009), since private radio stations began to produce their own news coverage at the end of the Suharto era, the popularity of RRI newscasts declined. Some private radio stations were able to create news that better attracted audiences, such as Radio Unisi

in Yogyakarta and Radio Maragita in Bandung. Private channels adopted audio streaming technology that facilitated access to content for listeners, even as RRI continued to use a terrestrial mode of service.[2]

TVRI, aside from facing an ownership crisis with the dissolution of the Ministry of Information, was followed by reduced money. Money from the state was reduced by the ongoing monetary crisis, while income from private television owners and public license fees decreased drastically. For example, in 2001, with around 7000 employees, TVRI requested that the government provide IDR 1.35 trillion to cover the operational costs of its 29 stations and to maintain its 400 transmitter units. However, the government was only able to provide IDR 135 billion, or 10% of the amount requested. In 1999, about IDR 20 billion in license fees was collected, but by 2001 income from license fees had decreased to IDR 7 billion. At the same time, the share of advertising benefit from private television stations through April 30, 2001, was only IDR 205.9 billion (Sudibyo 2004).

Confronting democratic media activists, the new government tried to reactivate the Ministry of Information by establishing the National Information and Communication Board (BIKN) on December 7, 1999 (Presidential Decree No. 153/1999). Under a resolution, passed in 2000, BIKN was made directly accountable to the president (rather than the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs, as under the former policy). This board was tasked with creating plans for information and communication services as well as with monitoring government and public institutions in the field of information and communication. Due to the trauma of authoritarianism and its control of media and information services, media activists actively rejected the establishment of this institution.

Before the establishment of BIKN, there was an initiative to formulate a Directorate General of Broadcasting at the Ministry of Transportation, which would be tasked with managing RRI/TVRI. But this idea was also rejected by broadcasters, including RRI and TVRI. Protests, for example, emerged from the RRI leaders who gathered in Yogyakarta in March 2000. They viewed the plan to reposition RRI/TVRI and to transform it from a bureaucratic unit under the Ministry of Information into an organization under the Ministry of Transportation as not solving the underlying problems they faced. Darmanto, a senior RRI staff (personal interview, 1 May 2017), argued that the idea of having such a body was

captured by old RRI/TVRI employees who had become accustomed, over 30 years, to Suharto's protection.

Supporting the RRI leaders, the MPPI activist Pandjaitan considered the policy of placing RRI/TVRI under the government/Ministry of Transportation was not congruent with the idea of changing these two institutions into a modern media house (Pandjaitan 2000). Pandjaitan considered the plan to re-locate RRI/TVRI under the control of a new government agency lacked legal standing. In particular, the idea of putting these media under a government ministry was risky because the new government lacked the funds to cover employees' salaries as well as the two broadcasters' operational costs.

In conclusion, two critical events: the end of Suharto's regime in May 1998 and the dissolution of the Ministry of Information brought RRI/TVRI, as government-run media, to an institutional crisis. The Minister of Information and Suharto were the, respectively, regulator and 'father' of thousands of civil servants working at these media. This crisis was compounded by their provision of bad services to audiences, the rise of civil society movements seeking to dismantle Suharto's legacy, and commercial broadcasters' refusal to share their money with TVRI.

In this situation, there was little room for RRI/TVRI: would it follow a new government policy that (unpopularly) maintained its position as a bureaucratic unit under a government ministry, or would it follow the demands of pro-democracy activists and separate itself from government power by changing its legal status and governance. It is important to note that, at this time, RRI/TVRI elites and staff were in limbo and stood as passive actors in media activists' efforts to formulate a new Broadcast Law. On the RRI broadcasters' perception of adopting PSB, Darmanto (2012) explained that the term 'public radio' emerged after the 2000s. Before then, the general perception that RRI was a state institution remained, even though RRI management understood that the law could no longer be implemented.

A detailed story of the motivated interests and types of movement among media activists and RRI/TVRI elites will be described in the following sections.

5.3 Toward a Pluralistic Broadcasting Policy

As described above, the dissolution of the Ministry of Information had expansive impact, including the demand to change the old broadcasting policy to realize freedom of expression and media. This section presents

the actions of civil society organizations (CSOs) to draft a new Broadcast Law between 1999 and 2002, particularly their idea of using a universal concept of external and internal media pluralism as a key pillar of the democratic media system.

Hitchens (2006, p. 8) identifies two categories of pluralism: First, pluralism may refer to a structural condition in which the media climate is open for different kinds of media and diverse ownership, with public and community broadcasters existing alongside private channels (external pluralism). The second category of pluralism refers to viewers and listeners choices and service providers (internal pluralism or diversity).

As common in post-autocratic regimes, media activists had a substantial role in the transitional media system, such as in Thailand during the formulation of the country's particular public broadcasting regulation in 2008 (Tangkitvanich 2008). Two issues—the anti-autocratic spirit and the struggle to reduce media capitalism—led to the adoption of a pluralistic broadcasting system and public-oriented media organization. In Indonesia, this occurred about five months after Suharto fell.

Three types of CSOs were involved in PSB advocacy: individuals associated with Masyarakat Pers dan Penyiaran Indonesia (Indonesian Press and Broadcasting Society or MPPI); non-profit organizations established for legislative advocacy, such as Yayasan Sains dan Estetika and the Indonesian Media Law and Policy Center; and university-based activists at Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta. The last of these, in late 2000 and 2001, held a road show to promote a public broadcasting system in ten major Indonesian cities and actively lobbied parliament in the formulation of the new Broadcast Law.

Amidst the euphoria of welcoming freedom of expression and freedom of the press, some media activists and professionals organized meetings in 1998 and 1999 to formulate a press and broadcasting law. One discussion, held October 14–15, 1998, at Jakarta, and sponsored by the Newspaper Publishers Union (SPS), can be seen as a historical moment, because it was in this forum that the first civil society organization to advocate media policy was born: *Masyarakat Pers Indonesia* (MPI). As noted by Kitley (2000), in the spirit of encouraging new laws to protect press freedom, MPI began encouraging the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, lobbying for the inclusion of an article providing a strong guarantee that information could flow freely in Indonesia.

In a meeting held in Bogor, West Java, from October 21 to 23, 1998, and chaired by Amir Effendi Siregar, MPI formulated a proposal to

amend the 1945 Constitution in parliament. As it had strong connections with politicians, as well as access to mass media coverage, MPI's scheme was fully accommodated by politicians. In November 1998, the Indonesian parliament enacted a decree on the rights of the public to express itself freely. This decree became an umbrella for later policy that introduced press and broadcasting laws. The full sentence of this amendment is as follows:

> Article 28F: Everyone shall have the right to communicate and obtain information to develop his/her personal and social environment, and shall have the right to seek, receive, possess, store, process and convey information using any available channel. (Basic Constitution of Indonesia 1945)

A third MPI meeting was held from December 15 to 16, 1998, in Bandung, West Java. This event had a broader audience, as it also included the Association of Private Television Journalists (IJTI). In addition to discussing print media law, this forum began discussing a new Broadcast Law as well as the broader idea of building an information society in Indonesia. As such, they chose to rename MPI, calling it MPPI or the Society of Indonesian Press and Broadcasting, and initiated the creation of a new Broadcast Law built on the assumption that broadcasting is a public activity and frequency is a public domain (Masduki 2007, p. 130).

From January 5 through 7, 1999, discussion of a new Broadcast Law began. With Kukuh Sanyoto serving as chair, this discussion involved a wide range of academics, broadcasters, etc., including Leo Batubara, Sutomo Parastho, Muhammad Ridho Eisy, Hinca Pandjaitan, R. H. Siregar, Tribuana Said, Azkarmin Zaini, Suryana, Shidki Wahab, Haris Jauhari, Atmakusumah Astraatmaja, Amir Effendi Siregar, Nugroho F. Judho, Riza Primadi, and Sumita Tobing. The first draft of the bill from this forum was considered to be the first proposal from the public (MPPI 2001).

Concerning the significance of broadcast policy for the future of commercial media, the MPPI draft subsequently received high attention from the broader media community. For instance, in the next MPPI meetings (held January 27; February 5; and February 24, 1999), the prominent private radio association namely PRSSNI (National Association of Indonesian Private Radio) joined the forum, with its own broadcast bill. Soetoyo Sukomihardjo, who served as PRSSNI's chair from 1999 to

2001, argued that Law No. 24/1997 limited the development of private radio with its obligation to relay RRI broadcasts and its requirement to renew frequency permits every year (Masduki 2007, p. 131).

On March 8–9 1999, two media bills for the press and broadcasting were officially submitted to parliament. However, due to the number of bills that had to be legislated (about 24), politicians postponed the discussion of the Broadcast Law, focusing instead on the Press Law. Discussion of the Broadcast Law was postponed until after the 1999 general election, and would be handled by the newly elected members of parliament.

In this period, advocacy for broadcast policy began involving larger institutions. The engagement of international bodies formally started with a forum, held October 8, 1999, that was sponsored by UNESCO. At this forum, UNESCO legal consultants Toby Mendel and Sylvie Coudray began engaging with politicians and press activists to produce a new Broadcast Law. Previously, according to Toby Mendel (online interview, January 22, 2018), the UNESCO team provided direct consultation in the government's drafting of a new press law. Following this, public debate over the new Broadcast Law occurred on May 17–23 and October 3–7 in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, Central Java (Masduki 2007, p. 131).

By 2000, the work of media professionals and CSO activists had intertwined, and this resulted in the integration of two broadcast bills into one proposal. On April 17–19, 2000, Ikatan Jurnalis Televisi Indonesia (IJTI) held a broadcast bill workshop to integrate concepts of the bill proposed by private television broadcasters with a similar proposal by CSOs. In the end, the forum established a team that combined media associations and media activists of diverse interests, consisting of Zainal A. Suryokusumo, Haris Jauhari, and Muhammad Ridho Eisy. This team organized political lobbying and attended a public hearing with politicians in parliament and state officials (Masduki 2007, p. 135).

Yet, despite the close ties between CSOs and media professionals, the involvement of RRI/TVRI elites in this movement was limited. As Chelsie Christiana Chan, former executive director of the Indonesia Media Law and Policy Center (IMLPC), said:

> The elites of both media kept looking outside, rather than closely engaging with the CSO's idea and activities. (personal interview, 6 December 2017)

The week before Gus Dur dissolved the Ministry of Information (October 1999), five drafts for a new Broadcast Law were sent to legislators, one each from MPPI, PRSSNI, the Private Television Broadcasters Forum, the Ministry of Information and UNESCO (MPPI, Jakarta 2001). This shows the high level of public participation.[3]

A year later, in November 2000, the number of drafts had grown to seven, with the arrival of drafts from the Association of Indonesian Broadcast Television (ATVSI) and the Ministry of Transportation (on behalf of Gus Dur's administration). In April 2001, six drafts remained: from parliament, MPPI, the Private Television Broadcasters Forum, new Association of Private Radio (ARSSNI), the Ministry of Transportation, and UNESCO (Masduki 2007, p. 144).[4]

Looking at the drafts by MPPI, UNESCO, and PRSSNI, there was a similar proposal to shift the broadcasting system from an autocratic system (in which the government served as the sole regulator and operator) to a pluralistic system by introducing two new broadcasting actors: public and community channels. Public channels were expected to replace the state-owned channels that had existed under the autocratic regime. In the MPPI draft, the term 'government broadcaster' is replaced by 'a non-profit public owned entity, supervised by parliament in the name of the public.' Moreover, the bills introduced independent regulator s outside the government to regulate and supervise broadcasting.

In support of broadcasting pluralism, participants at a media workshop held in Bandung, West Java, held from October 5 to 8, 2000, requested that a new law guarantee three things: diversity of ownership and content; the protection of children's rights and national culture; and the re-managing of industrial interests. Also, the text of the new law was expected to be more detailed, rather than open to multiple interpretations in its execution. In line with this spirit, although RRI/TVRI's management did not propose its own law, in a letter dated September 1, 2000, both media elites supported the public aspiration to introduce broadcast pluralism and accepted the presence of community broadcasters as new and alternative players outside RRI/TVRI.

Concerning the RRI/TVRI ownership model, media activists were in a limbo. On November 10, 1999, MPPI submitted a proposal to parliament on the need to transform them from government-owned entities to a state enterprise (commercial entity owned by the state). However, this changed after activists obtained input on universal PSB systems from international assistance agencies such as UNESCO (Batubara 2000). They

argued that state corporation status is not congruent with the non-profit status of PSBs. Meanwhile, MPPI firmly rejected the plan of the Minister of Transportation to establish a Directorate General of Broadcasting to cover RRI/TVRI as a state service unit, not a public service unit.

It is important to note that two industry associations—PRSSNI and the Indonesian Broadcasting Television Association (ATVSI)—actively lobbied politicians to keep their interests in the policy-making process of new Broadcast Law. PRSSNI used the term 'non-commercial broadcasting,' holding that, as a non-commercial body, Indonesian PSB should not be allowed to access commercial advertising. Moreover, the association also proposed a strict policy to prohibit RRI/TVRI from becoming involved in commercial activities, such as by renting their equipment to external parties for commercial purposes. However, RRI/TVRI was allowed to collect license fees, the amount of which would be determined by the broadcasting regulator. Politicians and CSO activists, meanwhile, supported the media having full authority to access all kinds of funding, including advertising.

After a one-year delay, the official broadcast bill was debated in parliament. Claimed to have originated from MPPI (Batubara 2017), the bill was submitted by 26 members of parliament from various political parties on June 7, 2000. Consisting of 6 chapters with 29 articles, it made three core arguments to emphasize the urgency of the new law: airwave scarcity, public right to quality information, and the need for a democratic media system.

Moreover, the bill argued, Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 was incompatible with the emergence of democracy and the principles of human rights. The previous law was thus subject to review, to be replaced by a new law enabling the adoption of plurality in broadcasting ownership and the replacement of the national-centralized broadcasting service with a network broadcast model.

The official broadcast bill confirmed that, after June 2000, the term 'public service broadcasting' would begin to be adopted in the legislative process. What, exactly, was the accepted PSB model? Looking into the legislators' bill, the idea was to follow the Western European model of a public-driven institution. This model can be seen as a result of intense interaction of media activists, media professionals, and international aid agencies between 1999 and 2001. The intense communication of media activists and international agencies promoting PSB, such as UNESCO

and Swedish Radio (SR) consultants, influenced this decision, as will be explored in a separate section of this chapter.

Following the submission of the bill, the idea of enabling public broadcasters to become new actors in Indonesian broadcasting continued to gain force in 2001. The Indonesian Press Council, the first regulator of post-New Order Indonesia, met in Jakarta on April 23, 2001, and expressed its support for the politicians' bill adopting PSB. The organization also called for a policy that combined national, regional, and local service with public and community broadcasters (Press Council Response to Broadcasting Bill, May 17, 2001). In line with the Press Council, PRSSNI re-stated its support for the presence of public service broadcasting using a special term: 'non-commercial broadcaster.' At this time, it can be said, the generic term 'public service broadcasting' was officially born in Indonesia.

The urgency of having PSB in Indonesia was also generated by a series of debates in such leading Indonesian newspapers as *Kompas* and *Republika*; this was relatively influential in directing PSB legislation in parliament. In *Kompas*, the chairman of Komunitas Televisi Publik Indonesia (Indonesian Public TV Community, or KTVPI), Garin Nugroho actively conveyed his view that a public television system would offer a new future for TVRI because private television has shown a tendency to violate public rights. For example, Nugroho wrote an article titled 'Demokratisasi TVRI: Saatnya Dibawah Kontrol Parlemen' (The Democratization of TVRI: Time for Parliamentary Control) (*Kompas*, November 1, 1999). The article voiced a hope that control over TVRI would shift from government to parliament (in the name of the public). In *Republika* on April 15, 2001, Djamalul Abidin wrote an article titled 'TV Publik, bukan TV Presiden' (Public TV, not President TV). He saw the public as desiring the creation of TVRI as an independent media, outside the government, that could offer an alternative to and compete with private television broadcasters.

In his book *Media dan Kekuasaan* (Media and Power), SK (2014) noted that the discourse urging the public television in Indonesia emerged in 1997, taking the form of mass media publications. However, this idea did not receive a political response until after the Ministry of Information was dissolved in October 1999. According to Ishadi, robust public television could provide an alternative that was able to compete with the dominant commercial stations in the country, as with ARD and ZDF in Germany.

In late July 2001, discussion of the new broadcast policy stopped due to the parliamentary impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid at an extraordinary session of Indonesian legislators held on July 23, 2001. Megawati Soekarnoputri then succeeded Gus Dur as president, and she reactivated the Ministry of Information, which had previously been dissolved. Headed by Syamsul Ma'arif, this ministry led the government team in continuing discussion of broadcast legislation.

It is important to note that, under the new president, the government continued Gus Dur's policy for broadcast pluralism. The same situation occurred when the chairmanship of the committee for broadcasting legislation was transferred from Dimyati Hartono to Paulus Widiyanto in May 2002. A member of the same party as Hartono, Widiyanto continued the politician's proposal to favor PSB. He saw broadcasting as a shared arena of all media institutions, and thus felt that public and community broadcasters should be recognized and enabled, so long as they complied with Indonesian media law.

Finally, Indonesia's second Broadcast Law was enacted on November 28, 2002. This law generally followed the proposals of CSOs, transforming the broadcasting system from a duopoly (with the government as the sole regulator) to a plurality, in particular by recognizing the equality of three types of broadcasters: public, private, and community. Generally, these broadcasting institutions were distinguished by their ownership, areas of service, and funding regimes. The law also introduced a non-governmental regulator, named *Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia*, and mandated this agency to regulate broadcast issues, including PSB. By law, PSB was positioned as a substitute for government broadcasting.

In this law, according to Kristiawan (2012), Indonesia was seeking to liberalize its media system by allowing foreign investment in the country's media industry. With no strict directions on equalizing broadcasters, the law reinforced the leading position of private television broadcasters over public and community broadcasters. In September 2002, ten private television broadcasters existed nationally: RCTI, SCTV, Indosiar, TPI, ANTEVE, Metro, TransTV, TV7 Lativi, and Global TV. The only national public television broadcaster was TVRI. At the local level, regional branches of TVRI competed with the dozens of local private television stations that had begun operating since 1999. In radio, meanwhile, there were more than 650 private radio broadcasters, while RRI only had 62 stations nationwide.

Moreover, although PSB was given special positioning in the text of the Broadcast Law, in practice it was marginal when dealing directly with the dominance of private operators. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the continued pressure of private broadcasters on policymakers resulted in delays on implementing a true PSB.

In short, the media activists had an influential role in recommending media pluralism and PSB between 1998 and 2002. Their proposal to adopt broadcasting pluralism can be seen as a pre-condition for the Western European model of PSB. Nevertheless, as in other post-autocratic regimes such as India and Taiwan, the arrival of external pluralism policy (Hitchens 2006) and PSB was resisted by highly commercialized media. It would have been risky for independent media advocates to implement an ideal broadcast system, such as PSB, as discussed in the next chapter of this book.

5.4 The Corporate Interests of RRI/TVRI

This section reviews the internal dynamics at RRI/TVRI in response to the government policy to dissolve its parent organization, the Ministry of Information, and the arrival of the idea of public broadcasting. Based on a review of policy documents, public statements, and semi-structured interviews with top figures from these media, I argue that the two management's agreement for PSB was mainly driven by the pragmatic interest of continuing the operations of RRI/TVRI, rather than the ideal interest (as voiced by CSOs) of creating pure public driven broadcast ers as a pillar of a democratic media system.

The huge crisis in the legal status of these media, as well as their employment and financing, forced elites and other broadcasters to find a new way to secure their futures amidst the high aspiration of becoming an independent media outside the government. In this sense, the choice to adopt PSB can be seen as a strategy for allying with the public; however, both media operators captured the policy-making process and textually inserted RRI/TVRI as PSB in the new Broadcast Law, without providing clear directions to transform the media from a state-owned entity into a public one.

One of the first and crucial problems arose following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information in RRI/TVRI; it was their working status. This led to massive street protests by the RRI/TVRI staffs, as well as the Ministry of Information staff. The weekly news magazine *Gatra*, in

a November 1999 report, told how thousands of ministry employees walked to the State Palace (500 meters from their former office). Led by the secretary general IGK Manila, they asked Gus Dur to give a direct explanation about their futures as civil servants. These protesters included hundreds of RRI/TVRI staff members. In a report titled 'Dapur Kami, Mr. President' (Our Kitchen, Mr. President), *Gatra* magazine (1999) reported that protests occurred not only in Jakarta but also in several big cities in Indonesia. In Makassar, for example, employees rallied using their official cars. 'I have 11 family members and rely on the Ministry of Information. How can I cover them?' said Teguh Nursito, the head of the Information Office, Makassar, when speaking to journalists. Similar actions were also taken in other cities, such as Manado, Medan, and Semarang.

Aside from street protests, media executives also organized emergency consolidation meetings. For instance, from November 2–4, 1999, Director of Radio Suryanta Saleh invited all regional RRI chairmen to choose one of three alternative statuses for RRI: to remain a state bureaucratic unit under the Ministry of Transportation; to become a state-owned enterprise or state company; or to become an autonomous agency outside the government/independent public-oriented channel. Another meeting was also arranged by the top leaders of TVRI. Former TVRI Director Sutrimo said that, following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information, several meetings were organized by TVRI to seek a new status (online interview, May 7, 2018). In this process, there were disputes between ordinary TVRI broadcasters, who wanted TVRI to exist as autonomic media outside the government administration, and the elites, who wanted to ally themselves with the authorities.

According to media activist Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017), in the euphoria of dismantling Suharto's autocratic legacy, the choice to remain a state controlled unit was not popular and would delegitimize RRI/TVRI in the public. Based on his past experience as an RRI broadcaster, Darmanto argued, the choice to become a public-oriented radio channel was favorable; however, there were split opinions among ordinary broadcasters and elites regarding the institutional format of RRI. The suggestion of RRI becoming a state-owned corporation in late 2000 was viewed as a 'short-term strategy' for adopting, although such a status also offered a commercial orientation that may violate the PSB model.

It is important to note that the sense of becoming a public service media institution emerged first among RRI broadcasters, then among

TVRI broadcasters. As Darmanto (2012) noted, from late 1998 to early 2000, meetings were held by RRI activists in Jakarta and Yogyakarta to seek an RRI governance model that would reflect Indonesia's democratic aspirations. For example, from September 3 to 5, 1998, an RRI workshop in PPPG Yogyakarta discussed new visions for the channel in the post-Suharto era. These ideas were reaffirmed after the organization established a partnership with Swedish Radio/SIDA between 2002 and 2005. Suryanta Saleh, former RRI's president director in this period, confirmed this cooperation (personal interview, 7 October 2017).

The PPPG workshop raised several issues related to reforming RRI, including the preparation of RRI to compete with private media and the radio's new role as a watchdog that had rarely been voiced under the previous government. The terms reform, competition, and social control officially were introduced to radio management as a new working spirit. Led by prominent figures such as Chaerul Zen, Suryanta Saleh, and Beni Kusbani, the forum was also enriched by a series of experiences from local RRI branches related to initiatives to change their editorial policies and their working conditions at large.

In the end, the forum produced the 'Yogya Recommendation' that contained broadcasters' commitment to improve service, without government interference, and to eliminate Suharto's legacy in their content production and their adoption of competitive culture. For funding, the participants proposed a mixed model of state subsidies, creative products, and community donations. Also, they initiated the integration of RRI/TVRI to strengthen their position over commercial media. Although the generic term 'public service broadcasting' had not been introduced, the Yogyakarta forum was considered the historic event in which RRI's freedom from the state first emerged. Dwi Hernuningsih, one of the forum's initiators, said it was an arena to build awareness of the need for PSB (personal interview, 30 November 2017).

The subsequent meetings in Jakarta, as Hernuningsih explained, were inspired by the slogan *Tri Prasetya* (Three Precepts) that was declared in 1946 to highlight both RRI's loyalty to Indonesia as new nation and its neutral position. During this time, the normative concept of RRI as an independent channel was formulated, as was its execution plan, including discussion in conjunction with RRI's 53rd anniversary on September 11, 1998.

Based on this material, it can be said that the initiative for changing RRI status emerged and circulated first among the channel's senior

broadcasters. One of the leading thinkers of the new RRI, Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017), argued that the 'romantic experiences' of BBC's quality journalism during the Suharto period and the intensive engagement of RRI elites with international aid agencies promoting PSB influenced the acceptance of PSB. However, reviewing the public statements and policy documents produced by RRI between 1998 and 1999, the idea could be seen as 'a dream of RRI elites for the future,' without any clear direction, and thus the broadcaster totally remained controlled by the State. Directed from Jakarta and/or Yogyakarta, the idea of PSB was elitist until the dissolution of the Ministry of Information brought out uncertainty regarding the working status of RRI staff.

Response to the PSB idea following the fall of Suharto was less intensive among TVRI elites and broadcasters. Internal effort for reform was initially driven by a pragmatic interest to prolong media operations and to reinforce income. In a statement in East Timor on June 14, 1998, Director General of Radio, Television and Film Ishadi stated that, under Broadcast Law No. 24/1997, income from commercial advertising had not been realized. Until the end of 1998, all money for TVRI's operations came from license fees and the state budget. Other income, such as the 12.5% of private television broadcasters (RCTI, SCTV, TPI, ANTV, and Indosiar) advertising revenues, were stalled.

According to Sukirman, a senior TVRI broadcaster (personal interview, 11 December 2017), the primary concern for TVRI between 1999 and 2000 was ensuring the channel could continue serving its audience following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information. In this sense, ownership and employment status were not essential discussion topics.

In a book titled *40 Tahun TVRI* (40 years of TVRI), Sutrimo recorded the PSB idea within TVRI as first appearing at some emergency meetings held in November 1999, after the dissolution of the Ministry of Information. This proposal was formally submitted to President Gus Dur and received a positive response by March 2000 (Suwardi 2002). Sutrimo argued that CSOs and international aid agencies had an influential role in promoting a non-profit PSB institution. However, there was also a strong tendency to position TVRI as as *Badan Usaha Milik Negara* or BUMN (a state–commercial corporation).

Concerning the arrival of the PSB idea within TVRI management, former TVRI President Director Chaerul Zen admitted to giving this idea to politicians during a public hearing held on November 16, 1999. At this meeting, Zen argued that TVRI should be made a PSB with full

autonomy in managing its employment, funding, and productions. For this reason, he made three recommendations: TVRI should be publicly funded, directly controlled by a non-government body, and serve the universal needs of the public.

Zen (personal interview, 8 November 2017) also emphasized that, like public television in developed countries, TVRI should no longer be controlled by government, even as its performance remained supervised by the president or by an independent national broadcasting council. Due to the amount of work facing politicians during the political crisis of 1999, this aspiration was left to 'rest in paper.'

Driven by a shared interest in securing institutional sustainability, in early 2002 the RRI/TVRI elites began to synergize and intertwined to defend their interests in parliament. Up through mid-2002, the broadcast bill made no clear statement about the future of RRI/TVRI. In the case of PSB, as a new player co-existing with private and community broadcasting, the law did not mention a specific institution as PSB. Although two political parties: *Golongan Karya* and *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (the National Awakening Party) explicitly supported RRI/TVRI becoming a PSB provider, most drafts circulated in public did not give a clear position to RRI/TVRI, or specify whether it would become independent or remain a government-owned entity. In other words, the legal idea of a PSB system and the future status of RRI/TVRI remained two-separate issues until the elites of these media began extensively lobbying politicians in August 2002.

From August through November 2002, RRI/TVRI elites actively lobbied political parties, government officials, and CSOs. This included, among other things, a letter requesting the inclusion of RRI/TVRI in the law as Indonesia's PSB providers. For instance, on October 2, 2002, RRI Director Suryanta Saleh sent a letter to parliament proposing the explicit insertion of RRI/TVRI as a PSB provider, as below:

> First, the Public Broadcasting Institution referred to in this Law shall consist of the Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and the Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI), whose stations may be located in the national, provincial, and/or regency capital; Second, RRI/TVRI as public broadcasters may operate international channels; Third, the President shall legally administer the supervisory board of the PSB based on an open selection mechanism in parliament.

In his letter, Saleh argued that RRI deserved to be a PSB because of its contribution to maintaining Indonesia's independence and unity. Furthermore, RRI already owned broadcasting assets throughout Indonesian territory. However, this letter did not provide a clear plan for ensuring RRI could compete with commercial media.

Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017) explained that this letter emerged from discussion of the Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 in Yogyakarta. A small team of RRI Yogyakarta submitted a proposal to the RRI headquarters in Jakarta to hold a discussion. In response, the RRI central office recommended that the Law be amended rather than replaced. The request was included in the forum's invitations and its event banners, but the actual agenda remained the examination of the amendment of the Broadcast Law. The result of this forum then became central material for a Special Coordinated Meeting of RRI leaders in Ciloto, Bogor, West Java, and was sent to parliament.

Similarly, on May 14, 2002, the head of the TVRI Workers' Union gave input to Commission I, suggesting (among other things) that TVRI be mandated as the PSB operator. Unlike the letter from RRI, the Union clearly proposed that TVRI gain the legal status of state-owned enterprise, rather than non-profit media institution. It argued that any profit gained by TVRI should be returned to the public via quality programming. In a statement signed by two senior broadcasters, Harmens Tahir and Purnama Suwardi, the Union also proposed a mixed funding model: commercial advertising (up to 15% of a total airtime), license fees, and advertising. The Union argued that advertising, as a source of funding for TVRI, could help it avoid the direct intervention of state officials.

With different reasoning, on November 19, 2002, MPPI sent an official letter to parliament and argued the importance of ensuring these media could be sustained by the new legal status as public service channels. According to Kukuh Sanyoto, one leader of MPPI, explicit legal recognition of RRI/TVRI in the Broadcast Law was essential for ending its history as state-owned media. Previously, similar support from politicians and academics had emerged. This includes, for instance, a meeting held on April 10, 2002, held at the RRI headquarters in Central Jakarta between Paulus Widiyanto (Chair of Legislative Team) and communication lecturers.

Reviewing the letters of RRI/TVRI, I can say that these requests were solely intended to shift these broadcasters from government ownership to public ownership. However, with no detailed proposal for managing

thousands of state personnel (as shown by these letters), the deal to realize an Indonesian PSB can only be seen as a formal political acceptance of the public agenda. There was no political guarantee that RRI/TVRI broadcasters would execute the PSB mandate, such as by reforming their bureaucratic working culture.

Also, there was some rejection of this initiative. Several senior RRI/TVRI staff joined a coalition called the 'RRI and TVRI Forum' on November 14, 2002, to resist the plans of their leaders. As, by law, Indonesia's PSB would be a state autonomous agency rather than a state commercial corporation, the coalition saw the exclusive mandate of RRI/TVRI as PSB ambassador as a pragmatic interest in securing employees' status as state run personnel and keeping the state budget as a key funding without public control. The forum saw the choice of PSB is not idealistic in nature.

Similarly, senior TVRI presenter Usi Karundeng, in a letter to politician Paulus Widhiyanto dated November 27, 2002, expressed her objection to TVRI being mandated as PSB holder. She argued that the status of state-owned company, which it had held from April to September 2002, was better for TVRI as it would enable the media to be competitive without relying on government facilities.

However, as a result of intensive political lobbying and political connections with RRI elites, these rejections were not influential. In a statement issued on November 15, 2002, other RRI/TVRI broadcasters supported their elites and sent a letter to parliament to counter the arguments of the RRI and TVRI Forum. They asked politicians to mandate RRI/TVRI as the sole national PSB agency. In another words, they wanted no other PSB channel to be allowed.

Finally, the aspiration to explicitly mandate the two formerly government-run channels as PSB was accommodated in the Broadcast Law without any provision for their transformation. According to Paulus Widiyanto, the key argument for this decision was pragmatic in nature; it was intended to rescue the channels' government staff and infrastructure assets. As the head of the special committee on broadcast legislation, Widiyanto described the extensive lobbying of RRI elites in 2002 as follows:

> … while we were drafting the new Broadcast Law, some of my RRI friends, including Beny Koesbani (RRI Director) and Niken (Widiastuti), regularly lobbied. They often contacted Joko Soesilo (a politician). I attended an

> event at Sabang Hotel, Jakarta, where all the RRI regional heads gathered. Beny Koesbani said to me: 'Please let my colleagues know the extent of RRI's position in the Broadcast Law'. I was asked to save the history and legacy of RRI and TVRI. To save them (in my view), the RRI name had to be included in the Act. If it were not mentioned clearly in the law, the media would disappear… (personal interview, 28 October 2017)

It is important to note that such a policy was also taken to save the dozens of local government channels, known as *Radio Siaran Pemerintah Daerah* or *RSPD* (Local Govermnent-run Radio), that had operated since the New Order. In the Suharto era, all of the ownership, staffing, and operational funds of these radio channels were provided entirely by local governments, who used these channels as political propaganda. Moreover, RRI also cooperated with 147 RSPD stations to air government broadcasts that were produced centrally in Jakarta (Sudibyo 2004). Following the fall of Suharto's regime and the rise of a social movement opposing government media, the majority of these RSPDs faced a crisis (Wiratmo 2014). Through intensive lobbying from RSPD operators, parliament decided to mandate the former local government stations as local PSBs outside RRI/TVRI, with no directions as to transforming them from units of local political power into PSB.

Overall, this section has shown how RRI/TVRI accepted 'PSB in spirit' to fit public demand and to protect their traditional institutions. This section also showed that, following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information, internal RRI/TVRI movement toward PSB was driven by the pragmatic agenda of securing employees' jobs. In this sense, the ideal autonomous PSB was confronted by the pragmatic choice of securing the existing organization of RRI/TVRI. The inclusion of RRI/TVRI in the Broadcast Law could be seen as political favoritism that promoted the central interest of RRI/TVRI staff to maintain their status as state, rather than public, personnel. Instead of providing a way to adopt a true PSB, placing RRI/TVRI as PSB without any plan for implementing this led to both media existing in a state of continual crisis.

5.5 Uncertain Government Policies

In the general sense that the government has an influential role in adopting or rejecting the PSB system, this section explores the policies of Suharto's successors in the transitional period (1998–2002). It also

describes how his successors made a number of transitional policies to keep RRI/TVRI as government assets while simultaneously responding to public demand to release both media and make them autonomous. By exploring the policies of political authorities related to RRI/TVRI that were produced between 1998 and 2002, this section finds that the government officials were incapable of managing a democratic media system. Instead of producing strategic long-term plans, the new political administrations used their power to create short-term and contradictory broadcast policies.

Between 1998 and 2002, Indonesia was led by numerous short-lived presidents, from Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998–1999), to Abdurrahman Wahid/Gus Dur (1999–2001) and Megawati Sukarnoputeri (2001–2004). The rapid shifts in power created three major uncertainties in RRI/TVRI management and policy: (1) in the Habibie era, during which the Ministry of Information was maintained, there were efforts to keep RRI/TVRI as a government unit; (2) in the Wahid era, following the dissolution of the Ministry of Information, RRI/TVRI was placed as a government-owned corporation, meaning that the government accepted the normative idea of locating RRI/TVRI as public service channels, but its ownership, staffing, and budget remained in the hand of government authorities; (3) in 2002, Megawati changed TVRI's status from *Perusahaan Jawatan* (government-owned corporation) to *Persero* (full commercial corporation).

Habibie's choice to maintain RRI/TVRI as state-owned media during his presidency (May 1998–October 1999) can be seen as the first policy deployed by the ruling political power in the transitional period (1998–2002). Although small changes occurred in RRI/TVRI's editorial management, as they included public issues rather than government agendas in news coverage, overall governance (remit, ownership, structure, and funding) remained static. In contrast, Habibie relaxed media regulations for private broadcasters, enabling them to develop rapidly. Adding the past five private channels, several new private channels were opened and owned by new individuals, outside the Suharto cronies. With more interactive and balanced journalistic services, the new private radio and television broadcasters received more positive response from the general public than the RRI/TVRI.

Moreover, to reinforce the development of non-state media, Habibie issued Press Law No. 40/1999, which was considered pro-liberal (Kristiawan 2012). The law prohibited the banning of print media and

publication licenses, meaning that print media went from government control over the newsroom to press freedom. Journalists working in private media enjoyed the absence of state control, both over their newsroom and over their fieldwork investigations. In line with this, Minister of Information Yunus Yosfiah reduced the obligation of private radio broadcasters to relay RRI news and allow commercial radio companies to produce their own news.

Habibie's broadcasting policy was formally duopolistic (allowing private broadcasters to accompany state-run broadcasters). However, in practice he adopted liberal free market competition in all media sectors, with no specific protection for RRI/TVRI. A mix of this pro-liberal Press Act and the unofficial policy to liberalize broadcasting drove the consolidation of media ownership. This created a monopoly in broadcasting and print-media ownership and later, in 2004–2008, the arrival of media oligarchs.

When President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) came to power in October 1999, he dissolved the Ministry of Information, a pillar of the former autocratic media policy. Following the breakdown of the Ministry of Information, around October–December 1999, Gus Dur tried to extend political control over RRI/TVRI by establishing the National Information and Communication Unit (BIKN). Furthermore, the Ministry of Transportation established its own unit, the Directorate of Broadcasting. The Ministry encouraged all RRI/TVRI staff to join/work within its offices at the central and regional branches. However, staff rejected these policies.

Following this rejection, a second policy was initiated. On December 3, 1999, a letter was sent by Minister of Civil Servant Affairs Freddy Numberi to Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. This letter proposed a new status for RRI/TVRI as a ministerial-controlled corporation named Perusahaan Jawatan (Perjan). This letter included a number of pragmatic arguments to protect the status of RRI/TVRI staff as government workers and continue media's public service. As such, the organization could deploy government staff to work while slowly shifting them to autonomous status. Moreover, with this company, the ruling government was still allowed to fund operations.

While awaiting approval of this Perjan status, in January 2000 Freddy Numberi published a policy to reactivate the Directorate of TVRI and RRI (Suwardi 2002). Around this time, on March 13, 2002, the Ministry of Investment and State Enterprise (SOEs) promoted the choice of

RRI/TVRI becoming fully commercial companies. These two actions reflect the weak coordination between governmental ministries.

Regarding the alternative of formulating TVRI as a state commercial company or BUMN, SK (2014) identified three arguments. First, consumer industries were getting stronger and required government-run media to support them. Second, out of the view that the crisis of RRI/TVRI had occurred because of poor bureaucratic management, there emerged the view that broadcasting managed by non-government staff would be institutionally more efficient and economically competitive. Third, audiences had shifted from product-oriented to market-oriented, a situation that would be difficult to address by maintaining a bureaucratic approach to service.

Responding to proposals (i.e., the potential status of Perjan/Persero), RRI/TVRI had different views. With its past experience in the 1970s, as a foundation that enjoyed advertising profits and other related businesses, TVRI welcomed the idea of becoming a commercial company. In contrast, without previous experience as a business entity and with thousands of state staff accustomed to working as bureaucrats, RRI rejected the idea.

In a meeting with the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises on March 17–20, 2000, TVRI accepted the proposal of becoming a commercial company, while RRI refused it. Voicing their rejection, on May 8, 2000, some senior RRI broadcasters held a meeting in Yogyakarta. They declared their resistance to the government plan to give RRI the status of commercial company, preferring instead to hold the status of government-owned company while awaiting the legislation of a new Broadcast Law. To support his broadcasters, RRI General Director Suryanta Saleh argued on May 28, 2000, that RRI was not ready to instantly become a commercial broadcaster like TVRI. Saleh asserted that this shift would burden RRI employees, as it would threaten their status as permanent government employees. He felt that some RRI stations would have to be closed for their bad performance as business entities.

On June 7, 2000, Gus Dur issued Decrees No. 36 and 37, which formally granted government-owned status namely Perjan to RRI/TVRI. This ended the lengthy status of RRI/TVRI as a bureaucratic unit under the Ministry of Information, which had existed since the 1970s, and placed RRI/TVRI in a transitional situation while awaiting the enactment of a new Broadcast Law. Through this decree, RRI/TVRI entered

new ownership as a ministerial corporation controlled by the Ministry of Finance.

One PSB promoter, Kabul Budiono, explained that, in view of RRI, Perjan status was intended to ensure the channel became a public-oriented media (personal interview, 4 May 2017). Also, this status was a compromise between RRI/TVRI and CSOs. Concerned by the new Broadcast Law's lengthy legislative process, this choice was considered realistic because it could accommodate two interests. On the one hand, it kept pragmatic attention on maintaining employees' status as government staff and the broadcaster's state financing, because neither media was ready to manage itself or collect other non-state incomes. On the other hand, with Perjan status, the two media could adopt the basic norms of PSB. In practice, the decision to adopt Perjan status was quickly made, because it only required a special decree made by Gus Dur as president, rather than a parliamentary law.

It can be said that, in the government decree on Perjan, the spirit of public-oriented broadcasting had already arrived in Indonesia. In this decree, the universal remit of public and cultural non-political services was formally adopted. However, the top structure, staffing, and budgeting of RRI/TVRI remained under government control. The nomenclature significantly changed, from a state bureaucratic model to a commercial model; for instance, the term General Manager began to be used, replacing 'Kepala Seksi' (Section Chief). This change, however, did not influence the bureaucratic working culture that was embodied in both media.

In practice, some managerial problems arose. For instance, internal conflict occurred among the directors of TVRI due to their different views of Government Decree No. 36/2000. TVRI General Director Sumitha Tobing considered herself to occupy a position as the leader of all board members, and thus to have the capacity to create her own decisions for developing TVRI, while other directors considered themselves to have equal power. Meanwhile, as a new corporation, the media lacked precise job planning, job desks, and evaluation systems. As RRI/TVRI had become a state-owned corporation, government funding was slowly reduced; the contribution of television fees, meanwhile, was marginal. At the same time, corruption emerged among media elites in Jakarta in 2001 (Sudibyo 2004).

Regarding employment model, according to a document submitted by TVRI to Paulus Widiyanto (chairman of Broadcast Law legislatures)

around 2001, although the media had become a Perjan, its operational style remained as bureaucratic as in the past. The number of government employees, 7000 in number, was the key problem, because as civil servants they were allowed to stay with TVRI until requirement (around the age of sixty), without room for punishing transgressions.

In July 2001, Megawati Soekarnoputeri replaced Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as president of Indonesian. Responding to the continued problem of TVRI, she transferred TVRI from Perjan status to Persero (Perseroan) status. She also issued Government Decree No. 9/2002 on April 17, 2002, as the new Broadcast Law was in the final stages of legislation. As a Persero, the operations of TVRI were evaluated by the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises and the Ministry of Finance. Also, the application of Persero status had a serious effect on staff, as employees became autonomous. Also, after TVRI became a Persero, pursuant to applicable law the national budget could no longer be a fixed source of the broadcaster's income. Instead, TVRI had to compete to collect revenue through advertising, as with all public companies. Unfortunately, there was no lower ministerial policies to guide TVRI in its transition from a government entity into a fully commercial corporation.[5]

In terms of remit, the 2002 decree called for TVRI to maintain itself as an independent, neutral, and public-oriented broadcaster, with the mission of developing a spirit of Pancasila, improving knowledge within society, and strengthening the unity of the nation. As a business entity, TVRI was required to produce high-quality content and seek profit using modern management. Following this decree, it can be said that, as TVRI became a fully commercial corporation, although government remained the main owner, it had the potential to transform its culture from one of bureaucracy to one of professionalism. However, most TVRI staff rejected this commercial status as it would mean losing their comfortable status as state employees. They also rejected a review of TVRI assets (Heryanto 2003). In his study, circulated to 70 TVRI staff at the Jakarta headquarters (aged 36–50), Subagyo (2004) found that 60% of TVRI broadcasters opposed Persero status.

Facing resistance from broadcasters, the implementation of commercial corporation status for TVRI was a failure, and the broadcaster faced a growing financial crisis because state funds had been cut. As an illustration, demand for state investment in TVRI in 2002 amounted to IDR 1.3 trillion, but the government was only able to allocate IDR 235 billion. Due to limited experience with marketing, the media was not able to

access financial resources from advertising. This meant the termination of some frequency transmitters as well as reduced volume of local content production in some regional stations (Sudibyo 2004). As a result, the status of the general director and directors of the regional stations was fragile.

Although not to the extent of TVRI, such a problem was also faced by RRI as it held Perjan status. The main problem was the excessive number of broadcasters and their lack of competence. Nugroho (2000) noted, they were accustomed to working under the orders of their leaders, rather than the public they were serving. They were unwilling to learn how to maintain audience loyalty.

According to Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017), most RRI staff saw the creation of a Perjan as 'a go fifty-fifty policy.' As he said:

> …generally, for RRI workers, PSB is politically acceptable, as long as they can still work at the station and receive funding from the state…they did not care about how to implement the real PSB.

At the end of 2002, 8335 employees were working at 56 RRI stations, with IDR 180 billion being spent in monthly salaries. These employees held the status of permanent staff and could not easily be terminated. During its year as a Perjan, RRI performed more poorly than privately-owned radio stations. As such, the RRI staff sought to adopt Persero status following the enactment of the Broadcast Act. This was influenced by the passage of Law No. 19/2003 on State-Owned enterprises, which stipulated that within two years of its passage all Perjan would be changed into *Perusahaan Umum* (public company) or Persero. On this basis, the Ministry of SOEs began planning to transform RRI into a public company.

According to Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017), Roes Aryawijaya, the Deputy Minister of SOEs, urged RRI to adopt Persero status no later than the end of 2003. To respond to this policy, RRI staff met with academics and media activists in Yogyakarta on July 28, 2003. Among the attendees were Masyarakat Penyiaran Publik Yogyakarta (The Yogyakarta Association for Public Broadcasting) and the Tim Kerja Reformasi RRI (RRI Reform Team). Regarding RRI's ideal status after Perjan, most participants were in limbo. Media activists warned that RRI would have weak public access if RRI were turned into a fully commercial entity. Nevertheless, if were to remain a Perjan, the new government would have

difficulty funding it. At the end, the forum urged RRI to confidently implement its status as PSB as formally set by the new Broadcast Law. Due to massive criticism from RRI broadcasters, in late 2003, the state authority postponed its plan to 'commercialize' RRI.

Overall, this section has shown that the governments in power between 1998 and 2002 had uncertain policies in managing RRI/TVRI's transformation from state-owned entity into public entity. The three policies—remaining a bureaucratic unit under the Ministry of Information; setting RRI/TVRI as a government corporation (Perjan); and setting RRI/TVRI as a state-commercial corporation (Persero)—contradicted each other and showed the new political powers' incapability to meet public aspirations.

The application of Perjan and Persero statuses to RRI/TVRI in 2000–2002 did not help improve the management of the biggest channels in Indonesia. In both, the adoption of Perjan status did not provide a fixed legal basis for overcoming employment crisis. By law, the adoption of these statuses was driven by the spirit of pro-public interest broadcasting. However, in reality, these statuses were strongly influenced by the pragmatic interest of saving broadcasters as government assets and ensuring access to state facilities and moneys, rather than the desire to make RRI/TVRI an autonomous agency that served the public.

This section has clearly emphasized that two autocratic legacies—staff's status as permanent state run employees loyal to the government (rather than the public) and reliance on state funds—hampered RRI/TVRI as they transformed from government-oriented services to public-oriented services. Such issue continued after 2002, when the two media held PSB status, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.

5.6 Three Mechanisms to Create PSB Policy in Parliament

Following Hallin and Mancini's argument (2004) on the parallel situation between the dynamics of political contestation in parliament and the adoption of a country's broadcast system, the question arises as to what extent this occurred in Indonesia's political transition. To answer this question, this section describes the legislative mechanisms and ideas among politicians, especially as related to PSB.

Based on semi-structured interviews with politicians, CSOs, and top RRI/TVRI figures, the ways in which politicians produced PSB provision can be classified into three different mechanisms: first, the formal

legislative process, with political parties as the main actor; second, the negotiation of a group of politicians; and third, an informal clientelistic practices involving politicians and their counterparts in the form of a non-formal/personal connection and personal lobbying. In PSB provision, the work or negotiation of small groups of politicians was influential.

Formally, the procedure for lawmaking in the Indonesian parliament is set out in Presidential Decree No. 68/2005. It describes the legislative process, the power to produce law (as held by the government or parliament), and the engagement of external consultants in related political fractions or related ministries (Adiputri 2015).

During the 1990s and 2000s, two Broadcast Laws were produced in parliament in different political landscapes. The first was Broadcast Law No. 24/1997, which was produced between 1996 and 1997 by legislators who were members of four political parties. Two parties, Golongan Karya and Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI, i.e., the Indonesian military), were Suharto's political vehicle; the other two were his opposition: Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party). The second was Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, produced between 2000 and 2002 by legislators from ten political parties with broader interests than under the previous period.

In 1996–1997, Suharto's rule over politicians was powerful. This resulted in a policy that favored government broadcasters. The situation had changed drastically by 2000–2002, as the number of political parties increased and the government had limited power. This new condition invited the idea of adopting non-government broadcasters.

In legislating the first Broadcast Law, in 1997, the initiative to produce the law came from Suharto's political administration. In response, parliament established a special commission representing all political forces. The committee worked for approximately six months, up to December 9, 1996, with almost all decisions following Suharto's interest. For example, the missions of and institutions regulating broadcasting were in favor of his regime. This policy can be understood because, in this era, Suharto strongly controlled politicians through Golkar and ABRI, while the opposition parties (PDI and PPP) had limited power.

In contrast, the situation when the second Broadcast Law was legislated, following the end of autocratic power, was entirely different. First, the bill came from parliament, not the government. The politicians who proposed the law came from different parties; these included, for example,

Paulus Widiyanto (PDI Perjuangan), Bambang Sadono (Golkar), Effendi Choeri (PKB), and Joko Soesilo (PAN). The dynamic of the political transition also influenced the formal legislative process: as the new political authority had not been consolidated; CSOs had a strong position. Also, there was a strong anti-Suharto spirit, and politicians had freedom to assert themselves.

To follow the formal legislation process, during a plenary session held on September 4, 2000, all politicians accepted the Broadcast Law and it thus became the parliament draft (Secretariat of Parliament 2002). From this period, the legislation of the law centered on parliament. As in the past, to detail the draft, parliament formed a special committee (Panitia Khusus) of 50 people; although it contained delegates from all political parties, as the electoral winner PDI-Perjuangan contributed the most (15 members), followed by Golkar (12 politicians). However, this composition was not significantly determinant in the output of new RRI/TVRI policy. Rather, the cross-political party team was most determinant.

In the legislative process, there are two formal stages in which political parties convey their views regarding the particular public issue being discussed. First, in the general assembly (*sidang paripurna*), every party delegate expresses his/her personal view. Second, there is a regular meeting with government officials to discuss policy in detail. Beyond these two formal interactions, most politicians are happy to convey their opinions through news publications and public forums about the broadcasting issues, be it inside or outside the house.

My review of legislative documents produced during the legislation of the 2002 Broadcast Law found that politicians expressed similar opinions regarding the urgency of transforming RRI/TVRI from government-owned media into public-owned media. However, attention was focused solely on the normative remit and structure of PSB and ignored other key issues, such as how to migrate RRI/TVRI staff from state employee status to autonomous status as well as how to reduce state funding.

As for the ownership model, Golkar speaker Bambang Sadono referred to models used in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and South Africa, where a centralistic non-state-owned PSB model is used. As such, Sadono proposed ending RRI/TVRI's status as Perjan, in the sense that the ministerial officer was still controlling RRI/TVRI through an exclusive power to elect the two media's directors. In line with Golkar's idea, PDI-Perjuangan called for RRI/TVRI to become a PSB that was directly

owned and controlled by the general public. In following a public ownership model, most politicians accepted the proposals of media advocates and international aid agencies to adopt the BBC model of a *Dewan Pengawas* (supervisory board). The power to elect board members was given to parliament, rather than a government office, and used an open and competitive selection mechanism.

In discussing funding and voicing private broadcasters' interests, politicians criticized the privileges that RRI/TVRI had received in the Suharto era, including the various forms of funding that harmed the private sector (i.e., state subsidies, license fees, broadcasting contributions, and advertising). In particular, the politician Astrid S. Susanto requested a public audit over TVRI's authority to collect license fees while it had foundation status. Overall, aside from license fees, donations, and advertising, most politicians argued that state funding remained important for the Indonesian PSB.

Unlike Broadcast Law No. 24/1997, the 2002 Broadcast Law incorporated more of politician's aspirations in the final output than government proposals. For instance, the use of the term 'public service broadcasting' instead of 'state broadcasting' (i.e., term proposed by the government officials) reflected the strong influence of politicians with pro-public agendas on the legislative process. Also, the state authority's ideas of commercializing RRI/TVRI and controlling the media were rejected.

Outside the formal process above, a second 'non-formal' way of policymaking in parliament is the practice of 'groupthink' (Janis 1991). In her study on the legislation of Public Information Openness Law No 14/2008, Adhrianti (2015) identified the practice of groupthink among the politicians of Commission I (the special commission for communication matters) and how it dominated political decisions about the law. The parliamentary speaker and the chair of Commission I merely served as a coordinator, accommodating politicians' opinions without promoting their own interests.

It is important to note that, compared to other political matters, the issue of RRI/TVRI and PSB in general was marginal. Politicians' concern for RRI/TVRI was low. The former leader of Commission I, Mahfudz Siddik emphasized this, as below:

> …speaking of RRI/TVRI, there were at least three perceptions among politicians: first, there were those who felt that the media were important

> for the nation. Even though both media were in crisis, Indonesia needed a PSB. On the contrary, with the fast progress of technology, most politicians argued that there was no need for PSB because the public could obtain information anywhere. The third perception was a critical review of the audience crisis being faced by RRI/TVRI, which circulated in a very small group, about 10 persons in Commission I. They viewed the media as on the verge of dying and needing fast transformation… (personal interview, 15 November 2017)

Concerning this situation, Widiyanto (personal interview, 28 October 2017) explained that the intense debate and exploration of PSB policy involved only a group of legislators. In the case of PSB, there were merely 8–20 politicians engaged in the process from the beginning until the end. These included, among others, Paulus Widiyanto, Effendi Choirie, Bambang Sadono, and Joko Soesilo. Before becoming politicians, they were journalists who wrote about press freedom. Bambang Sadono, for example, was a journalist at *Suara Merdeka*, a leading newspaper in Central Java, while Joko Susilo was a journalist at *Jawa Pos*—the second largest newspaper in Indonesia—published in East Java.

On his interest in PSB, Widiyanto said that he had been eager to access knowledge on PSB by participating in comparative studies overseas and in media workshops organized by international agencies. For example, on September 27–28, 2000, Widiyanto and several other politicians were invited to participate at the roundtable discussion on Broadcast Law in Asia and Europe in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, held by AIBD and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). This two-day event discussed public broadcasting models in Europe, and shaped Indonesia's strategy of adopting a public broadcasting system.

Outside this media workshop, politicians sought to access data on PSBs via trips to PSBs in developed societies. These included, for example, visits to the central office of the Federal Communication Commission and the National Public Radio (NPR) in the United States. On this international program, Widiyanto said:

> I went to South Africa … the Special committee (for the Indonesian broadcast law) visited NHK (Japan) and also Singapore. We learned about the Singapore media development agency. Also, I was personally invited to the Philippines, studying community broadcasting and subscription broadcasting rules. The Philippines is a nation with thousands of islands, like

> Indonesia. In South Africa, I learned about community broadcasting. (personal interview, 28 October 2017)

Following the argument by Janis (1991) that any groupthink may hold its own agenda outside its political party's policy-making agenda, proper knowledge about PSB systems as well as commitment to produce PSB policy in line with public demand are essential. In my interactions with some of what I classify as key figures in Commission I who held the power to create the PSB provision, most gave considerable attention to the urgency of Indonesian PSB, but lacked detailed knowledge on PSB systems.

The third mechanism of policy-making developed in parliament is personal lobbying and/or social connections between politicians and top figures outside parliament that influence decision making of PSB. For instance, the first Broadcast Law, submitted by 26 politicians in June 2000, was claimed by MPPI activists to have resulted from out-of-parliamentary interactions between politicians and key media activists. A number of politicians, such as Bambang Sadono, Joko Soesilo, and Paulus Widiyanto, actively consulted with media activists at the Newspaper Publishing Union of Jakarta, such as Amir E. Siregar, Leo Batubara, and Zaenal Suryokosumo. Indeed, their intersection had been clearly established, as they were formerly investors in or journalists at leading newspapers.

Such interactions were actively carried out between RRI/TVRI elites and politicians between 2000 and 2002. To include RRI/TVRI in the text of the law, for example, RRI elites lobbied politicians by using their networks as alumni of Universitas Gadjah Mada, a leading university in Yogyakarta. They claimed that, compared to sending a letter to parliament or making a public statement in a newspaper, personal lobbying offered a more powerful means of ensuring RRI/TVRI were included in the law as Indonesia's PSB.

To conclude, this section tells three mechanisms of PSB policy-making in Indonesian parliament between 2000 and 2002: the formal legislative process in the House; groupthink; and non-formal personal linkages. This section also shows that the power of PSB legislation was transferred from the government (1996–1997) to parliament (2000–2002); however, to follow Hallin and Mancini (2004), 'politics over broadcasting' continued to apply in the sense that almost all RRI/TVRI policies were steered by power holders, not the public.

In 2010–2014, when the idea of revising Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 and formulating special law for Indonesian PSB gained traction, the political landscape in the legislature was similar to the 2000–2002 period, with politicians maintaining strong power over the government. Ten political parties competed with each other in the legislation of a new Broadcast Law: the old parties PDIP (109 politicians), Golkar (91), Gerindra (73), Democratic Party (61), PAN (49), PKB (47), PKS (40), and PPP (39), as well as two new arrivals—Hanura (16) and Nasdem (35). Nevertheless, the legislation of a new Broadcast Law as well as a special PSB law has stalled. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, conflicts of interest between the owners of private television broadcasters, politicians, media activists, and digital frequency operators have slowed the pace of legislation.

5.7 Unfinished International Assistance

The drastic political changes following the fall of Suharto in May 1998 opened space for international media development agencies, based in Europe and America, to target Indonesia for technical and regulatory aids. Using a 'generic approach' previously applied in the post-communist and postwar regimes of Eastern Europe and Africa, they partnered with local Indonesian organizations to introduce a Western European or 'BBC-like' institutional model. This section describes the activity of international aid agencies operating in Indonesia between 2000 and 2002 and promoting free and independent broadcast systems (henceforth: media assistance), as well as their impact. Examining their projects, it can be said that international media development communities played a significant role in promoting PSB in Indonesia. However, their dominant focus on regulatory advocacy left the execution of the policy unfinished.[6]

Material of this section is derived from the reports of Perjan RRI, Swedish Radio/SIDA (Sweden), Internews (USAID), Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES Germany), and UNESCO. To complement the documents, I interviewed several individuals from these agencies: UNESCO advisor Toby Mendel; former Indonesian partner of Internews Christiana Chelsie Chan (Executive Director of the Indonesia Media Law & Policy Center); Kabul Budiono (RRI broadcaster and SR-MDO ally); Effendi Gazali (IFES/USAID partner); and Redemptus Kristiawan (Tifa Foundation, partner of the Open Society Foundation).[7]

Among the international agencies supporting PSB legislation between 2000 and 2002, three institutions were most prominent: UNESCO,

Internews, and Swedish Radio/SIDA. In the post-2002 period, the Open Society Foundation extended its intervention in Indonesia by using Tifa Foundation as a local ally to advocate a special law on RRI/TVRI between 2013 and 2017. At a smaller scale, several other international organizations were involved, such as IFES, FES Germany, and the Center for Democratic Institutions with ABC in Australia. Based on my review of their reports, various local Indonesian partners were engaged in their projects, from parliament, government officials, academics, up to RRI/TVRI.

Taking RRI as its focus partner, the Swedish Radio Media Development Organization (SR-MDO), which used money from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), was the most comprehensive project promoting a PSB system. As former RRI Director Kabul Budiono said, the cooperation emerged during a series of MPPI meetings with international agencies, in which RRI elites were engaged (personal interview, 14 November 2017).[8]

The institution claimed to have guided RRI on its journey from a media working under authoritarian rule toward a public media house. Conducted in partnership with RRI from 2000 to 2005, the project consisted of macro-sharing on PSB issues, initiating news channels, and equipment assistance. New management principles that best fit the public service mandate were adopted, as was the awareness of gender and minorities. According to Elmqvist (2008), the partnership began in 2000 and involved several stages: introduction of PSB via seminars in several cities; 2004 election coverage workshops; technological aid; visits to Swedish Radio; and the establishment of a news channel (Pro-3).

Among the main SR projects with RRI was the promotion of a public radio model through a series of workshops. For instance, on March 6–9, 2001, a workshop titled 'Understanding and Application of Public Radio Principles' was held. In this event, universal public broadcasting governance was introduced to 32 senior RRI staff from Java, Bali, and Nusa Tenggara provinces, who were the heads of their stations' news divisions. SR-MDO invited Jan Petersson and Staffan Sonning to speak on PSB governance, accompanied by the Indonesian media law expert Hinca Padjaitan and the academic Ashadi Siregar. Key radio governances were discussed, including funding income (license fees, government subsidies, commercial advertising, sponsorship, and public donations).

The workshop resulted in a plan to change RRI's status from government unit to public radio, using Swedish and BBC Radio as its model.

At this forum, broadcasters became more confident in the possibility of becoming a PSB. Similar events were also organized in other major Indonesian cities, such as Medan, Makassar, Jayapura, and Jakarta, as part of the 5-year program. Darmanto (personal interview, 1 May 2017) noted that the important impact of this cooperation was the adoption of public radio norms as part of the RRI's exit strategy. The RRI elites agreed with the government proposal of making their radio a government-owned corporation, in the sense that such a status would fit the PSB remit and structure, even when the ruling government controlled both staff and funding.

In addition to SR, Internews Indonesia (funded by USAID) provided media assistance to, among other things, accelerate the amendment of Law No. 24/1997. A book titled Prosiding Seminar Penyiaran 2000: Aspek Regulasi dan Kebijakan *(Proceedings of Broadcasting Seminar: Regulation and Policy Aspects)* (Pandjaitan 2000) recorded this project, outlining the initiatives of CSOs that were supported by Internews, such the seminars on broadcasting re-regulation. However, in these activities, RRI/TVRI elites were staying passive or ordinary participants.[9]

On May 8, 2000, RRI began to work with Internews, holding a one-day discussion on the topic: RRI as an independent and professional PSB. This event was held at Sriwedari Hotel, Yogyakarta, with delegates from RRI stations in Java and Bali. In this forum, Dr. Klaus Bergmann from Deutsche Welle shared the German experience managing PSBs. This project was considered the first forum to introduce public radio to RRI, and its organizers included Niken Widiastuti, Kabul Budiono, Hasto Kuncoro, Dwi Hernuningsih, and Darmanto, who later ran RRI after 2002. RRI Yogyakarta chairman Yon Hardoyono said that this event was a continuation of a previous seminar held in September 1998 and was intended as the final forum to discuss RRI's new institutional format (Abidin 2000).

Bergmann shared the history of PSB invention in Germany after Adolf Hitler's dictatorial regime and compared it with Indonesia. Also, he promoted German PSB model, including the Supervisory Council (consisting of representation from communities/societal groups), over the BBC model in which membership was a combination of delegates and 'public.' As a continuation of this event, on October 27–28, 2000, RRI organized a workshop in Magelang, Central Java, to produce new operational guidelines. This forum agreed to adopt the normative remit

of a pro-public radio, such as facilitating the freedom of expression and the care of national culture and minority groups (RRI Yogyakarta 2000).

Per its full report on media assistance in Indonesia (Kalathil and Kumar 2005), USAID (via Internews) sponsored three items: radio production training for conflict resolution, which was given USD 3.38 million in April 1999 and an additional USD 3.79 million for 2000–2003; capacity building for radio stations before coverage of the 2004 general election, valued at USD 1.74 million; and broadcasting regulatory advocacies in Indonesia. Outside RRI, Internews cooperated with 50 private radio stations in major cities of Indonesia. In advocating media policy, Internews focused on broadcasting law and public information law in collaboration with a local NGO, IMLPC (Indonesian Media Law and Policy Center).

It is important to note that, in the very open political situation of Indonesia, international agencies were able to establish direct contacts with parliament, mainly for advocating for Broadcast Law. Internews, for example, began formally cooperating with the General Secretary of the House of Representative on July 12, 2000, and the program lasted for two years (April 2000–2004). Cooperation included the granting of access to Internews to politicians in designing media policy and publishing proceedings. Sri Sumarjati, the head of the parliamentary secretariat, and Kathleen Reen, the director of Internews Indonesia, signed the agreement. No funding commitment was established between the two institutions, but Internews had formal access to the legislative process in parliament, a rare condition enabling the international aid agency to work directly with the post-authoritarian regime.[10]

Furthermore, Internews provided administrative aid to Indonesian legislators as they visited American media and regulatory institutions in the United States from May 25–31, 2003. On this occasion, several broadcasting legislatures, including Paulus Widiyanto and Joko Susilo, visited the headquarters of National Public Radio (NPR), the leading non-state PSB radio in the United States. The legislators learned how the NPR governed its service. In addition, the politicians also visited Internews international office in Washington, DC.

Amidst the drafting of a new Broadcast Law, UNESCO sent its legal adviser Toby Mendel (Law expert to Article 19) to share knowledge on the worldwide broadcast systems with Indonesian policymakers. Additionally, the organization formulated a typical draft Indonesian broadcasting law. Mendel actively held meetings with civil society, politicians, and

government officials to promote a democratic press system, proposing an alternative Press and Broadcasting law. As he explained:

> I was initially asked by UNESCO, which was working with the Indonesian government, first, to reform the press law… and the public system (TVRI and RRI) were at that time very much under government control. … There was a real effort to try to promote more independence in PSB… (online interview, January 22, 2018)

The UNESCO draft Broadcast Law was formally submitted to the Indonesian parliament in July 2000, and consisted of 44 articles. The overall mission of all types of broadcasting was included in Article 2: maintaining a climate of freedom of expression as well as the right to seek, receive, and access information. On the subject of PSB, UNESCO proposed that the law should clearly define its universal public mandate, an independent Public Council, and its accountability to parliament in the name of the public. In a special book regarding this draft, UNESCO offered a look at PSB systems and its regulators in developed and transitional regimes: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and South Africa (Mendel 2000).

On ownership, the UNESCO draft used the term: 'Corporation of Public Broadcasting of the Republic of Indonesia' (PPRI) as a non-State entity. In four articles (14, 15, 16, 17), the draft focused on PPRI's legal status as an independent house and its managerial structures, including its supervisory and directorial boards. As for funding, license fees were considered the priority model, with an obligation to provide a regular public report of its collection.

On the other hand, UNESCO financed the 3rd In-Country Conference on PSB, held by AIBD and RRI in Jakarta from January 21–22, 2002. This forum produced the 'Jakarta Declaration' on public broadcasting, which urged the creation of a PSB model in Indonesia. This was part of the dialogue between European and Asian Pacific countries concerning the PSB system. Key aspects (legal status, finances, and structure) were examined by 40 participants, from Indonesia, India, Germany, Switzerland, and Thailand. A number of international agencies outside UNESCO were present, including FES and the World Radio and Television Council (WRTC). The event provided Indonesian legislators and media activists with several choices for making PSB policy.

About 17 recommendations arose from this forum. RRI and TVRI were asked to become PSBs without government ownership or industry/political party influences. Funding needed to ensure its independence, such as license fees, grants, advertising, sponsorship, and public donations. Hence, direct government funding should be tested. In particular, the international forum urged RRI/TVRI elites to design a roadmap of their transition from government staff to autonomous employment.

Among the six Asian countries hosting AIBD conferences on public broadcast system s in the 2000s, until 2017 only two nations—India and Thailand—had formally adopted a special law on PSB. India has the Bharati Prasar Act, while Thailand has the Thai Public Broadcasting Act. By contrast, Indonesia has adopted PSB in limited chapters of the more general Broadcast Law.

Aside from Swedish Radio, Internews, and UNESCO, media assistance was also provided by non-Western European international agencies. For example, on June 5–9, 2000 in Sydney, the Asia Research Center and ABC Australia conducted a workshop titled 'Transition to Publicly Accountable Broadcasting in Indonesia,' with TVRI elites as participants. This marked an Australian initiative to encourage broadcast reform in Indonesia, and was the second workshop after an earlier one was held in 1999 at the request of the Indonesian Ministry of Information. Following the dissolution of this ministry, the second event was sponsored by the Center for Democratic Institute and organized at the request of TVRI's management (Sen 2000).

Where the first workshop had focused on the technical issue of public television, the second workshop introduced participants to PSB policy and models in developed countries such as Britain. Chairman of organizing committee, Sen (2000) noted, the session on media law became favorable as it coincided with the drafting of a new Broadcast Act in Indonesia. The rest was an ABC studio tour and discussion with ABC broadcasters as an effort to recognize the working condition of Australian broadcasting.

In the academic community, between April and August 2001, lecturers at the Department of Communications, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta conducted a series of workshops on PSB in ten major Indonesian cities (Medan, Padang, Bandung, Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Denpasar, Samarinda, Makassar, Manado, Jayapura). USAID funded these events, which were mediated by IFES (the International Federation of Election Systems). Initial research had been conducted in these cities since July 2001 to identify the real condition of RRI/TVRI as well as the need for knowledge on

the PSB system. Two books were published based on this activity, *Alternatif Tapi Mutlak* (An Alternative but Fixed) (Gazali et al. 2003) and *Konstruksi Sosial Industri Penyiaran di Indonesia* (The Social Construction of the Broadcast Industry in Indonesia) (Gazali et al. 2003). These books are considered to be the first to detail a public and community media system.

In detail, the project was titled 'Establishing a Middle Ground for Public and Community Broadcasting in Indonesia: An Action Research.' The project marked cohesive cooperation between academics, civil society, and RRI/TVRI, and had about 1345 participants. The workshop, for instance, discussed the future of RRI/TVRI as Perjan with public service mandates in comparison with the PSB model in the United States (presented by David Brugger), Canada (by Jim Byrd), and in Germany (by Eric Voght). Voght, for example, provided material on the public broadcasting model in Germany and his paper, which was published by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Jakarta and widely distributed to politicians and the general public (Gazali et al. 2003).

One of the significant proposals of this activity was that the Indonesian PSB should not only be represented by a national centralized and state-owned body as shown by RRI/TVRI, but may include local/community or university-based ownership systems. The workshop was followed by two pilot projects in ten big cities: audience research and forming local consultative forums, a replication of audience councils in the BBC model by involving local stakeholders as members.

In short, this section has illustrated the intervention of international aid agencies in assisting former state-owned broadcasters in their transition into PSB. Their activities included mainstreaming PSB concepts, policies, and governance via seminars and workshops with local actors, drafting a Broadcast Law with PSB provisions, ensuring access to politicians by consulting with them, setting-up a news channel for RRI, loading its relevant equipment, and assisting broadcasters with visits to western PSBs such as Swedish Radio. In their partnerships, agencies worked directly with three agents: (a) parliament and government offices, (b) RRI/TVRI, and (c) local NGOs such as MPPI, IMLPC, Sains Estetika Teknologi Foundation, or the academic community in Jakarta.

Introducing the Western European PSB model, the agencies placed broadcast autonomy from political interference (i.e., the shift of power from the government to the public, here represented by parliament house) as the central issue. This was generally translated into key aspects

of PSB governance, such as the necessity of public funding rather than state funding. Similarly, five normative issues were identified by UNESCO: independence, accountability, compliance mechanisms, and public service mandate. Nevertheless, there was no further elaboration on the ways these norms could be adopted into practice by the transitional regime.

Mostly, the impact of media assistance had three aspects. First, it strengthened the urgency of having a PSB with reliable reference to the centralistic model used by the BBC in the United Kingdom or in Western Europe in general. Second, it focused on the adoption of universal PSB norms and its generic governance in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. Third, it underscored the legacy of PSB knowledge in academia and among professionals, particularly in audience councils.

Reviewing the published opinions of international experts during their assistance projects in 2000–2002, it can be said that they mostly cited Western European experiences with PSBs, primarily those of British Broadcasting Corporation but also those of the PSBs of Germany, Sweden, Australia, the United States, and/or Japan. They did not share the experiences of post-authoritarian regimes outside Indonesia in adopting PSB within the legacy of autocratic power.

It can also be said, the general provision of Indonesian PSB in the Broadcast Law, which will be discussed in the next section, confirms the significant impact of international media assistance in addressing a PSB policy. However, soon after the passage of the new Broadcast Law in 2002, most international aid agencies ended their PSB projects in Indonesia and left implementation unfinished.

Toby Mendel emphasized the failure of international media assistance to ensure a proper provision for Indonesian PSB as, follows:

> I can say that the core legal framework for PSB from these bodies has not been put in place. In line with experiences all over the world, it is a huge challenge to transform RRI/TVRI, which had been used as a state broadcaster, into a PSB. This involves not only major institutional reforms but also, most importantly and most difficultly, transforming the culture and attitude of the staff. (online interview, 22 January 2018)

In line with Indonesia, the transformation of the Radio-Television Afghanistan (RTA) as state broadcaster received technical assistance from international consortium such as BBC World Trust, DW Akademie,

and Canal France International from 2004 to 2007. Nevertheless, DW Akademie (2014) noted, the media development projects were successful neither in changing the regulatory framework nor in engaging the top and middle management in the advocacies of the framework.

5.8 Legal Construction of Indonesian PSB

This section explores the legal construction of Indonesian PSB by referring to the final draft of the Broadcast Law, passed on November 28, 2002.

In the sense that the legal design was a convergence of proposals put forth by stakeholders—including the government, parliament, private broadcasters, RRI/TVRI, international aid agencies, and press freedom activists—between 2000 and 2002, I will first explore the stakeholders' competing ideas about Indonesian PSB policy that were submitted to parliament during this period. Using four PSB components as the framework of this book, Table 5.1 compares ideas of Indonesian PSB governance.

The table highlights the similarities and differences of the legal designs of PSB for Indonesia. Common ideas included the transfer of ownership from the state/government to parliament and the normative PSB remit. As such, parliament would be granted the power to select members of the supervisory board, similar to the cases in Japan and India. However, as shown by the table, there was also the competing idea of continuing to manage RRI/TVRI as a state agency as well as the new proposal to apply state corporation status. On the term PSB itself, private broadcasters preferred using the term 'non-profit' as a logical tool to ban advertising as a source of funding. Other proposals, however, mostly used the generic term 'public service broadcasting.'

Regarding ownership, the state official proposed keeping 'State agency' status, ensuring its control as the term 'State Agency' was understood to refer to government-owned media. In terms of structure, the authority proposed that the PSB should have two higher institutions: a supervisory and an executive board selected by the Minister of Information, a model previously applied in the Perjan/Persero system during 1998–2002. Meanwhile, although CSOs and politicians proposed a similar model of two top governing structures, they preferred the selection and control of these bodies to be handled by parliament, not Minister as common outside Indonesia. Finally, in terms of funding, all conveyers

Table 5.1 Proposals on Indonesian PSB model

Conveyer	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
Par	Unity and nationhood, national identity, anti-monopolistic industry, diplomacy, Pancasila norm and the 1945 constitution, morality and values of religion, spirit of press freedom	A legal entity established by State, independent, non-commercial and serves to the entire public interest: RRI, TVRI, local PSB	Board of Supervisory and Board of Director, legally stipulated by president, from open selection mechanism in parliament, membership type is not specified	Mix: license fee, contribution of private TV, state budget, public donation, advertising, other flexible business
Gov	Nation first, then public: national identity, cultural reflection, infotainment, neutral from gov't, politician, etc., awareness to government laws	State-owned enterprise established by government (neutral, public-oriented, not profit)	Structure and control mechanisms are entirely on the government hand alongside an internal oversight body	Mix: license fee, state budget, public donation, no commercial advertising.

Conveyer	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
CSO	Freedom of expression, to oppose private broadcasting, serving ethnic groups, education and culture, national unity	1999: State-owned enterprise (radio & TV). 2001: Public-run, non-profit: national and local channels	Board of Supervisory and Board of Director, supervised by independent regulator, membership open for public	Fee of radio and TV ownership, State annual budget, limited advertising
IA	Freedom expression, national identity, cultural diversity, service to minorities, forum for critical debates, maintaining historical archives	Public corporation outside government, not for profit, responsible to parliament	Board of Director (9 people who are experts in various fields) directly elected by parliament members	Public funding: license fee, no government budget
BI	Freedom of information, unity of nation, cultural diversity, serving remote areas and care local culture	Non-profit institution: RRI, TVRI, local radio/TV	-No proposal. Government to issue frequency, -Parliament to supervise content	Mix: State budget, license fee, public donation, no commercial advertising
RRI	Information, social control, education, entertainment	Independent, neutral, non-profit entity, a continuation of *Perjan* with stronger policy: RRI/ TVRI with holistic coverages: local, regional, national and international	Board of Supervisory and Director, appointed by president for the national level, by Governor at provincial level, five-year term. No review broadcast regulator/KPI	Mixed of funding: radio and TV receiver's fee, State annual budget, public donation, advertising, other business of broadcasting

(continued)

Table 5.1 (continued)

Conveyer	*Remit*	*Ownership*	*Structure*	*Funding*
TVRI	Information, social control, education, entertainment	Independent, institution. May 14, 2002: Federation of TVRI workers: State-owned corporation	Public broadcast authority with a societal model of membership: farmer, religious leaders, etc. open selection	Radio and TV receiver fee, soft sell commercial advertising to manage its political independence

Note Par: Parliament/Politicians; Gov: Government Officials; CSO: Civil Society Organization; IA: International Agencies; BI: Broadcasting Industry
Source Compiled from RRI/TVRI, government, parliament and NGO's broadcast bills, 2000–2002

shared the view that mixed sources of financial income were necessary to avoid political and economic pressures.

To summarize the table, the proposal of an 'independent-parliamentary model' (Hallin and Mancini 2004) was voiced by politicians, CSOs, RRI/TVRI, and aid agencies. In contrast, the idea of a ministerial PSB, with reference to Perjan/Persero, was voiced by the state to keep control over the two media. To what extent were these contradictory proposals incorporated in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002?

Reviewing the final draft of the Broadcast Law adopted on November 28, 2002, provisions for Indonesian PSB governance are included entirely in Articles 14 and 15. Article 14 consists of ten paragraphs, while Article 15 includes two paragraphs. To my observation, these articles generally regulate three key PSB governances: ownership, structure, and funding model, with the broad spirit of accepting a parliamentary PSB model.

The common idea of reducing government ownership of Indonesia's PSB was clearly written in Article 14, Paragraph 1. The official translation of this paragraph, provided by the Ministry of Communication and Informatics, follows:

> A public broadcasting institution as referred to under Article 13, Clause (2), Letter A, is a broadcasting institution in the form of corporate body established by the state; which is independent, neutral, non-commercial in nature, and functions to offer services for the benefit of the public. (National Information Agency 2003)

This clause affirms four essential aspects of Indonesian PSB system: (1) public ownership through a legal entity established by the state (in the name of public); (2) operational independence; (3) non-profit service orientation; and (4) universal remit to serve for the benefit of society. Nevertheless, the term 'legal entity' was not defined; it was unclear whether the PSB would be a public corporation outside the government or a state agency under a government office. In her study on this provision, Irma (2003) noted that the unclear definition of 'legal entity' provided the government with room to bring the media back under its ownership.

During the formulation of this paragraph, the central debate among CSOs and policymakers revolved around the term 'state.' There was no shared understanding of a detailed definition of the term that could avoid misunderstandings. Instead of using a clear term for ownership, such as

'state-corporation,' policymakers merely described the characteristics of ownership (i.e., independent, neutral, and not-for-profit).

On this issue, the former chair of the law's drafters, Paulus Widiyanto, said:

> What is PSB? We were still confused (in parliament). We learned from UNESCO. Well, the generic formula (for PSB) refers to a public institution established by the state. Previously, there was the alternative status of state-owned entity, referring to the Ministry of Education as an example, or the model of university autonomy. We then embark with this idea… (personal interview, 28 October 2017)

Another minor issue with this clause was an absence of a specific remit for PSB. In this case, policymakers could allow the public to use an overall remit that applied to all broadcasters. This mixed different roles: keeping national unity, cultural identity, and encouraging free-competition without monopoly (Article 5).

As for the type of operator for Indonesian PSB system, Article 14, Clauses 2–3, identified three mandatory Indonesian PSB operator: RRI/TVRI (explicitly identified as the key public broadcasting players) and local PSBs operating at the provincial or regency level (whose establishment was not necessary).

Below are the original sentences: Clause (2):

> A public broadcasting institution as referred to under clause (1) consists of the Radio Republik Indonesia and the Televisi Republik Indonesia, the central broadcasting stations of which shall be located in the Capital of the Republic of Indonesia. Clause (3): Local public broadcasting institutions may be established at the province, regency, or city. (National Information Agency 2003)

Pursuant to Paragraph 2–3, it can be seen that the Indonesian PSB operated as a mix of national and local broadcasters. In addition to TVRI/RRI, channels previously used by local authorities—namely Radio Siaran Pemerintah Daerah (RSPD)—were acknowledged as PSB providers for local districts. The policy of choosing a national and Jakarta (the national capital)-centric model of RRI/TVRI management was partially inspired by the BBC model, which is centrally managed in London, the capital of the UK, while the acceptance of RSPDs as PSBs can be seen as a partial adoption of Germany's regional PSB model.

Why were RRI/TVRI, as former state-owned channels, instantly mandated as PSB in the law? Paulus Widiyanto explained:

> …the point here is that we saved RRI/TVRI history… I can see, perhaps, the importance of having PSB in view of civil society is not RRI/TVRI-like… but, for me the important thing is that we have PSB… (personal interview, 28 October 2017)

The statement above indicates two contrasting things. First, the introduction of PSB in the Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 was a political response to public pressure for public media in Indonesia. As such, the introduction of PSB in the Broadcast Law could be understood as showing that Indonesia had formally adopted pluralist media ownership as part of its democratic media principles. Second, the political decision to mandate RRI/TVRI as a PSB operator was driven by the interest of saving the historical legacies of these two media as long-established state-sponsored broadcasters.

The next articles govern the two levels of organizational structure of Indonesia's PSB and it generally refers to BBC model. The two levels are the Board of Supervisors (BOS) and Board of Directors (BOD). They replaced the old and autocratic structure, namely Directorate of Radio and Television that had served as a sole structure under Suharto's political power. As in the BBC, the BOS was tasked with designing general policy, selecting-appointing BOD members, providing suggestions to the state officials and parliament regarding the state budget, and overseeing the execution of operational plans. BOS was set as including five members, serving five-year terms (with the possibility of being re-elected once), with an open selection mechanism in parliament. Meanwhile, the BOD was set as an executive body consisting of five members and led by a president director. These two structural models could also be applied to the local PSBs.

Concerning the term: 'Dewan Pengawas' for the top council, Paulus Widiyanto said that it referred practically to Perjan, a status once held by RRI/TVRI, and was included after a long debate in parliament on a fix term for a structure that resembled that of other Indonesian public institutions. Initially, CSOs proposed a new term: 'Dewan Penyiaran' (Broadcasting Council), but most politicians and government officials disagreed with this nomenclature. In the same spirit, the adoption of an open selection model that enabled all people to hold a seat on the

Supervisory Council, rather than delegates of strategic groups, practically referred to other Indonesian public bodies such as KPI, whose membership is open to all.

On the number of BOS members and the right of politicians to select them, Widiyanto illustrated as follow:

> I received many suggestions, ranging from 9 people, to 5, and 7. In essence, we saw RRI/TVRI was still small, so five people was enough. … In the fit and proper test by parliament, there was room to supervise RRI/TVRI. So, there would be formal supervision. But when we talked about financing, we still (saw) public fees or license fees as the priority model… (personal interview, 28 October 2017)

Based on Widiyanto's point about BOS membership, I can say that the Law continued Perjan, replacing the previous government decree with a stronger policy. In other words, PSB provision is, by law, 'Perjan in flavor,' a mix of PSB universal standards (as a non-profit body) and Perjan (a government corporation).

Article 15 of the Broadcast Law regulated the funding scheme for Indonesian PSB s and its accountability, with the clause:

> Financial resources for a Public Broadcasting Institution shall derive from broadcast subscriptions; state budgets and regional budgets; public contributions; advertising revenue, and other legal undertakings related to the broadcasting business. (National Information Agency 2003)

This clause offers a mix of competitive and non-competitive funding schemes. Traditional funding sources when RRI/TVRI were under the government control (i.e., license fees and state money) continued to exist together with new and competitive sources of financing (such as advertising and public donation).

It is essential to note that the placement of license fees in the first level of PSB funding sources reflects its priority and showing the legislature's views that a license fee is the most appropriate funding for Indonesian PSB. It is also interesting to note that Clause 2 of Article 15 required the public transparency of expenditures, a 'good sign' intended to create public trust in the PSB institution.

The complete clause is as follows:

> A public broadcasting institution, at the end of the fiscal year, is obliged to submit a financial report, which is to be audited by a public accountant, and the results shall be announced through the mass media. (National Information Agency 2003)

Under this clause, it may be stated that Indonesian PSB was obliged to open its financial reports to the public and allow public accountants (not state officials) to review said reports as a mean of public transparency. However, the clause regulated the transparency mechanism only on a yearly basis, using print media publication, rather than an online and daily basis (as common in developed PSBs).

Based on the legal design of PSB in the Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, Table 5.2 summarizes Indonesian public broadcasting model:

Unlike the previous legal entities developed in 1998–2002 (see the following Table 5.2) such as Perusahaan Jawatan (Perjan), the table above shows that the Indonesian PSB was legislated to be governed by a parliament, not the government. The table also shows that, unlike Perjan and Persero, which are entirely managed by a specific ministry, the Indonesian PSB or *Lembaga Penyiaran Publik (LPP)* was open to public access (i.e., through the supervisory board) and public participation (through mixed funding sources).[11] To detail, Table 5.3 compares Perjan, Persero, and LPP:

Reviewing the overall PSB provision in the Broadcast Law, two more issues can be identified. First, the Indonesian PSB system is legislated in

Table 5.2 Indonesian PSB in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002


REMIT:
To mouthpiece national integration and social order, trusted-balanced news, cultural preservation
Formal construct of Public Service Broadcasting (Article 14-15 of Broadcasting Act 32/2002): Three Providers: RRI, TVRI and Local PSBs
OWNERSHIP:
Not clear yet: state agency or public agency (controlled by parliament, not government)
STRUCTURE:
Dual board (supervisory and executive boards, elected by parliament in an open for public appointment)
FUNDING:
Mix of license fee, state budget, advertising, public donation, etc.

Table 5.3 Comparison of Jawatan, Persero, and LPP (PSB)

Dimension	Perusahaan Jawatan *(Government-owned corporation)*	Persero *or BUMN (State-owned corporation)*	Lembaga Penyiaran Publik/LPP *(Public-owned broadcasting)*
Goal/remit	Government entity with public service mandate and limited-profit interest	Fully commercial entity with public service mandate	Not for profit entity with public service mandate
Legal status	No legal entity, special unit under government/ministerial office	Legal entity, under Ministry of state enterprise	Legal entity, under both president and parliament
Relationship with state officials	Fully under government: part of particular ministry, chairman elected by a particular ministerial office	Government as key owner through Ministry of state enterprise that legalizes top board	Strongly under parliament that elects top board and president only legalizes it
Supervisory board	Consists of higher government officials, elected by a ministry	Commissaries, elected by shared holders' meeting	Special supervisory board, elected by parliament
Employment status	All state-run personnel/Civil servant	All Autonomous staff under company	Mix of state-run and autonomous staff
Budget source	Mix of state budget, state subsidy, limited advertising	All competitive financings, may accept state subsidy	Mix of public/state and competitive financings

Source Compiled from Government Decrees No. 36 & 37/2000; No. 9/2002; No. 12 & 13/2005

fewer provisions than commercial broadcasting. Of 64 total items, the Broadcast Law deals with public radio and television in only two articles and ten paragraphs. Second, the Broadcast Law legislated PSB only through very broad provisions, rather than detailed ones, covering only ownership; RRI/TVRI and local broadcasters' mandate as PSB operators; top governing structures (supervisory and executive board, including membership, terms, and board oversight); and funding source. It did not clearly regulate the employment model, frequency allocation, or how RRI/TVRI could be transformed into an independent media house. This posed a serious obstacle to the implementation of the PSB provision in Indonesia.

In contrast, the 2002 Broadcast Law regulated private broadcasters in more detail. The regulation covered almost all aspects of the private media governance, including ownership, source of funding, code of conduct, and licensing procedures. Also, as indicated by Mendel (2002), the lack of provision for Indonesian PSB and its top boards contrasts with the far more detailed treatment given to independent broadcasting regulators or KPI.

Mendel (2002) also noted that Article 14 of the Broadcast Law failed to define the objectives of Indonesian PSB as well as to make it clear that the objectives applied to TVRI/RRI as former state-run channels. Regarding the top structure, Mendel found unclear provision. The Broadcast Law formally stipulated that the president would administratively legalize the supervisory board s upon parliamentary appointment and it made these bodies accountable to parliament. However, no explicit clause explained the practical functions or public accountability of the boards.

Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 in general set out three democratic aspirations. First, it emphasized broadcast pluralism by adopting two new types of broadcasters: public and community, as well as the existing commercial and subscription systems. Second, the concept of PSB in the Broadcast Law referred to an independent, non-profit organization serving public interest s. Third, it changed the supervision of PSB from the government to parliament, in the name of the people. It can thus be said that the Law reflected the pro-democratic policy of legislators, although in size its provision was much weaker than that of PSBs in other transitional regimes such as India, Thailand, and South Africa.

In the brief provisions of the Broadcast Law, I would say the PSB model is a mix of state-run and public-oriented media. The state ownership is rooted mainly in the use of the term: 'established by the state' (Article 14, Clause 1), which led to the traditional norm of the 'public' as government rather than parliament or general public. This model was also manifested in the official inclusion of RRI/TVRI as PSBs, with no clear provision for transforming them from state-owned media into PSBs. In this sense, the Broadcast Law still allowed these two former government media to employ state personnel and a bureaucratic working culture, and to use state moneys as their core funding.

In addition, the inclusion of 'national unity' as a key remit for all broadcasters, include PSB, without detailed explication, reflects the securing of repressive media policy that was rooted in the autocratic politics of Indonesia. To agree with Romano (2003), the classic remit of all

broadcasters to support national unity or national integration was politically paternalistic, as in Suharto's autocratic regime it meant giving the president (i.e., father) the power to think, speak, and produce policy on particular national interests, free of criticism from society (i.e., children).

In contrast, the public-oriented media model was found in the adoption of two governing bodies, appointed by parliament, and the use of the terms 'independent' and 'public oriented' in reference to ownership (Article 14, Clause 1). Public orientation was also shown in the terms trust and balanced-information as key remits (Article 5), as well as the introduction of both competitive and non-competitive funding as means to release state control over the Indonesian PSB's operations.

5.9 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the struggle to adopt a public-oriented broadcasting model following the fall of Suharto's autocratic regime (1998–2002). The first section identified the political crisis marked by the fall of Suharto from his power and the dissolution of the Ministry of Information as a pre-condition for PSB arrival. It also found that the idea of adopting PSB arrived in 1998–2002 in the two conditions: the public criticism of RRI/TVRI as Suharto's official channels, and the introduction of market-driven media policies. Also, the spirit of opposition to Suharto and his centralized media policies enjoyed a 'golden moment,' in which CSOs and international aid agencies could bring new ideas of public-driven broadcasting to oppose a state-driven broadcast system.

The following sections of this chapter described the contributions of stakeholders (civil society organizations, politicians, state officials, international agencies, RRI/TVRI) in adopting or rejecting PSB during the policy-making period (2000–2002) both inside and outside parliament. These sections also identified problems coming from both changes to and continuity of autocratic legacies within the RRI/TVRI management, which hindered the ideal provision of PSB in the Broadcast Law. The last part of this chapter discussed the output of Broadcast Law with special concern for PSB arrangements.

I have demonstrated that the 1998–2002 period was a critical era for RRI/TVRI. The collapse of the Suharto regime, the 'father' and main supporter of the channels, left RRI/TVRI in limbo and subject to criticism from anti-Suharto activists. Following Suharto's resignation from power, his regime's duopoly policy (keeping control of RRI/TVRI as

state media and granting limited licenses to his cronies to operate private televisions) was delegitimized. Moreover, Law No. 24/1997, one of the last policies legislated by the regime, was no longer valid after the dissolution of the Ministry of Information in 1999. At this time, there was a contestation of various ideas for administering RRI/TVRI. The concept of a Western European PSB was confronted by two other ideas: managing RRI/TVRI as a state-run media, releasing them from the political power and/or transforming them into public corporations. Not really opposing the public broadcasting concept, private broadcasters tried to keep their dominant stand by proposing that RRI/TVRI be a non-profit public institution without access to advertising as a source of income.

As shown by this chapter, during the transitional political period (1998–2002), RRI/TVRI experienced changes in its policy and legal status, which was determined by the unstable political climate and the role of the state (government and parliament) being stronger than the public. Section 5 of this chapter described that the weakness and inability of the new political administrations to provide a proper democratic media system resulted in the uncertain policies regarding RRI/TVRI status in the period of transition between authoritarian (RRI/TVRI as state-owned bodies in the President Habibie era), pro-public in remit (Perjan in the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency era), and pro-liberal (Persero in the Megawati era), leaving the two media in a continual management crisis.

In parliament, with limited attention and knowledge on public broadcast systems, the practice of clientelism and groupthink (Janis 1991) in policy-making resulted in weak provisions regarding PSB in new Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. As shown by the last section of this chapter, policymakers finally took 'a middle way,' legally transferring the formerly state-owned channels into PSBs instead of creating a new PSB institution.

During 1998–2002, this chapter identified that six types of actors competed to determine the model of Indonesian PSB. They can be separated into two groups: pragmatists (group 1) and idealists (group 2), as seen in Fig. 5.1.

This figure shows that CSOs and politicians (group 2) who received assistance from international agencies and introduced a Western European PSB model were confronted by RRI/TVRI and government officials (group 1) who wanted to keep their interest in managing a pro-government channel with no radical change.


Group 1
Ministry of Transportation and MCIT
(1) Remit: National Unity & Development Promoter
(2) Ownership: state-owned corporation under MCIT
RRI and TVRI
(1) State run staff and state budget
(2) Government as Frequency Allocator
Private Broadcasters, i.e. PRSSNI and ATVSI
(1) Non profit media in the government hand
(2) Commercial advertising not allowed
Formal Construction of Indonesia PSB (By Law 32/2002): Mix of State Run & Public Oriented Channel
Group 2
Politicians: Commission I (1999-2004): Bambang Sadono, Paulus Widiyanto, Effendy Choirie, Joko Susilo
(1) BBC-like model
(2) Public Ownership of PSBs, Public Funding
CSOs: MPPI, KPI (Coalition of CSOs), IMLPC, Depok School
(1) Broadcast pluralism principles
(2) National PSBs and local non-state PSBs
Media Assistance Agencies: Swedish Radio-MDO; UNESCO; Internews; FES
(1) UNESCO-like PSBs
(2) Public Corporation
(3) Mixed-Funding

Fig. 5.1 Groups of actors and their agenda in PSB construction

Why did the Indonesian government and parliament agree to adopt public service broadcasting? There are three answers. First, the generic response to widespread demand to ban RRI/TVRI as a pillar of authoritarianism; second, the symbolic adoption of democracy, including external media pluralism; third, the close interactions of policymakers and CSOs sponsored by international PSB promoters. In this sense, I would argue, instead of fully adopting independent and public-oriented media, the legal design of PSB was merely intended to show that Indonesia had applied media pluralism.

Overall, in this chapter, I conclude that Indonesian PSB was legally given a hybrid model. It is a mix of state-run channel in ownership and remit and public-run channel in structure and funding. The introduction of a supervisory board selected by parliament as the highest supervisory structure and the use of mixed financial sources were pursuant with the universal PSB indicators proposed by UNESCO (2010). In contrast, the legal design of appointing RRI/TVRI as the PSB holder, with no clear direction for their institutional reform, strongly symbolized the continued legacy of state-run media.

Furthermore, the way Indonesian PSB was governed, as a centralistic, Jakarta-based service, continued the autocratic broadcast model while simultaneously referring to the BBC's ideal model. As listed in Chapter 4, during 1942–1998, the country had adopted a centralistic broadcast system since the Japanese colonial period, and thus was accustomed to the model. Also, lobbyists advocating for this issue were RRI/TVRI elites familiar with the centralistic service being used as a tool of development propaganda.

Articles 14–15 of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 legally promoted the characteristics of Indonesian public interest broadcast channels as not-for-profit and parliamentary (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Humphreys 1996). However, absent a detailed account of this basic character, there were systemic problems in implementing the Broadcast Law between 2002 and 2017, as will be detailed in the following chapter.

Notes

1. It is also important to note that commercial television practitioners' aspiration for policy reform was motivated by their desire to end the requirement to contribute 12.5% of their advertising profits to TVRI. Indeed, by January 31, 2000, private television broadcasters' debt to TVRI was IDR 30 billion. Meanwhile, commercial television managers were unwilling to give money to TVRI, because under Broadcast Act No. 24/1997, TVRI was allowed to broadcast commercial advertisements.
2. On April 29, 1999, the first radio news agency in Jakarta—Kantor Berita Radio (KBR) 68H—began operations. This agency, which produced its own national and international news, networked with 200 private stations around the Indonesian archipelago between 1999 and 2002, and thereby was able to compete with RRI. KBR 68H was managed by young activists and journalists working at the Institute for the Free Flow of Information and supported by various international agencies. It included two popular programs, *Bulletin Sore* and *Kabar Baru*, which were 30–60-second-long features covering social-political events. Because of its independence in journalism, this agency has been called 'public radio' in spirit (Santoso 2007).
3. It is important to note that the government was represented by two ministries: the Ministry of Transportation (under Gus Dur) and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (under Megawati). The media advocacy associations involved here were MPPI and *Koalisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian Broadcast Coalition). The

MPPI's proposed broadcast bill generally voices the entire media advocates. To some extent, it may be seen as a shared proposal of MPPI, PRSSNI, and journalist associations. Meanwhile, the proposal from UNESCO represented the general view of international media assistance providers.

4. In formal legislation mechanism, politicians and high-ranking government officials interact intensively to debate a particular bill. In the case of the 2000–2002 Broadcast Law, by mid-2000 the Ministry of Transportation (on behalf of the government) officially submitted a counter-bill to both parliament and the public. The government bill presented by the Ministry had 64 articles. Here, it offered a dualistic system of state-owned and privately-owned broadcasters. The term 'negara' (state) was proposed to confront the term 'public' used by politicians and the public. Moreover, the draft explicitly proposed that three public channels be given state-commercial enterprise (BUMN) status. This proposal changed the government's previous idea of turning RRI/TVRI into a state agency. In the draft, both the structure and funding system followed the common state corporation policy set by existing regulations. In this sense, it allowed mixed funding, including moneys from the government (as the key owner), state subsidies, and advertising.
5. Furthermore, TVRI's status as a Persero allowed the ruling government and private television owners to end their financing of TVRI. As Sudibyo (2004) noted, in 2002 the Ministry of Finance stopped including TVRI in its allocation of the annual budget. Similarly, when RRI/TVRI had Perjan status, Gus Dur's administration covered only staff salaries, not operational costs. TVRI's collection of advertising revenue in 2002 was only IDR 4 billion, far behind the income of private television broadcasters such as Indosiar and RCTI, that exceeded IDR 1 trillion. It was in this climate that the crisis of broadcast production occurred in most branches of TVRI.
6. In this perspective, three factors determined the PSB arrival in Indonesia: (1) the international media assistance promoting a pro-democratic media model in the country and assisting local partners to organize workshops, draft a new Broadcast Law, and deploying broadcast equipment; (2) the visitation of government officers, RRI/TVRI elites, and CSO activists to Western Europe and the United States, which included participation on global forums on media reform, especially in Western Europe and the United States; (3) the circulation of PSB knowledge on the Internet. For instance, as a tool for learning from Western European PSBs, in the first term of TVRI's Supervisory Body (2005–2010), the TVRI Board visited BBC's central offices in London together with RRI staff and some legislators. With members including Hayono Isman, Retno Intani, Kabul

Budiono, and Niken Widiastuti, it was the first official visit of TVRI elites to BBC, a broadcaster that had influenced the PSB model in Indonesia. The March 2010 visit included discussions with members of the BBC Trust, broadcast archive managers, and the BBC Indonesia service. The elites of both media also shared information on the recent progress of RRI/TVRI.

7. The idea of adopting broadcasting patterns from Western countries initially emerged in the 1950s. In this period, some RRI elites conducted comparative visits with media offices around Europe and the United States. For example, the idea of forming a national-centralized model was inspired by the international visitations of Maladi, Indonesia's Minister of Information. In a meeting held in the 1950s in Jakarta, Maladi recounted the results of his 4-month visit (April 3–August 13, 1952) to the United States and Western Europe and his understanding of these countries' radio, television, film, and media industries. In the Suharto era, two countries—Germany and Japan—assisted RRI/TVRI with equipment and training (Directorate of TVRI 1972).
8. In its public statement at www.srmdo.se, the SR-MDO claims as Media Development Office of the Swedish Radio since 1996 with the mission to design and implement development projects and collaborations all over the world. It belongs to the Swedish Public Service Media, Radio (SR), Television (SVT) and Educational Broadcasting. The institution has since that time conducted collaborative projects in the broadcasting sector in a dozen different countries including Indonesia.
9. It is significant to note that Hinca Pandjaitan led the Internews projects in media legislation. He was a central linker between CSOs, policymakers, and RRI/TVRI elites between 1999 and 2002. To reduce the negative stigma regarding the direct intervention of Internews, as a foreign entity, over Indonesian legal reform, Pandjaitan and other activists established IMLPC to mediate Internews' projects (Pandjaitan 2000). With PRSSNI, Internews and IMLPC organized road shows to campaign for broadcast reform, including the transformation of RRI/TVRI into PSBs (Kalathil and Kumar 2005). *Broadcasting Book 2000: Regulatory Aspects and Policy* explains all processes involved in USAID-funded activities in detail.
10. In a private letter to Siti Nurhajati Daud from NPD Parliamentary Support & Public Participation (a USAID local ally), dated June 18, 2003, the politician Paulus Widiyanto thanked NPD for its support in successful projects involving parliament, Universitas Indonesia, and the Ikatan Sarjana Komunikasi Indonesia (Indonesian Alliance of Communications Scholars) in advocating Broadcast policies.
11. With regard to Broadcast Act No. 32/2002, Fig. 5.2 is the formal structure of RRI/TVRI as Indonesian public broadcasting ambassadors.



Fig. 5.2 Formal structure of Indonesian PSB (2002–2017)

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CHAPTER 6

Indonesian PSB in Practice: Market-Driven Politics, Clientelism, and Paternalism (2002–2017)

6.1 Introduction

The hashtag 'Save RRI/TVRI' has been used by Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik (Indonesian Public Broadcasting Clearing House, or RPLPP) since it began operating as not-for-profit association in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on February 23, 2013. When I opened the online portal penyiaranpublik.org, the hashtag was located on the left side of the front page, together with the slogan *Selamatkan RRI dan TVRI* (Save RRI/TVRI). This slogan was accompanied by several publications regarding the political conflict between TVRI elites and Indonesian legislatures that began in December 2013. As published in the portal, on February 28, 2014, RPLPP invited academics, CSO activists, and senior broadcasters to meet at the Universitas Indonesia campus in Jakarta to observe this conflict. In the end, participants delivered a one-page open letter titled 'Salemba Commitment for Reforming TVRI.' Signed by all attendees, it listed four issues being faced by TVRI as PSB ambassador: leadership crisis caused by political interference; lack of operational budget; rampant corruption; and poor performance of staff. Again, the slogan 'Save RRI/TVRI' was used to end the statement, drawing public attention to TVRI's managerial problems.

In December 2013, the chairman and members of the TVRI supervisory board were dismissed by members of Commission I (i.e., the commission tasked with media and communications affairs). As such,

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TVRI's top power structure was legally empty. This was followed by a delay in approving TVRI's annual budget, such that the channel could air only old contents. Observing this crisis, the activists' forum above agreed to form an emergency team to comprehensively examine the issues and address the TVRI crisis in the name of public interest (Masduki and Darmanto 2014). Regarding this effort, in this chapter I will explore the journey of RRI/TVRI as it has practiced its mandate as a public service broadcaster between 2002 and 2017.

This chapter seeks to answer the following research question: How have a mix of political structure and culture, as well as the arrival of market-driven politics, influenced the practice of Indonesian PSB between 2002 and 2017? After policy-making on PSB and its results (1998–2002) were reviewed in Chapter V, this chapter explores the execution of PSB policy by looking at the interface of all actors. The practice of PSB in Indonesia can be explored in terms of two aspects: first, the translation of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 into lower policies by the ruling political power and/or RRI/TVRI; second, the application of policies between 2002 and 2017 within four PSB aspects of governance: remit, ownership, structure, and funding.

For the first aspect, this chapter will explain the way in which private media owners have kept their power over broadcasting through the 'market-driven policy' produced by the constitutional court, before inspecting the decrees published in 2005 that reinforced the RRI/TVRI's alliance with government officials, not public. On the second aspect, this chapter looks at the use of paternalism in translating RRI/TVRI's remit; conflict of ownership understanding among stakeholders; strong politicization of top structure; and clientelistic relationships in the appointment of PSB board as well as the allocation of the annual state budget. The last section of this chapter discusses the 'new hope' offered by an initiative that emerged among politicians in parliament in 2013 to create a special law for Indonesian PSB, named RTRI Law.

In other words, this chapter examines changes of the four characteristics of the former state-run media—remit, ownership, structure, and financial regime—between 2002 and 2017, as well as how various interconnected actors—RRI/TVRI, government (represented by Ministry of Communication and Informatics or MCIT), members of parliament, and private broadcasters—influenced the changes.

The materials used for writing this chapter come from many sources. The first are the policy documents produced by the presidential office,

constitutional court, and parliament, as well as the annual reports of RRI/TVRI for 2014–2016. Second, the public statements of TVRI/RRI elites and broadcasters, parliamentary hearings, CSO evaluations, book publications, and news related to both media. Third, notes from semi-structured interviews with politicians, government officials, RRI/TVRI elites, media regulators, and civil society activists. Fourth, records of my field visits to RRI/TVRI offices in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, and Banjarmasin, as well as observation of social media accounts operated by the two media broadcasters.

6.2 The Robust Market-Driven Policy

With regard to market-driven policies (Potschka 2012) and media capitalist tactics to marginalize PSB (Jakubowicz 2006), this section examines three public policies that favor private broadcasters while simultaneously limiting PSBs' freedom and popularity in the public. The decision of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to take away the power for translating the Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 from *Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian broadcast regulator or henceforth KPI) reinforced the existing pro-capitalist dominance in frequency allocation and advertising as will be discussed here.

July 28, 2003, was a 'good day' for private broadcasters and a 'bad day' for both KPI and the general public, including Indonesian PSB advocates. The constitutional court (the Indonesian court with the power to decide public regulatory conflicts) gave into private media demands to erase KPI's strong authority in producing lower rules under Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. In decision No. 005/PUU-I/2003, the court annulled all sentences and clauses in the Broadcast Law that gave KPI the power to produce policies on broadcasting. Henceforth, the power to produce broadcast policies was given exclusively to the government, a close ally of the commercial radio and television owners.

The court decision brought three consequences for PSB. First, it limited the public's involvement in the making of lower PSB policies. The new initiative of 'open to the public' method in making broadcast policy returned to the past Suharto model of closed and government-centric policy-making. When a lower policy is produced without public concern, the universal values of PSB may be reduced, as will be explored in the next part of this chapter. Second, the centralization of the power to regulate PSB in governmental offices/MCIT provided room for continued

political interference. Third, it reduced possibility to produce a policy that balances the dominance of private radio and television channels with public service broadcasters.

Historically, the court decision was the ultimate climax of the massive pressure from commercial media owners over Law No. 32/2002, which legally disrupted their trade. About two months after the Law was passed or February 2003, efforts to postpone its practice were made by filing a judicial review with the constitutional court. Todung Mulya Lubis, an attorney of a broadcast company in Jakarta, February 6, 2003, argued that the law impeded the freedom of the broadcast business. In his view, the law invited market authoritarianism because it positioned KPI as an extraordinary body that could oppose liberal economic interests (*Kompas*, February 27, 2003). The KPI was also described as a reincarnation of the repressive Ministry of Information of the Suharto era (Kingsbury 2005, p. 134). In addition to submitting a judicial review, the association also requested to delay the implementation of all provisions of the Broadcast Law until a final decision was made.

Previously, a series of public protests was held by private broadcasters during the legislation of Broadcast Law in 2001–2002. For example, on February 22, 2001, the association of private television channels (ATVSI) issued a press statement that rejected the law. Made by the ATVSI Chairman Anton Nangoy, Metro TV President Surya Paloh, President Director of RCTI Wisnuhadi, President Director of SCTV Agus Mulyanto, and President Director of TransTV Ishadi, this statement urged the protection of ATVSI's operations. The association urged that the public service protects private broadcasters and their operations. In this case, ATVSI agreed with KPI's power to oversee broadcast services, but held that public complaints over malpractices by private television broadcasters should be determined by a general court rather than KPI. Regarding frequency licensing, this association sought to ensure its traditional ally, the Ministry of Information or MCIT officers, would remain the sole licenser, rather than KPI.

Aside from promoting the pro-democratic idea of avoiding monopoly and cross-ownership, the association also asked Parliament to liberalize broadcasting by allowing foreign investment in this sector as tool to adopt advanced broadcast technology and knowledge. As a result of strong lobbying, Article 17, Clause 2, of the Broadcast Law accommodated this request. In particular, the association also asked for broadcast cigarette advertisements to be approved in the Law.

Similarly, the private radio association namely PRSSNI struggled to keep its dominance by proposing a policy to prohibit advertising as a source of funding for Indonesian PSB (RRI/TVRI). As discussed in Chapter 6, the association emphasized the non-profit nature of Indonesian PSB as a tool to protect their advertising market as a source of income. As seen in Article 15 of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, Indonesian PSB is allowed to earn financial income from advertising. However, Article 46, Clause 8, of the Broadcast Law limits advertising to a maximum 15% of total PSB channels' time. This clause basically favored private broadcasters by enabling them to extensively benefit from advertising as their sole source of income by limiting the flexibility of PSB to use competitive financial resources in engaging with consumers.

Instead of re-allocating advertising income to all broadcast types, the Broadcast Law maintained the dominance of private television in this sector. SWA magazine (2017) reported, the television advertising revenue increased during 2013 (IDR 68.1 trillion) to 2016 (IDR 103.8 trillion) and about 98% of the revenue goes to private television. Between 2010 and 2015, private television earned 67% of its income from advertising, followed by newspapers (29%), magazines (1.4%), outdoor (1.4%), and radio (0.7%). Media Scene (2015) noted, that TVRI has occupied a static/marginal position in accessing advertising compared to ten privately owned television channels. During 2010–2014, TVRI's advertising income remained a steady 0.1–0.2% of total advertising profits in television broadcasting.[1]

The two policies discussed above—the decision of the constitutional court to take away KPI's power in policy-making and Broadcast Law No. 32/2002's stipulation that limited PSB's access to commercial advertising—can be seen as the extension of market-driven policies in the early stages of political transition (1999–2000). Inspired by the spirit of media liberalization, the two policies completed the pro-liberal policy that had been initiated toward the fall of Suharto in the 1990s and continued by the Habibie, Gus Dur, and Megawati governments. As per Heryanto (2003), Nugroho et al. (2012), and Kristiawan (2012), media liberalization inspired the passage of two media laws: Press Law No. 40/1999 and Broadcast Law No. 32/2002.

These policies promoted the rapid growth of private ownership in broadcasting to compete with TVRI. By 2016, the number of privately owned TVs had increased to 1251 across Indonesia (Komisi Penyiaran

Indonesia 2017), a figure that includes public, private, paid, and community television broadcasters. Meanwhile, as shown by Lim (2012), broadcasting has been controlled by only twelve conglomerates, which own not only television channels but also other commercial media types: Media Nusantara Citra, Mahaka Media, Kompas Gramedia, Jawa Pos, Bali Post, Crown Eagle Tech, Lippo, Bakrie & Brothers, Femina, Media Group, Mugi Reka Abadi, and Trans Corpora.

Moreover, per Widyatama (2018), until the end of 2016, national television channels in Jakarta controlled 98.8% of the Indonesian market share and were oligopolistic in nature. Only seven companies dominated the country: MNC, Viva Media Asia, EMTEK, CT Corp, Kompas Gramedia, Media Indonesia, and Rajawali Corpora. These corporations were the greedy giants of media oligarchs (Armando 2014), and many were connected to major political parties, as shown in Table 6.1.

This table displays the link between media tycoons and the political parties dominating policy-making in parliament. Robison and Hadiz (2014) and Kononczuk et al. (2017) characterize this phenomenon as media oligarchy, in which a small number of media shape political decisions. Strong links between politicians, owners of commercial channels, and government officials resulted in policies that favored capitalist interests while going against public and PSB interests.

Table 6.1 Indonesian Media Oligarchs (2012–2017)

No.	*Media Oligarchs*	*Media company*	*Political link*
1	Hary Tanoesoedibjo	Media Nusantara Citra: Television, Online News Portal, Radio, and Newspapers (e.g. MNC, RCTI, Global TV, SINDO TV and Newspaper)	Hary Tanoesoedibjo is chairman of Perindo Party
2	Aburizal Bakrie	Visi Media Asia: Television and Online News Portal (e.g., TVOne, ANTEVE)	Aburizal Bakrie is chairman of Golkar Party
3	Surya Paloh	Media Group: Television and Newspapers (e.g., Media Indonesia, Metro TV)	Surya Paloh is chairman of National Demokrat Party

Source Compiled from Lim (2012) and Widyatama (2018)

To discuss in more detail, Tapsell (2014) noted, Global MediaCom owns MNC, which controls several television channels: RCTI, MNCTV, and Global TV, and thus collectively account for 65% of television audiences. The share price for Global Mediacom rose by 120% in a twelve-month period between 2011 and 2012. Visi Media Asia, meanwhile, includes two free-to-air television broadcasters: ANTV (news-entertainment) and TVOne (24-hour national news); one digital paid television news station, Bloomberg Indonesia (24-hour news); the online news portal VivaNews; two daily newspapers; and the social networking site Path. According to Tapsell (2014), this media conglomerate is owned by Aburizal Bakrie, a media mogul who was the Golkar Party candidate for Indonesia's 2014 presidential election and used his media to push his presidential candidacy.

Regarding the problem of media oligarchy, civil society activists in the Coalition for Broadcast Democratization (KIDP) filed a judicial review with the constitutional court in 2011. These activists included representatives of the CSOs Media-Link, Press Legal Aid Institute, Media Regulation-Regulators Watch, 28-Foundation, and the Alliance of Independent Journalists. The coalition urged the court to classify private television owners as violating the public's right to healthy information. In the view of the coalition, private television owners were also ignoring the legal obligation to apply network broadcasts other than Jakarta-centric broadcast services. However, the judges rejected the request of the activists, holding that the malpractices of private broadcasters were not driven by the law, but rather by the weak implementation of the Law.

Similar to the massive growth of private television broadcasting, private radio has also developed rapidly. In 2015, there were 672 private radio stations in Indonesia that were competing with RRI; these consist of 583 FM radio broadcasters and 89 AM radio broadcasters. According to the Media Scene Report (2015), the highest number of radio stations is located in West Java (120), followed by Central Java (96), and East Java (93). In some major cities, including Jakarta, Bandung, and Semarang, private radio has dominated audiences and marginalized RRI. For instance, in the 2010–2014 period, the five favorite stations in Jakarta were Gen, Bens, Elgangga, Elshinta, and Radio Dangdut Indonesia. In Bandung, the five largest channels were Dahlia, Rama, Ardan, Cosmo, and Cakra. In Semarang, the channels were Pop, KIS, Voice of Semarang, Gajah Mada, and Imelda. In all three cities, RRI channels had limited penetration.

Similar to RRI condition, in comparison with commercial competitors, TVRI lacked audience penetration. The 2013 AC Nielson survey ranks TVRI lowest in terms of audience share (1.3%). By comparison, one private TV named TransTV had the highest share (17.2%), followed by SCTV (16.5%), and RCTI (14.0%). Two news channels, TVOne and Metro TV, respective received audience shares of 3.1 and 1.6%. In 2012, TVRI had an even lower audience share (0.8%). In another survey, conducted in 2016, several entertainment channels such as RCTI and Indosiar had more than 10% audience share, while TVRI had only 1% audience share.

According to Suharsono (2015), TVRI services would ideally reach 5–10% of Indonesian audiences. Nevertheless, it has had difficulty achieving this minimal position. By comparison, NHK (Japan's public television) enjoys a 17% audience share, while KBS (South Korea's public television) has an 18.2% share.

The commercialization of Indonesia's television and radio landscape has pushed policymakers and government officials to produce pro-market policies rather than protect public interests. Following the relaxation of advertising laws for private broadcasters, one market-driven policy was the unclear allocation of analog frequency under Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. This unclear policy favored the dominance of commercial radio and television over analog frequency bands, which has reached 80%. At the time the policy was made, RRI/TVRI only used 10% of the entire frequency.

Pressure from the broadcasting industry appears to have affected the provision of frequency for RRI/TVRI under Government Decree No. 11/2005. The chair of the policy drafting committee, Niken Widiastuti, said that, considering the limited capacity of RRI/TVRI to use the public spectrum and the real condition of frequency cooptation by the existing private broadcasters, policymakers were allocating a limited amount of the frequency spectrum (20%) to the two public broadcasters. As Widiastuti said:

> … we mapped global PSBs and the percentage of frequencies allocated to PSBs. In Japan, Sweden, and Australia, PSBs are prioritized over private broadcasters. In Indonesia, private broadcasters dominated the public spectrum. In this situation, we initially asked for 30% of frequencies, not 50% as in many other countries. However, 30% was considered too much for

> RRI/TVRI. We then re-calculated [the amount], reduced it.... (personal interview, November 10, 2017)

It can be said that market-driven policies applied to both Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 and the decisions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2003 and 2011. The rapid growth of commercial broadcasters following the fall of the Suharto captured the making of lower policies in broadcasting sector. The strong pressure made giant steps toward consolidating media ownership and the arrival of media oligarchs (Heryanto and Hadiz 2005) while limiting the access of RRI/TVRI (Indonesia's PSB providers) to advertising income, frequency use, and audience popularity.

6.3 Government-Oriented PSB Policy

Looking again at the 2003 decision of the constitutional court as well as the series of government decree on public service broadcasting in this section, I would argue that, instead of being drive by market players, the policies were driven by the pragmatic interest of old RRI/TVRI staff to maintain their alliance with the government as well as government (rather than public) supervision. This section explores the further impact of the court decision on the Indonesian PSB policy design and examines a series of government decrees on PSB issued around 2005.

Aside from favoring the interest of the broadcast industry, the 2003 Constitutional Court decision restored the power to supervise RRI/TVRI's performance to two actors: parliament and the government (whereas the public had previously had control through the KPI). This verdict further supported the pragmatic interests of RRI/TVRI staff, who wanted to maintain close relations with state officials rather than public. The following table compares the distribution of the power to examine RRI/TVRI's performance under the two Broadcast Laws and after the court decision in 2003 (Table 6.2).

The table summarizes the shifting power to supervise RRI/TVRI's management (selection of the media's top board, licensing, and reviewing their performance). The table shows that, in Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 (passed under an autocratic political system), the government was set as the sole supervisor. In the political reform era, under Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, it was parliament that was given the power to supervise Indonesia's PSB together with the government, public financial auditor, and KPI (representing the public). Nevertheless, following the 2003 decision, the

Table 6.2 Power sharing in managing RRI/TVRI

Power	*Law 24/1997 on broadcasting*	*Law 32/2002 before Constitutional Court*	*Law 32/2002 after Constitutional Court & Govt Decree 2005*
Selection of Top Board	Ministry of Information	Parliament	Parliament
Legalizing Top Board	Ministry of Information	President	President
Review of RRI/ TVRI Performance	Ministry of Information	Parliament (mandatory) and KPI (not necessary)	Parliament
Power of Frequency Licensing	Ministry of Information	Ministry of Communication and Informatics with KPI	Ministry of Communication and Informatics
Formulation of Operational Policy	Ministry of Information	RRI/ TVRI with KPI	RRI/ TVRI
Review of Finance Report	Internal Governmental Auditor	Public Financial Auditor	Public Financial Auditor

Source Compiled from Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 and No. 32/2002 and its revised version

mandate was returned back to the state authority. The authority was given exclusive control of two strategic powers: the issuance of frequency license and the creation of lower policies regarding RRI/TVRI.

Almost three years after Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 came into force, on March 18, 2005, as a means to translate the Law, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued three decrees on RRI, TVRI, and local PSBs: Government Decree No. 11/2005 on PSB, Government Decree No. 12/2005 on RRI as National Public Radio, and Government Decree No. 13/2005 on TVRI as Public Television. In 56 articles, Government Decree No. 11/2005 provides the remit for national (RRI/TVRI) and local PSBs in general, as well as licensing mechanisms. The other two decrees, each consisting of 47 articles, specifically regulate RRI/TVRI governance.

Reviewing these three decrees, I find that, in addition to affirming the normative values of PSB in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, those decrees also translate and further detail a number of institutional dimensions of RRI/TVRI which allow government control and reduce public

access. Four issues will be examined herein: ownership and employment, frequency licensing, allocation of technological spectrum, and funding.

Generally, the three decrees show policymakers' legal efforts to maintain RRI/TVRI and local PSBs as state-owned media, rather than public broadcasters. In translating ownership from Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, there was a desire to restore government control over the public media, as seen in the two clauses of Article 3, Government Decree No. 12/2005, below:

> (1) RRI is a public broadcasting institution which is independent, neutral and non-profit. (2) RRI is positioned under and responsible to the President.

The two clauses contradict each other: placing RRI as an independent entity in one side (Clause 1), and positioning RRI under and accountable to the president (Clause 2) on the other. Moreover, the clauses clearly avoid public accountability mechanism through parliament or an audience council, as applied by the BBC in the UK. The clauses furthermore undermine the ideal balance of power between three actors: state authority, politicians, and independent regulator in supervising RRI/TVRI, as stated in Broadcast Law, instead inviting the president to again control the media.

Regarding employment system, it is important to note that the Broadcast Law makes no explicit provision showing the possibility to hire independent workers outside government. However, Article 41 of Decrees No. 12 and 13 recognize two types: *pegawai negeri sipil* (civil servants/government employees), which are appointed by the government; and *pegawai bukan PNS* (autonomous employees), which are hired by the Director of RRI/TVRI. As such, the creation of these two types can be seen having been drafted to accommodate the real condition that RRI/TVRI have two categories of staff. Although government and autonomous employees are formally regulated, government employees account for 70% of RRI's 4880 total employees (Hernuningsih 2013). They occupy all strategic positions at all stations and reduce the opportunity for management to recruit new staff with professional competencies.

In his analysis of the three decrees, Darmanto (2004) shows the survival of the Suharto's autocratic legacy. Continuing to use government employees as its core media staff, these two media also continue to use

bureaucratic terms such as *Kepala Stasiun* (Station Chief), *Kepala Bagian* (Division Chief), *Kepala Bidang* (Field Chief), and *Kepala Seksi* (Section Chief) in their organizational structure. Typical broadcast terms such as presenter, news producer, and reporter are marginal.

Some classical problems arise with the employment of RRI/TVRI. As state-run staff, RRI/TVRI staff are expected to affirm their loyalty to the government officials, not public. Broadcast Law No. 43/1999 obligated them to pledge loyalty to President or a Minister as their top employment leader. This clause made it difficult for government staff, such as those working at RRI/TVRI, to remain neutral and critical. Article 12 of the Law on State Civil Apparatus No. 5/2014, meanwhile, requires employees to handle administrative jobs and manage national development. This contradicts the normative role of media workers as watchdogs over government projects.

Moreover, the performance evaluation of state-run staff including RRI/TVRI broadcasters is bound to ministerial, rather than public evaluations, as stated in Article 25: (1) The president, holding governmental power, has supreme authority in both supervising and improving [the performance of] state employees. (2) To translate this power, the president mandates the Ministry of State Employee Affairs to formulate policies, coordinate, and supervise all state apparatuses.

Indeed, the policy of having RRI/TVRI staff be government employees is seen as being more desirable by the old broadcasters themselves, many of whom have been working in these media since the Suharto era (Darmanto, personal interview, May 1, 2017). Around 6000 RRI employees (averaging 45–50 years old) are government employees, with legal basis in Law No. 8 of 1974. With their permanent employment status, they receive many facilities, such as regular increase of annual salary, improved job positions, and job security until retirement at age 60.

In short, the legal introduction of two things in the 2005 decrees—the status RRI/TVRI staff as state employees and the use of typical bureaucratic terms in these broadcasters' structure—manifests efforts to preserve the identity of state, rather than public-oriented, broadcaster. It also indicates the maintenance of past autocratic media system, as when both media were formally under governmental control.

In addition to staffing, the 2005 government decrees also addressed the licensing procedures of RRI/TVRI, which limited the public's right

to review the broadcasters. Decree No. 11/2005, Article 8, Clause 1–2, stipulates the following:

> (1) RRI/TVRI will receive licenses for the operation of central and regional branches by sending written reports directly to the related Ministry. (2) In the interest of developing new broadcast networks, RRI/TVRI shall file a written application for a new frequency to the Minister.

This second clause of the article indicated that the independent broadcasting regulator (KPI) was not required to review the content of PSB. The decree stipulates that the RRI's permit lasts for five years, while TVRI's permit lasts for 10 years, and may be extended directly by the Minister, not KPI. This Article clearly contradicts Article 33 of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, which stipulates that, before operating, all radio and television broadcasters must obtain permission from the government and the independent regulator y body. Instead of guiding RRI/TVRI to a public evaluation mechanism, the decree guides both media to a sole and politically driven government inspection.

The decree also discriminates between RRI/TVRI and local PSBs in their licensing treatment. While the two national broadcasters are not entailed to regular licensing tools if they want to renew frequency allocation, local PSBs must follow the bureaucratic procedures in the MCIT and KPI offices as can be seen in Chapter 8 of Decree No. 11/2005. Moreover, MCIT Policy No. 63/KEP/M.KOMINFO, issued in March 2011, reinforced the discriminative decree. It mentioned that the frequency permits for RRI/TVRI would be extended directly by MCIT after receiving an official report at the end of the frequency use period. This obviously limits the public's access to evaluate RRI/TVRI's performance as PSB providers before deciding to continue or terminate its 5- or 10-year broadcasting permit.

Another issue that invited criticism was the reduction of a public seat on the supervisory board and involvement of government officials in selecting the board. Article 14, Clause 6, of the Broadcast Law stipulated that the top RRI/TVRI board would consist of five persons, without going into detail regarding membership categories. However, Article 8 of Decree No. 12 and 13 eroded 'the open for all' spirit behind the Broadcast Law by implanting strict membership categories: RRI, government, and public. The policy giving membership to a limited group of

stakeholders reduced public rights and reduced the competitive selection processes stipulated by the Broadcast Law. In the Broadcast Law, parliament is mandated to fully elect the board (Article 14, Clause 5), meaning that parliament was allowed to create its own policies for determining selection mechanisms. However, the 2005 decrees invited the government (through the MCIT) to select the board.

The involvement of state officials in the selection process gives them space to intervene, such as by forming selection committees that favor their own agendas or promote particular candidates. This is a violation of the universal norm that PSBs should be free of political influences at all levels of their operations.

In conclusion, the 2005 government decrees reduced the independence of PSB as promoted by Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. This can be seen from several issues: the desire to maintain close connections between RRI/TVRI and the government by limiting public access to licensing mechanisms, the previous status of employees, and the provision of a seat for a government representative on the supervisory board. In particular, there was an effort to return RRI/TVRI to government units in the interest of protecting existing government staff who were working for the stations. As such, the role of the government, or at least the access of state officials (and thus potential for intervention), became more open. On the other hand, the pressure of private media was evident in the weak policy regarding frequency quotas.

Back to the constitutional court decision discussed earlier, the drafting of the 2005 decrees was solely under the government. The decrees were formulated exclusively by an inter-ministerial team inside the governmental office, without involving the KPI or the general public. If the process had involved the public, I argue, the decrees may have accommodated pro-public mechanisms in board selection as well as the translation of ownership and employment.

The chair of the law experts for the legislators, Ahmad Budiman (personal interview, May 2, 2017), considered the formulation of these decrees to not follow the common logic of public policy drafting, partly to ensure that they remained rooted in the Broadcast Law. Moreover, he found that most of the decree's articles were simply rewritten from the Broadcast Law, without providing sufficient detail. For instance, the passage defining PSB ownership and funding sources is 'copied and pasted' from the Broadcast Law, except for a very brief description

of license fees as the amount of money paid by the public to fund RRI/TVRI.

In particular, Budiman observed that there is no detailed policy providing mechanisms for allocating funding (e.g., license fees, specific bodies authorized to collect the fees, and transparency systems). Likewise, the decree did not provide any description of other forms of funding, such as individual donations and advertising.

In line with Budiman's observation, former politician and Broadcast Act legislator Paulus Widiyanto claims that the decrees were abnormal policy.

> …Government Decrees No. 12 and 13 mostly contradict the Broadcast Act. Normatively, there should be an equal process for licensing all broadcasters. However, the decrees grant RRI/TVRI special treatment. Concerning regulatory culture in Indonesia, these decrees show the government's desire to again coop RRI/TVRI. (personal interview, October 28, 2017)

An alliance of CSOs named Masyarakat Komunikasi Indonesia (Indonesian Communications Society), on March 3, 2006, issued a public statement asking the government to revoke the decrees. Led by Henry Subiakto, a media lecturer, the alliance emphasized that the decrees were bad examples of how the government violated the Broadcast Act to regain control of RRI/TVRI and to resist the values of democracy. Similarly, KPI, as an independent broadcast regulator, sent a letter to the government rejecting the policies in 2004. KPI argued that the policies reduced the public's right to monitor Indonesian PSB (Mutmainnah 2014). Nevertheless, there was no response from MCIT or the president, and the 2005 decrees remained.

To conclude, the three decrees on PSB produced exclusively by government officials in 2005 reduced the basic norms of PSB freedom and public accountability while simultaneously offering a way for the government officials to again intervene in RRI/TVRI. These decrees also reinforced the legal impact of the 2003 Constitutional Court decision that limited the mandate for supervising PSB management to politicians and ministerial officials, excluding the public.

6.4 Remit: Paternalistic Orientation

This section investigates the surviving goal of RRI/TVRI as the mouthpiece of 'national unity' or 'national integration' remit that was existing since the Sukarno's autocratic period to the present time. This section also shows the choice of RRI/TVRI to spotlight state-run agenda such as to boost Indonesian political image in the nation's borders, instead of promoting societal agenda. As argued by Katz and Wedell (1977), national integration is a key orientation of most broadcasters in post-colonial and postwar societies. In line with Katz and Wedell, observing the transformation of former state-owned channels in post-communist and post-autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Deutsche Welle Akademie (2014) found that such a remit was applied by Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Serbian former state channels.

Article 5 of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 stipulates the general remit for all Indonesian broadcasting operators, including RRI/TVRI as Indonesian PSB providers. In this article, the remit 'menjaga dan mempererat persatuan dan kesatuan bangsa' [maintaining and strengthening unity and national integration] is made the key service orientation of all broadcasters (Article 5), followed by voicing public opinions and producing balanced and accurate news. It means that the typical post-autocratic remit is legally mixed with facilitating freedom of expression as new and pro-democratic values of remit. Following this regulation, to what extent a 'national unity/integration' remit is placed, translated, and executed by the RRI/TVRI broadcasters in their working policies?

Referring to Article 5, it can be said, there a continuity of using the national integration or national unity as key orientation of Indonesian national broadcasters from Sukarno's repressive era to the present time. With no more challenge with separatism, the continuation of such remit is vulnerable for Indonesian PSB as it can be used to reduce the other key function of creating a public sphere, which according to DW Akademie (2014) is one of the functions media need to fulfill in pluralistic societies.

Tracing the history of RRI/TVRI, the mottos *Persatuan Bangsa* (national unity) and *Media Pemersatu Bangsa* (media for national integration) are rooted in these medias' lengthy experience propagating the autocratic politics of Sukarno and Suharto. Under President Sukarno, for example, TVRI was used as a tool for mobilizing national unity and understood as voicing loyalty both to Sukarno himself and his personal ambition to create an Asian political alliance (Kitley 2000). When Suharto

took power in 1965, he continued Sukarno's policy by using RRI/TVRI as a means of promoting national integration and social order, both of which were pre-conditions for his developmental projects. Following Suharto's resignation in May 1998, policies that prioritized national integration advanced; this was confirmed by former RRI chairman Suryanta Saleh (personal interview, October 7, 2017).

Between 2000 and 2002, for instance, a remit of national integration was dominant in these media's broadcasts and in their elites' speeches. Such a remit remains essential today. However, it has been co-opted by RRI's interest in maintaining alliances with policymakers (thereby maintaining access to state funding and staff) rather than advocating the public interest.

In exploring the formal-institutional translation of 'national unity' used by RRI/TVRI, I refer to two official books published by these broadcasters' top management. In the book *Transformasi RRI di Era Konvergensi Media* [Transforming RRI in the Era of Media Convergence], published in 2015 by the General Director of RRI, the public can see the broadcaster's vision and mission as its official translations of the remit given by the Broadcast Law. Meanwhile, in 2012, TVRI's supervisory board published a booklet titled *Transformasi TVRI: Kebijakan TVRI Periode 2011–2016* [Transformation of TVRI: The Policy for 2011–2016] to express its vision, mission, and strategic policy.

These books provide detailed and written accounts of the vision, mission, and functions of RRI/TVRI. For instance, in its strategic mission, TVRI positions itself as an information provider with its first remit of guarding national unity, followed by supporting democracy, developing the national character, and presenting a positive aura of Indonesia to the world (TVRI Dewan Pengawas 2012, p. 3). This role is amplified by the motto the channel began using under the repressive power of Suharto: *TVRI, menjalin persatuan dan kesatuan* [TVRI, weaving unity and togetherness]. Likewise, of the eleven roles of RRI (RRI Dewan Pengawas 2015, p. 11), the function of maintaining unity is placed first, followed by maintaining national culture, national image, and providing safety for people living in Indonesia's border areas. This term further translated by RRI foreign service as solely presenting a positive image of Indonesia.

In addition to using the term national unity, the two media elites regularly voice terms that draw on slogans popularized by high-level state officials, such as the president, ministers, or politicians, such as

'Guard of Indonesia,' *menjaga NKRI* [protecting the nation] and *penggerak pemersatu bangsa* [promoting national unity]. For instance, in a seminar on the Broadcast Law held in July 2013, senior politician Tantowi Yahya emphasized that all broadcasters had the top remit of maintaining national integration. Nevertheless, alternative slogans circulating among the public, such as *jaga keberagaman sosial* [maintaining social pluralism] or *kebebasan berekspresi* [let's keep freedom of expression], have not been adopted.

Concerning the rise of political contestations between presidential candidates in 2014 and 2017, RRI/TVRI gave political authorities the opportunity to voice the national integration slogan without public discussion and criticism. Under the presidencies of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014) and Joko Widodo (2014–2018), the remit of 'maintaining diversity and unity' was frequently voiced by high officials and politicians in RRI/TVRI. On the contrary, the alternative jargons voiced by social activists—such as 'freedom to express political choices' and 'no discrimination against citizens'—are rare.

In its written vision, TVRI emphasizes national unity and dignity of Indonesia as the main goal of its service. Similarly, the book commemorating the 50th year of TVRI is titled *50 Tahun TVRI: Mengawal Kesatuan* [50 Years of TVRI: Monitoring Unity] (Suwardi 2012). Earlier in the 2000s, the national television channel actively displayed the slogan *Menjalin Persatuan dan Kesatuan* [Weaving Unity and Togetherness] on its live screen. Helmy Yahya, the President Director of TVRI for 2018–2023, further emphasized this sentiment by using the slogan 'Saluran Pemersatu Bangsa' [Channel for National Unity] on his personal Instagram account as well as TVRI official Instagram. By contrast, the use of freedom of expression and criticism of political authorities as new remits is rare.

The desire to orient the remits of RRI/TVRI to voice the government agenda can also be seen in RRI's strategic plan for 2015–2019. In this plan, the RRI supervisory board explicitly referenced Law No. 17/2007 on Indonesia's Long-Term Development Plan (RPJP) in their five-year strategic plan, showing an inclination to follow the régime agenda (RRI Dewan Pengawas 2015). As a result, most of the written policies in the book deal with the issues voiced by the state officials, not the public.

From the written policies above, I would argue that high-level political agendas, such as maintaining national integration, enhancing a positive image, and keeping the Indonesian border, are considered stronger and

more urgent than the populist agenda of public rights, such as managing freedom of expression or providing quality/trusted content to the general public. This indicates the standing of RRI/TVRI as a government voicer rather than a public voicer. This material reinforces the findings of the Deutsche Welle Akademie (2014) in other post-autocratic states, that the government agenda of keeping territorial integration is considered a greater priority than ensuring the public right to freely express opinions.

Beyond these published texts, other sources indicating the state orientation of the remit can be seen in the official speeches of RRI/TVRI elites, as well as the subjects of regular meetings or social activities. For example, the official speeches of directors and supervisory board members frequently and provocatively emphasize the 'heroic slogan' of maintaining national unity (NKRI), rather than voicing public rights. In its ceremonial events, such as musical concert, held on December 13, 2017, in Jakarta, that sought to promote awareness of such remit among the younger generation, RRI used the normative topic *membangun kohesi nasional* [building national cohesion], a generic and abstract theme regularly used by state officials, rather than 'down to earth' terms such as *semua berhak bicara* [everyone has the right to speak].

In many public discussions that debated the future of RRI from November 2010 to March 2011, RRI leaders emphasized the station's four traditional roles and contributions, which were paternalistic in nature: (1) a state agency serving society, (2) a medium promoting political independence, (3) a keeper of national integrity, unity, and culture, and (4) a defender of the country (Masduki and Darmanto 2014). Without any further detail, the frequent publication of those roles leads to a conclusion that the RRI elites have placed their media as a key supporter of government agenda.

Favoring politicians or high government officials as policymakers for their annual state budgets, RRI/TVRI elites frequently popularize their programs and offer space for the president or other top-level politicians to speak, such as through the radio shows *Presiden Menyapa, Ibu Negara Menyapa* [The President and First Lady Speaking]. Instead of presenting criticism of government actions, these shows provide the president and other state officials the space to promote their personal political views.

Some regular shows aired on RRI have government officials as key speakers and use a one-sided model of communication. In 2017, for instance, RRI organized a radio show with the attorney general's office called *Jaksa Menyapa*. This talk show eased government officials in voicing

their views and policies, while general audiences were positioned only as listeners. Such a model was also applied in activities celebrating the media's anniversary. Similarly, for RRI's 66th birthday, it organized fun bike and blood donor events, neither of which were directly linked to its main task as a radio broadcaster. At these events, government ministers and other high officials delivered speeches on tentative live radio talk shows.

National integration is the general function for which RRI/TVRI still holds the biggest potential for Indonesia. Nevertheless, a report of RPLPP (Masduki and Darmanto 2014) said this function is far from being fully realized. RRI/TVRI is still very much focused on the Jakarta's policymakers as the source of information. The media still does not adequately represent the whole population of the country.

According to my observations during my fieldwork (October–December 2017), in the huge protests over the hoaxes spread on social media platforms, public discussion and advocacy frequently targeted private broadcasters and social media, but was rarely aimed at RRI/TVRI. Some trusted online platforms created fact-checking units to defend against fake news. RRI/TVRI, meanwhile, simply continued to conduct live talk shows and publish official statements from state officials.

Observing some of the social media platforms of RRI/TVRI staff, I can say most of them exhibit a strong desire to ally with government and military officials in practicing their commitment as a media professional. Photographs depicting ceremonial events or individual staff standing with military or government officers are readily found on their Facebook pages. For instance, one photograph shows a traditional market, with all speakers being government officials. On another occasion, a live talk at RRI studio had government officials speaking about an issue, but had no members of the public present for balance.

To summarize, based on my review over texts of visions, missions, and speeches to the public, it can be said that RRI/TVRI management translated the normative remit legally mandated by Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 by amplifying jargons and agenda circulated among authorities to connect them with the high political officials, rather than the public. This paternalistic orientation reduced the media's universal role to provide services that meet the needs of the public. This has further alienated the two media from the public.

Despite being introduced as PSBs from 2002 to 2017, RRI/TVRI have not ended their dependence on the government and politicians.

Rather, their use of state-oriented remits (e.g., educating the public on the norms of Pancasila, maintaining national unity, and engaging in the economic development projects) shows the continued use of autocratic RRI/TVRI policy and the government influence on the media.

Reviewing official reports, statements, and the social media platforms of some individual RRI/TVRI staff, I would argue that the translation of the legally mandated remit is paternalistic, in the sense that government is viewed as 'father' of RRI/TVRI broadcasters (who are viewed as 'children'), and the authority (rather than the public) is placed as the definer of national unity and political diplomacy. Indeed, what the state officials think of national unity is paternalistic (Romano 2003): keeping political stability, 'calm relationship' between state officials as the father of and RRI/TVRI as children.

The concept of a 'father' is rooted in the post-colonial history of Indonesia. According to Romano (2003), amid anti-colonial and Western perspectives of the nation, Sukarno and Suharto adopted a framework based on Supomo's idea of integralistic nation rather than an individualistic one (as in the West). In this sense, Indonesia was put forth as a family, in which the father (i.e., the government officials) had the right to define what was important for the children (i.e., society). Though this view was publicly criticized as authoritarian, in the sense that most RRI/TVRI staffs were (and remain) government employees, the elites of two media were happy using government slogans rather than the public slogans.

6.5 Ownership: State Agency or Public Agency?

This section surveys the unfinished debate on the RRI/TVRI ownership pattern that delayed manifestation of a true PSB. In particular, it explores the way in which the Western European framework of PSB ownership as public corporations outside the political authority (BBC in the United Kingdom, ARD Germany, ABC in Australia) has been instantly translated into state-owned media entities in post-autocratic powers. In addition to identifying competing ideas on RRI/TVRI ownership from policymakers, CSOs, and RRI/TVRI, this section examines the legal efforts of the ruling powers to return to the state ownership pattern for Indonesian PSB providers.

The generic indicator of PSB ownership is rooted in the term 'public,' derived from public broadcasting. It refers to the UNESCO definition of

PSB as broadcasting made, financed, and controlled by the public for the public. It is neither commercial nor state-owned, and it is free from political interference and market pressures (Banarjee and Seneviratne 2005). Based on this idea, Abbott (2016) emphasized that independence from the government is essential in PSBs. In the Western European experience, PSBs have been institutions with strong public ownership, reflected not only in their remits but also in their legal statuses as non-state institutions. To follow UNESCO's definition (2010) and the Western European best practices on which Indonesia's PSB was legally founded, I use the term 'public ownership' to illustrate the normative standard of PSB ownership, including PSB staffing and funding.

Looking at the BBC model, the application of public ownership is manifested by forming the PSB as a public corporation outside the United Kingdom government. This public corporation status is indicated by several management aspects: The budget comes directly from the public through license fees, and all staff members are corporate employees rather than government employees. The relationship between BBC and the British authority is contractual, based on the BBC Charter. Also, BBC's overall job is supervised by the public media regulator: the Office of Communications.

When the historic and UNESCO-sponsored PSB model enters post-authoritarian regimes such as Indonesia, its translation may be a complicated issue contested by old and new interests in former state-owned channels. For instance, South Africa managed South African Broadcasting Company (SABC) as a state-commercial corporation, while Thailand has formulated its PSB as an autonomous state agency. KBS, as South Korea's PSB, is organized as a highly commercial channel, while Prasar Bharati (India's PSB) is operated by broadcaster–bureaucrats as a pro-government agency.

From my observation and semi-structured interviews with key CSO figures and top-figures of RRI/TVRI, several issues determined the choice of ownership model: trauma over the Suharto's autocratic politics when it entirely controlled RRI/TVRI, high demand for quality service able to compete with private channels, and the desire to adopt the best practices of Western PSBs. At the same time, there was a pragmatic interest to keep the honors given to state-run staff working in RRI/TVRI: salary, state financing, and permanent job status. Also, the absence of experience with public corporation drove staff to continue the previous ownership policy as a state-owned entity with limited freedom in content.

In short, there were two competing proposals: (1) 'state agency,' with the government as a key ally, recognizing that RRI/TVRI still needed state protection; (2) 'public agency,' with a strong alliance with, orientation of service toward, and support from public.

Between 2002 and 2017, debate between parliament and state officials as broadcast policymakers with RRI/TVRI, and the public over the ownership and the formalization of its independence continued. As discussed in Chapter V, Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 only described the ownership type of PSB—established by the state, independent, and non-profit—without further detailing these keywords. The law, thus, leaves questions regarding whether (for example) the 'state' refers to the government or parliament, as well as the meaning of independent and non-profit.

In an official proposal filed by RRI/TVRI on November 24, 2010, the two media proposed *Lembaga Negara* [State Agency] status, without a clear distinction between this proposed status with the old version as government agency status. Looking at the detailed proposal, the media tried to maintain their current ownership model as state-run media, including their use of state funds and their use of state employees. Moreover, the proposal continued to use bureaucratic terms, rather than broadcast-oriented ones, such as *Sekretaris Jenderal* [Secretary General], *Inspektur Jenderal* [Inspector General], and *Kepala Cabang* [Branch Chief]. Hence, I would argue that the idea of state agency is strongly oriented toward the idea of government agency.

Summarizing the above debate among PSB stakeholders to determine an appropriate ownership model for RRI/TVRI, Ardiyanti (2013) identified three distinct proposals: *lembaga negara* (autonomous state agency), *badan usaha milik negara* (state-owned enterprise), and *badan layanan umum* (state social-service agency).

According to Ardiyanti (2013), media activists have supported the idea of RRI/TVRI adopting an autonomous state agency model rather than a state-owned enterprise model. In this case, autonomous state agency refers here to a media entity that exists outside the government, being funded and staffed entirely by the public. In line with this idea, in a 2003 workshop on PSB, press freedom advocates urged RRI/TVRI to adopt an autonomous employment system and public-based financial model (Masduki 2013).

The other two ideas, state-owned enterprise and state social-service agency, were promoted by the government and politicians. The state-owned enterprise model was based on commercial television broadcasters' success providing attractive services and ensuring flexibility in business management. The state social-service agency model, meanwhile, was proposed as a tool for solving the particular problem of financing. However, both models would be supervised by government ministries, rather than parliament or the public (Government Decree No. 74 of 2012), which could reduce PSB independence. As such, RRI/TVRI and media activists rejected these proposals.

Up until 2017, the common and 'compromise' agreement on the institutional pattern of Indonesian PSB among policymakers, press freedom advocates, and RRI/TVRI was the status of non-ministerial autonomous state agency, supervised directly by parliament, similar to the other state agencies created after the Suharto era. With this status, although RRI/TVRI still receive funding from the government, the media enjoy freedom of government control, and flexibility in managing their staff. Two new and autonomous state-owned agencies are frequently used as references: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi [Commission on Corruption Eradication] and Otoritas Jasa Keuangan [Authority of Financial Service].

Up through 2017, proposals of Indonesian authorities to transform RRI/TVRI into state-owned enterprises (BUMN) or state-owned public service s (BLU) supervised by a specific ministry were rejected by RRI/TVRI and by press freedom advocates. Also, without experience with a 'parliamentary controlled public media,' the adoption of a public corporation directly supervised by parliament—useful in developed democracies—is poorly suited for Indonesia, where all public institutions are managed by the governmental administration. However, this common agreement requires stronger policy than provided by Article 14, Clause 1, of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002.

While awaiting the final agreement of stakeholders and stronger policy for legalizing, as argued by Widiyanto (personal interview, October 28, 2017), between 2002 and 2017 RRI/TVRI management blurred the line between public and state-run media institution. To illustrate, the supervisory board in the two media is obligated to report the media's performance to politicians in parliament, while the media's staffs and funding allocation rely heavily on the government.

Unlike RRI/TVRI as national PSB channels, the translation of 'public ownership' for local PSBs is clearly regulated by Government Decree No.

11/2005. By allowing local political authorities to create their own PSBs, the decree recognizes local PSBs as government-owned entities rather than public-owned entities, a violation of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. In detail, the decree states:

> A local PSB is a legal entity established by the local government, organizing radio or television services, independent, neutral, non-commercial, serving for the public benefit, and whose contents are networked with the Radio Republik Indonesia for radio and Televisi Republik Indonesia for television. (Article 1, Clause 3 of Government Decree 11/2005)

The text affirms local government ownership over local PSBs, conflicting with the principle of independence set in the Broadcast Law. This decree has been further translated by local authorities into political-oriented policies of remit, structure, and employment. For example, the local authority of Musi Banyuasin Regency, South Sumatra, issued Decree No. 13/2007 to place Musi Banyuasin Television as the media of the regent, not the local public. In addition to mandating the regent (*bupati*) as the founder and owner of the radio, the policy gave local officials the freedom to operate the station and to join the Supervisory Body.

A senior local PSB broadcaster, Purwoto Sumodiharjo (online interview, January 7, 2018), argued that local political authorities have no similar view of including local PSBs in their power. Some local authorities include PSBs as technical units of the information office obliged to earn money, thereby eroding the non-profit spirit of PSB. Other local governments allow local PSBs to operate freely as commercial entities. In most cases, local PSBs are manifested as continuations of past government channels, those known as Radio Siaran Pemerintah Daerah. Purwoto Sumodiharjo further said:

> …our public radio, Suara Pacitan, originated from a government-run channel under the Pacitan authorities in the 1970s, which was managed by the district public relations unit. Following this tradition, the station is funded solely through the local budget. Also, local government officials dominate the top structures as well as the operational management. Two of the three members of the board of trustees are active officials in the local communication authority. Moreover, the general director and head of production are government staff directly controlled by the resident…

Back to RRI/TVRI, the desire to avoid initiative of adopting public ownership for these former state-run media was indicated several times between 2002 and 2017. These views were voiced by high state officials through public statements or tentative policies. For instance, at his opening remarks for the anniversary of ANTARA (the Indonesian news agency), former Vice President Boediono (served 2009–2014) promoted the idea of merging the three former government-owned media: RRI, TVRI, and ANTARA news agency. He urged these three media institutions to facilitate government information and balance the expansive criticism voiced by private media (Ecip 2010).

Meanwhile, in 2009, the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MCIT) initiated a new government decree to replace the 2005 decrees on RRI/TVRI. In this draft, the idea of merging the two channels into a single broadcaster—with the proposed name RTRI—was initially mentioned. However, the draft contained controversial ideas of ownership, personnel, and financing, which invited direct government control. Article 12, for example, proposed transferring parliamentary control to the president, as well as strengthening the government's position in selecting the top board of RRI/TVRI and its permanent staff. Also, it required ministry approval for the selection of RRI/TVRI directors. This draft likewise returned to the state bureaucratic model, using classic terms such as *Kepala Bidang*. As in the 2005 government decrees, the proposed licensing mechanisms for RRI/TVRI did not involve KPI as a government partner in reviewing broadcaster performance.

It can be said that this draft indicates a systematic effort to restore political control of RRI/TVRI. With this draft, the public ownership model was eroded by the insertion of political-oriented media governances, such as the placement of state-run staffs obliged to pledge their loyalty to political authorities rather than the public. The desire to keep RRI/TVRI as a bureaucratic media institution was also manifested in the ministerial draft by continued use of bureaucratic terms in the media. Following the massive public protests in 2009, Minister of Communication postponed its draft.

In short, due to the unfinished debates over this issue among policymakers, the ownership of Indonesian PSB between 2002 and 2017 is unclear, with the line between government and public media house being blurred. Meanwhile, unlike RRI/TVRI, the public ownership of local PSBs has been reduced by systematic policies positioning them as local state-owned media, thereby violating the norm of public ownership.

To summarize, the translation of the UNESCO-sponsored 'public ownership' model or BBC 'public corporation' model in transitional regimes is not easy. In Indonesia, amid the unclear definition of ownership pattern in the Broadcast Law, the translation of RRI/TVRI's 'public ownership' has been driven by three competing logics: autocratic media logic (state/government agency), liberal media logic (state-owned commercial corporation), and public media logic (autonomous state agency outside the government). More importantly, the unfinished debate of ownership since 2002 illustrates the absence of political will in Indonesia's authority to transfer their power over RRI/TVRI to the public.

6.6 Structure: The Practice of Clientelism

Aside from the unfinished ownership controversy, both RRI/TVRI—as with the media systems of Southern Europe and Latin America—have faced political clientelism (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos 2002). In this section, I examine the clientelistic practices employed by supervisory board members, media elites, and politicians through their personal and societal linkages, as well as the effects of such clientelism.

Reflecting Scott (1972), Hallin and Papathanassopolous (2002) define clientelism as individual relationships of dependence. Meanwhile, Jacquemin (2015) understands political clientelism as occurring when a person of high sociopolitical and economic status uses his/her capital to provide benefits to persons of the same/lower status by offering generous support. In the case of RRI/TVRI, clientelism may be associated with personalized linkage between media elites (clients) and politicians (patrons) in the appointment and supervision of the media's top structure, the supervisory board (*Dewan Pengawas*).

A seminar commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Broadcast Law held from February 17–18, 2010, confirmed the practice of political clientelism in parliament's appointment of supervisory board members. Political parties competed to place their cadres on this board, but with only five seats available, competition was fierce. From documents obtained in the field, interviews with politicians and former board members, a series of crises between 2005 and 2015 centered around the selection and determination of TVRI's supervisory board members, a practice that was replete with clientelistic practices.

The appointment of board members, as well as the eventual dismissal of the board, was political in nature, involving a long process and many levels of policy-making both inside and outside parliament. Per Decree No. 13/2005, the decision of Commission I to dismiss all members of TVRI's supervisory board on December 2013 was first level policy-making, determined by the chairman of parliament and then approved by the president. In this process, personal alliances between members of the supervisory board and parliamentary leaders, for instance, could have changed the situation. According to a report in *Tempo* magazine (February 23, 2014), Marzuki Ali (the parliamentary speaker) rejected Commission I's choice and delayed the letter seeking the president's dismissal. Ali's decision further invited a year of conflict between the TVRI supervisory board, Commission I politicians, and Marzuki Ali, delaying the transformation of TVRI into a real PSB.

On this issue, former chairman of Commission I Mahfudz Siddik stated:

> …Commission I has full authority in the appointment and dismissal of the TVRI supervisory board. When we see a problem (in TVRI), and the issue is not made by the board, Commission I can use its political authority (to dismiss board members). However, there is a different procedure with the president. When the dismissal takes place, the president is also involved in the process, which may delay our decision…. (personal interview, November 15, 2017)

As in the drafting of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, the connection between formal and informal politics could be found in the appointment of the PSB's top board. Aside from the parliamentary appointment process, informal practices occurred through patron-client mechanisms. Political parties and individual politicians with the right to elect the RRI/TVRI board supported candidates with political links to them, or persons who had lobbied them. Such relationships continued when candidates were formally selected and sitting on the board. One junior politician explained:

> … I can say that the flow in parliament is not an academic process. From the 15 candidates for RRI/TVRI board, there are lobbying activities. The 'fit and proper test' is arguably a formal procedure, unless we find a better candidate during the test. However, when our boss (i.e. the political party) promotes a worse candidate, we will reject [it]… Usually, candidates try to

> lobby politicians. As we are members of particular political parties, we have leadership. So, I typically tell a candidate: please lobby my boss…. (personal interview, November 15, 2017)

In Indonesia's clientelistic political culture, the more political parties and politicians involved in Commission I, the greater their opportunity to place loyal persons on RRI/TVRI's top board. In 2011, of the 50 members of Commission I, the Democratic Party—as the winner of the legislative election—had the largest number of seats (13) and exerted stronger influence on RRI/TVRI's management. It was followed by other parties, such as Golkar (11), PDIP (9), and PKS (5) (Parliament Secretariat 2011).

Aside from individual politician, political parties also have significant influence in making the final decision of appointing RRI/TVRI's supervisory boards. However, the decision to select certain candidates often arises from the individual interests of politicians, rather than their parties' ideological standings. One senior politician emphasized that some politicians actively communicate with the central committees of their parties. Others have the full mandate to choose their favorite candidates. He also claims that the final decision does not rely on a strategic and long-term plan.

The 'short-term' interests of political parties and politician in TVRI/RRI's management broadly lies in the ability to control news coverages and the desire to benefit from the broadcaster's state funding. For instance, one senior politician told me that TVRI's annual budget in 2010 reached IDR 900 billion, and that—for some active politicians—it is a 'great cake' (personal interview, November 15, 2017).

Regarding her experience with the appointment route, former member of TVRI's supervisory board Retno Intani (served 2006–2011) claimed that political intervention was very strong. Intervention occurred not only during the appointment process, but also in the selection of executive directors and day-to-day TVRI activities. Politicians expected coverage of the political activities in their electoral districts, especially where TVRI's broadcasts are influential (personal interview, November 13, 2017).

Compared to private televisions, TVRI remains strong in rural communities. The national station had 29 branches in 29 provinces, with coverage reaching 46.3% of Indonesia's residents (TVRI Dewan Pengawas 2017). This achievement has drawn the continued interest of politicians and their parties in using TVRI as an electoral medium.

It is important to note that political clientelism has led to steady intervention from politicians over the operations of TVRI. In her doctoral dissertation on TVRI, Intani (2013) recounted, instead of examining its performance in serving the public, politicians paid more attention to the appointment of TVRI leaders. Intani (2013) found that, during her tenure (2005–2010), some politicians actively pressured the TVRI board to replace its director for the 2005–2011 period. Rejection of this request could have led to conflict. Also, legislature intervened in the day-to-day matters of the channel, despite this being under the mandate of the TVRI board rather than politicians (Kasali 2014).

From my interviews with top media regulators, it is apparent that political clientelism applies not only to RRI/TVRI, but also to other public regulators where parliament has the mandate to select their members. Regarding the appointment of KPI members, the deputy chairman of this broadcast regulator Rahmad Arifin explained:

> …ideally, the candidate for KPI should be chosen for his/her competence, as well as their past experience with broadcasting management or policy. But in practice it seems that the personal lobby to policymakers determines the final selection process. (personal interview, November 12, 2017)

Other than politicians, Arifin emphasized, in the final round of appointment the pressure of commercial television is vital. The decision to favor a particular candidate as promoted by a fraction (i.e., representatives of a political party) is in fact driven in part by the commercial channels' interest in safeguarding their own businesses.

Commenting on the appointment of RRI/TVRI boards and other media regulators, the chairman of the Indonesian Press Council Stanley Adi Prasetyo said the following:

> A candidate for the TVRI board may be a master in field of broadcasting. However, once the candidate enters the 'fit and proper test' forum in parliament, the situation is different. Politicians prefer choosing candidates who donate to their political parties. As a result, most public agencies under parliament are in crisis. For example, two periods of KPI were destroyed by interests that served politicians' agendas, rather than the public. (personal interview, November 24, 2017)

Historically, such political clientelism has been an extension of autocratic legacy of intervening government-owned media by appointing

senior politicians to the office of director or to the supervisory board of RRI/TVRI. For illustration, while TVRI had Perjan status in 2000–2002 and the Ministry of Information held the power to select members of the media board, Heryanto (2003) and Darmanto (2004) noted, Budi Harsono—the secretary general of Golkar Party—was elected to the TVRI's board of commissioners.

Meanwhile, Yazirwan Uyun, the President Director of TVRI while it held Persero status, had close ties to Taufik Kiemas, the husband of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle (PDIP). As a consequence, Darmanto (2004) found that, in TVRI's coverage of the 2004 legislative election, PDIP received the most coverage (14.3%), followed by Golkar (9.9%).

This political clientelism in the process, I argue, aside from being culturally rooted in parliamentary politics, is also invited by the legal mechanism for selecting RRI/TVRI board members. Article 14 of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 stipulates that the PSB should be supervised by a board of five persons and use a competitive selection model. This contrasts with such boards in developed countries. For instance, in the German PSB tradition, board members are delegates of key communities and undergo no parliamentary or government selection process. Although political parties can send delegates to the board, political intervention is still reduced.

Following the determination of PSB status for RRI/TVRI, the selection of the PSB board was given legal prescription through Government Decrees No. 12 and 13 of 2005. Article 8 of these decrees stipulate the number of RRI/TVRI board members as well as the appointment mechanisms, which involve a small government/MCIT team, all politicians in Commission I, and the Presidential house. The government-run special team may select up to fifteen candidates, to be reduced to a list of five candidates by politicians, and then finally legalized by the president.

With the decrees, members of the supervisory board should formally meet several generic criteria. They must be Indonesian citizens, pledge loyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, hold a bachelor's degree or equivalent indication of intellectual competence, and be non-partisan/a political party cadre. Also, members shall have good knowledge, expertise, and experience in broadcasting and should not have direct or indirect links to existing broadcast channels.

The appointment process, according to the decrees, consists of three stages. In the first stage, the process is organized by a small team of

government officials and public figures. The team conducts a number of tests to search for proper candidates, including document reviews, psychological tests, written proof of knowledge, and open interviews. Sharing her experience selecting the TVRI supervisory board in 2016, Nina Armando noted that there were hundreds of applicants, but most were job seekers, not public media professionals (personal interview, December 6, 2017).

The second stage takes place in parliament in an 'open to the public' test, in which each candidate presents their plan in front of politicians. In this stage, the political clientelism initially occurred. Sharing his experience selecting members of *Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia* (Indonesian broadcast regulator), Paulus Widiyanto (personal interview, October 28, 2017) held that the 'open to the public fit and proper test' is ceremonial. In reality, informal links and individual lobbying are prominent. Widiyanto feels that the intimate linking of politicians with certain candidates may violate the emphasis on candidate competence in the selection of RRI/TVRI or KPI boards. The third stage, meanwhile, is the approval of all selected candidates by the president, an administrative matter.

Two implications of the 'open for all' and clientelism practice can be noted: the lack of public delegates seating in the TVRI/RRI board and the less connection between the elected members with general public. During three periods of RRI/TVRI supervisory board since the broadcasters became PSBs, of 30 total members, the public has been represented by only five persons at TVRI and five persons in RRI. The largest portion of seats was occupied by RRI/TVRI elites and delegates of government offices.

The second implication of this clientelism is that the general working habits of the RRI/TVRI boards follow politicians' intents for and interests in the media, rather than the public's aspirations. In its 2014 survey of the performance of RRI/TVRI, Masduki and Darmanto (2014) found that the two boards had limited engagement with the public in advocating strategic policies for securing PSB. Aside from sending reports to politicians and government officials, the supervisory boards delayed public requests to inspect their financial reports.

Moreover, the working model of these supervisory boards is politically driven by their interest in maintaining alliances with parliament and the government houses, rather than professionally supervising RRI/TVRI management. Puji Rianto, a consultant to the RRI board in 2015–2017, said:

> I see the Boards have enough energy in producing strategic and operative policies for RRI, including public lobbying. However, they rarely think that the public issues the Boards fight for can change rapidly. Moreover, public issues discussed in regional provinces did not use as evidence for policy-making. Their visits with the public in the provinces outside Jakarta are just ritual or ceremonial events. (personal interview, November 30, 2017)

On the TVRI partnership with parliament, former chairman of TVRI's supervisory board (2011–2016), Ahmad Sofyan argued that the normal relationship of legislators and TVRI board is not a superior-subordinate position, but a mutual partnership. However, in practice, politicians mostly subordinated the TVRI supervisory board, steering the board with their personal interests (personal interview, November 14, 2017).

To sum up, this section demonstrated that political clientelism occurred during the appointment of RRI/TVRI top boards since they gained PSB status (2005–2017). This practice had two serious implications that delayed RRI/TVRI's way into true PSBs. First is the cooptation of RRI/TVRI and state-run delegates in board membership. Second is the habits of the boards to favor the welfares of politicians. The practice of clientelism has alienated RRI/TVRI from their true owners: the public.

6.7 Funding: Dependency on State Budget

In most developed countries, PSBs are publicly funded. License fees are the most popular source of money to cover operational expenses. In post-autocratic regimes, however, most PSBs are supported by state budgets, which are political. This section explores the dominance of state funds in the journey of RRI/TVRI as PSBs between 2002 and 2017. In the general sense that state funds are allocated and reviewed by political officials, I would argue, the reliance of RRI/TVRI on this money reduces its operational freedom as will be explored here. It also invites corruption in programming acquisitions as well as in equipment purchases (TVRI Dewan Pengawas 2017).

Since their establishment in 1945 (RRI) and 1962 (TVRI), funding has been a key factor in determining the sustainability of the media as well as offering room for funding providers, especially the political authorities, to politically intervene in them. Moreover, as a surviving legacy of Suharto's power, the reliance of the two media on state budgets was politically designed, similarly to employees' status as civil servants, in 1975.

With their standing as state-owned media in the Suharto era, RRI/TVRI workers enjoyed regular salary payments and government income (rather than from competitive sources). When Broadcast Act No. 32/2002 legalized these media as PSBs with a mix of various incomes, most media personnel lacked competitive skills.[2]

It is significant to note that the use of state funds between 1940 and the 1990s was reinforced by government policies that showed the government's special attention to RRI/TVRI. The first national regulation concerning RRI funding was issued on May 5, 1947. Known as Special Law No. 12/1947, it stipulated that taxes collected from the owners of radio receivers would be the main source of income for RRI. In detail, Article 4 of the law required the owners of radio receivers to pay IDR 5 per month for each radio receiver they owned. This payment mechanism involves the post and telegraph office, a state-owned company with which radio receivers had to be registered. Also, the law set a fine of IDR 100 for owners who were late in their payments, allowing both the police and post office employees to impose this sanction.[3]

It can thus be said that, in the Dutch era, the collection of taxes was managed independently by the radio organization itself, but under the Sukarno regime, state apparatuses became actively involved. This law thus marked a shift from the old, local, and voluntary model of financing into a model of national authority intervention. As a result, it created dependence on Sukarno's protection and led to stronger loyalty to government interests, not the public (as the taxpayer).

Such a policy was continued by the Suharto's political administration (1966–1998) as it sought to maintain RRI/TVRI as a promoter of development. Formally, the media had three kinds of funding sources: license fees, state budget, and commercial advertising. However, in practice, state funds were dominant. Aside from money, the Suharto administration also covered the cost of building new studios as well as buying transmitters. As Sudibyo (2004) notes, to maintain his control over Papua, Suharto used a large amount of money to establish dozens of RRI channels in the region during the 1970s; such a policy was also applied to Aceh and East Timor.

Regarding TVRI's funding, as noted in the book *Television in Indonesia* (1972), between 1962 and 1972 the channel obtained funding from four sources. The first was license fees (include fees from television receiver listing fees, television ownership transfer fees, and the 'voluntary' donations of receiver owners); the policy on this funding model was

enacted in 1963 with a decree produced directly by Sukarno's administration. The second income was advertising. The third was annual state budget, including subsidies for routine expenses. Fourth were specific state funds for long-term investments.

In its official report, Directorate of TVRI (1972) depicts the dominance of license fees in TVRI's income between 1962 and 1971, followed by commercial advertising, which represent public and competitive financings. The table also shows that subsidies from government began in 1966, shortly toward the end of Sukarno's presidency. From TVRI's establishment in 1962 and until 1965, Sukarno provided only an incidental budget, not permanent funding. Nevertheless, his control over TVRI operations was powerful due to his central position as the chair of this governmental-owned foundation.

It can be said, in the first two decades of TVRI operation, income from state budget was marginal. After the end of Sukarno's power in 1965, the dominance of advertising in TVRI's funding continued in the early years of the Suharto regime. As Ishadi (2014) and Armando (2016) noted, TVRI experienced a period of financial glory in the 1970 and 1980s. During this period, revenue from advertising reached 55% of TVRI's entire income. Data from 1975/1976 indicates, for instance, that income from license fees reached IDR 2.8 billion, and income from advertising reached IDR 2.4 billion. In contrast, state subsidies were minor, contributing only IDR 95 million. As argued by Armando (2016), in this era production costs could be reduced due to the absence of government pressure. With their double status as foundation and government staff, TVRI employees had higher salaries than other government employees of Suharto's political administration. Armando (2016) also noted that this resulted in jealousy from other state employees.

The public and competitive funding model underwent pressure from Suharto's autocratic policy in the 1970s and 1980s. After 1975, Suharto transferred TVRI status and its staff from autonomous foundation to governmental units. He also changed the salary mechanisms from internal procedures into a ministerial-bureaucratic system as used by other government-controlled staff. In view of Armando (2016), during this period, the reviews of TVRI staff achievements are not determined by their performance, but their political loyalty to top government officials. This policy continued with the removal of commercial advertising from TVRI screens (Decree of the Minister of Information No. 30/1981). As

a result, most TVRI funding came from the Suharto's administration and was allocated by state officials using a bureaucratic model.

To follow Armando (2016), losing its advertising revenue (55%) reduced the service level of TVRI, particularly its provision of quality broadcasts and employees' social welfare. More, the Suharto's policy to limit the foreign content on TVRI screen to a maximum of 20% reduced the media's popularity and audiences' loyalty, and in turn their willingness to pay license fees. To replace attractive foreign programs, Suharto pressed TVRI to air development projects, and he deployed money to cover these low-quality services.

Amid TVRI's monetary crisis, Suharto produced a Policy No. 40/1990 to force the use of license fees for TVRI's operational costs. Under this decree, members of the public were required to pay money to support TVRI. Nevertheless, up to the end of Suharto's regime in 1998, this policy was not fully implemented. Meanwhile, the use of a third party corporation, PT. Mekatama Raya, in collecting the license fee brought many problems. As noted by Aditjondro (1998), Bambang Trihatmojo, the son of Suharto and owner of Mekatama Raya, was given the right to collect payment from television receiver owners in February 1992 (with a contract for a 15-year period). However, the public reporting of the money was unclear.

A unique model of funding source was used for TVRI in the later years of Suharto's political administration; the broadcaster was given 2.5% of the advertising revenue of five private televisions operating in the late 1990s. This model is rarely applied in countries with advanced broadcast systems. Contracts between private television broadcasters and TVRI legalized such finding as compensation for the licenses given to commercial television channels. However, after Suharto's resignation in 1998, private television owners refused the terms of this contract. As such, TVRI remained dependent on state funds into the 2000s.

In the transitional period (1999–2002), RRI/TVRI funding formally varied, and involved license fee, private television contributions, and state funding. Nevertheless, due to the limited ability of RRI/TVRI employees to access license fees, while holding Perjan (2000–2002) and Persero (2002–2005) status, RRI/TVRI remained entirely dependent on state moneys. For example, in 2001 the income of TVRI came primarily from the annual state budget (IDR 139 billion), while license fees contributed

only IDR 2.5 billion. Moreover, money from private television broadcasters was low (IDR 338 million). In this year, TVRI also had a debt of IDR 79 billion to a third party.

Similar to TVRI, in 2002 RRI's formal financial income came from four different sources: regular government funding; infrastructure development funding; foreign aid; and benefits from regular broadcast services. The greatest amount came from the state; this condition continued over the next fifteen years, reaching IDR 245,778,828,000 in 2003 and IDR 338,372,958,000 in 2004. Employee salaries accounted for almost half of the broadcaster's budget (RRI Perjan 2002).

In 2000–2015, according to a survey from Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik (Masduki and Darmanto 2014), state funding was dominant, and approximately 60–70% of this money was used to pay the salaries of civil servants; less money was available for production, the core business of broadcasters. As a result, most RRI/TVRI airtime is filled with re-runs/reproductions of old content. Moreover, the production of RRI/TVRI local broadcasts intended to draw public attention is lacking.

Based on the above explanation, two general conclusions can be drawn. First, state funding first became dominant in the 1940s, when RRI operated as a government unit (*djawatan*) and, later, as a unit of the Ministry of Information. Meanwhile, despite experiencing a short period in the mid-1970s when it was free to manage its license fees and obtain revenue from commercial advertising, TVR began relying on state funding in the late 1970s. This dependence only grew in the 1980s and 1990s, after the government banned advertising on the channel.

Second, from their incorporation through 2018, RRI/TVRI became 'addicted' to state funds that were accessed through political decision-making processes, rather than public and competitive budgets. As such, both broadcasters were less engaged with the public than with politicians.

Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 changed the status of RRI/TVRI and introduced a mixed funding regime. Under this law, the two media were allowed to derive money from license fees, state budget, advertising, public donations, and other linked businesses. These mixed funding also applied to local PSBs. One former drafter of the law, Paulus Widiyanto, argued that the provision of mixed fund was a tool to reduce the dependence of RRI/TVRI on state moneys and train them to collect social and competitive funds despite public trust. On the remaining use of state funding, Widiyanto recounted, this funding was necessary to cover

the salaries of thousands of the civil servants working for RRI/TVRI's national and regional offices (personal interview, October 28, 2017).

In practice, between 2005 and 2015, the majority of RRI/TVRI's expenses—almost 95% per year—remained covered by the state budget. Outside the budget, these media have only accessed a miniscule amount of funds from commercial advertising, less than 2% of their total annual revenues. RRI's Director of Service and Business Cooperation Sudiman Bonaparte estimated that, in 2014, with 1800 channels, advertising revenue for RRI could potentially have reached IDR 300 billion. However, in practice, the broadcaster was only to collect IDR 60 billion (Utomo 2015). Also, RRI/TVRI received less income from license fees and public donations. According to Suharsono (2015), with a condition of no agreement with government and public distrust in the collection of license fees experienced in the Suharto era, it has been difficult to collect direct income from the public.

Overall, each year, the Jakarta's authority has provided at least IDR 1.7–1.9 trillion for the operational costs of the two media, as illustrated Table 6.3.

This table demonstrated the increased dominance of state-controlled money as RRI/TVRI's primary source of income from 2012 to 2017. The table also shows how TVRI received more government funding than RRI. Meanwhile, the management of the two media were only able to collect about 2% of their funding needs from other potential sources. To illustrate, the Table 6.4 summarizes the income of RRI outside the state budget between 2011 and 2014.

This table confirms the minor role of non-state funding from RRI from 2011 to 2014. Its average revenue from non-state funding only reached

Table 6.3 Comparison of State Funds for RRI and TVRI (in IDR)

Year	*RRI*	*TVRI*
2012	813,000,000,000	758,807,880,000
2013	885,177,413,000	821,270,540,000
2014	924,049,049,000	1,075,123,014,000
2015	889,015,132,000	N/A
2016	864,423,065,000	930,262,532,000
2017	969,448,063,000	1,065,527,291,000

Source Compiled from RRI Board of Directors (2012) and TVRI Supervisory Board (2015)

Table 6.4 Non-State Funding Incomes of RRI (in IDR)

Source	*2011*	*2012*	*2013*	*2014*
On-Air	39,459,554,076	23,195,424,854	26,618,230,799	32,704,176,608
Other than On-Air	201,616,290	7,463,454,786	7,463,454,786	9,558,907,054
Variety	2,624,194,374	2,306,587,020	2,833,796,483	1,504,401,025
Total	42,285,364,740	38,808,826,975	36,915,482,074	43,767,484,687

Source Compiled from RRI Supervisory Board (2015) and RRI Reports to Parliament

IDR 35–45 billion, less than 3% of the total money from government. Of this amount, advertising and sponsorship income were dominant. This table also confirms the limited amount of money collected from license fees and donations, the pillars of the public funding model.

In its special report on the financial performance of RRI/TVRI, the national auditory board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan 2018) found a limited income from non-state sources for covering operational costs between 2014 and 2016. For instance, in 2015 RRI received IDR 809.19 billion in state moneys, but only IDR 44.74 billion (5%) in non-state moneys. In 2016, RRI had a state budget of IDR 929.80 billion, with non-state moneys amounting to IDR 41.70 billion (4%). A similar situation occurred at TVRI. In 2014, for instance, the broadcaster received IDR 727.88 billion from the government, with only IDR 185.98 billion (20%) in non-state funds. In 2016, meanwhile, non-state funding decreased to IDR 138.94 billion, only 16% of the IDR 746.58 billion received from the authority.

It is important to note that changes in political and economic climates have changed the significance of state funding for RRI/TVRI. Under the Suharto regime, reliance on such funds was created systematically as part of transforming RRI/TVRI into propaganda tools. Following the integration of RRI/TVRI into the Ministry of Information, the two media were required to play the role of government mouthpiece and cover all ceremonies of the Suharto's government officials. As a result, Darmanto noticed, audience support for RRI/TVRI decreased as a consequence of the broadcasters' unwillingness to serve audience interests (personal interview, May 1, 2017).

In the post-Suharto era, the subsequent new governments held weak positions and thus could not use funding as a means of interfering in

these medias' managements. In this period, dependence on state funding was driven merely by the thousands of civil servants working for the media that required fixed and routine financial protection. In addition, the choice to use state funding was desired by most workers, who felt happiest receiving government facilities rather than public protection.

By Law, the allocation process of government funding is political and it avoids public participation. According to State Finance Law No. 17/2003, the state budget is the annual money from government. It is approved by legislature. Article 8 of the State Finance Law gives the Minister of Finance the power to prepare the national budget plan, while users such as RRI/TVRI have the duty to propose their own budget plans. Subsequently, the Minister of Finance submits and discusses the proposed budget to parliament, based on development priorities. According to Article 25, the supervision of state expenditures is handled by the Ministry of Finance, not the public.

A major destructive effect of state budget on RRI/TVRI management is loyalty to the politicians and government officials in power, rather than the public. This loyalty created a sense of clientelism between RRI/TVRI elites and allocators of the money to ensure fixed amounts and easy allocation processes. The two media elites have had to sustain good relationships with policymakers of state money, such as by providing them airtime (Darmanto, personal interview, May 1, 2017).

In meetings to set the annual budget, the elites of both media must establish intensive communications with politicians, either through official or unofficial channels. Describing this practice, Darmanto found that some public panels organized by RRI invite politicians as speakers. These talks are usually held in the electoral district of these politicians and deal with specific topics. Often such forums are used by RRI to intensively lobby politicians. Moreover, in the newsroom, the need of RRI/TVRI journalists to air public criticism must be tempered by the interest of keeping the politicians comfortable.

In the sense that the total amount of state funding for RRI/TVRI is set annually, depending on actual economic conditions, the channels' service plans are determined by the availability of funds with no room for long-term budget plans. The inability to budget four or five years in advance limits the opportunities of media managers to create long-term operational strategy (i.e., for ten- or twenty-five-year periods).

In short, this section has shown the high dependence of RRI/TVRI on state funding rather than public and competitive or commercial budgets.

This section further identified that changes in political regimes led to changes in the financial regimes of the media. At RRI, the reliance on state budget initially began when Sukarno consolidated his power in 1946 and stemmed from the broadcaster's status as a *djawatan* of the Ministry of Information. Such a situation occurred in TVRI, meanwhile, in the 1970s when Suharto consolidated his power and banned advertising on the TVRI's screen.

In the post-Suharto era, reliance on state budget in the transitional period (1998–2002) and as RRI/TVRI formalized their PSB status (2002–2017) has been driven by three empirical situations: new governments' monetary crises and funding, limited competence of RRI/TVRI in accessing public and competitive funding, and reluctance of broadcasters to leave their comfortable position as recipients of state money.

Finally, this section has explored the implications of the dominance of state funding, including the rise of clientelism that has limited the freedom of RRI/TVRI from the intervention of politicians/authorities as money providers.

6.8 Cooptation of State-Run Employees

In addition to the dominance of state funding, the other past legacy of RRI/TVRI as formerly state-run broadcasters is the dominance of state employees, with a tendency for managing administrative tasks assigned by top political officials rather than the public. According to Darmanto (2013), the main characteristic of state officials in Indonesia is their attitude of paternalism, their subservience to the orders of their seniors, and their low dedication to official office time. Aside from these issues, a more serious problem is their lack of professional broadcast competency.

Back in the early years of RRI, when it became a *Jawatan* in 1946, all RRI operators were government employees managed by the Ministry of Information. Such a status continued with stronger political control during the Suharto era, which remained into the present time.[4] The transformation of RRI ownership into a *Perjan* in 2000–2002 did not change its staffing status. TVRI, meanwhile, from its beginnings in 1962 until the fall of Suharto experienced a dualism in staffing, with staff simultaneously being autonomous foundation employees and state-controlled employees. With Broadcast Law No. 24/1997, this dual status was erased, and all TVRI personnels gained civil servant status.

The first regulation to specify that RRI/TVRI personnels were civil servants, not autonomous staff was Government Decree No. 37/1980. This regulation was part of Suharto's political policy to integrate the two media into his development propaganda unit. With this decree, the political orientation, work culture, and payroll system were integrated and determined by the interest of safeguarding Suharto's power. To some extent, despite subsequent political administrations facing a crisis in the post-Suharto era, loyalty to state officials and bureaucratic working styles remain; this culture has slowed the process of transforming the two media into real public broadcasting institutions.

As discussed in Chapter V, Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 did not clearly regulate the employment status of RRI/TVRI's staff. It generally gave policymakers the flexibility to choose an autonomous status outside the government (a common type of PSB employment model) or state-run status (the traditional and problematic status of RRI/TVRI staff). However, a series of government decrees in 2005 instantly translated this Law by defining two types of PSB personnel: *pegawai negeri sipil* or PNS (civil servant/state-run staff) and *pegawai bukan pegawai negeri sipil* or PBPNS (non-civil servant/state-run staff). These decrees welcomed all civil servants previously working for RRI/TVRI under *perjan* status to work as PSB providers without proper assessment and public evaluation.

As a result, the state-run staff dominated the RRI/TVRI management. The official report of RRI's supervisory board in 2015 confirmed that the radio broadcaster employed 6960 people, consisting of 4673 civil servants (67.14%) and 2287 non-civil servants (32.86%). Most of them aged 45–55 or beyond their most productive period with low level of education. In 2014, this data changed; the number of civil servants remained stable, at 4580, while the amount of non-civil servants increased to 2656 people.

In 2016–2017, the number of civil servants was significantly reduced, but they continued to enjoy significant power. For instance, in 2016, about 3999 civil servants were employed at RRI, while 2269 RRI staff were not civil servants. With regard to this data, it can be said that although the number of civil servants employed has declined, they remain dominant compared to non-government personnel.

Moreover, most civil servants employed by RRI station are concentrated in three offices: RRI Jakarta (371 persons), RRI Surakarta (275 persons), and the RRI central office (251 persons). In the RRI Surakarta, Central Java, for example, of a total 275 staff, 245 are civil servants; this represents nearly 90% of the staff.

A similar situation happened in TVRI. In 2017, for instance, TVRI had 4978 employees, 3692 (74.16%) of whom were civil servants. In staffing distribution, there is an insufficient number of employees at the central TVRI headquarters to produce quality programming. Afni Jaya Putera, the TVRI program and news director for 2017–2022, noted that of TVRI's 4300 workers, about 1800 are located centrally in Jakarta headquarters. Meanwhile, 2500 employees are stationed outside Jakarta; however, they only have 20% of the total production ability (Tirto.id, April 2, 2018).

The increase in civil servant worker initially occurred when the office of TVRI/RRI was fully integrated into Ministry of Information office in the mid-1970s. In this period, the number of staff dramatically increased, albeit with employees predominantly having administrative skills rather than broadcast production skills.

It is important to note that RRI/TVRI's annual report is not publicly accessible. Moreover, there is no longitudinal and comprehensive report of RRI/TVRI's staff. It shows weak and non-transparent management. For this study, I have only found a partial report of the staffing performance of two media through my personal links with their supervisory boards and from online coverage of Indonesian parliamentary hearings.

Regarding the low competency of TVRI broadcasters, Sukirman, the head of TVRI Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, said:

> I can say, staff's working competence is worse at almost all TVRI channels throughout Indonesia. All stations. Perhaps because of nepotism in their recruitment processes. (personal interview, December 11, 2017)

In its 2017 report on the performance of TVRI personnel, the national auditory board [Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan] (2018) noted that most employees lack higher education (52.11% are high school graduates). The organization also found the dominance of senior/older staff (54.66% older than 51 years of age).

The cooptation of state-controlled personnel in RRI/TVRI has resulted in two problems: first, the insufficient 'fresh' and younger staff to produce quality content; second, lack of 'fresh' and pro-public leadership, in the sense that only civil servants can occupy strategic positions in the two media (such as chairman/department head). This crisis occurred both centrally and locally (Darmanto 2013).

Among the cultural problems faced by senior RRI personnel is their desire to stay 'ordinary or regular worker,' unwilling to innovate their working style or pursue a higher employment and organizational position. Said Abdillah, the chairman of RRI's Surakarta branch (personal interview, December 22, 2017), described this issue as follows:

> … they do not want to go out (to access a higher position in another station). Only one or two personnel are willing to pursue higher employment. I plan to improve their job position, but they do not want to leave. (RRI Surakarta)

As a result, the station must accommodate a large number of senior workers until retirement, mostly when they reach the ages of 55–60.

In addition to disturbing service performance and the transfer of leadership, the surplus of senior civil servants at RRI/TVRI has eroded the operational budgets of the public channels. By the end 2017, RRI/TVRI combined employed a total of about 9000 people and thus spent much of its expenditures on their salaries and welfare.

To compare, with its limited number of staff at the time, in the 1960s TVRI had more money to purchase equipment and produce content. For example, in 1968, the cost of purchasing technical equipment was IDR 26,981,000, while production costs reached IDR 28,668,000; for comparison, IDR 52,976,000 was spent on all staff salaries and expenses. Salaries of workers began to increase sharply in the mid-1970s (reaching IDR 248,807,000) following the increased hiring of TVRI's operational staff. The number of TVRI personnel reached 1000 in 1971, bringing increased pressure to cover their salaries and reducing available moneys for production.

Similarly, in an article titled 'Quo Vadis RRI/TVRI' at *Kompas* newspaper (2017), a member of the RRI supervisory board Frederick Ndolu notes that, of the total IDR 900 billion received from the state budget in 2017, the largest percentage was spent on civil servants' salaries (IDR 650 billion). As a result, the amount of money available to manage the 92 RRI stations across Indonesia was only IDR 90 billion.

Another problem faced by state employees is their adoption of a government career path, rather than a broadcast media career path. Government Decree No. 100/2000 stipulates that the appointment of all RRI/TVRI station heads must follow the typical flow of bureaucratic institutions, which prioritizes senior employees over junior employees.

According to Darmanto (2013), the bureaucratic career model is vertical in nature, not horizontal, meaning that employees who hold certain positions (such as station head) will continue to experience promotion up to the highest level—even without proper achievements. In line with this model, while RRI/TVRI are mandated as PSBs, the generic terms *kepala seksi*, *kepala bidang*, etc. have remain used to refer to the hierarchical positions and functions of their staff. These terms are not, however, common in the world of professional broadcasting.

It can be noted, two policies regarding civil servants and their orientation may conflict with the ideal direction of RRI/TVRI to serve the public. First, Government Decree No. 53/2010 requires all state personnel to maintain the dignity of their top official (President/ministerial officials). Second, this decree is supported by Law No. 5/2014 on State Civil Apparatuses, which gives an exclusive mandate to the Ministry of State Apparatus Affairs to hire, and dismiss employees, including those working at RRI/TVRI. These two regulations limit the incentive for RRI/TVRI worker to serve the public, instead orienting them toward serving the ruling power.

More, Article 90 of the State Apparatus Law sets a mandatory retirement age of 58 for civil administrators and 60 for managers. This strict policy removes the potential for RRI/TVRI boards to terminate their underperforming workers. Former chairman of TVRI supervisory board (2010–2016), Ahmad Sofyan said:

> State personnel in TVRI face a complicated situation, in which they are regulated by governmental policies other than those of TVRI management. When we stopped a person from chairing a local station at the age of 56, the person sued us, complained to the president office…As a result, we were busy taking care of his complaint. We couldn't go forward. (personal interview, November 14, 2017)

The two government policies mentioned above also reinforce the need for loyalty to the government, which is rooted in the paternalistic relationship between top officials ('father') and ordinary workers ('children'). The policies encourage all government workers to conduct ceremonies on particular days and to use slogans that do not totally fit the real need of the public (as the main owner of PSB). For instance, amid heavy criticism of Suharto's role in the anti-communist movement in 1965, RRI/TVRI management organized 'a typical Suharto autocratic ceremony' named

Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day) every year in all media offices to commemorate the controversial day.

To my observation, most ceremonial events initiated under the past autocratic era, when RRI/TVRI served as Suharto's government voicer, are retained without any significant criticism. My field visit to the RRI/TVRI offices between October and December 2017 found that the RRI headquarters actively organized social events, such as blood drives, that is not directly linked to the radio's duty as public media. Instead of attracting millennial audiences, such social events position RRI as government body, rather than public media. In its 2016 report, the RRI supervisory board (2015) criticized such events. However, as of 2017 there has been no further policy to reduce such activities.

In short, regarding the complicated problems described, it can be said that the continued presence of state-run workers as a legacy of Suharto's regime in RRI/TVRI offices has delayed the transformation of formerly political-driven media into public-driven media. With the dominance of civil servants, I can say, the RRI/TVRI management retain a static, non-public media atmosphere, rather than the dynamic one seen in broadcasting offices. Referring to the statement of Jawhar Sircar above (2017), Indonesia is the best example of how broadcasters-cum-bureaucrats working in PSBs in post-authoritarian societies delay the media's transformation into true PSBs.

6.9 The Indonesian Public Service Broadcasting Bill (2013–2017)

The decision of parliament to draft the *Radio dan Televisi Republik Indonesia* (henceforth: RTRI) Law in late 2013 signaled a new phase in the struggle to welcome a real PSB in Indonesia. Recognizing the limited provision for PSBs in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, politicians in 2014 began drafting the law.

Former chair of Commission I of the House Mahfudz Siddik said, parliament decided to draft an RTRI Law alongside a new Broadcast Law, and although its passage would be determined by the final draft of said Broadcast Law (as the umbrella law for all broadcast policies), discussion of the RTRI Law was organized simultaneously by policymakers (personal interview, November 15, 2017).

Regarding this initiative, several questions will be answered in this section. First, which interest groups have been involved? What are the

key ideas and arguments of PSB governance in the planned law? To what extent can the RTRI Law solve the problems faced by RRI/TVRI in their journey toward true PSBs, as described in this chapter? To answer these questions, the first draft of the RTRI Law, which circulated publicly between 2014 and 2016, will be used as a key reference.

In terms of the policy format, a popular-single model of PSB Act that applied in Western developed countries inspired Indonesian policymakers to further advance the policy of RRI/TVRI. Most politicians and CSO activists referred to the 2017 Royal Charter of BBC and Australia's ABC Act in 1983. Also used as references were special PSB laws in Thailand and India, despite them being in their early phases of execution. Politicians' views, the Law could strengthen RRI/TVRI to be on a par with the UK's BBC or Australia's ABC (*Jakarta Post* 2015).

CSO activists such as Rumah Perubahan Lembaga Penyiaran Publik (RPLPP) welcomed the idea of drafting a special law for RRI/TVRI. In a 2013 public statement, the organization stated that such a law offered a legal solution for the systematic problems that had occurred within RRI/TVRI after the passage of the Broadcast Law in 2002. I agree that, if this initiative is successful, Indonesia would have a strong policy on PSB with detailed provisions, similar to the special laws in other developed and developing democracies.[5] For example, the United Kingdom, Thailand, India, and Australia have special laws for their PSBs, while Germany and Japan have detailed provisions for public channels in their broader broadcast laws.[5]

As with the Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, the RTRI Law has been produced by parliament, while the government has positioned itself as responding to its draft. Two institutions, RRI/TVRI and RPLPP, have created their own draft.

It is important to note that, in contrast with parliament and media advocates, state officials have been passive in the initiative to pass a special law that can regulate Indonesian PSB (i.e., has not proposed its own RTRI law). Henry Subiakto, a legal adviser to MCIT, argued that Indonesian PSB policy can easily be incorporated into a new Broadcast Law, and then followed by a government decree. Subiakto said:

> … the priority of the government is to accelerate the review of the Broadcast Law as an umbrella for Indonesia's national broadcasting system. The national system must exist first. On the initiative of RTRI Law, if a new

> Broadcast Law can cover all of the issues faced by RRI/TVRI management, it is no longer urgent to create a special law for the two media. (personal interview, November 11, 2017)

In the legislation process of RTRI law, various actors and interests have been involved, repeating the similar struggle that occurred during the drafting of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 around 2000–2002. From 2014 to 2017, five groups were involved in debating the RTRI Law: RRI/TVRI; CSOs represented by RPLPP and Koalisi Nasional Reformasi Penyiaran (National Coalition for Broadcasting Reform); MCIT officials; and politicians. Regarding issue of digitization, private broadcasters have engaged and lobbied politicians to fight for their control in frequency use. To understand the key issues addressed by those stakeholders, the Table 6.5 compares their proposals in the RTRI bills.

The table illustrates the similarities and dissimilarities of the parties' proposals regarding PSB governance. They shared views on the merging of RRI/TVRI into a single entity with two key governing structures, the Supervisory and Executive Boards. In this case, politicians referred to Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) in Japan and BBC in the United Kingdom (*Jakarta Post* 2015). RTRI to be overseen by an autonomous public broadcasting council consisting of nine people.

Differences emerged, however, in their views of the RRI/TVRI integration process. Politicians and CSOs agreed to merge all RRI/TVRI assets into a newly created media house. However, RRI/TVRI requested a partial merger, only in the top structure. Given the different working culture and history of the media, RRI elites proposed keeping the staff separate. TVRI is reluctant to merge at operational level, believing that television operatives deal with sophisticated issues compared to radio.[6]

Another important difference lies in the conception of the lower policies. Both parliament and RRI/TVRI welcomed the creation of lower policies to supplement the Law, while CSOs requested that the RTRI Law be a final and comprehensive policy format, without any obligation for government officials and other non-PSB institutions to generate lower regulations. Some contradictory ideas also lie in their understandings of ownership, employment, and public access.

Regarding RRI/TVRI ownership, although the term 'state agency' is too abstract, parliament and RRI/TVRI have chosen the 'safe route' of maintaining this nomenclature rather than adopting the term 'public corporation,' as in the 2002 Broadcast Law. In line with this scheme,

Table 6.5 Proposals on Indonesian PSB in RTRI Bills

Dimension	*RRI & TVRI*	*Parliament*	*CSOs*
Policy Level	RTRI (with lower policy designed by government and RTRI)	RTRI (with lower policy designed by government and RTRI)	RTRI (detailed, no need of lower policy)
Format of Institution	RTRI (combination of RRI/ TVRI top executive only)	RTRI (integration of RRI/ TVRI into a single institution)	RTRI (integration of RRI/ TVRI into a single institution)
Ownership	State agency	State autonomous agency	Autonomous agency outside government
Remit	– National integration – National constitution, Pancasila norm – Facilitating public opinion	– National ideology – National integration – Protection of national culture & identity	– Public right to know & expression – Building democracy – Promoting of art and culture
Structure	Two Levels: (1) Dewan Penyiaran Publik (7–11 members, not clear where from) (2) Executive Board	Two Levels: (1) Dewan Penyiaran Publik (9 members: 5 from RTRI delegates, 4 from general public) (2) Executive Board	Two Levels: (1) Dewan Penyiaran Publik (11 members all from public) (2) Executive Board
Appointment Mechanism	Open selection for supervisory and executive boards via parliament	Open selection for supervisory and executive board via parliament	Open selection to all levels: supervisory and executive boards and station managers
Employment	Mix of Government and autonomous staff	Mix of Government and autonomous staff	Mostly autonomous staff. Government staff for finance tasks only
Funding Model	Single: state budget	Single: state budget	Mix of license fee, state budget, crowdfunding, social contribution, advertising, etc.
Public Access	National meetings of RRI/TVRI elites	No Description	Annual forum of RTRI with public representatives Ombudsman (for content supervision)

(continued)

Table 6.5 (continued)

Dimension	*RRI & TVRI*	*Parliament*	*CSOs*
Transitional Policy	No Description	No Description	All assets of RRI/ TVRI are subject of review by an independent body

Source Compiled from Secretariat of Parliament (2014) and RPLPP (2013)

RRI/TVRI proposed using the governmental terms such as secretary general, deputy, and bureau chief for RTRI, terms used in the bureaucratic bodies and not public media bodies. Such a proposal was put forth by the union of retired RRI staff on January 31, 2012. The union also proposed maintaining the term 'RRI' in the new Law, as recognition of its historical contributions.

In contrast to RRI/TVRI proposals, CSOs introduced the term public ownership and proposed removing all kinds of government's legacy from RRI/TVRI (i.e., state-oriented employment and state budget). In terms of funding scheme, CSOs proposed keeping a mixed source model, while legislature and RRI/TVRI recommended only a single state money. Moreover, in the RTRI bill drafted by RPLPP, the organization proposed a total audit of employees' abilities if they wish to continue working for RTRI. By contrast, in the parliament draft, such a proposal is not included.

Contradiction between stakeholders also occurred in the provisions regarding digital frequency. To pursue the national target of analog switch-off in 2021, MCIT officials—along with politicians—accelerated the revision of the Broadcast Law to regulate digital frequency use. A general reason behind this provision is to accelerate digitalization and to equally redistribute frequencies to all broadcasting operators.

According to Rahayu (2016), the migration from analog to digital frequency requires new policies, as it involves not only the adoption of the new technology itself, but also changes in governance, including frequency ownership, business models, and public access. The analog model, which combined the functions of frequency operators and content providers, is changing with the emergence of new technologies, and frequency operators and content providers are being distinguished.

Strong debate occurred in 2016–2018 and involved policymakers, RRI/TVRI, media advocates, and commercial broadcast owners. CSOs,

RRI, and most politicians chose to separate content providers and multiplex operators. This model provides space for the reallocation of broadcast frequencies to support public interests. In particular, this model may open new funding sources for RRI/TVRI as the sole organizer of digital channels. However, to maintain their control over the frequency use, private broadcasters preferred the 'free market competition' policy model which a media entity may free to perform as content producer and or digital frequency operator.

To win their proposal, between 2014 and 2018, the private television owners involved in ATVSI actively lobbied politicians working in the Commission I. As a result, the drafting of the new broadcast law was delayed, and as such the drafting of the RTRI Law was similarly delayed. By the mid of 2017, politicians split into two groups: those supporting the privately run broadcasters' urgings and those opposing them.

In the sense that the creation of new PSB policy will be legally determined by political will of policymakers, a good political climate for the legislative process of the RTRI Law is essential. To follow CSO activists such as Darmanto (personal interview, May 1, 2017), in the political year of 2018–2019, wherein legislatures will concentrate on competing for their next terms in parliament, limited attention will be given for the drafting of RTRI Law. And as of late 2017, there is no sign that politicians as well as government officials will continue creating a special PSB law to provide a legal tool to realize PSB.

In summary, the drafting of the RTRI Law has been the latest battle in seeking an appropriate model for Indonesian PSB in post analogue broadcasting arena. Inspired by the strong policy of BBC in the UK and the ABC in Australia, the idea of integrating RRI/TVRI into a single media entity has been accepted by stakeholders. It can also be said, contradictions between stakeholders in the drafting of the RTRI Law have reflected their similar struggle during the drafting of the Broadcast Law around 2002. Although most of them have shared the spirit of forming a special law, however, desire to retain the autocratic broadcasting systems, such as state ownership, state employee status, and state funding, remains high among RRI/TVRI elites. At the same time, ideal efforts to equally distribute digital frequency use through RTRI bill face pressure from commercial media operators, who are worried their business will be disturbed.

Lastly, with no clear schedule of drafting the RTRI law in the parliament, the future of RRI/TVRI to legally becoming a real PSB is also unclear.

6.10 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the practice of Indonesian PSBs since 2002 has faced severe obstacles, namely manipulation of their policies; clientelism and paternalism in the relationships between RRI/TVRI elites and state officials/politicians; and pressure of media oligarchs. The failure to adopt a true PSB in Indonesia has been caused by two mutually influential situations: direct and indirect political intervention from politicians and state officials, and the desire of senior RRI/TVRI broadcasters to maintain a traditional position as government, rather than public, ally. The creation of an addiction to state funding, as shown in this chapter, is the best example of how these two interests are interlocked. These obstacles might be a legacy of past authoritarian and bureaucratic policies, as well as the new issues that have emerged since 2005. Actors who have delayed the shift of RRI/TVRI into real PSBs have come internally (RRI/TVRI elites and staff) and externally (state officials, politicians, and private broadcasters), while pressure against implementing a PSB concept has come from four sectors: state officials with the interest of owning propaganda media; politicians with clientelistic practices; media oligarchs keeping their market control; and RRI/TVRI staff seeking to maintain comfortable ally with government.

This chapter also shows that during the implementation of the PSB provisions of the Broadcast Law between 2002 and 2017, there was a systematic effort to take the 'hybrid model' of Indonesian PSB and transform it into a government-oriented broadcast model. The decision of the constitutional court to reduce the power of the non-state broadcast regulator in creating PSB policies was a pre-condition for the extensive manipulation of PSB policies by both ministerial officials and RRI/TVRI elites. Having been given the exclusive power to produce lower PSB policies, in 2005 the government produced decrees on PSB which were problematic. These decrees gave the authorities the mandate to select RRI/TVRI boards and to handle the frequency licensing of the media. In addition, these decrees maintained the civil servant status of employees and central position of state funds. For local PSBs, Decree No. 11/2005 positioned local authorities as the founders and key operators.

The first section of this chapter has shown the dominance of media oligarchs (Winters 2014) and their tactics to marginalize PSB in Indonesia. They have lobbied politicians to maintain control over frequencies and advertising. The other sections of this chapter have demonstrated that, during the three terms of RRI/TVRI Top Boards (2005–2017), the practice of clientelism and paternalism has colored their interactions with the ministries and politicians (Commission I). Two cases were explored: the appointment of RRI/TVRI board members and the allocation of state fund. The dominance of state funding has created clientelism between RRI/TVRI elites and policymakers, neglecting the public.

To detail, based on the four dimensions of PSB that guide this project (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), this chapter has concluded several points.

Regarding remit, there is a paternalistic direction to use the state's positioning of national unity as the key remit of RRI/TVRI, rather than the desires of the general public. The interest of maintaining close ties with and loyalty to the ruling regime as the 'father' of the civil servants working at the two media is embedded in their written policies, including their visions, missions, and speeches. For example, the frequent use of non-concrete slogans such as 'menjaga persatuan' [safeguarding national unity] is more visible than the facilitation of real public expressions.

Regarding ownership, the legal construction of Indonesian PSBs as independent and public-oriented entities has been, in practice, manipulated using three tactics: inviting the authorities, through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics, to appoint the supervisory board; keeping state-run personnel as main producers; and using state moneys as a key funding source. Political intervention has occurred through paternalistic interactions between staff (as civil servants) and ministerial officials with the power to distribute their salaries and determine their careers. In this sense, Rianto (2012) found, most of the stories published by RRI/TVRI favor government officials. Live/interactive programs, thus, lack balance in their content.

Similarly, the elimination of independence has been apparent in local PSBs and their use of civil servants as the central producers. The dominance of civil servants and state funding at both national and local PSBs have ensured loyalty to the power holder, rather than the public. It also preserved the bureaucratic culture in daily operations and hindered the establishment of direct public control.

In terms of structure, the practice of clientelism is evident in the appointment of RRI/TVRI's supervisory boards during 2010s. Factors such as personal alliances, political affiliations, and resource transactions generally determine the final selection of candidates, rather than their professional capabilities. Instead of using the ideological interests of certain political parties in selecting candidates, the process is shaped by the pragmatic interest of coopting RRI/TVRI's resources. This clientelism thus reduces the amount of public representation in the top boards. It also orients RRI/TVRI boards toward sustaining political linkages with policymakers (politicians in Commission I) rather than managing alliances with the public. The travels of board members with politicians to domestic and foreign forums are the best examples of this phenomena.

In terms of funding, there has been a severe erosion of the mixed financial model offered by Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. Between 2002 and 2017, state moneys dominated the income of RRI/TVRI. As a result, the budget policies of these two broadcasters must follow political-oriented logic, rather than public-oriented logic. Moreover, the allocation of state money is political in nature, involving the Ministry of Finance and politicians, rather than the public. More importantly, the dominance of state fund is a legacy of Suharto's authoritarian regime and the pragmatic objective of maintaining the comfortable jobs of civil servants.

The Table 6.6 compiles those points and compares three Indonesian PSB providers: RRI (national radio), TVRI (national television), and local PSBs.

This table shows us the real features of Indonesian PSB developed between 2002 and 2018. It demonstrates a gradual change from what has legally been termed public service broadcasting (in 2002) into state- or government-oriented broadcasting (since 2002). Under Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, Indonesia's PSB is legally designed to follow a 'parliamentary model' (Hallin and Mancini 2004), wherein political control is formally wielded by parliament rather than the government. As noted by DW Akademie (2014), Indonesia's PSB is legally transitioning into a true PSB. However, in practice, between 2002 and 2017 its three official ambassadors—RRI, TVRI, and local PSBs—were restored to state-owned media and served the interests of those in power rather than the public.

Finally, I have argued that, amid the manipulation of PSB policies, political paternalism and clientelism as well as high pressure of commercial media owners over broadcast policies, what has legally been promoted as a post-autocratic PSB was in practice (at least between 2002 and 2017)

Table 6.6 Indonesian PSB providers in practice (2002–2017)

Governance	*National Public Radio (RRI)*	*National Public Television (TVRI)*	*Local Public Radio & TV (LPP Lokal)*
Legal Basis	Government Decree No. 12/2005	Government Decree No. 13/2005	Government Decree No. 11/2005
Remit/orientation	National government-oriented service	National government-oriented service	Local government-oriented service
Ownership Model	State autonomous agency with strong tendency to be a government entity	State autonomous agency with strong tendency to be a government entity	Local authority agency (established by the Governor/Resident/Major of provincial/district)
Employment Model	Legally: mix of state-run and autonomous staff. In reality: 80% state-run staff	Legally: mix of state-run and autonomous staff. In reality: 80% state personnel	Mostly employed by local government-run personnels
Governing Structure	Supervisory board (5-member consists of government, RRI, and public delegates. In fact: RRI and government is more represented than public)	Supervisory board (5-member consists of government, TVRI, and public delegates. In fact: TVRI and government is more represented than public)	Supervisory board (consists of 3 members: government, broadcaster, and public delegates. In fact: Local government delegate is more represented than public)
Appointment of Top Board	Competitive based selection, organized by special team of MCIT, elected by parliament, legalized by president	Competitive based selection, organized by a special team of MCIT, elected by parliament, legalized by president	Competitive based selection, organized by a special team of local authority, elected by local parliament, legalized by governor, resident/city major
Funding Source	Legally: mix of license fee; state budget; advertising; public donation. In reality: 95% state budget	Legally: mix of license fee; state budget; public donation; advertising, etc. In reality: 95% from state budget	Almost from local government budget, not public fund
Licensing Mechanism	By a letter submitted to the MCIT office with no public review	By a letter submitted to the MCIT office with no public review	By normal procedure: submit a request to KPI as public regulator, then approved by a meeting between KPI-MCIT

(continued)

Table 6.6 (continued)

Governance	*National Public Radio (RRI)*	*National Public Television (TVRI)*	*Local Public Radio & TV (LPP Lokal)*
Frequency Allocation	Maximum 20%. In reality: only 5–8%	Maximum 20%. In reality: only 8–10%	Maximum 20%. In reality: average 3–5%
Number of Service in 2017	1 national news channel, 90 local and state's border channels, 1 foreign service, 1 online news portal: rri.co.id	1 national channel in Jakarta, 28 local channels outside Jakarta	76 provincial and residential channels (data from KPI 2017)

Source Compiled from Indonesian Government Decrees No. 11, 12, and 13 year 2005

shifting back to the autocratic model of RRI/TVRI as state-control led media. The findings have confirmed the thesis prepared by Hallin and Mancini (2004) regarding broadcasting politics in the typical polarized pluralist media systems of such post-autocratic societies as India and Taiwan. It also confirmed the thesis of Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) that the transformation of the former state-owned broadcasters into PSBs has been a legally mimetic process. In practice, such a transformation is atavistic in the sense that Indonesian authorities and RRI/TVRI elites have opposed it.

Notes

1. According to Media Scene (2015), Indonesian media spending on advertising reached USD 10 billion in 2013, with no sign of a slowdown. Television advertising is dominant, accounting for around 70% of the total spent. The growth in digital advertising, although very rapid, still represented only 5% of the total. Media Scene also noted two major factors driving this growth: the expansion of Indonesia's middle class and its market consumption; and the increased focus of Indonesia's domestic consumer goods companies on brand development and market demands.
2. Historically, RRI/TVRI did not use a single source of funding, but a mixture of state and non-state funding. For example, between 1945 and 1946, RRI's funding came from small subsidies from local authorities and the personal donations of broadcasters. Department of Information (1953) noted that, following the declaration of RRI's establishment on September 11, 1945, the potential for financial support from Sukarno was uncertain. Hence, all RRI branches (former Hoso Kyoku branches) collected resources voluntarily. RRI Solo, for example, received a loan from KNI, an information agency owned by the Central Java provincial authority. Similarly, RRI Yogyakarta received KNI mandate to collect public taxes. RRI Malang and Bandung, meanwhile, received support from PTT, a telecom company. Following the granting of *djawatan* status to RRI on April 1, 1946, state fund from Sukarno began to flow. RRI's staff were also included as employees of the Ministry of Information and thus received money from this state body.
3. Law No. 12/1947 also confirmed the use of taxation for funding RRI replicated a model that had existed under the Dutch colonial era. In the Dutch period, money was collected directly by NIROM. Following Indonesia's political independence, the new government imposed the same model and gave the postal and telegraph office the mandate to collect this money. The Law recognized 37,238 radio receiver units in Indonesia in December

1946, most of which were owned by the elites of Indonesian society. The decision to set a rate of IDR 5 of license fee payment was considered to suit the economic situation of Indonesian elites.

4. The first generation of RRI broadcasters consisted of Hoso Kyoku alumni and newcomers recruited by the Ministry of Information following RRI's integration. The most considerable addition of RRI employees occurred in 1981, when more than 500 traditional artists working at various RRI stations throughout Indonesia were appointed as permanent civil servants by Minister of Information Ali Murtopo. This action was political, fitting RRI's position as a Suharto agency.
5. To illustrate, the Table 6.7 compares PSB Laws in the six developed and developing democracies.
6. To review the draft's dissemination in the public, the RTRI's remit is relatively similar to the actual remit stipulated by Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 (strengthening the *Pancasila* ideology, maintaining national unity, showing

Table 6.7 Comparison of PSB Laws in six countries

Country	*Type of policy*	*Level, policy maker, and content*
United Kingdom	Special: (1) Royal Charter (2) BBC Charter: agreement between secretary of state for culture, media, and sport with BBC management	National (1) Royal Charter: Queen Elizabeth (9 chapters, 65 articles) (2) Secretary of State for Culture, Media, and Sport (20 chapters, 110 articles)
Germany	Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (amend 1 January 2013)	National, Interstate parliament (7 chapters, 64 articles)
Thailand	Special: Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act (2008)	National, parliament (8 chapters, 61 articles)
India	Special: Prasar Bharati Act (1990)	National, parliament (4 chapters, 35 articles)
Japan	General with more detail on PSB provision: Broadcast Act no. 132/1950, amended to no. 65/2010)	National, parliament (11 chapters, special articles for Nippon Hoso Kyokai)
Australia	Special: Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983, amend to no. 49 of 2006	National, parliament (8 chapters, 83 articles)

Source Compiled from PSB Acts of the UK, Germany, Thailand, India, Japan, Australia

concern for local culture, and promoting good images of the state at the global level). In terms of RTRI structure, it seems that the sharing power among politicians and government officials was again promoted in its appointment. The top structure of RTRI has two levels, as in the BBC (United Kingdom) and the ARD (Germany): the supervisory board and the board of directors. The supervisory board consists of eleven members, selected by parliament using an 'open to the public' system. Members of the board serve five-year terms, as under the previous Broadcast Law. The executive board consists of a president director, some lower directors, and a secretary. Further, unlike under the previous Broadcast Law, in this draft parliament is given the power to directly select the President Director of RTRI based on the views of the supervisory board and top government official. The selection is open for public, and appointees serve five-year terms. As for employment, it again allows for both state-run and non-state personnel. Mixed funding sources continued to be provided, as under the previous law; these may include state funding, license fees, advertising, and other businesses.

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CHAPTER 7

Indonesian PSB Model: Continuity and Change

Taking advantage of increased explorations in public-oriented broadcasting systems in postwar, post-communist, and post-authoritarian societies, this book has investigated public service broadcasting in post-authoritarian regimes by using Indonesia as a case study. To understand the PSB model and its arrival in post-authoritarian Indonesia, this study examined three issues: the history of broadcast governance in authoritarian Indonesia (1930s–1990s); the competing ideas and struggles of local and international actors in Indonesia's adoption of a Western European PSB model and its legal provision in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 (1998–2002); and problems faced by Indonesia's former state-owned broadcasters, RRI and TVRI, in their journey to realize their legal mandate as PSBs (2002–2017).

This book has answered several key questions. First, what is the public service broadcasting model in Indonesia's post-authoritarian politics? Second, why has the country's PSB system not worked? Third, what systematic features have hindered PSB policy and its execution in Indonesia? This book has shown that, under various authoritarian political systems (1930s–1990s), Indonesia experienced a range of broadcast institutions. Following political reform, and after a long and dynamic policy-making process in the early post-autocratic period (1998–2002), Indonesia's PSB was legally constructed through Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 as having 'a hybrid and mimetic' institutional model. However,

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transitional political and societal factors (i.e., the legacies of autocratic power: paternalism and clientelism, political parallelism, and market-driven politics) have delayed the adoption of a genuine PSB in the country.

This research relies on qualitative methods. Materials were obtained through semi-structured interviews, examination of archival records, and field visits. The use of archival material represents a key contribution to the review of the historical roots of Indonesian broadcasters in both the colonial and post-colonial periods, as described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5, examining the struggle to accept a PSB system, drew on records obtained from legislative proposals regarding RRI/TVRI governance published by stakeholders and semi-structured interviews with key informants. Chapter 6 detailed the journey of RRI/TVRI as PSBs and used data collected by similar methods.

Indonesia's characteristic as a post-colonial and post-authoritarian society that peacefully accepted democracy has positioned it as a unique place for academics to investigate changes in a media system after the demise of authoritarian power. By situating Indonesia's PSB system within the context of global media liberalization, I identified several universal problems of PSBs in post-authoritarian societies, including the arrival of neoliberal logics and media oligarchs that favor free market media over pro-public media. I also determined that existing autocratic broadcasting tendencies have hampered efforts to create a true public-oriented broadcast channel.

By using four elements of PSB governance—remit, structure, ownership, and funding (Deutsche Welle 2014; Hanretty 2007; Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008; Pippidi 2003; UNESCO 2010)—as the analytical objects, I can clearly define broadcasting governance in colonial and post-colonial Indonesia (1930–1998) as authoritarian. Political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004) manifested in the form of indirect state control in the Dutch colonial time (NIROM was the only channel sponsored by the Dutch), in a direct-monopolistic ownership of political authorities in the Japanese period (Hoso Kyoku), and in Sukarno and Suharto's autocratic eras. Political regimes played a stronger role than the public did, in particular as RRI/TVRI developed under the long regimes of Sukarno and Suharto (1945–1998). This book also confirmed that, in the ultimate co-optation of RRI/TVRI as mouthpieces of political authorities, there was no room for public-oriented media governance.

As a post-colonial country, Indonesia has had a broadcasting journey similar to that of India (formerly Dutch and British colonial land). Sinha (1996) noted that in the 1920s, the first Indian radio station was operated by an autonomous social club. In 1935, the designation of the Indian State Broadcast Service was changed to All India Radio; it was transferred in 1941 to the Department of Communication, which became a governmental ministerial office after India's independence (Mohapatra and Das 2014). Moreover, the two countries' PSBs shared the combination of certain PSB elements (top structure, license fees, and cultural programs) with strong political control by state apparatuses.

In this study, I found that, in the earliest years of the post-authoritarian period (1998–2002), the inability of the new regime to implement a democratic media system (Voltmer 2013) resulted in weaker provisions for PSBs than for private broadcasters. Instead of establishing a new institution, the ruler and politicians chose a pragmatic way to transform the former state-owned and bureaucratic broadcast body into a PSB; this is similar to steps taken by post-authoritarian regimes in India, Japan, and Taiwan. Meanwhile, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, most former RRI/TVRI staff were eager to retain their luxurious benefits and their status as state officials, which granted them money and permanent employment.

I have argued that the political structure and culture delayed the adoption of a true PSB in Indonesia. Between 2002 and 2017, what was defined by law as a PSB was in practice dominated by political intervention, the arrival of neoliberal logic and media oligarchs, and the practices of previously autocratic cultures (including paternalism in translating remits and ownership and political clientelism in appointing organizational leadership and setting state budgets). The two Indonesian PSB providers, RRI and TVRI, failed to extricate themselves from the interests of political authorities and thus could not freely provide public services. Similar to the journeys of PSBs in other transitional countries, a coalition of systematic political features invited a PSB as a symbol of democracy but failed to put it into practice.

Based on these findings, I argue that the legal provision for Indonesian PSBs can be seen as a hybrid of two contradictory components: In remit and ownership, it is state-oriented media, but in structure and funding, it is public-oriented media. Based on my investigation into the law's implementation, I argue that a PSB in post-autocratic Indonesia remains state-oriented broadcasting, rather than public-oriented media. Although

the ruling power may no longer have legal ownership of RRI/TVRI, their service orientation, structure, staffing, and budgeting are driven by the political interests of parliament and of government offices.

Similar to PSBs in other transitional and Global South regimes, such as in the Arab states (Sakr 2012), Bangladesh (Rahman 2014, 2016), South Africa (Fourie 2003), and India (Mohapatra and Das 2014), the creation of PSBs in Indonesia has not reflected the ideal initially promised by media advocates and instead has been flawed in both policy and governance. Unlike PSBs in Western Europe, which have received significant state and public support from a strong alliance between private broadcasters and politicians, the Indonesian PSB system has shared its position with the PSBs of post-autocratic and post-communist states in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. It has been symbolic, meant to show external media pluralism (Hitchens 2006) and democracy, but lacking the necessary policy and political will for implementation.

Returning to Hallin and Mancini (2004), I argue that the model and condition of the Indonesian PSBs fit with the broader landscape of the Indonesian media system as polarized pluralist, in which broadcasting politics are strongly manifested. Although a PSB is framed as showing media pluralism, existing alongside private and community broadcasters, both parliament and the regime remain in control of its operation. According to McCargo (2012) and Thomson (2013), in the growing tendency of media liberalization in Asian transitional regimes, market-driven media owners will force the remaining state intervention to marginalize PSBs further. This leads to the possibility of a polarized pluralist model being combined with the liberal media system, as found in Thailand and the Philippines.

Compared with historical and powerful PSBs that began as public monopolies in most Western European countries, Indonesia's PSB system arrived in two different conditions: an absent of historical experience with independent public media organization and a highly commercialized media market where the RRI/TVRI monopoly was no longer protected. In line with the practice of illiberal democracy—a concept from Zakaria (1997) to describe the insertion of democratic tendencies in a formal political structure with a lack of civil liberties—the acceptance of the Western PSB concept is merely a legal action with no clear map and direction for implementation.

7.1 Authoritarian Roots: Centralism and Propaganda

Tracing the roots of the Indonesian broadcasting to the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods, this study demonstrated that, influenced by the steady control of authoritarian political administrations, Indonesian broadcasters experienced three contradictory systems: a community, not-for-profit model (Solosche Radio Vereeniging and its allies), a state-owned commercial model (NIROM), and a military-controlled broadcasting model (Hoso Kyoku). As the Dutch colonial power collapsed in the face of Japanese invasion, a rapid change occurred in Indonesian broadcasting, as it became a centralized and pro-political regime broadcast orientation.

Reviewing the journey of the broadcast system from the 1930s to the 1990s, I realized that there has been change and continuity in broadcast policies in pre- and post-independence Indonesia. The Japanese Hoso Kyoku model, which used a state-owned and centralized service approach, was adopted in the early years of RRI, Indonesia's first national radio in the Sukarno era. The adoption of a single and monopolistic media model for RRI/TVRI, with no room for non-state media, was also a continuation of this Japanese media tradition. In the Suharto era, this policy continued by integrating RRI/TVRI (and their staff and money) into the office of the Ministry of Information. Based on this practice, it can be said that no public-oriented broadcast system was operating at the national or local/provincial level.

This study identified five ownership patterns during the authoritarian era (1930s–1990s): community non-state (PPRK network), state-owned corporation (NIROM), colonial troop's agency (Hoso Kyoku), state-foundation and agency (RRI/TVRI in the Sukarno era), and state autocratic agency (RRI/TVRI in the Suharto era, 1973–1998). Similarly, service orientation varied, from maintaining Javanese traditions as a means of cultural diplomacy (as in SRV) to propagating anticolonial, anti-separatist, and national development politics (as in RRI/TVRI under Sukarno and Suharto). To ensure this remit was realized, in practice, Sukarno directly led TVRI as its sole chairman, whereas Suharto structurally included RRI/TVRI as a bureaucratic unit of the Ministry of Information.

In Chapter 4, I showed that the PSB system did not exist when broadcasting was first introduced in Indonesia in the colonial period (1930s), unlike with the BBC in the United Kingdom. Although the mixed

funding model (involving donations, license fees, commercial advertising, and state funds [incidental subsidies and regular budgets]) has historical roots, the funding of RRI/TVRI was dominated by state subsidies, reflecting the desire of the ruling authority (Sukarno/Suharto) to co-opt the broadcasters. Instead of providing public-oriented service and engagement, RRI/TVRI under Suharto experienced ultimate political control, enforced particularly through their dependence on state money and state personnel.

Overall, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004), broadcasting politics (centralism of control and political propaganda interests) were applied during the invention and development of Indonesia's broadcast system in the repressive and post-repressive periods. Referring to Katz and Wedell (1977), imperialist European and Asian regimes (i.e., Dutch and Japanese) were able to dictate autocratic broadcast patterns in their dependent territories, as seen with Hoso Kyoku and RRI/TVRI. This situation continued in the post-repressive period, where changing political regimes led to modifications to the broadcasters. The continuation of centralized management in RRI/TVRI can be seen as a formal acceptance of a BBC-like model on the one hand but an extension of the past colonial and autocratic model on the other.

7.2 Public Service Broadcasting Adoption in Indonesia

The idea of a PSB arrived between 1998 and 2002 amidst high demand for media pluralism, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press as key pillars of a democratic media system. Civil society activists' opposition to Suharto and his centralized policies was accompanied by the trauma of his regime's exploitation of RRI/TVRI to serve his political interests (rather than those of the public). The greater prosperity and rapid growth of market-oriented broadcasters in the late 1990s led to increased demand for more attractive, high-quality programming and thus reform in the management of RRI/TVRI as the national broadcasters.

The shocking political decision of President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999–2000) to disband the Ministry of Information led RRI/TVRI broadcasters to find new ways to secure their future. This situation reflected the efforts of civil society activists and international media advocates to sponsor a Western European democratic media system (i.e., PSBs). However, this book has shown that the new authorities had limited

political will to formulate a strong PSB policy and that RRI/TVRI broadcasters had a strong tendency to maintain links with the government rather than the public.

The struggle to promote a new direction for the broadcast system, as realized in policy-making through Broadcast Law No. 32/2002, was more dynamic than the legislation of Broadcast Law No. 24/1997 under Suharto. Stakeholders (state officials, politicians, CSO activists, international aid agencies, and capitalist actors) were actively promoting their own interests. In line with such processes in post-communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008) and the Arab states (Sakr 2012), cross actors demanded the agenda setting and formulation of policy (Howlett and Ramesh 2003) of the transplanted Western PSB model and CSOs held an influential position in encouraging PSBs. However, this study found that, confronted by the existing interests in controlling RRI/TVRI as state channels and protecting government assets in the media, such as state-controlled personnel and funding, the struggle to adopt a PSB model resulted in weak provisions for PSBs. The final stage of policy-making, in November 2002, produced a law with general and normative provisions that lacked clear directions for transforming RRI/TVRI from autocratic media institutions into independent PSBs.

The output of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002 legalized the Indonesian PSB system, using a model that combined state ownership with public orientation. This was a pragmatic choice, intended to continue to some degree the previous status of RRI/TVRI as state agencies and reject the creation of new institutions. Rather than transferring supervisory power of a PSB to the public, the Broadcast Law gave state officials and politicians the shared power to control its structure and funding. Although the unstable political climate following Suharto's resignation in 1998 led to a struggle to reform RRI/TVRI into PSBs, the outcome seemed to be nothing more than an extension of the previous autocratic broadcasting model. The centralistic management model, for example, continued as it had since the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods.

In Asia, there are at least two empirical examples from countries whose histories and cultures overlap with Indonesia: Taiwan and South Korea, which were also Japanese colonies. Lin (2012, p. 32) noted that the South Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and Taiwan's Public Television Service (PTS) provide examples of transformations from former state-owned television systems under military control to public-driven

broadcast ers with a tendency to adopt a British-style PSB (in terms of top structure) and US-style commercial broadcast (dependent on advertising revenues). Although identified as a PSB, KBS has increasingly come to rely on advertising for financing (61%) rather than on the reception fee (39%).

In comparison, the BBC in the United Kingdom and the ABC in Australia both have special public laws giving them strong positions as PSBs, with no leeway for changes from the political authorities. By my observation, around the world, there are three types of PSB law. The first is the Royal Charter model (made directly by the monarch and reviewed by the public), with this translated into a public service contract between the office of the United Kingdom and the BBC and between the German legislature and the ARD/ZDF. The second is the general broadcast act model, governing all broadcasting issues in a country (including PSBs), as in Indonesia; in this model, a PSB is only a small part of the whole arrangement. The third is the special PSB law model, such as that used by the Public Broadcasting Act (United States), the ABC and SBS Act (Australia), and the Public Broadcasting Act (Thailand).

According to the framework developed by Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) in exploring media transformations in post-Soviet regimes, post-authoritarian Indonesia's experience with adopting a PSB can be seen as an atavistic process in which new (democratically minded) power elites are unwilling to give up all control of, or ability to co-opt the PSB. Unlike the introduction of PSBs in post-communist Eastern Europe, which was overseen by the European Union, a supranational institution that could dictate a real PSB model, the creation of a PSB in Indonesia was driven by media advocates with limited power to directly pressure state officials.

Moreover, in the idealistic policy orientation in which PSB is placed as a key player, the direct transplantation of a Western PSB model to Indonesia can also be called *mimetic* (Jakubowicz and Sukosd 2008), a policy of "Westernization" or liberalization in which PSBs may exist alongside commercial broadcasters.

7.3 PSB in Practice: Between Old and New Aspirations

As this book shows, the implementation of a PSB system in Indonesia was strongly influenced by illiberal democratic politics (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011; Zakaria 1997). In illiberal democracies, such as Iran, Brazil, and

Indonesia, new authorities tend to formally adopt media policies that fit democratic politics but are delayed in implementing these policies by the strict rule of the state.

This study clearly shows how the formal adoption of PSBs in Indonesia has faced severe problems in practice. During 2002–2017, there has been a systematic attempt to blur the normative provisions regarding former state-oriented media in Broadcast Law No. 32/2002. The 2005 government decree on Indonesian PSBs failed to expand on the Broadcast Law's provisions regarding broadcasting governance (remit, structure, funding, and ownership) and realize a true PSB institution.

As discussed in the first section of Chapter 6, a controversial 2003 decision by the Indonesian Constitutional Court to limit the power of the Indonesian Broadcast Commission to produce broadcasting policies made the future of Indonesian PSBs even less clear. This decision shows the success of media oligarchs in resisting the intervention of public regulators in their commercial dominance, which led to state officials receiving the exclusive capacity to create lower PSB policies without public involvement. One such decree was passed in 2005, which gave the Ministry of Communication and Informatics the mandate to select the supervisory board and handle the licensing process. This decree maintained the autocratic legacy of state-run staff as the key operators of RRI/TVRI and state money as the primary source of funding of these public media. Decree No. 11/2005 also prioritized local officials, rather than the general public, in regulating and operating local PSBs.

This book has also shown that, between 2002 and 2017, RRI/TVRI practiced their mandate as PSBs as allies of the government, not of the public. RRI/TVRI elites used the unclear provision of RRI/TVRI's legal status among other state institutions and the vague deadline to end their position as state-owned media to enjoy standing as allies of the regime and politicians. This was reinforced by RRI/TVRI's heavy reliance on state money rather than public funding. The dominance of state personnel in RRI/TVRI also supported this choice.

Chapter 6 also demonstrated that the installation of a normative remit as media serving the public need was, in practice, marked by the executives and ordinary staff demonstrating paternalistic ways of thinking. The way that state officials think and speak about public issues is perceived as a public agenda. Their descriptions of national issues are also determined by their status as state employees with a higher obligation to state officials than to the public. In terms of the partisan and personal alliance between

media elites and politicians (McCargo 2012), this chapter found that politicians' interest in keeping their electoral voters strongly influenced the orientation of RRI/TVRI services.

I have argued that the patterns of interactions between RRI/TVRI elites and politicians are clientelistic, particularly in the appointment of the RRI/TVRI supervisory board and the allocation of state funds. Under a vertical clientelistic approach (Scott 1972), the personal alliances of politicians are more influential in choosing members of the supervisory board than formal procedures are. This practice has further resulted in the politicization of the RRI/TVRI supervisory board and the distribution of state funds. The incentive to produce broadcasts that favor politicians is stronger than the incentive to promote societal interests.

This research supports the argument of Lin (2012, p. 38) that, in many parts of the "transnational" world, a PSB is a distant ideal but not a working reality. Even when the leaders in these countries have embraced the ideal, "the lack of a receptive political and professional culture is the next hurdle" (Lin 2012; Raboy 1997, 2002). The Indonesian case informs us that, in countries with a long tradition of state-owned systems, it may not be easy to convince those in power to give up control of state channels and transform them into PSBs. Issues of financing, staff, and purpose translation are crucial. For instance, a system of obligatory license fees may be difficult to apply where the public is accustomed to "free access" content. More, influenced by commercial media owners, policy-makers disagree whether a market-led approach to broadcasting is better or worse than one oriented to public service.

Overall, without experience with public-oriented channels under autocratic regimes and with limited public attention given to the reform of state channels into public media, the design and practice of a PSB in Indonesia may be a transitional model of sorts, one that is no longer state-owned but not truly a PSB. Following the arguments of Raboy (1997), Voltmer (2013), and Chadwick (2013), it can be said that, although the Indonesian PSB system is formally a hybrid of the old repressive model and a new public-oriented model, in practice, it has remained oriented toward the state. In the four elements of broadcast governance (remit, ownership, structure, and funding), the practice of the Indonesia PSB system presents a contrast in balancing the autocratic legacies of media systems with democratic aspirations.

7.4 Projecting the Future of Indonesian PSB

The future of Indonesian PSBs depends on the outcome of selecting a democratic media policy. As this book demonstrates, the formal adoption of a PSB system was initially driven by policymakers' acceptance of a pluralistic media system. The continued change of its former state-owned broadcasters into true PSBs is also a struggle for maintaining media pluralism in the dominance of commercial media. In this sense, the initiative for reregulation (rather than deregulation) may repeat the struggle of introducing broadcasting pluralism experienced by stakeholders during the legislation of Broadcast Law No. 32/2002.

Nevertheless, unanswered questions remain. As key PSB providers, what should RRI/TVRI ultimately become? Should they be national broadcasters that are fully independent of political authority yet remain under the control of the state, or perhaps public broadcasters governed by a legislative house or independent commission? Is there any room for alternative PSB platforms? The political will of policymakers is essential to answer these questions, particularly in the firing or retiring of the state-controlled staff, which requires structural and financial preparation.

The last section in Chapter 6 indicated that a new hope for the reintroduction of a true PSB has come from the idea of constructing a special law for RRI/TVRI, namely the Radio–Televisi Republik Indonesia, which began legislation in 2014. According to the politicians on Commission I, which initiated it, the law would provide a detailed and comprehensive provision for an Indonesian PSB. Using Japan's Nippon Hoso Kyokai and South Korea's KBS as benchmarks, these politicians have shown their commitment to create a special law to guide the transformation of RRI/TVRI (*Jakarta Post* 2015). This initiative has received positive responses from RRI/TVRI and media activists.

Nevertheless, the drafting process (2013–2017) has been slow, reflecting the lack of attention that policymakers have given to this need for public service media. Private media's active lobbying of politicians, to maintain the dominance of their business, has also delayed the drafting. In this climate, the future of broadcasting pluralism in general and a PSB in particular would be determined by the reactivation of teamwork that happened in 2002 among CSOs and international media advocates in addressing the new law.

The arrival of digital technology and Indonesia's plan to eliminate analog service around 2020 would also help a PSB expand its service,

enlarge frequency use, and generate income. Politicians' official plan to give a full mandate for RRI/TVRI to manage digital frequency for all broadcast actors would allow the two public broadcasting operators to access new income outside the state budget. However, extensive lobbying from private television owners has postponed this plan.

In public, the massive use of private television by politicians for campaign purposes in 2014–2017 (Pambudi et al. 2015; Sudibyo and Patria 2013) created distrust in terrestrial TV services and confirmed the failure of the market to use broadcasts to promote the public good. In this sense, the nationwide PSB can be an alternative channel for the public to access independent political views. Although most urban residents favor online and social media platforms when accessing information, there is hope that a PSB can offer a public sphere to address fake news and hate speech spreading in social media. In other words, the future of an Indonesian PSB depends on its ability to balance or replace the role of privately owned media in providing public information. Otherwise, such services may be provided by the community radio and television stations that are becoming rivals to RRI/TVRI.

Concerning the poor 2002–2017 performance of RRI/TVRI in upholding PSB principles, it is important to note that a national, public-funded media model is no longer the only choice for media activists. A local media or network of community-owned and non-state-funded media could be a new form of public interest broadcasters in the near future. The rise of personalized media using online and interactive platforms has received increased interest; such media provides unlimited freedom and space for societal expression. Better public access to internet services has supported these new media usage habits. About 130 million of Indonesia's 265.4 million inhabitants were active social media users in 2018; Indonesia ranked fourth globally in social media use (*Okezone* 2018).

Finally, as the decision to transform Indonesia's national broadcasters into PSBs was political, the future of these former state-owned media as the chief actors of PSBs will be determined strongly by both political parallelism (strong alliance of RRI/TVRI elites with government officials and politicians) and the changing role of the new governments in maintaining public interest. In this sense, I would argue, both RRI and TVRI will continue to exist as the nation's PSBs but with no clear distinction of serving government or public needs. State interventions will also continue, as the state seeks to use the media as a mouthpiece for its political policies and reach people living without access to appropriate private

broadcast services, particularly rural populations. The Indonesian PSBs will remain marginalized by commercial broadcasting media serving urban elite societies, as with the National Public Radio or PBS Network in the United States. The ideal ambition of Indonesian society, to have a strong nationwide PSB system as exemplified by the BBC, remains a dream.

7.5 Conceptual Implications of This Book

Generally, this book supports the views of Hallin and Mancini (2012), Voltmer (2012), and McCargo (2012) that generalizing the prevailing media systems in Western Europe and North America to transitional countries is risky. Referring to three media systems—liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist—promoted by Hallin and Mancini (2004), I conclude that the post-authoritarian Indonesian media system in general and its PSB system in particular cannot be exclusively categorized as only one type. I would endorse the opinion of Thomson (2013) that the overall media system in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, is a mix of the polarized pluralist model with a strong liberal tendency. This book extends Thomson's idea by addressing the hybrid PSB system in Indonesia.

As shown in Chapters 4–6, in looking at the establishment of PSB systems and mapping the governance of former state-owned broadcasters in post-autocratic countries, the four indicators proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004)—political parallelism (media connection with political parties); the structure of the media market; professionalism of journalists (journalist autonomy and public interest remit); and the role of the political administration in media (subsidies for PSBs and existence of media laws)—should be accompanied by a deep examination of the history of politics and media systems in the repressive era as an additional indicator. This research also suggests that a political parallelism approach (Hallin and Mancini 2004), which focuses only on political structures (parliamentary and governmental systems), is insufficient to portray PSBs in transitional countries. An additional approach is needed, such as local political culture (including paternalism and clientelism).

I agree with El-Richani (2012, pp. 4–5) that the factors of political parallelism and state involvement, as key components of Hallin and Mancini's media systems, should "travel" forward to some contextual sub-indicators to prevent a failure to reveal patterns when applied to non-Western, post-colonial, and post-autocratic countries. Political parallelism,

for instance, requires adaptation where political parties in post-repressive political societies never took root and where primordial, sectarian, or even "supranational forces" reign supreme. The role of democratic political authorities in a PSB is another dimension worth revisiting, mainly in weak states, such as Indonesia. As proved by this book, the state initiative to legally introduce PSBs is essential, but non-state actors—including RRI/TVRI and media oligarchs—hinder or trigger state action, weakening PSB implementation.

Another new indicator of media or PSB systems that needs to be included in the study of PSBs in post-authoritarian countries is the arrival of market-driven politics. Such a study should include Hallin and Mancini's indicator of media-political parallelism (2004), with a strong emphasis on the presence of media oligarchs (Winters 2014) who act not only as broadcast owners but also as close allies of media policy makers.

I have concluded that different historical contexts and legacies of repressive politics have shaped Indonesia's post-autocratic PSB system in a way that departs significantly from that system's origin (the United Kingdom). The four PSB classifications developed by Humphreys (1996) and Hallin and Mancini (2004)—government, professional, parliamentary, and civic corporatist—can only apply in European countries with strong democracies. In post-authoritarian societies, PSB systems may be a mix of the four types. My findings strengthen the argument of Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) that Indonesia's PSB system is mimetic, imitating PSB policies in Western Europe, and atavistic in its implementation.

In contrast with scholarly ideas on the linear connection between adopting democracy and the arrival of a true PSB system, my investigation affirms the illogical flow between the end of the autocratic system, the arrival of a democratic media system, and the survival of the latter. I found that a unique condition occurred in the development of the Indonesian broadcast system between the 1930s and 2010s. In authoritarian periods (under Dutch and Japanese colonialism and then Presidents Sukarno and Suharto), the broadcast system was purely authoritarian, under the full control of the political administrative holders. After the collapse of the Suharto regime in 1998, legally, there was a hybrid broadcast model (Chadwick 2013; Voltmer 2013), balancing government- and public-oriented services. However, between 2002 and 2017, with the influence of the political heritage within RRI/TVRI as PSB ambassadors and the rise of media oligarchs, a true PSB system did not work in Indonesia, and a state-oriented broadcast system re-emerged.

My exploration of the journey of PSBs expands former debates on PSB invention in the Middle East, South Africa n states (Sakr 2012), and the Global South (Rahman 2014). This book also adds to the studies of Matuszak (2012) and Kononczuk et al. (2017) on the arrival of media oligarchs and their control of media policies in post-communist societies (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova) and supports Zakaria's thesis of illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997). Indonesian authorities have formally adopted a PSB system but rejected its implementation. In practice, there has been a change in the political procedures of PSB management from government to parliament, but both political authorities and previous broadcasters have dominated the procedures so as to maintain their comfortable relationship.

I agree with the assumptions of some media researchers in Europe, such as Blumler and Gurevitch (1995), Raboy (1997), Hallin and Mancini (2004), and Voltmer (2013), that the political system is a central issue in PSB construction. In particular, I found that the weak political will of new political administrations and the absence of knowledge of PSB systems produced policies inhospitable for public broadcasting in Indonesia, as with new PSBs in post-communist Eastern Europe (Jakubowicz 2006; Pippidi 2003). However, this book has demonstrated that, unlike in Eastern Europe, the government is no longer the sole political actor. Other actors include politicians as policymakers, appointers, and reviewers of PSB board s; commercial broadcasters; and RRI/TVRI staffs. The management of RRI/TVRI, who were once government officials, are key actors in the delay of transforming these media into true PSBs. This resembles the case of Prasar Bharati (an Indian PSB), where the dominance of thousands of former state-owned media workers (Doordarshan and All India Radio) and their poor working habits hindered the reform of the two media.

I also agree with Lin (2012) and Thomson (2013) that free market forces have been dominant since the arrival of PSBs in most post-dictatorial regimes. The experiences of several post-authoritarian countries in Asia and Africa indicate that the arrival of PSBs was preceded by chaos in broadcast systems and the existing dominance of commercial media. In Indonesia, the influence of private media owners began with the discussion of a Broadcast Law in 1997, primarily to safeguard their interest in advertising as the main source of funding. Further, between 2002 and 2017, commercial media owners grew as not only operators but also policy-making determinants. However, their pressure on PSB legislation is

limited to two issues: advertising and frequency allocation. The power of commercial broadcasting and the arrival of media oligarchs resulted from political policies at the fall of Suharto, which were motivated by pragmatic economic and political interests.

This book demonstrates that Indonesia has not fully experienced the media liberalization that reached Southeast Asia (McCargo 2012; Thomson 2013), where the power of government and the autocratic elements in former state-run channels (i.e., state-controlled workers) are eliminated. Both government roles and legacies of autocratic elements still exist. This study, thus, shows the metamorphosis of political forces from rough intervention to a softer form, from state officials as sole actors to a broader base of actors.

The journey of Indonesia's PSB system (1998–2017) described herein informs us that the globalization of "democratic politics" and the global pressure to adopt a new broadcast system in post-autocratic societies have contributed to the introduction of pro-public broadcast channels. This book has noted that the acceptance of a Western liberal democracy by Suharto's successor, Habibie, received support from CSOs and intellectuals and was followed by the arrival of international aid agencies providing technical assistance to create a democratic broadcast policy. Jakubowicz and Sukosd (2008) identified this phenomenon as an idealistic process of media transformation in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. Yet, in contrast with those societies (which experienced direct pressure from the European Union), the PSBs in post-autocratic and or in Islamic majority regimes, such as the Arab states (Sakr 2012) and Indonesia, have received weak support from supranational bodies. As a result, state-administered broadcasters are not dying but utilize the 'democratic media spirit' in its formal policy to continue operations. As Rahman (2014) observed, the extensive political lobbying of previous broadcasters to the ruling authority to maintain their positions as state employees and retain access to state funds has enabled former state-run media to continue to exist and serve audiences, albeit in a static condition.

My study of Indonesian PSBs demonstrates that the arrival of the PSB model in post-repressive regimes in Asia and the installation of some democratic media elements in former state broadcasters (such as RRI/TVRI) can be seen as resulting from pro-democratic political movements. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that employing the Western approach of PSBs in Indonesia is an arena of struggle between old and new political ideas. The idealistic concepts of the PSB created by

democratic media advocates have been combined with autocratic media governances.

Finally, the general claim that a PSB system would be the "antithesis" of former state-owned broadcasting in post-authoritarian societies did not prove correct. In contrast, Indonesia experienced an extension of the autocratic broadcast system. Departing from this context, instead of generalizing the Western PSB concept, policy, and governance, there is a need for a new way to examine PSB constructions in other post-autocratic countries, which presents a substantial task for future research.

7.6 Limitations and Future Directions

The findings of this book clearly contribute to academic debate on what is intended to be a model of PSBs in transitional societies (DW Akademie 2014), specifically in post-authoritarian Indonesia, which remains quite distant from the PSBs that operate in mature democracies. For the study of media and politics, this book has also demonstrated how authoritarian and post-authoritarian politics have shaped the course of PSB policy and its practice in pre- and post-colonial Indonesia: How it has been deployed and enacted and its output and practice. In the debate of media and politics in new democracies (Zielonka 2015), this discussion locates the Indonesian PSB experience as an important example in Asia.

This research also extends the fields of media transformation research, particularly the collective and individual actors who demand, support, and manage the changeover of former state-owned broadcast channels into public-driven channels in post-authoritarian societies. I see transformation research as a comparative approach. It combines comparison with the dimension of policies and actors, such as by analyzing similar change processes of PSB systems in different world regions and times in history.

This project makes a distinctive contribution to the literature because it provides three specific inputs on PSB studies: (a) a case study of PSB policy and governance outside Western Europe; (b) an alternative picture of postwar, post-communist, and post-authoritarian societies that introduce PSBs to symbolize their acceptance of democracy; and (c) a wake-up call to PSB advocates, both in Indonesia and around the globe, to continue their media advocacies. This book has shown not only how Western European PSB or 'BBC-like' models have traveled to new democracies but also how autocratic legacies embedded

in former state-owned radio and television broadcasters have resisted external pressures.

The study provides a model of media policy research that combines historical review, media policy-making, and implementation. It bridges the limitation of studies on the history of PSB transformation in post-autocratic societies. This historical overview of early broadcasting governances serves not only as a historical backdrop but also to determine the connection between old and new institutions of broadcasting in the illiberal democracies in Asia. I have sought to situate the adoption of rigorous PSBs within the complex political reality, which demands further investigation of its sustainability. Indonesia is the best example of the unfinished effort to adopt a public-oriented media system, a critical point among global media scholars and advocates.

Drawing from academic debates on media systems beyond the Western world (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2012), with strong emphasis on PSBs, this book provides a case study of how the PSB concept that traces originally to Western European countries has traveled to new democracies. This should inspire other scholars to further compare it with PSBs in other autocratic regimes and clarify the challenging features of public broadcasting systems.

However, this book has mostly addressed regulatory issues, with a focus on four elements of PSB systems. One limitation is the exclusion of an examination of the day-to-day performance of RRI/TVRI and other former state channels. Moreover, this study has solely investigated the institutional design of PSBs, rather than individual broadcasters, structures of media markets, and the culture of production and contents. This is not only because of a lack of time and resources but also because I prioritized the analysis of PSB governance. There is a need for more academic clarification regarding individual broadcasters, be they RRI/TVRI or others, including their working culture, the content they create, and the overall structures of media markets in post-authoritarian societies. For this, I advise content analysis and ethnographic methods.

This project focused entirely on the map of stakeholders involved in the drafting and implementation of the Broadcast Law; it made no mention of the perceptions and engagement of the audience (as service recipients). It is necessary to survey public debate s regarding RRI/TVRI and post-authoritarian PSBs in general. I recommend a survey to gain an understanding of what ordinary citizens propose for PSBs, how they would like such broadcasters manifested today, and their awareness of

former state-run media reform. It would be useful to have a quantitative study of public attitudes toward PSBs to measure the general public's demands.

Finally, this book concentrated specifically on Indonesia, so an extended investigation of new PSBs in other post-authoritarian countries is needed to determine new approaches in PSB studies outside Western Europe. In the strong tendency of media liberalization and the vast growth of digital-social media use, the exploration of broadcasting journeys from state- to public-owned channels in post-colonial and post-repressive societies is always challenging.

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Masduki is associate professor at the Department of Communications, Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He earned his doctoral degree at the Institute of Communication Studies and Media Research (IfKW), University of Munich, Germany (2019). He has published several books and articles on the Indonesian media and politics.

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